周波：特朗普如何能让台海避免战争？有五点

Club提要：2025年10月23日，清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波应美国《时代》周刊（TIME）邀请，发表题为《How Trump Can Avoid a War Over Taiwan》（特朗普如何能让台海避免战争）的署名文章。现北京对话联合观察者网推出全文中译版。

【文/观察者网专栏作者 周波，翻译：金地】

美国总统特朗普迄今在涉华事务上做出过一项正确决策，那就是没有允许台湾地区领导人赖清德今年七月窜访拉美地区时过境美国纽约。而在两年前，拜登总统曾给时任台湾地区领导人蔡英文开了绿灯。此外，特朗普还明确表态他不想和中国开战，这同拜登曾4次要“保卫台湾”的“失言”大相径庭。

特朗普

特朗普的谨慎态度还是可圈可点的。毕竟，能让中美两个巨人爆发全面冲突的只有台湾问题。中国必将统一，唯一的问题是如何统一。日益强大的中国是会更加自信，寻求最终和平统一，还是会逐渐失去耐心，最终诉诸武力？

简单地说，这取决于“台湾当局”。虽然蔡英文和赖清德同属民进党，醉心于“台湾国家认同”，但自封“务实台独工作者”的赖清德看起来更为危险。当前，他以“抗拒统战”为由阻挠两岸民间交流，将大陆界定为“境外敌对势力”，并由此推出“17项策略”，威胁恐吓支持两岸民间交流的各界人士。      

事实上，赖清德的“境外敌对势力”之说已经触及了北京的红线，即“台湾被从中国分裂出去”；《反分裂国家法》当中有“或者和平统一的可能性完全丧失，国家得采取非和平方式”的条文。事已至此，大陆方面还有多大耐心？  

当前，中美两国都在采取两手策略，一方面维系战略模糊，另一方面则为最坏的情况做准备。具体来说，中国已在台岛周边大规模增加军事演习，而美国则沿着连接日本、韩国、菲律宾的“第一岛链”加强前线军事部署。但是，中国不会公布所谓“统一时间表”，而美国也对是否在中国发动军事行动的情况下协防台湾闭口不谈。

然而，对美国来说，因为中国不断增长的综合国力和在冲突地域附近的地利之便，时间已不在自己一边。周围的盟友也指望不上，日本和澳大利亚都已拒绝向美国承诺假设因台湾问题而同中国发生冲突时提供支援的要求，强调任何决定只能由当时的政府来决定。

东风-5C

如果说，避免因乌克兰问题同俄罗斯开战是美国的优先事项，那么避免同世界第二大经济体兼核大国的中国开战也肯定符合美国最高国家利益。为此，特朗普总统该怎么做呢？

华盛顿的路线图

首先，特朗普可以定下规矩，不让台湾地区领导人过境纽约、华盛顿这样的美国重要城市。在这些地方过境不同于之前在檀香山、洛杉矶过境的情况，“台湾当局”是要以此来试探美国政府在特定议题上是否态度发生了变化。

其次，特朗普应该管好他的手下。过去十年里，不少美军将军都对中国大陆何时进攻台湾做出过耸人听闻的预测。比如说，空军上将迈克·米尼汉曾在一份2023年的备忘录中声称，他直觉预感中美两国将在两年之内爆发战争。五角大楼对此予以否认，声称这并非其官方立场。

同样，美国战争部长赫格塞思今年五月曾警告称，大陆对台军事行动已“迫在眉睫”，时间应该是在2027年。这番表态与其前任奥斯汀的表态大相径庭；同样是在香格里拉论坛上，奥斯汀认为对台军事行动既非迫在眉睫，也非不可避免。

第三，特朗普应该像回应俄罗斯前总统、前总理梅德韦杰夫对其外交政策的批评那样，警告赖清德“谨言慎行”。此事确有先例。2003年，民进党领导人陈水扁曾鼓噪发动涉及两岸关系的公投，而时任美国总统小布什随即对其进行了斥责。

第四，特朗普应下令撤回在台美军培训教官。1972年中美联合公报中明确规定美国武装力量和军事设施必须从台湾撤走。再说，这种培训真有什么效果吗？连岛内自己的评估都说台军战备水平极差，士兵甚至被戏称为“草莓兵”。前台湾地区领导人马英九也说过，当同中国大陆发生军事冲突时，“首战即终战”。

最后，特朗普应该鼓励“台湾当局”接受大陆与台湾之间的“九二共识”，重启两岸对话。大陆方面表示过，“在一个中国的前提下，什么问题都可以谈”。可以说，这是缓和两岸紧张关系的最佳途径，并可以此为基础逐步推进后续事项。而如果台湾方面拒绝承认“一个中国”，那么军事冲突就不再是是否会发生，而是何时会发生的问题了。

特朗普总统希望被世人铭记为“和平缔造者”。他现在所拥有的权力看起来比自己第一任期时要大得多，他理应利用这些权力来消弭台海风险。他最不应该做的事，就是给赖清德开出一张可能蘸着美国人鲜血填写的空白支票。

In his dealings with China so far, President Donald Trump has been right on one thing: He didn’t let Taiwanese leader Lai Ching-te make a stopover in New York City on his way to Latin America. That was the opposite decision of Joe Biden, who allowed Lai’s predecessor Tsai Ing-wen on a sensitive New York City stopover two years ago. And unlike Biden who “gaffed” four times to say the U.S. will defend Taiwan in the event of an attack from the Chinese mainland, Trump made it clear he wasn’t interested in going to war with China.

Such caution is commendable. The only issue that can drag the two titans into a full-blown conflict is the Taiwan issue. Reunification with Taiwan is a must for China. The only question is how—will a stronger China become more confident in eventual peaceful reunification one day or will it become more impatient to resort to use of force?

A short answer is: it depends on the Taiwanese authorities. Both Lai and his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen are from the Democratic Progressive Party that advocates a separate Taiwanese national identity. But Lai, a self-described “practical worker for Taiwan independence,” appears more dangerous. Lai has prevented cross-strait people-to-people exchanges in the name of “opposing China’s united front work.” He labeled the Chinese mainland as “foreign hostile forces” and outlined 17 strategies to threaten the people in Taiwan who support cross-strait exchanges.

Lai’s description of the Chinese mainland as “foreign hostile forces” touches the bottom line of Beijing—cessation of Taiwan from the mainland. China’s anti-secession law stipulates that China will use force when it believes that all possibilities for peaceful reunification are exhausted. So how much patience does China still have?

Both Beijing and Washington are playing with strategic ambiguity while preparing for the worst. China has vastly increased military exercises near the island, while the U.S. has bolstered its forward military presence along the “first island chain” that runs from Japan and South Korea to the Philippines. Yet Beijing won’t clarify when is its deadline for reunification while Washington won’t say if it will assist Taipei militarily if the Chinese mainland launches an attack.

The problem is time is not on the American side thanks to China’s growing capabilities and its proximity to the conflict zone. U.S. allies don’t look reliable either. Japan and Australia have both rejected requests from the U.S. to commit to a hypothetical conflict with China over Taiwan, emphasizing that any decision would be made by their governments at the time.

If refraining from direct war with Russia over Ukraine is a top American priority, then surely, avoiding a war with the second largest economy and another nuclear power is in America’s highest national interest. So, what can President Trump do?

A roadmap for Washington

First, President Trump could make a formal rule to not let any Taiwanese leader make stopovers in important American cities like New York or Washington. These stop-overs, unlike those made in Honolulu or Los Angeles before, are used by Taiwanese authorities to test the reaction of the U.S. government over any changing attitude.

Second, he should control the remarks of his lieutenants. In the last 10 years, a number of American generals made sensational remarks on when the Chinese mainland might launch attacks on Taiwan. For example, Air Force General Mike Minihan said in 2023 in a memo that his gut told him the U.S. would fight China in the next two years. This was brushed away by the Pentagon, saying it was not representative of the department’s view.

Likewise, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth warned in May that an attack on Taiwan was “imminent” and floated 2027 as a date. These remarks were a sharp contrast with that of his predecessor Lloyd Austin, who said at the same Shangri-La Dialogue a year earlier that a conflict was neither imminent nor inevitable.

Third, President Trump should warn Lai to “watch his words” as he did to former Russian President and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev after he criticized Trump’s foreign policy. There are other precedents. When the DPP leader Chen Shuibian called for a referendum on relations with the Chinese mainland in 2003, President George W. Bush rebuked him.

Fourth, President Trump should withdraw U.S. defense trainers from Taiwan. The 1972 joint communique affirms the ultimate aim of withdrawing all American forces and military installations from the island. And is such training really useful? Even Taiwan’s own assessments of its military readiness are dire. Taiwanese troops are nicknamed “strawberry soldiers.” Former Taiwanese leader Ma Ying-jeou has said, in the event of war with China, the “first battle will be the last.”

Finally, President Trump should encourage current Taiwanese authorities to recognize the “One China” 1992 consensus between Beijing and Taipei, in order to kickstart cross-strait talks. Beijing has said that any differences can be discussed under “One China.” This is the best way to defuse tensions across the strait and things could move from there. Without Taiwan agreeing to “One China,” it is only a matter of when, rather than if, the conflict will occur.

President Trump craves to be remembered as a peacemaker. He appears to have much more authority than during his first term. He should use it to make the strait less dangerous. The last thing he needs is to provide Lai a blank check that he might fill with American blood.

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