“外媒论中国”第27期｜美国把欧洲推向中国？还是中国拉欧洲布局？_风闻

01

美欧达成贸易协议，中国持何立场

**原标题：**Where does China stand after US trade deal with EU seen as ‘more rhetoric than substance’?

发布机构：南华早报**（South China Morning Post）**

**关键词：**美欧贸易协议

中文

《南华早报》最新发文分析了美欧贸易协议对中国的影响。在美欧达成新的贸易框架协议之际，中美也在瑞典展开第三轮谈判。文章指出，中国保持冷静，观望协议落实情况，因为该协议“言辞多于实质”。尽管美方可能将该协议作为对华施压的筹码，但中方无需急于回应。

美欧协议包括对大部分欧盟商品征收15%关税，欧盟承诺三年内购买7500亿美元美国产能源，并增加对美投资6000亿美元。专家指出，欧盟更多是出于政治考虑暂时安抚美方，其作出的许多承诺具延后性，实施效果存在疑问，并非实质性转变。尽管当前无需急于回应，北京仍应警惕美欧可能联合针对中国的趋势。中国外交部重申，反对任何以损害中国利益为代价达成的协议。

7月27日，欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩在苏格兰与美国总统特朗普坐在一起，宣布双方已达成贸易协议（图源：法新社）

从具体影响来看，美国对欧关税使中国产品在价格上仍具一定竞争力，短期内可实现有限缓冲。然而，大规模欧盟能源和制造品进口转向美国，或削弱中国在清洁能源、高端制造和对欧投资中的优势。此外，中欧间产业重合度不高，对彼此的影响有限，但若中企计划在欧建厂以避开美国关税，则需重新评估战略布局。

Short Summary

A recent opinion piece published by South China Morning Post, titled “Where does China stand after US trade deal with EU seen as ‘more rhetoric than substance’?”, analyzes the implications of the agreement for China. As the US and the EU reached a new framework trade deal, China and the US simultaneously began their third round of negotiations in Sweden. The opinion piece noted that China could remain calm and observe how the agreement is implemented, as it is considered to be “more rhetoric than substance.” Although the US may attempt to use the deal as leverage in its talks with China, Beijing is under no pressure to respond immediately.

The agreement includes a 15% tariff on most EU goods entering the US. In return, the EU pledged to purchase $750 billion worth of American energy over three years and to increase investment in the US by $600 billion. Experts pointed out that these commitments are largely politically motivated gestures to appease Washington, with many of the pledges being delayed in nature and their actual implementation uncertain—more symbolic than substantive.

Despite the lack of urgency, Beijing should remain alert to the possibility of the US and EU forming a coordinated front against China. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that China opposes any agreement that comes at the expense of its national interests. In practical terms, the US tariffs on EU goods may give Chinese exporters some pricing advantage, providing a limited buffer in the short term. However, a large-scale shift in EU energy and manufacturing imports toward the US could undermine China’s strengths in clean energy, high-end manufacturing, and investment flows with Europe.

Additionally, as industrial overlap between China and the EU remains relatively low, the direct impact may be limited. Yet for Chinese companies planning to build factories in Europe to bypass US tariffs, the new deal may necessitate a reassessment of their strategic positioning.

02

美国会把欧洲推向中国吗

**原标题：**Will the United States Push Europe Toward China?

**发布机构：**战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）

关键词：中欧关系；跨大西洋联盟

中文

特朗普政府以推进“美国优先”贸易目标为名的关税威胁，虽然在短期内可能对欧盟形成压力，但也存在削弱跨大西洋联盟、限制欧洲在对华政策上战略回旋空间的风险，从而损害美国自身的长期利益。在中资持续加大对欧投资的背景下，美国对欧加征关税反而可能促使欧洲在经贸合作上更趋向中国。

欧盟方面曾多次表达对中国在高科技领域快速发展的担忧，尤其是在电动汽车、电池、半导体等行业；与此同时，也批评中国未在俄乌冲突中明确立场，认为这影响了欧洲整体对华信任。尽管欧美在对华议题上在某些方面存在共识，理想情况下或可通过协调沟通引导中方深化市场化改革，但目前来看，无论是拜登政府还是特朗普政府，在对华立场上均缺乏清晰的政策主张，后者更偏向采取单边主义路径。虽然美国近年通过与英国、越南、印尼等国推进双边贸易安排，释放出“重塑供应链”信号，但缺乏政策透明度和执行连贯性，导致对华战略呈现碎片化状态，也增加了与盟友协调应对挑战的难度。

2024年5月6日，中法欧领导人在巴黎爱丽舍宫举行三方会晤（图源：法新社）

跨大西洋贸易战可能对欧洲经济造成严重冲击，削弱其对华谈判筹码，尤其在电动汽车和传统汽车产业领域。这一局面也可能促使欧洲对中国投资持更加开放的态度。尽管中国资本有助于振兴欧洲制造业，推动绿色转型，但由于欧盟缺乏统一的对外投资战略，相关合作往往缺少必要的保障机制和本土化要求，从而使得中资在欧布局一定程度上只能按中方规则展开。这一趋势可能加速欧洲在特定经济领域向中国靠拢，从长远看可能改变美国在地区事务中的主导地位。

文章指出，中国企业在欧洲的本土化发展有望提升中方在锂电池等关键领域的技术实力和供应链多元化能力，同时也可能对欧洲在某些地缘政治议题上与美国保持一致的意愿造成影响。

当前，欧洲正处于地缘政治的关键时刻。中欧峰会有助于缓解部分紧张氛围，但有限的让步难以从根本上解决结构性矛盾，合作空间仍面临现实约束。美方若寄希望于中欧关系发展受阻来维持自身影响力，并不足以构成可持续战略。

跨大西洋贸易战可能对欧洲经济造成严重冲击，削弱其在对华谈判中的筹码，尤其在电动汽车和传统汽车产业领域。这一局面也可能促使欧洲对中国投资持更加开放的态度。尽管中国资本有助于振兴欧洲制造业，推动绿色转型，但由于欧盟缺乏统一的对外投资战略，相关合作往往缺少必要的保障机制和本土化要求，从而使得中资在欧洲的布局在一定程度上按照中方规则展开。这一趋势可能加速欧洲在特定经济领域向中国靠拢，从长远看可能改变美国在地区事务中的主导地位。

中国企业在欧洲的本土化发展有望提升中方在锂电池等关键领域的技术实力和供应链多元化能力，同时也可能对欧洲在某些地缘政治议题上与美国保持一致的意愿造成影响。若美国希望实现长期战略目标，仍需与盟友一道推动以规则为基础的国际经贸秩序，而不是依靠单边关税等对抗性措施。

当前，布鲁塞尔正处于地缘政治的关键时刻。欧盟虽然持续推进经济竞争力与安全机制建设，但可能低估了跨大西洋关系裂痕的深度以及中国国家主导型产业崛起带来的结构性挑战。

中欧峰会有助于缓解部分紧张氛围，但有限的让步难以从根本上解决结构性矛盾，合作空间仍面临现实约束。美方若寄希望于中欧关系发展受阻来维持自身影响力，并不足以构成可持续战略。华盛顿需要采取更加系统的政策安排，将外交沟通、经济利益与长远战略目标协调统一，尤其要在理解盟友处境的基础上，通过低调、务实的方式推进合作，避免将欧洲进一步推向中国。

Short Summary

The article by CSIS pointed out that the tariff threats imposed under the banner of the Trump administration’s “America First” trade agenda, while exerting short-term pressure on the European Union, risk weakening the transatlantic alliance and limiting Europe’s strategic flexibility in shaping its China policy. This, in turn, could ultimately undermine the United States’ own long-term interests. Amid continued growth in Chinese investment in Europe, U.S. tariffs on the EU may instead push Europe to deepen its economic ties with China.

The EU has repeatedly voiced concerns over China’s rapid advancements in high-tech sectors such as electric vehicles, batteries, and semiconductors. At the same time, it has criticized China’s perceived lack of a clear stance on the Russia–Ukraine conflict, which has affected the overall level of trust in China–EU relations. Despite a certain degree of consensus between Europe and the U.S. on China-related issues, in an ideal scenario, coordination and dialogue could help steer China toward deeper market-oriented reforms. However, in practice, both the Biden and Trump administrations have lacked a coherent and consistent China policy, with the latter tending toward unilateral approaches.

While the U.S. has in recent years pursued bilateral trade arrangements with countries such as the United Kingdom, Vietnam, and Indonesia—sending signals of a restructured global supply chain—these efforts have been undermined by a lack of transparency and implementation coherence. As a result, Washington’s China strategy appears fragmented and inconsistent, making it harder to align with allies in addressing shared challenges.

A transatlantic trade conflict would deal a significant blow to the European economy and erode its bargaining power with China, especially in the electric and traditional automotive sectors. This situation could prompt Europe to become more receptive to Chinese investment. Although Chinese capital may help revitalize European manufacturing and support its green transition, the absence of a unified EU investment strategy has meant that many of these transactions lack adequate safeguards and localization requirements. As a result, Chinese investments in Europe often unfold largely according to China’s own rules. This trend could accelerate Europe’s alignment with China in specific economic areas, potentially shifting the balance of regional influence away from the United States in the long run.

The article also notes that the localized development of Chinese enterprises in Europe could enhance China’s technological capabilities and supply chain resilience in key sectors such as lithium batteries. This may, in turn, reduce Europe’s willingness to fully align with the U.S. on certain geopolitical issues.

Europe currently stands at a critical geopolitical juncture. While the recent China–EU summit helped ease tensions to some extent, limited concessions are unlikely to address deeper structural contradictions, and the scope for meaningful cooperation remains constrained. If Washington places its hopes on stalled China–EU relations as a means of preserving influence, this alone does not constitute a sustainable strategy.

03

国际社会对中国的看法略有好转

**原标题：**International Views of China Turn Slightly More Positive

**发布机构：**皮尤研究中心（Pew Research Center）

关键词：中美关系

中文

根据皮尤研究中心在2025年对25个国家进行的调查并发布的报告《国际社会对中国看法略有好转》，全球对中国的整体印象正在出现改善迹象。在接受调查的国家中，有15国对中国持正面看法的比例上升，这是自2020年新冠疫情爆发以来首次出现较为广泛的好转。尽管如此，这一变化仍较为微小——全球中位数仅有36%的人对中国持正面看法，而54%持负面态度。

尽管整体好感有限，但越来越多的人认为中国已是全球第一大经济体。在此次调查中，有41%的受访者认为中国是全球领先的经济强国，而认为美国居首的比例为39%。这一趋势与两年前形成鲜明对比，当时认为美国是头号经济体的人远远多于中国。然而，在实际经济选择上，情况更为复杂——几乎所有受访国家的大多数人仍倾向于与美国建立更紧密的经济关系。不过，优先考虑与中国发展经贸关系的比例正在上升，尤其是在墨西哥，自2015年以来该比例已翻了三倍。

各国对中国的看法在高收入国家与中等收入国家之间存在显著差异。在此次调查的九个中等收入国家中，人们对中国的评价普遍比高收入国家更为积极。在印度尼西亚、土耳其和肯尼亚等国，中国投资受到较高认可，自2019年以来这一支持度显著上升。然而，积极评价的同时，也伴随着对中国影响力上升的担忧。在巴西、尼日利亚和印度尼西亚等国，部分民众表达了对与中国合作中可能出现的债务可持续性问题的关注，同时也对中国在地区安全事务和政治影响力方面的日益活跃表示关切。

北京的历史街区（图源：Getty Images）

值得注意的是，这些中等收入国家对美国也表达了类似的不安。例如，在南非，65%的受访者认为美国在人权方面的政策是一个严重问题，而持相同观点看待中国的比例为56%。这表明，中国在全球南方的影响虽在扩大，但民众态度更倾向于一种谨慎的务实，而非单方面的热情接纳。

在对“盟友”与“威胁”的认知上，美国在多国眼中的表现不如中国。在调查覆盖的九个中等收入国家中，没有一个国家将中国视为首要威胁；而在阿根廷、巴西、印度尼西亚、墨西哥和南非，公众中有相当比例认为美国才是最大的威胁。同时，中国被南非和印尼民众最常提及为本国最重要盟友；相比之下，阿根廷、巴西和墨西哥仍将美国视为头号伙伴。

总体来看，自2020年以来，全球对中美两国的观感差距明显缩小。这一变化部分归因于国际社会对特朗普的不信任，尤其在他是否具备应对全球经济挑战的能力上。在许多国家，对特朗普缺乏信心的受访者更倾向于支持与中国的经济往来。随着中美地缘竞争加剧，全球舆论之争也正变得更加动态复杂，尤其是在全球南方国家之间。此次调查表明，中国尚未真正赢得全世界，但其影响力正在上升；与此同时，各国在中美之间的选择也日益多元与微妙。

Short Summary

Global perceptions of China are showing signs of improvement, according to Pew Research Center’s report “International Views of China Turn Slightly More Positive” which includes a 2025 survey of 25 countries. Favorable views of China have increased in 15 of those countries—marking the first widespread shift toward positivity since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, when views plummeted to historic lows. Still, the change is modest. A global median of only 36% view China favorably, while 54% hold unfavorable views.

Despite the lukewarm sentiment, more people globally now view China as the world’s top economic power. In the current survey, 41% of respondents identify China as the leading global economy, compared with 39% who say the United States holds that title. This represents a significant shift from two years ago, when the U.S. was seen as the dominant economic power by a much wider margin. Nonetheless, economic alignment tells a more complex story. In nearly all countries surveyed, a majority of people still prefer closer economic ties with the U.S. over China. That said, the share of those prioritizing ties with China is growing—particularly in countries like Mexico, where such preferences have tripled since 2015.

One of the clearest dividing lines in attitudes lies between high- and middle-income countries. Views of China Xi are far more positive in the nine middle-income nations surveyed than in the 16 high-income ones. In many of these developing nations, Chinese investment is viewed favorably, especially in Indonesia, Turkey, and Kenya. Public approval of Chinese investment has risen significantly since 2019. However, this comes with growing unease. In countries like Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia, majorities express serious concern over the amount of national debt owed to China, as well as over issues like Beijing’s military power, political influence, and human rights record.

Importantly, people in these middle-income countries often express similar concerns about the United States. For example, 65% of South Africans say U.S. human rights policies are a serious problem, not far from the 56% who say the same about China. This suggests that while China’s presence may be growing, it is viewed through a lens of cautious pragmatism rather than blind enthusiasm.

When it comes to perceptions of allies and threats, the U.S. fares worse than China in several middle-income countries. China is not considered the top threat in any of the nine surveyed, whereas the U.S. is seen as the greatest threat by significant portions of the public in Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa. Meanwhile, South Africans and Indonesians most frequently name China as their country’s top ally. In contrast, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico still identify the U.S. as their strongest partner.

Finally, the overall gap in global views of the U.S. and China has narrowed significantly since 2020. This shift is partly fueled by growing distrust in President Donald Trump, particularly regarding his ability to manage the global economy. In many countries, people who lack confidence in Trump are more inclined to favor economic engagement with China. As geopolitical competition between the two powers intensifies, the battle for global public opinion is becoming more fluid, especially in the Global South. The survey underscores that while China has yet to fully win over the world, its influence is clearly rising—and so is the complexity of global allegiances.

04

欧盟制裁两家向俄提供援助的中国银行

**原标题：**European Union sanctions 2 Chinese banks over aid to Russia

发布机构：南华早报（South China Morning Post）****

关键词：中欧关系；制裁

中文

自俄乌冲突爆发以来，欧盟首次将两家中国小型银行——绥芬河农村商业银行和黑河农村商业银行——列入其第18轮制裁名单。布鲁塞尔方面称，这两家银行利用加密货币渠道，帮助俄罗斯进口已被欧盟禁运的商品；而中方则反驳道，这些交易是在限制措施出台前进行的正常贸易。

位于比利时布鲁塞尔的欧盟总部（图源：南华早报）

该制裁方案历经数周外交博弈后获批。期间，斯洛伐克在确保俄罗斯天然气将在 2028 年逐步停用后，不再使用其否决权。同一时期，中国外交部长王毅与欧盟代表卡娅·卡拉斯进行了多次交流，王毅明确警告将采取 “必要反制措施”。尽管这两家银行仍在制裁名单上，但欧盟同意，若六个月内能证明其停止违规活动，将重新评估制裁决定。

该问题在本周于北京召开的中欧峰会上也被提及。欧洲领导人计划就军民两用物品流入俄罗斯问题提出关切，而中方重申反对单边制裁的一贯立场，呼吁基于事实开展对话。中欧双方仍在探讨为第31届联合国气候变化大会（COP31）发表联合气候声明的可能性，但双方官员均表示，此次峰会的主要目标是进行坦诚的高层对话，而非取得实质性的突破。

Short Summary

In a first for the Ukraine conflict, the European Union has added two small Chinese lenders—Suifenhe Rural Commercial Bank and Heihe Rural Commercial Bank—to its 18th sanctions list. Brussels says the banks used crypto channels to help Russia import goods already under EU embargo; Beijing counters that the transactions were normal trade conducted before any restrictions existed.

Approval followed weeks of diplomacy in which Slovakia lifted its veto after securing a 2028 phase-out of Russian gas. During the same period, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and EU envoy Kaja Kallas held multiple exchanges in which Wang warned of “necessary counter-measures.” Although the banks remain on the list, the EU agreed to review their status in six months if evidence shows they have stopped any activity deemed sanctionable.

This issue was also raised at the China-EU summit held in Beijing this week. European leaders plan to raise concerns about the flow of dual-use items to Russia, while Chinese officials emphasize their long-standing position against unilateral sanctions and call for dialogue based on facts. Both sides are still discussing a possible joint climate statement for COP31, but officials on each side describe the summit’s main goal as a candid, high-level conversation rather than concrete breakthroughs.

05

中国对稀土的最强控制权在于金融“锁喉”

**原标题：**China’s tightest rare-earths headlock is financial

发布机构：路透社（Reuters）

关键词：稀土

中文

路透社发表的文章《中国对稀土的最强控制权在于金融“锁喉”》指出，西方国家正日益警觉中国在稀土精炼领域的主导地位——这个行业对电动车、导弹系统等关键技术至关重要。尽管稀土元素在地壳中并不稀少，但由于其提炼过程复杂、环节众多，成本极高，因此对西方企业来说一直缺乏吸引力，特别是在利润微薄、价格波动剧烈的背景下。

目前全球91%的稀土精炼产出来自中国。中国能够持续保持全球市场的领先地位，得益于政府长期稳定的支持政策，以及企业灵活应对低利润、高效率竞争环境的能力。相比之下，西方矿业公司更倾向于从事利润更高的原材料开采，基本放弃了复杂又费钱的精炼环节。这种失衡使西方国家在国防和绿色技术等关键领域陷入依赖，面临战略性脆弱。

内蒙古白云鄂博稀土矿（图源：路透社）

为了扭转局面，美国、法国、日本和韩国等国已开始动用公共资金支持本国的稀土项目，包括提供价格托底和政府采购承诺，以稳定市场。例如，美国国防部将设定价格底线来保障本土稀土生产的可持续性。

然而，即便在上述努力下，中国到2040年在全球稀土精炼市场的占比预计也只会降至73%。要真正打破这种依赖，西方国家还需采取更大规模、更有协同力的行动，比如组建国际联合体、建立国家战略库存等系统性干预。

Short Summary

The article published by Reuters titled “China’s tightest rare-earths headlock is financial” states that Western governments are increasingly alarmed by China’s dominance in rare earth refining — a sector critical for technologies ranging from electric vehicles to missile systems. Although rare earth elements are not geologically rare, they are extremely difficult and expensive to refine due to complex, multi-stage processes. This has made the industry unattractive to Western companies, particularly because of low margins and volatile prices.

China refines 91% of global rare earth output and maintains dominance through state subsidies and willingness to accept lower profitability. By contrast, Western miners prefer raw material extraction, which is more profitable, and have largely abandoned refining. This imbalance has left Western countries vulnerable, especially as rare earths are essential for defense and green technologies.

To counter this, governments like the U.S., France, Japan, and South Korea have begun to invest public money into rare earth projects, offering price guarantees and stockpile commitments to stabilize the market. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense will backstop rare earth prices to keep domestic production viable.

Still, even with current efforts, China’s market share in refining is only expected to fall to 73% by 2040. To make a serious dent, the West will need more coordinated, large-scale interventions — including international consortia and sovereign stockpiling.