伊朗对中国是真的忘恩负义、寡廉鲜耻、十恶不赦？_风闻
larryh-24分钟前
红迪有个问题帖：为什么中国帮助巴基斯坦获得核武器（我注：这个论点显然存疑），而不是伊朗？
本文来自于这个帖子的一个近年中伊关系事件的详尽回答。主要用微软翻译，人工略微润色，中英对照，错漏之处请海涵。
其中多数重要事件列出了参与各方、时间、相关人员、具体数字，具有相当的置信度，可作为参考。
但是，我个人认知来说，有一些疑点：
1、个别地方可能夸大其词；
2、站在西方传统国际关系价值观的语言（如中对伊“独家保护”）；
3、甚至可能编造事实，如“单方面终止了歼-10C 采购合同，转而引进俄制苏-35”。
因此个人不能排除这是很高级黑文，意在挑拨离间的可能性。我不是说伊朗没问题，伊朗对中国肯定是忘恩负义、寡廉鲜耻的小人无疑，但有没有那么罄竹难书、十恶不赦，我很怀疑。
以下为回答贴内容：
1. The 2014 Iran Nuclear Negotiations: The Starting Point of the Collapse of Trust
1. 2014 年伊朗核谈判：信任崩溃的起点
On November 24, 2014, at the negotiation table in the Hofburg Palace in Vienna, then-US Secretary of State John Kerry suddenly threw out a “Sanctions List of Chinese Companies Involved in Iran.”
2014 年 11 月 24 日，在维也纳霍夫堡宫的谈判桌上，时任美国国务卿约翰·克里突然抛出了一份“涉伊朗中国公司制裁名单”。
This 237-page document details the energy and communications equipment transactions between 68 Chinese companies and Iran, and even includes details of a 130 million euro computer equipment contract between Huawei’s subsidiary Skycom and Iran’s telecommunications company.
这份 237 页的文件详细介绍了 68 家中国公司与伊朗之间的能源和通信设备交易，甚至还包括华为子公司 Skycom 与伊朗电信公司之间价值 1.3 亿欧元的计算机设备合同的细节。
The Iranian negotiator admitted on the spot that it was “based on international anti-money laundering cooperation obligations” and provided some information, which directly led to the US Department of Justice initiating “bank fraud” charges against Meng Wanzhou the following year.
伊朗谈判代表当场承认是“基于国际反洗钱合作义务”，并提供了一些信息，直接导致美国司法部在次年对孟晚舟发起了“银行欺诈”指控。
Behind this deal is a secret game between the United States and Iran: the United States promised to unfreeze Iran’s $8 billion overseas assets in exchange for its cooperation in cracking down on “Chinese and Russian companies that violated sanctions.”
这笔交易的背后是美国和伊朗之间的秘密游戏：美国承诺解冻伊朗 80 亿美元的海外资产，以换取其合作打击“违反制裁的中国和俄罗斯公司”。
Zanganeh, then Iran’s oil minister, revealed in his memoirs: “We need to prove our sincerity in reform to the West. China and Russia will never truly understand the spirit of the Islamic Revolution.”
时任伊朗石油部长的赞加内在他的回忆录中透露：“我们需要向西方证明我们改革的诚意。中国和俄罗斯永远不会真正理解伊斯兰革命的精神。”
This strategic misjudgment directly triggered a chain reaction - Huawei was forced to withdraw from Iran’s 5G construction project, ZTE paid a fine of US$890 million, and the development rights of CNPC’s South Pars gas field were transferred to France’s Total.
这一战略误判直接引发了连锁反应——华为被迫退出伊朗 5G 建设项目，中兴通讯支付了 8.9 亿美元的罚款，中石油南帕尔斯气田的开发权被转让给了法国的道达尔。
The deeper rift lies in the subversion of business ethics. After the signing of the Iran nuclear agreement in 2015, Iran unilaterally abolished 14 infrastructure contracts signed with Chinese companies with a total value of over US$12 billion, including projects such as the Tehran Metro extension and the Isfahan refinery.
更深的裂痕在于对商业道德的颠覆。2015 年签署伊朗核协议后，伊朗单方面取消了与中国公司签署的 14 项总价值超过 120 亿美元的基础设施合同，其中包括德黑兰地铁扩建和伊斯法罕炼油厂等项目。
Iranian Industry Minister Rahmani publicly declared: “The technical standards of European companies are more in line with the values of Islamic civilization.”
伊朗工业部长拉赫马尼公开宣称：“欧洲公司的技术标准更符合伊斯兰文明的价值观。”
Ironically, companies such as Siemens and Alstom have never dared to enter the market in a substantial manner due to concerns about US sanctions, resulting in these projects remaining just steel skeletons in the desert.
具有讽刺意味的是，由于担心美国制裁，西门子和阿尔斯通等公司从未敢以实质性的方式进入市场，导致这些项目沦为沙漠中的钢骨架。
2. The China-Iran 25-Year Agreement: A Testing Ground for Asymmetric Cooperation
2. 中伊 25 年协议：不对称合作的试验场
The China-Iran Comprehensive Cooperation Plan signed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Tehran on March 27, 2021 could have been a milestone in Middle East geopolitics.
中国外交部长王毅于 2021 年 3 月 27 日在德黑兰签署的《中伊全面合作规划》可能成为中东地缘政治的一个里程碑。
The agreement covers an investment of US$400 billion in energy, infrastructure, military industry and other fields, and specifically stipulates strategic cooperation such as settling oil trade in RMB, replacing GPS with the Beidou system, and jointly developing the Hormuz Strait Free Trade Zone.
协议涵盖能源、基础设施、军工等领域 4000 亿美元的投资，并明确规定了以人民币结算石油贸易、以北斗系统取代 GPS、共同开发霍尔木兹海峡自由贸易区等战略合作。
However, the agreement encountered three difficulties at the beginning of its implementation:
然而，该协议在实施之初就遇到了三个困难：
Financial channel obstruction. Despite the establishment of Kunlun Bank as a special settlement channel, the Central Bank of Iran has always refused to disclose details of its foreign exchange reserves.
金融渠道受阻。尽管昆仑银行设立了专门的结算渠道，但伊朗中央银行一直拒绝披露其外汇储备的细节。
In 2022, Iran’s oil exports to China surged to 920,000 barrels per day, but nearly 30% of the payment was misappropriated by Iran to purchase Turkish gold and Indian medicines, resulting in a break in the funding chain of Chinese companies’ refining projects.
2022 年，伊朗对中国的石油出口飙升至每天 92 万桶，但近 30% 的货款被伊朗挪用购买土耳其黄金和印度药品，导致中国企业炼油项目的资金链断裂。
Inconsistent policies. During the construction of Chabahar Port, Iran changed its plan six times: from a free trade zone to a military base, and then to an oil reserve center.
政策不一致。在恰巴哈尔港建设期间，伊朗六次改变了计划：从自由贸易区到军事基地，再到石油储备中心。
Li Minghao, project manager of China Communications Construction Group, revealed: “Every change requires China to make additional investment, but refuses to provide sovereign guarantees.” In the end, this strategic port became a “black hole project” for which Chinese companies set aside 2.3 billion yuan in bad debts.
中国交通建设集团项目经理李明浩透露：“每一次变化都需要中国进行额外投资，但拒绝提供主权担保。最终，这个战略港口变成了一个“黑洞工程”，中国公司为此拨出了 23 亿元的坏账。”
Technology transfer trap. Iran has forced Chinese companies to adopt a “51% localization rate” in their energy projects, but Iranian technicians leaked the shale gas extraction technology provided by China to Gazprom.
技术转移陷阱。伊朗强迫中国公司在其能源项目中采用“51% 的本地化率”，但伊朗技术人员向俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司（Gazprom）泄露了中国提供的页岩气开采技术。
What is even more absurd is that in 2023, the Iranian Ministry of Petroleum refused to accept the eight sets of deep-sea drilling equipment delivered by Sinopec on the grounds that “technical parameters did not meet the standards”, but turned around and used the design drawings of the equipment to negotiate with ExxonMobil.
更荒谬的是，2023 年，伊朗石油部以“技术参数不符合标准”为由拒绝接受中石化交付的八套深海钻探设备，而是转身利用设备的设计图纸与埃克森美孚谈判。
3. The Middle East chess game: a strategic shift from a “mediator” to a “loss stopper”
3. 中东国际象棋游戏：从“调解人”到“止损人”的战略转变
The holding of the first China-Arab Summit in December 2022 marks a major adjustment in China’s Middle East policy.
2022 年 12 月举行首届中阿峰会，标志着中国中东政策的重大调整。
When Saudi Arabia promised to give priority to supplying oil to China in the next 50 years and the UAE announced its joining the New Development Bank of BRICS, senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard General Jaafari suddenly summoned the Chinese ambassador to Iran and threatened that “any action that undermines the balance in the Persian Gulf will pay a price.”
当沙特阿拉伯承诺在未来 50 年内优先向中国供应石油，阿联酋宣布加入金砖国家新开发银行时，伊朗革命卫队高级将军贾法里突然召见中国驻伊朗大使，并威胁说“任何破坏波斯湾平衡的行动都将付出代价”。
Behind this diplomatic gaffe is Iran’s deep anxiety about losing “exclusive protection from China.” The secret negotiations in Beijing in March 2023 could have been a strategic opportunity for Iran.
这种外交失误的背后是伊朗对失去“来自中国的独家保护”的深深焦虑。2023 年 3 月在北京举行的秘密谈判对伊朗来说可能是一个战略机会。
Under the mediation of Chinese envoys, Saudi Crown Prince Salman and Iranian President Raisi reached the “Beijing Reconciliation Declaration”, agreeing to establish embassies in each other’s country, resume oil transit, and jointly develop oil and gas fields in the Persian Gulf.
在中国特使的斡旋下，沙特王储萨勒曼和伊朗总统莱希达成了《北京和解宣言》，同意在对方国家设立大使馆，恢复石油过境，共同开发波斯湾油气田。
But before the ink on the agreement had dried, Iran provided the Houthis with Quds-2 cruise missile technology, leading to another attack on Saudi Aramco’s oil facilities.
但在协议的墨迹还没干之前，伊朗就向胡塞武装提供了圣城旅-2 （Quds-2） 巡航导弹技术，导致沙特阿美的石油设施再次遭到袭击。
This act of “setting fire to the negotiating table” has completely destroyed China’s political credibility. The plane crash of President Lehi in May 2024 became a turning point in Sino-Iranian relations.
这种“放火烧桌”的行为，彻底摧毁了中国的政治信誉。2024 年 5 月莱希总统的飞机失事成为中伊关系的转折点。
In his first week in office, the new president Mukhberi publicly questioned: “China promised to invest $400 billion, but less than $30 billion has actually been received.”
新总统穆赫贝里在上任第一周就公开质疑：“中国承诺投资 4000 亿美元，但实际上收到的不到 300 亿美元。”
Such remarks, which misinterpret the long-term investment agreement as “aid grants”, expose the Iranian decision-makers’ ignorance of modern economic and trade rules.
这些言论将长期投资协议误解为“援助赠款”，暴露了伊朗决策者对现代经济和贸易规则的无知。
A more serious provocation occurred in the military field: Iran’s Ministry of Defense unilaterally terminated the J-10C procurement contract and instead introduced the Russian-made Su-35 on the grounds of “maintaining technological sovereignty”, but in fact it was because Moscow promised to provide uranium enrichment purification technology.
军事领域发生了更严重的挑衅：伊朗国防部以“维护技术主权”为由单方面终止了歼-10C 采购合同，转而引进俄制苏-35，但实际上是因为莫斯科承诺提供铀浓缩净化技术。
4. 2024 Persian Gulf Crisis: Final Settlement of Strategic Negative Assets
4. 2024 年波斯湾危机：战略负资产的最终结算
On October 12, 2024, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard suddenly announced that “any attack on the mainland will trigger indiscriminate strikes against the Gulf countries,” directly pointing the finger at Saudi Arabia.
2024 年 10 月 12 日，伊朗革命卫队突然宣布“对大陆的任何攻击都将引发对海湾国家的无差别打击”，直接将矛头指向沙特阿拉伯。
It was only 17 days since China and Saudi Arabia signed the Jeddah Defense Cooperation Agreement, which included China’s technology transfer to Saudi Arabia’s Rainbow-7 UAV production line.
距中国和沙特阿拉伯签署吉达防务合作协议仅有 17 天，其中包括中国向沙特阿拉伯的彩虹 7 无人机生产线转让技术。
Iran’s military adventure not only threatens China’s $65 billion Red Sea New City project, but also shakes the foundation of China’s Middle East strategy - energy security and geopolitical balance.
伊朗的军事冒险不仅威胁到中国 650 亿美元的红海新城项目，还动摇了中国中东战略的基础——能源安全和地缘政治平衡。
Beijing finally launched the “strategic stop-loss procedure”:
北京终于启动了“战略止损程序”：
Suspend all sovereign loan approvals to Iran; Withdraw technical personnel from 23 projects including Chabahar Port and Isfahan Photovoltaic Industrial Park; Put Iran on the list of “high-risk investment countries” and require companies to purchase political risk insurance for new contracts; The UN Security Council tacitly approved the United States’ strengthening of the oil embargo on Iran.
暂停对伊朗的所有主权贷款批准;撤出恰巴哈尔港、伊斯法罕光伏产业园等 23 个项目的技术人员;将伊朗列入“高风险投资国”名单，要求公司为新合同购买政治风险保险;联合国安理会默许美国加强对伊朗的石油禁运。
This shift is by no means accidental. According to the Ministry of Commerce’s ODI filing data, China’s direct investment in Iran plummeted 87% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2025, while investment in Saudi Arabia increased by 214% and in the UAE by 179% during the same period.
这种转变绝非偶然。根据商务部的 ODI 申报数据，2025 年第一季度中国对伊朗的直接投资同比暴跌 87%，同期对沙特阿拉伯的投资增长 214%，对阿联酋的投资增长 179%。
The “Iron Camel Caravan” that once spanned Europe and Asia is quietly turning toward the Persian Gulf.
曾经横跨欧洲和亚洲的“铁骆驼大篷车”正在悄然转向波斯湾。
5. Mirror and reflection: the dilemma in international relations
5. 镜子与倒影：国际关系中的困境
Iran’s dilemma has taught great power diplomacy a profound lesson:
伊朗的困境给大国外交上了深刻的一课：
The double-edged sword of interest bundling: When China undertakes 78% of Iran’s oil exports between 2016 and 2023, it invisibly emboldens Iran’s “blackmail diplomacy”. This one-way dependence instead weakens its strategic initiative.
利益捆绑的双刃剑：当中国在 2016 年至 2023 年期间承担伊朗 78% 的石油出口时，它无形中助长了伊朗的“勒索外交”。这种单向依赖反而削弱了它的战略主动性。
The gap in civilizational cognition: The historical glory of the Persian Empire and the Shia “martyrdom” ideology are intertwined, making it difficult for the Iranian elite to understand the spirit of modern contracts. Said, a professor at the University of Tehran, pointed out: “In their eyes, contracts are not legal documents, but temporary records of the game between the strong and the weak.”
文明认知的差距：波斯帝国的历史辉煌和什叶派的“殉道”意识形态交织在一起，使得伊朗精英难以理解现代契约的精神。德黑兰大学教授赛义德指出：“在他们眼中，合同不是法律文件，而是强者与弱者博弈的临时记录。
The metabolic law of geopolitics: The Middle East is transforming from a “conflict continent” to a “development highland”. The new forces represented by Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” and the UAE’s “Artificial Intelligence Strategy” are eliminating “revolution exporting” economies such as Iran.
地缘政治的新陈代谢规律：中东正在从“冲突大陆”转变为“发展高地”。以沙特阿拉伯的“2030 年愿景”和阿联酋的“人工智能战略”为代表的新力量正在淘汰伊朗等“革命输出”经济体。
The “No China, No Future” graffiti currently appearing on the streets of Iran is the bitter fruit of strategic shortsightedness. However, when Chinese oil tankers bypassed the Strait of Hormuz and rerouted to the Cape of Good Hope in Africa, this former “Middle Eastern ally” was sliding into the abyss of “strategic negative assets” on the geopolitical map.
目前出现在伊朗街头的“没有中国，就没有未来”的涂鸦是战略短视的苦果。然而，当中国油轮绕过霍尔木兹海峡，改道前往非洲的好望角时，这个曾经的“中东盟友”正在滑入地缘政治版图上“战略负资产”的深渊。