周波：“自由主义国际秩序”？这不过是一种历史近视

**编者按：**近日，清华大学国际战略与安全研究中心研究员周波接受澳大利亚广播公司国家广播电台（ABC Radio International）《环球漫游》节目主持人杰拉丁·杜格和哈米什·麦克唐纳的专访，阐述了中国对于当前国际局势、台海问题及全球责任的看法。

本文为北京对话与观察者网翻译发布，以飨读者。

【文/周波，翻译/王奕涵，核译/刘松瑀】

**杰拉丁·杜格：**我们接下来要采访的人是周波——我们之前采访过他，当时反响非常好。他是一位退役大校，最近出了一本新书——《世界应该惧怕中国吗？》。这是一本很少见的、从中国视角出发的著作。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**那我们就从当下这个时刻开始聊吧，说实话，我特别、特别想知道的是：中国怎么看现在这个世界的局势？全世界一片混乱，而从中国的视角，这一切又是怎样的呢？

**周波：**这可真是个“价值十亿美元的问题”。其实我自己也一直在思考，部分原因是我不太相信那个曾经根深蒂固的概念——所谓的“自由主义国际秩序”。

简单来说，我认为现在的国际秩序，其实和过去没有本质的不同：它始终是由不同国家、不同社会制度、不同国家认同、不同文化，最重要的是不同文明组成的一个集合体。打个比方吧，人们基本上直到16世纪“地理大发现”，即达·伽马发现印度，哥伦布发现美洲后才逐渐清晰地了解世界的轮廓，才开始对这个世界有了更完整的认知。

但如果你简单地把“世界秩序”定义为一个所谓的“自由主义国际秩序”，那其实是一种历史近视。因为如果你真这么看，那就有点像活在弗朗西斯·福山式的世界里了——那个“历史终结”的世界。

美国学者弗朗西斯·福山，著有《历史的终结》一书

**杰拉丁·杜格：**所以你的意思是，这其实是一种西方强加的世界观，是这样吗？

**周波：**是的，那种所谓的“自由主义国际秩序”，顶多也就是在苏联解体、中国尚未完全崛起的那段时间才看起来像那么回事。但如果你真相信那套秩序，那就容易陷入自恋；一旦发现自己不再强大了，就会开始寻找“敌人”。这其实是非常危险的。但如果你相信这个世界秩序本就是由各种文明构成的集合体，那你就会问自己：我该如何与他人共存？

**杰拉丁·杜格：**从某种程度上讲，特朗普总统可能多少会同意你的观点。他似乎也在设想一种权力与影响力的“共享”格局，而这在西方某些地方引起了极大震动——因为他选择与一些持有完全不同权力观的人合作。所以从这个意义上说，你所描述的这种思路，是否某种程度上和特朗普的观点有些契合？

**周波：**不，我不这么认为。因为特朗普的口号是“让美国再次伟大”，而这种“再次伟大”基本上就是要恢复美国的霸权地位，恢复对世界的主导权。而中国则更愿意把自己看作是世界的一部分，仅此而已。

**杰拉丁·杜格：**难道他不就是想把世界分割开来吗？我们不是正逐渐看清楚这一点吗？他似乎在搞“势力范围”的划分？

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**对啊，比如他愿意把欧洲“让”给俄罗斯，可能还会把亚洲“让”给中国，然后让美国专注于自身事务。

**周波：**你的说法可能是对的。但关键是，所谓“势力范围”其实是一个非常古老的概念，根本不适用于21世纪。我一直强调，中国首先是没有势力范围的；即便中国想拥有，也不会有。

为什么这么说？很多人会把东南亚称为中国的“后院”，但你看看东南亚，有不少国家在南海问题上和中国存在领土争端，还有几个国家是美国的盟友。再看东北亚，朝鲜也不一定会听中国的。

菲律宾拉洛机场，已于2023年对美军开放

那么请问，中国的“势力范围”到底在哪儿？所以结论是：如果中国根本没有势力范围，那就没必要去建立一个。我们只需要走向世界，让自己变得更有影响力就行了。

要明白，“影响力”和“势力范围”是两回事。中国的影响力已经是全球性的，所以不需要去追求所谓的势力范围。追求势力范围，你就得结交一堆盟友，而结盟既昂贵又难以维系，为什么要这么做呢？

**杰拉丁·杜格：**很有意思。你等于是提出了一个观点——中国在处理国际事务时，完全没有任何帝国主义色彩。而且你对中国的“国民性”也有一个很有趣的观察：你说中国目前依然有某种程度的“受害者心态”，而这其实并不利于国家的发展。那么，你为什么认为这种心态对中国自身的发展没有帮助呢？

**周波：**是的，不少中国人确实深信这种“受害者心态”。从某种意义上讲，这种心态也并非没有道理，因为中国确实在1840年以后遭受过外来侵略。但我们经常提到的所谓“百年耻辱”，理论上、甚至从数学上讲，如果从1840年算起，到1949年就结束了。

1949年中华人民共和国成立，毛泽东宣布“中国人民从此站起来了”。既然中国人民已经“站起来了”，那这段受辱的历史也应该翻篇了。这种受害者心态可能造成民族主义，因为你觉得自己曾经被不公对待。但一旦你变强了，这种情绪会让别人开始感到紧张。

如果我们把中国的经济总量除以人口规模，中国当然是一个发展中国家。但与此同时，中国也确实有可能成为世界上最大的经济体。那么问题来了：一个全球最大经济体，还能被称为发展中国家吗？如果答案是“可以”，那“发达国家”与“发展中国家”的划分又还有什么意义？如果中国成为了全球最强大的国家之一，还有必要继续维系“受害者”心态吗？你还会继续称自己为“受害者”吗？

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**好吧，但这不正是美国对中国不满的一个核心问题吗？美国认为中国利用了“发展中国家”的地位来为自己谋取利益。比如在气候转型的国际责任分担中，这一点就成了争议焦点——因为中国被归为发展中国家，所以在应对气候变化时不需要承担像西方发达国家那样的责任和义务。而这在西方看来是不公平的，毕竟，正如你自己也提到的，中国可能很快就会成为世界上最大的经济体。

**周波：**问题在于，中国被戴了“太多顶高帽子”——而每一顶帽子又都是真实的，这让很多人包括中国人感到困惑。在中国人自己看来：我们按GDP算是全球第二大经济体，但按购买力平价来算，我们是世界第一大经济体；我们是世界第一大贸易国，第一大出口国，也是全球最大工业国。但与此同时，不久之前我们还是世界人口第一大国。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**那么问题来了：为什么中国似乎害怕承认自己的强大与影响力？

**周波：**我觉得是因为中国戴了太多顶高帽子，所以中国的每一个方面都是真实的。这取决于你在跟谁说话，也取决于你站在什么立场、用什么视角来看中国。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**确实，周先生，我在听你解释的时候也确实有点这种“戴太多顶高帽子”的感觉。你说中国其实不需要也不想要盟友，但同时又和俄罗斯“友谊无上限”。这两个说法怎么能放在一起呢？

**周波：**我很高兴你问了这个问题——让我尽量用最简单的方式来说服你吧。比如我说，哈米什，我想和你做朋友。然后又说，等一下哈米什，我们的友谊必须有限度。你觉得这说得通吗？所以所谓“友谊无上限”，基本上就是表达一种美好愿望，希望这段友谊能够长久地持续下去。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**但中国并不是对所有朋友都这么说啊。它确实会说友谊是有底线的。它对我们澳大利亚就是这么说的。我们曾经经历过友谊不断升温的时期，但也有一些时候，中国会说：“不，这里有问题。”

**周波：**也许我可以换个方式来说服你。虽然这段友谊在同一份文件中被描述为“无上限”，但就在这句话之后一两句，我们明确表示这不是一种军事同盟。所以，这体现了即便在这种友谊中，中国也是有底线的。中国反对任何形式的核武器使用，中国也没有向俄罗斯提供任何导弹或军事装备。

在两会记者会上，王毅部长表示，中俄已探索出一条“不结盟、不对抗、不针对第三方”的相处之道。外交部

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**是啊，这就是我不太理解的地方。中国希望成为一个全球的主要力量，那为什么不在与俄罗斯的关系中发挥影响力，去促成乌克兰战争的结束呢？

**周波：**那是因为你是用欧洲人的视角来看这个问题。而中国在审视这段关系时，首先必须从双边的的角度来看待。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**但中国也说过，比如说经济增长需要依靠和平，全球的稳定是实现持续繁荣的前提。

**周波：**哦，当然了。关于“稳定”，那问题是什么导致了不稳定？因为俄罗斯认为北约的扩张正是不稳定的根源。这说法也不无道理，因为普京和前任领导人最大的不同在于，他是那个说“够了，到此为止”的人。从苏联时期开始，不论是戈尔巴乔夫、叶利钦还是普京，他们对北约的态度基本是一致的——北约不应该继续扩张。但不同的是，普京决定采取行动，这就是他和前任领导人之间的区别。

**杰拉丁·杜格：**我觉得我们可能无法在这期播客中解决这个观点分歧，但我想转向另一个问题。你在书中提到一个显而易见的重点：我们所有人面临的最大问题是，如何避免中国与其他国家——不论“其他国家”是谁——之间爆发战争。而你的回答非常直接，也确实点出了台海局势中的一个挑战。你能不能概括一下你的观点，让我们听听你是怎么看的？

**周波：**首先，我认为中国和美国之间发生战争也并不是不可避免的。我们可能爆发冲突的地方只有两个：一个是南海，一个是台海。我把南海放在台海前面，这和很多人想的不一样，这是因为美国一直在往南海派遣飞机和军舰，我们有时候也会进行拦截。这就造成了一种非常危险的近距离接触。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**美国往南海派遣船只和飞机去维护航行自由，这有什么问题呢？

**周波：**这恰恰是问题所在。这些岛礁是中国的领土，但美国不承认。问题是，美国自己并没有批准《联合国海洋法公约》，却一直以“守护者”的身份自居。那我想问，如果这部法律真那么好，为什么你们不批准？如果它不好，你又为什么用它来挑战别人？

**杰拉丁·杜格：**但我还是想把话题拉回来。我看你在引言中写到：“如何避免台海战争？我的回答很简单——让中国相信和平统一依然可能。”这句话非常特别。我还想补充一点：你没有提到台湾人民。他们想要什么？我们要怎么达成一种共识，能让每个人的权利都能被尊重？

**周波：**我之所以这么说，是因为这是我对一个“十亿美元级别问题”的最简单回答。根据中国的法律，中国使用非和平手段的一个条件是：中国认为和平统一的前景已经完全丧失。因此，我们必须相信：“和平统一的前景还没有完全破灭，我们还有耐心。”而现在中国正处于快速发展之中，这也引出了一个问题：中国会因此更有信心追求和平统一，还是会变得更没有耐心，从而诉诸武力？

我认为让中国政府相信和平仍然是可能的，这就意味着美国要有所克制，台湾当局也要有所克制。如果这些都能做到，我相信和平是有可能的。如果中国政府认为和平统一的途径已经走不通了，那就会是一个完全不同的局面了。

2024年5月8日，美军导弹驱逐舰穿越台湾海峡

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**但实现统一的方式有很多种，很多人会拿香港举例。所以台湾也完全可能在类似的情境下被“收回”，对吧？

**周波：**这种类比其实并不完全恰当。让我换个例子说吧。疫情前，大约有150万台湾人住在中国大陆，所以你不能想象两岸是完全隔绝的。

150万台湾人生活在中国大陆，这意味着大约有6%的台湾人已经在大陆居住了。人们总是提到大陆会用“大棒”，但大家往往忘了，大陆其实也给出了很多、很多“胡萝卜”。比如说，台湾人的孩子可以在福建省上幼儿园，就像我们自己的孩子一样。他们还会有身份证，几乎是一样的身份证。

所以这150万人说明了很多问题。这些人并不在乎生活在一个完全不同的社会和完全不同的政治体制中——只要这个社会能为他们提供更好的机会。而这些人都是中产阶级以上的，所以我相信，随着全球化的发展和人工智能的加速，就像世界上其他地方一样，两岸之间的融合也在加速。这也意味着，也许有一天，台湾人会觉得，成为这个地球上最强大国家的一部分，其实也不错。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**我对你如何看待中国未来作为全球大国的角色很感兴趣。在中国对外传递的信息中，我们经常听到提到“基于规则的国际秩序”。而与此同时，美国似乎正在放弃软实力，似乎在把盟友当成敌人。如果美国不再扮演传统的角色，那中国会如何定位自己？是要取而代之，还是另有想法？

**周波：**中国其实已经介入了。因为当世界其他地方看起来越来越混乱的时候，人们自然会把目光投向中国，提出和你一样的问题。但中国会扮演怎样的角色呢？我认为，中国更像是这个动荡世界中的“锚”或“稳定器”。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**但如果中国想成为“稳定器”，那岂不是意味着要在中东冲突、欧洲冲突中扮演调解者的角色？那就得做一些现在中国在国际舞台上其实并不常做的事吧？

**周波：**我认为中国确实可以在中东和乌克兰战争中发挥作用。现在俄罗斯和美国虽有沟通，但你跟我一样看新闻，都知道普京提出的停火其实是有条件的，对吧？所以将来或许会有那么一个时刻，所有主要大国，包括中国，都需要提供某种形式的集体安全保障。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**你觉得中国真的会这么做吗？比如在乌克兰或者中东？

**周波：**是的，我认为有可能，这要看局势如何发展。如果最终的结局是一种“停战”，那肯定需要安全保障。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**那你觉得，拿乌克兰为例，什么样的安全保障是可能的？

普京签署关于乌东四地加入俄联邦的条约

**周波：**比如说，俄罗斯已经宣布将那四个州并入俄罗斯领土，但俄罗斯其实很难真正完全控制那四个州，因为乌克兰至少还有欧洲的全力支持，甚至可能还有美国的支持。所以未来这四个州很可能会变成类似阿富汗的局面——乌克兰人会像圣战者那样进行无休止的游击战。这就意味着俄罗斯永远无法真正控制那四个地区。所以这也就意味着，所谓的“停战协议”是有可能的。现在很多人都在谈停火、停战、或其他情境，而“停战”是被讨论最多的一个选项。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**所以，首先想请问，中国的安全保障到底是提供给俄罗斯，还是乌克兰？

**周波：**应该是对双方都提供集体安全保障，因为双方都不可能彻底战胜对方，但两边其实都很害怕。大家都担心一旦达成的停火被打破，会出现各种情况。这不仅是乌克兰害怕，俄罗斯也害怕，害怕自己显得孤立。所以俄罗斯才希望全球南方国家，比如中国、印度和巴西能参与进来。

中国第4批赴南苏丹（朱巴）维和步兵营组织应急演练

**杰拉丁·杜格：**你在书中也提到，中国其实在全球维和行动中发挥了很重要的作用，这点我以前并不太了解。如果有乌克兰停战的安排，中国愿意派遣维和部队去监督吗？

**周波：**我认为，如果冲突双方提出请求——这是进行维和的首要条件——那中国是可以这么做的。因为中国是五个安理会常任理事国中出兵最多的国家，而且在全球维和方面的信誉毋庸置疑。所以我认为，中国可以和印度、还有其他全球南方国家一起承担这个角色，再加上一些非北约的欧洲国家。毕竟这场战争发生在欧洲的心脏地带，欧洲国家还是应该参与的，但不能是北约成员国。因为我想对俄罗斯来说，这些国家只会被视为“披着羊皮的狼”。

**杰拉丁·杜格：**也许我们该回到你这本书的标题：《世界应该害怕中国吗？》你的答案明显是“不应该”。那你能不能再展开说说这个观点，尤其是在当前这种局势非常不确定、谁都不知道接下来会发生什么的时候。请你谈谈为什么你认为中国其实可以在新的世界秩序中扮演一个建设性的角色？

**周波：**我们先看看中国过去40年的历史。中国的崛起已经是人类历史上的一个奇迹了，这本身就已经说明了很多。我认为中国接下来要证明的是，中国即使强大了，也不需要以霸权的方式行事。这是中国面临的下一个挑战。我认为第一个问题我们已经解决了。现在要看中国能不能作为世界上最强大的国家之一，却不走霸权之路。

这确实具有挑战性，但我们有时间去观察。如果中国过去40多年都能保持和平，那为什么中国不能让这个世界更安全呢？世界并不是西方看世界的那种单一视角。如果你从全球南方的角度看世界，我认为人们对中国的看法总体上是正面的。在非洲，绝大多数国家对中国都有正面印象。而在印太地区，情况比较复杂，但即便是去年，根据一份民调，在东南亚，人们对中国的好评其实是超过了对美国的评价。

**杰拉丁·杜格：**那印度呢？我能插一句吗？中印之间似乎就更复杂一些。

**周波：**是的，确实如此。因为中印关系本来是不错的，直到2020年在边境发生了那场致命的冲突。但即便在那次事件中，我依然看到了一点积极的东西——那就是双方都没有选择开枪。你不觉得很奇怪吗？两个世界上的现代化军队，却用石器时代的方式在打架。这就说明，两边的士兵在潜意识里都知道：不能开枪。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**我们可能有点忽略了非洲部分国家和太平洋地区一些国家的感受——尤其是它们如今因为中国的贷款而背负的债务和还债的义务。我想知道，在这样的背景下，我们澳大利亚该怎么看待这种关系？中国是想和我们做朋友，还是事情其实更微妙一些？

**周波：**这么跟你说吧，我第一次出国访问的国家，其实就是澳大利亚，那是在1990年。当时我是来担任口译员的，陪同中国飞行员在安塞特航空公司的模拟器上帮助中国飞行员培训。安塞特如今似乎已经不存在了。但我在1999年又去了一次，当时我是澳大利亚皇家军事学院的第一位中国访问研究员，我在那儿待了三个月。所以我觉得，总体来说，中国人对澳大利亚的感情还是挺正面的。因为你们离我们很远，是汪洋中的一个大岛。理论上来说，我们之间不应该是敌人，但历史上你们总是参与别人的战争。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**是的，我们确实离得很远。那为什么中国海军舰艇要绕行澳大利亚？这样做的目的是什么？我们又该如何解读这种行为呢？

**周波：**那我也许应该提醒你们，为什么你们的军舰会开到离中国海岸线那么近的地方？还有你们的军机为什么会入侵西沙群岛的空域？那是中国的领空。而且这种事你们不是做过一次两次，是多次。

澳大利亚P-8巡逻机，曾未经允许侵闯中国西沙群岛领空

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**不过我们的官方立场是，我们是在确保国际贸易航道的航行自由。这两者之间还是有区别的。

**周波：**那我是不是也可以借用你的话说，我们绕行澳大利亚也是为了同样的理由，做同样的事？

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**你是说你们绕行澳大利亚是为了运送贸易物资？是这个意思吗？

**周波：**我的意思是，我们的舰艇也在澳大利亚周边进行“航行自由”行动。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**那目的是什么呢？

**周波：**首先，那是公海，我们有权航行。没有任何国际法规禁止我们那么做。其实问题应该是问你们：你们为什么要穿越台湾海峡？你们通过那里是为了什么？你们通过那儿其实没有多少实质性的贸易，对吧？你们三分之一的贸易是和中国大陆进行的，军舰并不需要穿越台湾海峡来运输这些货物。

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**所以你的意思是，我们应该从中得到的解读就是：“你们别对我们这么做”？

**周波：**我不认为中国政府曾经以这种方式表达过意见，但是国际法确实允许我们这么做。但如果你们能扪心自问一下，我觉得那对你们也是好事。

哈米什·麦克唐纳：(大笑)那我们就到这里结束吧？

**杰拉丁·杜格：**哦，等等，我还特别想问你一个问题，就是关于“硬实力”和“软实力”的。约瑟夫·奈（Joseph Nye）曾经说过，从长远来看，软实力往往胜过硬实力。比如说中国人民解放军现在的装备非常先进，你们的海军也让全世界都羡慕。但我想说，中国的软实力其实并不强。尽管在“全球南方”你们的形象有所提升，但总体来看，中国的软实力还是处于劣势地位。你怎么看，这是中国的短板吗？

**周波：**我不这么认为，这其实取决于你如何定义软实力。就拿你刚刚提到的解放军来说，目前为止，中国军队在海外的行动全都是人道主义性质的，不管是打击海盗、维和，还是灾难救援。我们的医疗船“和平方舟”已经环游世界，为人们免费提供药品和医疗服务，从不收费。这些都是中国展示其善意的努力。

中国医疗船“和平方舟”

作为一名解放军老兵，我的希望是：即使中国拥有世界上最多的军舰，解放军未来依然只做人道主义任务。因为杀人总能找到各种借口，可是谁能记住那些借口呢，对吧？但如果你只是去帮助世界各地需要帮助的人们，他们会感激你。而维和、打击海盗、救灾，这些事情的重要性，谁能否认呢？而这正是解放军一直在做的事。在过去40年里，你找不出一个例子说明解放军在海外杀过一个人——这难道不值得称赞吗？

**哈米什·麦克唐纳：**周先生，我们来自两个经常彼此误解、也不常直接交流的国家。所以我个人非常感谢你今天来跟我们交流。我也真心希望以后还能邀请你回来，继续这场对话。我认为这比以往任何时候都更重要。

**周波：**谢谢你，哈米什，谢谢你，杰拉尔丁。这是一场有趣的、友好的争论。

**杰拉丁·杜格：**我们可能还需要更多这样的“友好争论”。

以下为英文提要和采访原文：

**Geraldine Doogue ：**The man we’re going to meet, Zhou Bo, who we spoke to and we got good feedback on him. He’s a retired Senior Colonel. He has recently brought out a new book -- Should the world fear China? Now that’s an unusual book to emerge from China.

**Hamish Macdonald：**Zhou Bo, welcome to Global Roaming now. Can we start with the current moment? To be honest, the thing I really, really want to know is the way China is viewing this moment. There’s such chaos in the world, but how is that viewed from China?

**Zhou Bo：**Well, this is really a billion-dollar question. Actually, I myself have been struggling with this issue in part because I kind of dismiss the concept has been deep, deeply rooted, that is the so called “liberal international order”. To put a long story short, basically, I believe the international order now as in the past, is the same thing. It is a combination of different countries, different social system, different national identities, different cultures, and, above all, different civilizations. So just give you an example, people basically know more or less how the world look like after 16th century with this so called geographical discovery -- De Gamma discovered india and Columbus discovered America. So people then developed that general idea about how the world looks like. But if you just say the world order is kind of liberal international order, that was basically a kind of historic myopia. Because if that is true, that is very much Francis Fukuyama’s world—the end of history.

**Geraldine Doogue：**So you are saying that this is sort of Western imposition, aren’t  you?

**Zhou Bo：**Yes, the time after the dissolution of Soviet Union and before the full rise of China, that looks at best like the liberal international order. But if you believe in that, then you become narcissistic. And if you find that you are not strong enough, then you start to look for enemies. So that is something very bad. But if you believe this world order is a composition, is a hybrid of a different civilizations, then you would tell yourself, how can I coexist with other people.

**Geraldine Doogue ：**In a way, President Trump almost might agree with you. He seems to be imagining some sort of shared power and influence which has caused a great deal of shock in, you know, in parts of the West, as he decides he’s going to twin with people who certainly have had a very different view about the way powers are used. So, in a way, what you’re describing, wouldn’t you say slightly accords with his apparent view?

**Zhou Bo：**No, I don’t think so. Because Trump’s idea is to Make America Great Again. And this kind of Make America Great Again is basically to resume American hegemony, or dominance in the world, while China would consider itself a part of the world, no more than a pole.

**Geraldine Doogue：**Doesn’t he want to divide up the world? Isn’t that one of the things we’re learning that he has these spheres of interest?

**Hamish Macdonald：**He’s willing to give Europe to Russia. He’s willing to give maybe the Asia region to China, and allow America to concentrate on its own.

**Zhou Bo：**Your description is probably right. But the point is, first of all, sphere of influence is really an old concept, a very old concept, which should not be fitting for the 21st century. I’m always arguing that China, first of all, doesn’t have any spheres of influence. Even if China wants, China won’t have sphere of influence. Why is that? Most people would describe Southeast Asia as China’s backyard. But look at Southeast Asia, where we have quite a few countries that have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, where there are quite a few countries that are American allies. In Northeast Asia, the DPRK won’t necessarily listen to China. So where is your sphere of influence? So the conclusion is, if China doesn’t have sphere of influence, then you don’t need to establish it. You just go to the rest of the world to make yourself more influential. Influence and sphere influence are two different things. Because China’s influence is already global, china doesn’t need to seek sphere influence. If you seek sphere of  influence, you have to have allies, which itself is costly and difficult to maintain. Why would you try to do that?

**Geraldine Doogue：**Very interesting. So you’re putting the idea that there’s absolutely nothing imperialistic at all about the way China is approaching international affairs, and that you have this very interesting diagnosis of China’s temperament. At the moment, you say that it is still full of victimhood, which doesn’t help China’s growth. Now, why do you say it’s not helpful to your own country’s growth?

**Zhou Bo：**Yes. A lot of Chinese believe in this kind of victimhood. That is right, because China certainly was invaded after 1840. But if we talk about 100 years of humiliation, that even in theory, mathematically speaking, should finish by 1940 and People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 when Mao Zedong declared that the Chinese people have stood up. Then Chinese people have stood up. Then the century should have finished, right? This kind of victimhood actually wouldn’t  help China, because it might lead to nationalism， because you feel that you are wrongly treated by other people. So if you become strong, then you may just make other people nervous. China is certainly a developing country, if its population is divided, if its economy strength is divided by its population. But then there is really a possibility that China could still become the largest economy in the world. So can the largest economy in the world be also a developing country? If yes, so, what is the point of dividing countries into developing country and developed country? If China becomes the strongest nation on this, how can you still have victimhood? Do you still describe yourself as victim?

**Hamish Macdonald：**Okay. But this is part of what America’s complaint about China is, right? That you have leveraged the position of developing nation status to your own advantage. This is part of the whole argument against Western developed nations throwing money into the climate transition, because countries like China are classified as developing and therefore don’t have the same impost in terms of responding. That scene is unfair, because, as you point out, you might become the biggest economy in the world.

**Zhou Bo：**The irony is that, because Chinese are wearing too many hats, all of them are true. So that confuses everybody including Chinese. We are the second largest economy by GDP, but we are the largest by PPP. Then China is certainly the largest trade nation on earth. China is the largest exporter. China is the largest industrial nation, but China, not a long time ago, is also the most populous country on earth.

Hamish Macdonald：So why is China afraid to admit its power and its might?

**Zhou Bo：**I think because there is a truth, a grain of truth in every aspect. China is wearing too many hats. So it depends on really who you are talking to, right? And it also depends on where you are standing if you look at China.

**Hamish Macdonald：**Respectfully, Zhou, I’m feeling a bit of that too many hats in listening to your explanations. Like you talk about China not really wanting or needing allies, but there is this no-limits partnership with Russia. How does that all fit together?

**Zhou Bo：**I’m glad you brought up this question, because -- let me just try to persuade you in the most simple way. If I say, for example, Hamish, I say I want to develop my friendship with you. And then let’s hang on for a moment, Hamish, our friendship has to be limited. What do you think? So this kind of unlimited friendship is basically an expression of good wishes for this kind of friendship to go on.

**Hamish Macdonald：**But China is not saying that to all its friends. I mean, it does say friendships have limits. I mean, it said that to us here in Australia. We’ve gone through times of really building the friendship, and then there’s been moments where China said, “No. You know, there are issues here.”

**Zhou Bo：**Maybe I can try to convince you another way. Although this friendship is described as unlimited in the same document where this very word was mentioned just one or two sentences after this, we have maintained that is not one of military alliance. So this war has demonstrate exactly how China, in spite of this friendship, has bottom lines. China has discouraged any use of nuclear weapons. China has not provided any missiles or  military aid to Russia.

**Hamish Macdonald：**Yeah, this is, you know, something that I just don’t understand, right? China does aspire to be a major global power. Why not exercise its influence in this relationship with Russia to bring about an end to a major conflict in Ukraine?

**Zhou Bo：**Well, that is because you are looking at this issue through the prism of a European. When China examines this relationship, first of all, China has to look at this relationship from bilateral basis. So the war…

**Hamish Macdonald：**But I’m also listening to what China is saying about the need for economic growth to rely upon peace, the need for stability on our planet to ensure ongoing prosperity.

**Zhou Bo：**Oh, of course. On stability, the question is, what cause instability? Because Russia would consider NATO’s expansion the very source of instability. And there is some truth in it, because – Putin, what makes him different from his predecessors? He’s a man who said “enough is enough.” Because from the Soviet time, that is from Mikhail Gorbachev to Boris Yeltsin to President Putin, they all think in the same light, that is NATO should not expand. But Putin is a man who said “enough is enough”, and he decided to do something that is different between him and his predecessors.

**Geraldine Doogue：**I don’t know that we’re going to solve this difference of opinions on this podcast, but I would like to move to another, question you make the obvious point in your book. The biggest question facing us all is how war can be avoided between China and others, whoever those others may be. Well, your answer is pretty blunt, and it’s a real challenge about China and Taiwan. Now, could you outline that please, so we can hear how somebody like yourself sees it?

**Zhou Bo：**Yeah. First of all, the chance of China having a war, even with the United States, is not inevitable. There are only two places where we might have the wars or conflicts: the first is South China Sea, the second is Taiwan Strait. I put South China Sea in front of the Taiwan Strait, contrary to what most people think, just because Americans keep on sending aircraft and ships to come to South China Sea, where we sometimes would do interceptions. Because this would create kind of a very dangerous close-distance encounters.

**Hamish Macdonald：**What’s the problem with America sending ships and an aircraft to monitor freedom of navigation in the South China Sea? It’s not Chinese territory.

**Zhou Bo：**Well, that’s exactly the point. Chinese believe these islands and rocks are Chinese territories, while the United States would not, you know, agree to that. That is fine. But then the point is, the United States is not a country that has actually ratified the UN Convention Law of Sea, but it is behaving as if it is guardian of the Law of the Sea. Then my question is, if the law is so good, why don’t you ratify it? If they’re not good, why would you challenge other people in the name of it?

**Geraldine Doogue：**But look, I want to bring you back. I read in your introduction, “how can war be avoided in the Taiwan Straits? My answer is simple: let China believe that peaceful reunification is still possible”. It’s an extraordinary sentence from you. I might add, there was no mention of the Taiwanese people in that. What the Taiwanese people might like? How do we come to some sort of understanding about a move forward where everybody’s rights are respected?

**Zhou Bo：**Well, I talked about that because that is my most simple answer to a billion-dollar question. Because, according to China’s law, one of the conditions for China to use non-peaceful means is that Beijing felt that the prospect for peaceful reunification is exhausted forever. Therefore we have to believe that, “okay, this kind of prospect for peaceful reunification is not exhausted, so we would have patience,” right? So China is growing with strength, and that invites a question: whether China would be more confident to have peaceful reunification, or China would become more impatient to use force?

My view is that we have to let Chinese government to believe that peace is still possible, and that would mean restraint from the United States. That means restraint from the Taiwanese authorities. So with all these, I believe peace is still possible. If the Chinese Government believe peaceful reunification is not possible, then, it’s a totally different story.

**Hamish Macdonald：**There are also many different ways that this could happen, right? So many people point to the Hong Kong example. There’s many scenarios in which Taiwan could be taken back, isn’t it?

**Zhou Bo：**Well, this kind of analogy is not absolutely all right. Let me give you another example. Before COVID, there was about 1.5 million Taiwanese people living in mainland. So you just cannot imagine as if the two sides are all separated. No.

**Hamish Macdonald：**I’m interested in what you think China’s role as a global power is moving forward. There’s a lot of talk in China when you hear the communication of the outside world that refers to the international rules-based order. And we have an America that seems to be giving up on soft power, seems to be turning allies into enemies. What role does China play then, if America is not going to play that traditional role？Does China want to step in and be that player, or is it something else?

**Zhou Bo：**Let me tell you, if there are 1.5 million Taiwanese people living in mainland China. That means 6% Taiwanese people were already living in mainland China. And people always mentioned how China would use sticks, but people forgot, China also has offered a lot, a lot of carrots. For example, the children of Taiwanese could actually go to kindergartens in Fujian province, like our children would do. They would have ID cards, almost same ID card. So those people, 1.5 million people, tell a lot. These people do not care to live in a totally different society with a totally different political system, so long as this society can provide them better opportunities. And these people, are middle-class people and above, right? So I believe with globalization, with the acceleration of AI, the integration between mainland China and Taiwan is also accelerating, like in any parts of the world. So that means maybe one day Taiwanese people would consider it’s not that bad to be part of the strongest nation on earth.

**Zhou Bo：**China has already stepped in. Yeah, because when the rest of the world looks more chaotic, people definitely will look up to China to ask the same questions as you did. But then how would China look like? I think China would look more like a kind of anchor or stabilizer in this volatile world.

**Hamish Macdonald：**But wouldn’t that involve playing the role of dealmaker when it comes to conflict in the Middle East or conflict in Europe? Wouldn’t it actually involve doing something quite different to what China does on the global stage?

**Zhou Bo：**I believe China does have a role, both in the Middle East and in the war in Ukraine. Because right now Russia and the United States are talking but you read newspapers like I do, so actually, President Putin’s offer of ceasefire is just conditional, right? So maybe there could be a time when all the major powers, including China, would have to provide a kind of collective security guarantee.

**Hamish Macdonald：**Can you see China doing that, for example, in Ukraine or in the Middle East?

**Zhou Bo：**Yeah, I think so, because it depends on how the situation develop. If the end game is a kind of armistice, then it needs security guarantee.

**Hamish Macdonald：**What would be the security guarantee that you could imagine? Let’s just take Ukraine as the example.

**Zhou Bo：**For example, Russia has claimed the four oblasts as Russian territories, but Russia can hardly really have  full control of the four oblasts, because Ukraine is wholly supported by Europe, at least, If not by America. So that means these four oblasts in the future could very much become like Afghanistan, where Ukrainians would behave like Mujahideens to have endless guerrilla warfare. That means Russia can never have full control of the four regions. So that means there could be a possibility of so-called armistice. Because many people talk about the ceasefire, armistice and another scenario, but armistice is the one that is talked the most.

**Hamish Macdonald：**So starting on who’s China offering the security guarantee, to the Russians or the Ukrainians?

**Zhou Bo：**Well, it has to be a collective security to both sides, because they could not win over others. But both sides are afraid. What about the ceasefire is broken, for different reasons? It’s not only that Ukraine is afraid. Russia is also afraid, at least of looking lonely. So that is why Russia would want, you know, countries from Global South that is China, India and Brazil, to be involved.

**Geraldine Doogue：**And you make the point in your book about how many peacekeepers that China actually plays a big role in peacekeeping operations around the world, which I must say, I wasn’t quite aware of. Would China be happy to send peacekeepers to monitor the Ukraine armistice?

**Zhou Bo：**I think if there is a request from the warring parties, which is the first condition for peacekeeping, then I think China can do that because China is the largest troop contributing country out of P5 and in terms of China’s credibility in peacekeeping, it is never doubted. So China, along with India, with some other Global South countries, would be most, most suitable for this role, plus some non-NATO countries from Europe. Because this anyway, is a war in the heartland of Europe. So European countries can still be involved, but they should not be any NATO countries, because for Russia, these countries will simply be wolves in sheep’’ clothing, I believe.

**Geraldine Doogue：**Maybe we should go back to the title of your book, Should the world fear China? Now, you’re clearly saying, “No, it should not.” Develop that idea, particularly at the moment when everything is so fluid and no one quite knows how it’s going to unfold in the next little while. Tell us why you think China, in fact, could play a constructive role in this new world order.

**Zhou Bo：**Well, let’s look at China’s history in the last 40 years. China’s rise is already a miracle in human history. So this is already proved it. I think the next thing China needs to prove is that even if China is strong, it doesn’t have to behave like a hegemon. That is the next challenge. I think China has already solved the first problem. We have to wait and see whether China can actually behave like the strongest nation on earth, but not a hegemon. That is challenging, but we have time to wait and see. But if China can achieve, you know, peace in the last 40 years and plus, why just can’t China make the world safer? The world is not how the West look at it. If you look at this world, in Global South, I think people’s perception about China is more or less positive. In Africa, certainly, most of the countries would have positive views of China. Then in the Indo-Pacific, this picture is a little bit patchy, but even last year, China’s impression in the Southeastern Asia actually prevails over people’s impression of the United States according to a poll.

**Geraldine Doogue：**With India, can I just pop that in with India? It has been quite a lot more complicated.

**Zhou Bo：**Yes, that is true, because, India’s relationship with China was good, but until we had the deadly brawl in the border in 2020. But even in that incident, I still see something positive, that is neither side decides to shoot at each other. Isn’t it strange that the two modern armies in the world were fighting in a Stone Age manner, so that means the soldiers on both sides know subconsciously that they should not shoot at each other.

**Hamish Macdonald：**We might be somewhat skimming over the feelings in parts of Africa and parts of the Pacific about the debt levels and the obligations that those countries have now to China because of the loans that were granted to them. I wonder, then, where that leaves us here in Australia, does China want to be our friend, or is it something a little more nuanced?

**Zhou Bo：**Let me tell you the first country that I visited was actually Australia in 1990. That was my first trip to Australia, working as an interpreter for Chinese pilot training on simulator of  Ansett Australia, which does seem to exist anymore. But I was back in 1999 when I was the first visiting fellow of the Royal Military College in Duntroon, where I stay for three months. So I believe, generally speaking, Chinese People’s feelings toward Australia is quite positive, because you are far away from us. You are a big island in the ocean. Theoretically you should not be enemy, but historically, you always fought  other people’s war.

**Hamish Macdonald：**Yes, we are far away. Why are Chinese naval ships circumnavigating Australia? What’s the purpose of all of that? How do you want us to interpret that?

**Zhou Bo：**Well, maybe I should remind you why your ships would sail so close to Chinese shore? And why would your aircraft penetrate into the airspace of Paracel Islands, which, according to Chinese, is China’s airspace? And you did it more than once for all these kinds of things, and the Chinese ships sailing…

**Hamish Macdonald：**I think our position, though, our formal position, is that we’re ensuring that there’s free passage through international trade routes. So there is a bit different.

**Zhou Bo：**Can I just borrow your words to say, we are doing exactly the same thing around Australia, for the same reason?

**Hamish Macdonald：**You want to send trade around the bottoms of Australia. Do you?

**Zhou Bo：**No. I mean, our ships are also doing kind of freedom navigation around Australia.

**Hamish Macdonald：**For what purpose?

**Zhou Bo：**Right. First of all, that is high seas we can sail. There’s no international rule, you know, restricting that. And actually, the question is for you. Why would you sail through Taiwan strait? What is the purpose of you sailing through Taiwan strait? There is not much business for you to go through there, right? One third of your trade is done with China. The warships don’t have to carry all these goods through Taiwan strait.

**Hamish Macdonald：**So the interpretation that you think we should take from this is, “don’t do it to us.”

**Zhou Bo：**Well, I don’t think the Chinese government has ever talked about like that, but the international law would allow us to do that. But if you ask yourself, do some soul-searching, I think it is good for you.

Hamish Macdonald：(laughter) Should we leave it there?

**Geraldine Doogue：**Oh, well, I just really wanted to ask you about hard and soft power. Joseph Nye talks about the fact that long-term soft power often wins over hard power. You know, there’s the PLA equipped in an extraordinary way. You’ve got a navy that is the envy now of the world. But your soft power, I would argue, to you, is really not great. You’re on the back foot despite those changes in the Global South, do you see this as a deficit for China?

**Zhou Bo：**I don’t think so, because it really depends on how you define soft power. Let me just raise the PLA you have mentioned. So far PLA’s operation overseas are all communitarian in nature, be it counterpiracy, peacekeeping or disaster relief. And our hospital ship, Peace Ark, has been sailing around the world to give free medicine and free medical treatment to people without charging anything. And this is the Chinese efforts to show that its intentions are benign. My hope as a PLA veteran is that I hope PLA will always do humanitarian operation in the future, even if China has the largest number of ships. Because you don’t have to kill people with all kinds of excuses whatsoever. Who can remember all these excuses? But if you just do humanitarian aid to people of the rest of the world, people would be grateful to you. And who can disagree the importance of peacekeeping, counterpiracy and disaster relief？And this is exactly what PLA has been doing. You cannot give me a single example that the PLA has killed anyone overseas in the last 40 years. Isn’t that impressive?

**Hamish Macdonald：**Zhou, we come from two countries that often don’t understand each other very well, and often don’t talk directly to each other very much. So personally, I want to say thank you for coming on and discussing with us. And I actually hope that we can have you back and continue this conversation. I think it’s as important as ever.

**Zhou Bo：**Thank you, Hamish and Geraldine. This is an interesting friendly quarrel.

Geraldine Doogue：[Chuckles] Friendly quarrel, we may need more friendly quarrels.

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