周波：解决俄乌冲突，中国可发挥三重作用

俄乌问题会在特朗普的推动下，很快得到解决吗？特朗普的下一步，是台湾吗？中国又将在其中发挥什么样的作用，以及如何应对？

日前，清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波在慕尼黑安全会议现场接受“德国之声”采访。记者理查德·沃克就多个国际热点问题展开提问，周波就中美关系、中国核力量发展、美国“新帝国主义”倾向及台湾问题等众多问题阐述观点。北京对话和观察者网授权翻译如下。

【文/周波，翻译/毛琪、王奕涵，核译/刘松瑀】

**理查德·沃克：**我们正在慕尼黑安全会议现场，这次会议的核心议题是跨大西洋关系和结束乌克兰战争。然而，我们也希望了解世界另一超级大国——中国的观点。今天，我们将与前中国军方的周波大校进行交流。他现在是清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员，也是慕尼黑安全会议的常客。

感谢您接受德国之声的采访。过去几天，慕安会备受关注，特朗普政府正在推动一项新的和平方案以解决乌克兰问题。特朗普本人曾与弗拉基米尔·普京对话。那么，中国对此持何种态度？您认为特朗普有可能成为乌克兰问题的“和平缔造者”吗？

第58届慕尼黑安全会议2月18日在德国慕尼黑开幕 新华社

**周波：**我认为，任何有关乌克兰的和平倡议，中国都会表示欢迎。事实上，特朗普本人也曾请求中国提供帮助。作为一名中国人，我对此感到有趣，因为他此前表示能够在24小时内解决乌克兰问题。

当然，这种说法在更像是一种选举期间的竞选口号，但他向中国寻求帮助的事实表明，中国在乌克兰战争中可以发挥一定作用。

我认为，中国的作用首先体现在与其他主要大国一道，为乌克兰，甚至俄罗斯，提供某种集体安全保障。为什么这么说？因为这种集体安全保障不仅是乌克兰总统泽连斯基经常提及，同时也深深植根于所有乌克兰人的历史记忆之中——早在1990年代，乌克兰决定放弃核武器时，这一问题就已成为关键考量。

是的，我们无法确定这场战争还会持续多久，但肯定还会持续一段时间。然而，战争不会永远打下去。总有一天，各方将不得不讨论如何实现停火。

而乌克兰方面经常提到一个问题：谁来保障停火协议的执行？所以我认为中国这次可以与其他主要大国一道，为乌克兰提供这种集体安全保障。

中国可能提供的第二种协助是——如果交战国同意维和行动，那么我认为中国及印度等国或许是最佳的出兵国。因为对于欧洲国家而言，如波兰总理和法国总统所提议的那样，由欧洲人直接介入并不现实。俄罗斯必然会将此视为北约在乌克兰的另一种存在。

第三种可能的协助是战后重建。中国在基础设施建设方面的能力首屈一指，这一点无需赘述，不言自明。中国能够以更快的速度、更高的效率和更低的成本完成重建工作。

**理查德·沃克：**您提到了北约。特朗普政府曾暗示——尽管其中存在一些不确定性——可能会考虑将乌克兰加入北约的选项最终排除在讨论范围之外。您认为这是一个好的决策吗？因为中国一贯对北约的东扩持批评态度。

**周波：**中国方面认为，这场战争与北约的扩张有一定关系。因为虽然人们在讨论这场战争，讨论俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略，但人们往往忽视了一个事实，那就是从米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫到鲍里斯·叶利钦，再到普京总统，也就是说，从苏联时期到今天的俄罗斯，苏联和俄罗斯的领导人一直在警告这种扩张的危害。

北约从1949年到2024年的扩张 维基百科

关于北约的未来，问题在于，随着西方民主的衰退，北约是否会变得更强大？或许有人会说，芬兰和瑞典的加入证明北约实力的增长。但我不这么认为。

我曾经说过，北约是一具行走的僵尸。为什么这么说呢？因为这种军事联盟，或者说所有军事联盟，都依赖于威胁而生存。它们就像水蛭一样吸血，因此必须寻找敌人。

理查德·沃克：难道威胁不是来源于俄罗斯吗？

**周波：**我并不是在为俄罗斯辩护，但事实是，即使在这场战争之前，北约就已经将俄罗斯视为威胁，因为苏联解体后，北约的未来并不确定。然而，为了生存，北约必须找到一个威胁。而谁能成为威胁呢？之前是苏联，现在当然就是俄罗斯。

因此，我认为这种军事联盟事实上并不会加强西方民主。相反，它实际上引发了战争。因此，欧洲安全的根本问题是，不管愿不愿意，北约必须与俄罗斯共存，因为俄罗斯无法被抹去。所以，欧洲的安全本质上是北约如何与俄罗斯共存。人们必须思考这个问题，不能仅仅着眼于几个简单的事件。

**理查德·沃克：**之前您说的确实是历史的一部分，特别是中国的看法。今天的会议，讨论的焦点之一就是美国副总统万斯的演讲，他批评了欧洲民主，特别是德国的民主。许多人将这视为中国改善与欧洲关系的机会，而欧洲正因这番批评而感到震惊。您认为这个时机到来了吗？

**周波：**我认为，欧洲肯定会思考万斯所说的话，以及接下来会有什么行动。事实上，依据《金融时报》的报道，中国和欧盟之间的渐进式接触已经在发生，因为我在记者吉登·拉赫曼的观点中读到，他引用了一位欧洲官员的话说：“相信我，这已经开始发生了。”

所以我认为这次会议表明了欧洲人如何对万斯的演讲感到失望，因为即便作为中国人，我也感到惊讶。

我本以为大家关注的主要是乌克兰问题，所以他会在演讲中大谈乌克兰；而且鉴于美国与中国所谓的战略竞争，他也会谈到美中竞争。但他完全没有提及这些内容。相反，他谈论的内容让欧洲人感到惊讶和愤怒，这很有趣。

**理查德·沃克：**这是否感觉像是送给中国代表团的礼物呢？

**周波：**我认为这不是我们所创造的局面。但最终，我认为欧洲人会觉得他们必须寻求一种平衡。因为这种情况已经在发生，甚至冯德莱恩也谈到了与中国达成新协议。所以即便在这次会议之前，欧洲领导人就已经有所表态，而与欧洲保持良好关系始终是中国的利益所在。

对中国来说，这场战争实际上对我们有些不公平，因为中国并未参与这场战争，也没有被告知这场战争即将发生。但由于这场战争，中国与欧洲各国的关系变得紧张，而这并不符合我们的利益。

**理查德·沃克：**当然，欧洲各国与中国的关系变得紧张，原因之一是它们对中国在经济和外交上对俄罗斯的支持感到非常沮丧。但我还想谈谈与新政府相关的另一个问题——特朗普曾谈到想要接管格陵兰岛，让加拿大成为美国的第51个州。

这似乎反映了一种被一些人称为新帝国主义的意识形态，或者至少是一种想要扩张美国领土的理念。您对此有何看法？

**周波：**其实，就像它让所有人感到惊讶一样，这件事也让我感到惊讶。谁都没想到他会到处搜刮，确实挺出乎意料的。不过，我现在关注的重点倒不是他接下来会干什么——这个谁也说不准——但我觉得他肯定还会继续出乎大家的意料。

真正让我思考的是，到他第二个任期结束时，美国的国际形象可能会继续下滑。毕竟，如果大家都认定美国既不愿承担国际责任，除此之外还想在各地攫取土地，那么美国的道德高地又何在呢？

**理查德·沃克：**我的意思是，从某种程度上讲，我有点担心，因为特朗普释放出这样的信号可能意味着他并不介意中国大陆采取行动来控制台湾。从中国的角度来看，你觉得这是不是某种暗示，表明特朗普可能不会阻止台湾回归中华人民共和国？

**周波：**的确，很多人喜欢把中国对台湾的立场与乌克兰战争、甚至特朗普的言论联系在一起。但我认为，中国政府的立场始终如一，那就是，我们依然希望通过和平方式实现统一。

只有在三种特定情况下中国才会考虑非和平手段，这一点早已明确写入《反分裂国家法》。所以我不认为特朗普的言论会对中国的决策产生任何影响。

至于如何解开这道价值连城的难题——如何保持台海的和平稳定？我的答案很简单，就是必须让中国相信和平统一仍然是可能的。

因为中国使用非和平手段的最后一个条件，是中国认为和平统一的前景已经完全丧失。因此，对全球而言，最重要的就是向中国释放清晰的信息：和平统一的机会依然存在。这样，台海的战争就并非不可避免。

**理查德·沃克：**美国国防部长皮特·海格赛斯表示，美国决定在欧洲收缩军力的一个动机，是需要重新部署部队到亚太地区，以应对他所称的“来自中国的威胁”。对此，你怎么看？

**周波：**我一点都不担心这个问题。试想一下，美国如果把重点转向印太地区，那谁会真正帮它？毕竟，拜登政府把盟友的重要性提到了前所未有的高度，对吧？

特朗普主张“美国优先”，但对拜登来说，可能更像是“盟友优先”。可如果真的爆发一场中美战争，美国能指望谁呢？

日本可能是最重要的盟友之一，但民调显示，支持与中国直接对抗的日本人只有11%左右。再看澳大利亚。没错，澳大利亚确实要从美英购买8艘核动力潜艇，但现任澳大利亚政府已经明确表示不会参与台海冲突。接着是韩国，但韩国更关心朝鲜半岛局势，在这方面他们绝对需要中国的支持。

再来看菲律宾。菲律宾确实向美军提供了9个军事基地，这些基地位于第一岛链的关键位置，对美国来说非常有价值。

菲律宾的9个美军基地的位置，红色方框为2023年新增的4个基地 Ksliu

但菲律宾政府也不是傻子，他们给美军使用这些基地设定了严格的条件——比如，美军不能在这些基地存放武器，也不能从这些基地直接发动攻击。这些限制至今仍然有效。

所以，没有谁是傻子。我不认为中美在西太平洋发生战争的情况下，美国一定能赢。事实上，根据美国智库的研究，大多数兵棋推演的结果显示，美国反而是输的一方。

**理查德·沃克：**我的意思是，美国人现在在问的一个问题是：为什么中国正在如此迅速地扩充其核武库？他们的担忧是，这可能是为了在未来某个时候中美之间可能爆发的战争中作为后盾。那么，为什么中国正在如此快速地扩展其核力量？

另外，特朗普最近也在试探性地提出，他希望与中国和普京就军备控制问题进行对话，中国是否会接受他的提议？

**周波：**首先，中国并没有真正快速地扩充其核武库。因为全球90%的核武库仍然属于两个国家——俄罗斯和美国。

**理查德·沃克：**虽然中国的核武库规模仍然远远落后，但它的扩张速度确实在加快。

**周波：**但中国确实有充分的理由扩充核武库。为什么呢？首先，你应该明白，武器现代化是必然的，就像所有类型的武器都会经历升级换代一样。这并不意味着你永远只做维护工作。

我举个例子，我个人对乌克兰战争的看法是，为什么北约至今没有派兵直接与俄军作战？我认为，俄罗斯的核威慑起到了至关重要的作用。而这让我不得不把俄罗斯和中国进行比较。

美国似乎并不太担心与中国发生直接冲突，而更担心与俄罗斯发生直接冲突。这是为什么？难道不就是因为俄罗斯拥有更庞大的核武库吗？

要知道，中国的航母比俄罗斯多，军队的规模也比俄罗斯更大，中国的军费预算更是俄罗斯的三倍。但为什么美国仍然不像对待俄罗斯那样对中国忌惮？

于是我问自己：是不是因为中国的核武库规模还不到美国的十分之一？如果真是这样，那问题就很清楚了——我们需要的是一个政治决定。

世界国家核弹头数量排名（截至2024年1月）

毕竟，中国有雄厚的工业实力，有成熟的技术，而就在几个月前，我们的洲际弹道导弹试验也已经证明了中国的导弹能力完全没有问题。因此，对我们来说，唯一的需要决定的就是要不要增加核武器的数量。

更值得警惕的是，一些美国人甚至公开讨论过在台海冲突中对中国使用核武器。这是一个极其危险的信号。

为什么他们会这么说？因为他们意识到，在台海的常规战争中，他们已经失去了对中国的优势，所以才会有人主张诉诸核武器。

**理查德·沃克：**我们今天就先聊到这里，但这个话题真的值得深入探讨，我希望能继续与你讨论，因为核军备控制无疑会成为今年乃至明年的热点议题之一。不过，今天就先到这里，我们在慕尼黑感谢你接受德国之声的采访。

**周波：**谢谢。

Richard Walker: We’re here at the Munich Security Conference, where transatlantic relations and ending the Ukraine war have been the primary focus. But we want to get the view from the other superpower in the world, China. And we’re going to speak with Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, who is a former member of the Chinese military. He’s now an analyst at Tsinghua University. He’s a regular at the Munich Security Conference.

Zhou Bo, thanks for speaking to DW. We’ve seen what’s been going on these last few days in Munich – the Trump administration is pushing a new idea of bringing about peace in Ukraine. Donald Trump once talks with Vladimir Putin, does the PRC welcome this? Do you see Trump potentially as a peacemaker?

Zhou Bo: I think any ideas about peace in Ukraine is welcomed in China. In fact, Donald Trump himself has asked China to help. This is interesting for me to observe as a Chinese, because he previously talked about how to resolve this within 24 hours. Of course, that is a kind of rhetoric during the election, but the fact that he asked China to help really demonstrates that China might have a role in the war in Ukraine. I believe China’s role, first of all, is in joining other major powers in providing kind of a collective security guarantee to Ukraine and even to Russia. Why? Because this kind of collective security guarantee is often talked about by President Zelensky, and is also deep in the memory of all Ukrainians when Ukraine decided to relinquish nuclear weapons in the 1990s, so this is what they remember.

So yes, we don’t know how long the war will last, except that the war will last for a while, but no war will last forever. So there definitely will be a time when people will discuss how to have a ceasefire. Then the question, as raised by Ukrainian from time to time, is who is going to guarantee this ceasefire. So I think at this time, China can join other major powers in providing this kind of collective security guarantee.

The second possible assistance from China is that, if people have so decided, I mean, the warring countries have decided to have peacekeeping operations, then I believe China, and countries like China and  India, might be the best troop-contributing countries in that for Europeans to do this, as proposed by the Polish Prime Minister, and proposed by the French President, it would not be realistic. Russia definitely would take it as another way of NATO’s presence in Ukraine.

The third possible assistance is the post-war reconstruction. China’s capability in infrastructure is next to none. So I don’t need to elaborate on that; I think this is just self-evident. China can just do it more quickly and do it more efficiently at a lower cost.

Richard Walker: You mentioned NATO, the Trump administration has sort of indicated – although there’s some confusion about this – but indicated that it might take the idea of Ukraine joining NATO eventually off the table. Do you think that’s a good thing to remove that? Because China has generally been pretty critical of NATO expansion.

Zhou Bo: We in China really consider that this war has something to do with NATO expansion. Because, yes, people talking about the war, talking about this kind of invasion by Russia against Ukraine, but people forgot that actually, starting from Mikhail Gorbachev down to Boris Yeltsin down to President Putin, that means from Soviet time to Russia today, Soviet and Russian leaders have been warning about this kind of expansion.

Then about the future of NATO. The question is, with the Western democracy going down, would NATO become really stronger? Probably people say that the membership of Finland and Sweden might be proof of NATO’s growing strengths. I don’t think so. I used to say that NATO is a zombie that is still walking. Why? Because this kind of military alliance – all military alliance  – lives on threat. They’re just like leeches sucking blood, so they have to find enemies.

Richard Walker: Isn’t it true that the threat is Russia?

Zhou Bo: I’m not just trying to defend Russia, but it’s true that even before this war, NATO has taken Russia as a threat, because after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the future of NATO is not that certain. But for NATO to survive, they have to find a kind of threat. And who can be the threat? In the old days， it is the Soviet Union, and nowadays, of course, it is Russia. So I believe that this kind of military alliance actually would not strengthen Western democracy. On the contrary, it actually invites the war. The fundamental question about security in Europe is that NATO has to coexist with Russia, like it or not, because Russia cannot be washed away. So the security of Europe is essentially how they can coexist. People have to think about that. You just cannot look at a few simple events.

Richard Walker: That’s part of the history, certainly the Chinese view of it. This conference has been dominated, really, by the discussions around these halls by conversations about this speech by JD Vance, the US Vice President, in which he criticized European democracy, particularly German democracy. Many see this as an opportunity for China to improve relations with Europe, which is reeling from this criticism. Do you see that opportunity taking shape?

Zhou Bo: I think definitely Europe will think about what Vance said, and what is going to do next. In fact, according to the Financial Times, this kind of inching together between China and EU is already happening, because this is what I read from Gideon Rahman’ opinion, in which he quoted an European official saying: “believe me, this is already happening”. So I think this conference will tell how Europeans would actually become disappointed with JD Vance’s speech, because, even as a Chinese, I was surprised. I thought, because people’s concern here is primarily Ukraine, therefore he will talk a lot about Ukraine, and then, because the United States is in so-called strategic competition with China, therefore he will talk about US-China competition, but he has not talked about all these at all. Instead, he’s talking about something that surprised Europeans and angered them, so this is interesting.

Richard Walker: Is it feel like a gift to the Chinese delegation?

Zhou Bo: I think this is not what we have created. But as a result, I think the Europeans will feel that they have to strike a balance. Because this is what is already happening, because Ursula Von der Leyen talked about having new agreement with China, so even before this conference, the European leaders have said something, and is always in China’s interest to have good relationship with Europe. Because for China, this war actually is somewhat unfair for China, in that China is not involved in this war. China is not informed about this war. But because of this war, China’s relationship with European capitals has become sour, and this is not in our interest.

Richard Walker: But of course, the reason that the relations have been soured is the European capitals are very frustrated by the economic and diplomatic backing that the Chinese have been providing for Russia. But I just want to touch on another thing relating to this new administration – Donald Trump’s been talking about wanting to take over Greenland, talking about Canada becoming the 51st State of the United States. This seems to reflect a kind of what some people call a neo-imperialism, or at least an idea that, you know, wanting to add territory to the United States. What’s your take on that?

Zhou Bo: Actually, it surprised me as it surprised everybody. Nobody has anticipated that he would talk about this kind of gain here and there. So it is really surprising. What I am thinking actually is not what he is going to do next  – I don’t know, but I believe he will continue to surprise people. What I’m thinking is that at the end of his second term, American’s image probably will go down further. Because if all people concluded that the United States does not want to shoulder any international responsibility, and apart from that America wants to grab land here and there, what is the moral high ground of the United States?

Richard Walker: I mean, at some point to that, I’m worried that if Trump is sending these signals, it might suggest that he wouldn’t mind for instance if China made moves to take control of Taiwan. From a Chinese point of view, do you think that is some sort of encouragement that Trump might not stand in the way of, as you would see it, the reunification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China?

Zhou Bo: Well, people certainly put a lot of reference to China’s intention on Taiwan, be the Ukraine War, or be the remarks about Donald Trump. But I believe the Chinese government has been consistent to insist that we still would wish to have a peaceful reunification. So we only would use non-peaceful means in three conditions that are well documented in China’s anti-secession law. So I believe that Trump’s remarks would not really have anything to do with China.

And how could we resolve this billion-dollar question about maintaining peace in Taiwan Strait?

My personal answer is very simple -- we have to let China believe that peaceful reunification is still possible. Because one of the last conditions for China to use a non-peaceful means is that when China concludes that all possibilities for peaceful reunification are exhausted. So for the rest of the world, it’s extremely important to assure China that there are still opportunities for peaceful reunification. So war across the strait is not inevitable.

Richard Walker: Pete Hegseth, the Defense Secretary, has been saying that one of the motivations for the US to pull back within Europe is that it needs to reassign forces to the Asia-Pacific to face what he describes as the threat from China. What’s your perspective on that?

Zhou Bo: I don’t worry about that at all. Because just imagine, the United States could refocus on Indo-Pacific, so who can help the United States? Because the Biden administration has placed unprecedented importance on allies, right? Trump said America first, but for Biden, probably it is allies first. But in the war, in a hypothetical war with China, who can really help the United States?

Japan is on top of the list, but according to a public opinion poll, there are just about 11% of people who support a direct confrontation with China. And then it goes down to Australia. Australia, yes, would buy 8 nuclear-powered submarines from the United States and Britain, but the current Australian government has made it quite clear that they would not be involved in conflict in the Taiwan Strait. And then comes South Korea. South Korea would worry more about Korean Peninsula, and on that they definitely need support from the Chinese government. And then the Philippines. The Philippines has provided 9 military bases that are just on the first chain of Islands that would have tremendous military value for the United States. But the Filipinos are not stupid, because they have laid down conditions for the United States to use these bases. They cannot store weapons there, cannot launch attacks from there. Until this moment, still, this is the policy.

So no one is stupid. I don’t believe that in a war between China and the US in the Western Pacific, it is a sure saying that the United states can win. Actually according to American think tanks, in most of the war games, the United states has actually lost to China.

Richard Walker: So I mean, one of the questions that Americans are asking themselves is why China is building up its nuclear arsenal so rapidly? The fear is that it might be to serve as a backstop for the kind of war that could potentially emerge between the two superpowers at some point in the future. Why is China expanding its nuclear forces so fast? And will the Chinese be open to suggestions from Donald Trump, which he’s been floating as well that he would like to talk with the Chinese and with Vladimir Putin about arms control?

Zhou Bo: First of all, China is not really building its nuclear arsenal that fast. Because 90% of the nuclear arsenal around the world still belong to two countries -- Russia and the United States.

Richard Walker: It is still far behind, but it is still rapidly accelerating.

Zhou Bo: But China does have good reasons to increase its nuclear arsenals. Why? Because first of all you should modernize your weaponries and the equipment, as it happens to all kinds of weapons. So it does not mean that you can always do the maintenance work. I will give an example. How do I feel personally about the war in Ukraine about why NATOs would not send any soldiers to fight against the Russians. I think Russia’s nuclear deterrence has really played a critical role. Then I have to compare Russia with China.

The United States doesn’t seem to care that much to be involved in a direct conflict with China as it would worry to be in a direct conflict with Russia. Why is that? Isn’t it just because Russia has more nuclear weapons? China has more aircraft carriers than Russia. China’s military is bigger than Russian military, and China’s defense budget is three times bigger than the Russian military. So why the United States seems to be less afraid of China? I ask myself this question: is it because that China has just a nuclear arsenal that is less than 1/10 of that of the United States? If that is the case, what we need is a political decision. Because China has strong industry. China has the technical know-how and has demonstrated in our ICBM launch just several months ago that our missiles are quite all right. So the only question for us is to increase the number or not.

And some Americans actually have talked about using nuclear weapons against the Chinese in a conflict in Taiwan Strait. That is really， really alarming. And why would they say that? They say that because they feel that they actually have lost their advantage in a conventional warfare with China in theTaiwan Strait. So they are advocating using nuclear weapons against China.

Richard Walker: So Zhou Bo, we’re going to have to end it there. But this is a conversation that I would love to continue with you because I think nuclear arms control is definitely going to be one of the hottest issues this year and heading into next year. But for now, from Munich, thank you Zhou Bo very much for speaking to DW.

Zhou Bo: Thank you.

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