独家｜波黑驻华大使：波黑的未来不应由外人书写_风闻

Club提要：波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那是一个由两个高度自治的政治实体——塞族共和国和波黑联邦，以及一个自治的布尔奇科特区组成的国家。这种独特的结构源于1995年的《代顿和平协议》，该协议结束了波黑战争，确保了波什尼亚克族、塞尔维亚族和克罗地亚族三个民族的权力平衡。2025年，波黑的局势因塞族共和国总统多迪克拒绝执行高级代表施密特的决定而被判刑而变得更加紧张。高级代表由《代顿和平协议》设立，负责协调和平进程，但1997年获得的“波恩权力”允许其绕过议会强加法律或罢免官员，这一权力未获波黑宪法明确支持。

近日，波黑驻华大使贝里扬（Sinisa Berjan）为北京对话独家撰稿：《强加的权威与民选意志：波黑能否决定自己的未来？》（Imposed Authority vs. Elected Will: Can Bosnia Decide Its Own Future?），深入剖析了波黑当前面临的宪法与政治危机。他指出，波黑危机的根源并非内部的不稳定，而是外部的干预。高级代表办公室并非波黑政府的一部分，而是外部设立的国际机构。高级代表施密特强加的决定，威胁了波黑民选政府的权威和国家主权。

自上任以来，贝里扬大使积极推动中波关系发展，深化文化、教育和经济合作。2025年适逢中波黑建交三十周年，贝里扬大使的文章为中国读者打开了理解波黑复杂局势的窗口，反映了他在外部干预下坚定捍卫国家主权的立场。

Club Briefing: Bosnia and Herzegovina is a nation composed of two highly autonomous political entities—the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—along with the autonomous Brčko District. This unique structure originated from the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the Bosnian War and ensured a balance of power among the three constituent peoples: Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats.

In 2025, tensions in Bosnia escalated when the President of Republika Srpska, Dodik, was convicted for refusing to implement decisions imposed by the High Representative Schmidt. The Office of the High Representative, established by the Dayton Agreement to oversee the peace process, acquired “Bonn Powers” in 1997, enabling it to bypass parliamentary procedures to impose laws or dismiss officials—a power not explicitly supported by Bosnia’s constitution.

Recently, Bosnia’s Ambassador to China, Sinisa Berjan, contributed an exclusive article to Beijing Club for International Dialogue titled “Imposed Authority vs. Elected Will: Can Bosnia Decide Its Own Future?”, offering a deep analysis of Bosnia’s ongoing constitutional and political crisis. He emphasized that the root of Bosnia’s turmoil lies not in internal instability, but in external intervention. The Office of the High Representative, he noted, is not part of Bosnia’s government but an external international institution. Decisions imposed by High Representative Schmidt threaten the authority of Bosnia’s democratically elected government and its national sovereignty.

Since assuming his role, Ambassador Berjan has actively promoted China-Bosnia relations, deepening cooperation in culture, education, and the economy. As 2025 marks the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties between China and Bosnia, his article opens a window for Chinese readers to understand Bosnia’s complex realities and reflects his steadfast commitment to defending national sovereignty against external interference.

引言：处于十字路口的国家

波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那（以下简称波黑）是一个历史坎坷、政治格局复杂的国家。在《代顿和平协议》签署近三十年后，波黑正站在一个关键的十字路口。这份协议当初旨在结束冲突、确保和平并推动民主转型，但随着时间的推移，它演变为一种长期的国际监督状态。如今，波黑正面临自战后以来最严重的政治和宪法危机。危机的根源并非内部不稳定，而是外国官员持续强加决定，无视国家主权，试图架空民选代表。其中，现任高级代表尤为突出——这位非民选人物未经任何民主程序确认合法性，却在波黑拥有重大权力，实际上在一个不属于他的国家中“统治”，其权威几乎没有明确界限。这引发了根本性的疑问：一个主权国家若其关键政治决定由不受选民问责的外国专制者掌控，还能被视为真正的民主国家吗？波黑在其迈向欧盟成员国的道路上，若继续处于事实上的国际管理之下，能否充分发挥作为一个自治欧洲国家的潜力？显然，持续的国际干预正将波黑变成一个现代版的“保护国”，这在任何主权民主国家中都是不可想象的先例。

巴尔干半岛的心脏——波黑首都萨拉热窝（图源：Quora）

宪法架构：微妙的平衡

波黑的治理体系复杂且高度分权，反映了其人民在民族和政治上的多样性。国家由两个高度自治的实体组成：塞族共和国和波黑联邦（后者进一步划分为十个州），以及自治的布尔奇科特区。权力在三个构成民族——波什尼亚克族、塞尔维亚族和克罗地亚族之间共享。《代顿和平协议》结束了冲突，建立了一个民主的宪法架构，旨在确保没有单一民族能够支配其他民族。该协议还规定，关键职能如教育、医疗和内部安全由实体而非中央政府管辖。在许多领域，国家级政府主要扮演协调角色。

这种分权体系并非弱点，而是波黑多民族社会的体现，也是《代顿和平协议》框架的重要组成部分。为了更清晰地理解这一体系，可以将其与比利时进行比较。比利时是另一个欧洲分权国家，拥有多个语言社区，通过区域政府和议会运作，权力分享以反映多样性和防止中央集权为原则。然而，与波黑不同的是，比利时没有一个非民选的外国权威有权强加法律或推翻其民主机构的决定。

1995年，波黑、南联盟、克罗地亚（代表波黑克族）三国领导人于正式签订波黑和平框架协议。（图源：Quora）

超越代顿：谁在治理波黑？

波黑的宪法体系通过1995年签署的《和平总框架协议》（即《代顿协议》）确立。高级代表办公室（OHR）由该协议设立，负责监督和平协议的实施，确保波黑在战后过渡期的稳定。高级代表的角色最初被设想为协调和支持，但其影响力和权力逐渐扩大。1997年，和平执行委员会（PIC）——一个由国际行为体组成的团体——赋予高级代表额外的“波恩权力”，允许其强加法律、绕过议会程序并罢免民选官员。

必须强调，《代顿协议》中定义的PIC仅有权提出建议，而无权发布具有法律约束力的决定。此外，所谓的“波恩权力”在《代顿协议》原文中并未明确提及，也未获得波黑三个构成民族的一致同意，在国家宪法中缺乏依据。尽管这些权力最初是为了在国家脆弱的早期稳定局势而引入，但近三十年后其持续使用引发了越来越多的争议。这些权力在缺乏明确法律依据的情况下，其合法性正受到质疑。辩论的核心是一个关键问题：在民主国家中，缺乏明确宪法或法律依据的权力——在《代顿协议》中没有直接法律基础的权力——是否仍应被行使？为了波黑的未来，这一问题必须通过包容且透明的对话解决，优先考虑国内自主权和宪法完整性。

波黑国内各族的势力分布图（图源：地球知识局）

高级代表争议：施密特风波

现任高级代表克里斯蒂安·施密特先生自2021年上任以来，其合法性始终备受争议。根据《代顿协议》，联合国安理会必须正式批准高级代表的任命。然而，施密特未经这一关键步骤即上任，引发了对其授权合法性和有效性的严重质疑。他的近期行动进一步加剧了这些担忧，特别是他强加的《刑法》修正案引发了政治压迫的担忧。这些修正案允许逮捕、起诉或罢免反对高级代表决定的民选官员，强化了人们对该办公室已成为政治工具而非和平进程中立仲裁者的看法。施密特的个人法令统治是对波黑民主宪法的公然违反，也是对其公民民事和政治权利的直接冒犯。他的法令不受任何国内外法院或管理机构的审查，实际上无人可问责。

民主信任：一个合法性的问题

作为一个主权国家，波黑应被信任通过民主方式管理自身事务。当一个不受波黑人民问责的非民选权威有权推翻民选代表的决定时，真正的民主还能存在吗？波黑的民主制度或许不完美，但它们是由人民选择的，这些制度必须在国家治理中拥有最终决定权。一个非民选外国官员持续拥有绕过民主程序的权力，引发了对制度合法性的严重关切。波黑要成为成熟的民主国家，取决于对其自身制度的信任，以及对其人民自治能力的信任。持续的国际干预可能使波黑陷入依赖状态。越来越多的人认识到，波黑在政治和制度上已取得进步。国际监督应退场，让位于本地领导，外部强加的法律必须终止。

高级代表克雷斯蒂安·施密特在联合国安理会会议上就波黑局势发表讲话。（图源：联合国新闻）

国庆节与象征：分裂的身份

即使在象征性事务上，如国庆节，也揭示了强加的叙事与民主共识之间的更广泛紧张关系。3月1日（独立日）和11月25日（国家日）主要由波什尼亚克族和部分克罗地亚族庆祝，而许多塞尔维亚族人，特别是塞族共和国的居民，不承认这些日期为官方国庆节，主要是因为没有国家级法律正式宣布这些日期为波黑的国庆节。因此，这些日期不能被视为真正意义上的国庆节，因为它们未在全国范围内统一庆祝，也未被三个构成民族普遍接受。相比之下，塞族共和国庆祝的1月9日尽管在实体层面由法律确立，却面临宪法挑战。

这反映了在一个社会深刻分裂的国家中创建统一国家身份的更广泛挑战。国庆节应促进团结，但在波黑，它们往往加深了现有分歧。外国行为体若不顾这些日期的争议性地位而公开支持某些节日，可能会通过选择性认可而非和解加剧分裂。更具包容性的方法——尊重国家法律框架，鼓励围绕纪念实践的国内对话——将是更具建设性的方式。

波斯尼亚战争结束超过25年后，在波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的一个村庄仍可看到战争留下的残迹。（联合国新闻）

国际行为体应为伙伴，而非监督者

波黑局势持续吸引包括地区大国和全球性机构在内的国际行为体的广泛关注。它们在波黑战后恢复中的贡献——经济援助、维和、机构建设——不容否认。然而，随着国家向前迈进，国际参与的性质必须转变。这些行为体不应继续扮演监督角色，而应转向伙伴角色：支持波黑的政治机构，同时尊重《代顿协议》、国家主权和内部政治对话。

外国行为体不应强加决定或为特定政治议程提供选择性支持。它们的角色应是鼓励对话，协助波黑领导人找到共同点，应对国家挑战。重点必须是加强本国的政治领导机构，促进其独立性，支持合法代表之间的协作，而非维持外部监督。只有通过增强国内政治能动性并尊重波黑实体特定的宪法角色，国际行为体才能为波黑的长期稳定作出积极贡献。

1995年7月，波黑战争接近尾声时，塞族军队在两周内屠杀了大约8000名波什尼亚克族男子。如今，在居民楼间、去往黄堡的路上，随处可见穆斯林墓碑。（图源：搜狐网）

走向自主与对话的未来

尽管面临政治危机，波黑的安全局势并未受到威胁。国家面临的挑战主要是政治性质，而非生存危机。这使得建设性和包容性的制度对话不仅可能，而且至关重要。在《代顿协议》签署30周年之际，亟需回归其核心原则，强调宪法对话、相互尊重和国内对国家未来的自主权。这包括通过国内政治实体承担全部责任，重新审视缺乏政治合法性的外部强加法律。

逐步取消高级代表的角色必须是这一进程的一部分。波黑的政治实体和国家部门完全有能力管理自身事务，国际监督已不再必要。政治争端应通过宪法规定的机制在内部解决。国际行为体应支持这一过渡，而非阻碍。波黑致力于其欧盟成员国之路，欧盟委员会已明确表示，高级代表办公室对波黑的“监督”与国家主权及欧盟志向相矛盾。未来的优先事项应包括终止外国法律的强加，促进政治实体间的建设性对话，基于平等伙伴关系培育族际合作。

2月26日，波黑法院对塞族共和国总统米洛拉德·多迪克被控藐视宪法法院和波黑高级代表克里斯蒂安·施密特的决定一案做出判决。他将面临五年徒刑并且被禁止从事政治活动。（图源：俄罗斯卫星通讯社）

结论：由波黑人民书写的未来

波黑的和平与宪法框架依然完整，但正日益受到外部压力和强加决策的紧张影响。国家围绕两个实体和一个自治区的复杂结构必须被视为多样化社会的基础，而非障碍。只有当波黑被允许作为一个真正独立的国家运作——由其人民的意志而非外国官员的指令治理——才能实现可持续的和平、有效的治理和民主的合法性。国际行为体应正视这一现实，重新调整其方式。

波黑的政治稳定之路不在于更多的监督和强加决定，而在于支持波黑的制度，尊重其宪法和《代顿协议》，赋予其民选代表在无外部干预下的领导权。这并非要求波黑拒绝国际支持，而是恳请国际行为体认识到波黑在政治上的成熟，准备好规划自己的道路。波黑寻求的是伙伴关系，而非庇护。国内领导人也肩负责任。他们必须通过有意义的对话，展现政治勇气，将共同利益置于狭隘利益之上，拥抱对波黑未来的自主权。让波黑的未来不是由外人书写，而是由其人民通过对话、尊严和民主意志亲手谱写。

以下为英文原文：

Introduction: A Country at a Crossroads

Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country with a turbulent history and a complex political landscape, finds itself at a crossroads nearly thirty years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. What was once designed as an arrangement to secure peace and facilitate democratic transition has, over time, evolved into a prolonged phase of international supervision. Today, Bosnia is confronting its most serious political and constitutional crisissince theend of the conflict.

The root of this crisis lies not in internal instability, but in the ongoing imposition of decisions by foreign officialswho disregard the country’s sovereignty and attempt to sideline its locally elected representatives. Among them, the current High Representative stands out—an unelected figure whose legitimacy has never been affirmed through any democratic process. This individual wields significant power over Bosnia’s future without ever having been elected by its citizens, practically “ruling” in a country that is not his ownwith no clear limits to his authority.

The situation has raised fundamental concerns: Can a sovereign state truly be considered democratic if key political decisions are dictated by foreign autocrat unaccountable to its electorate? Can Bosnia and Herzegovina, on its path toward becoming a member of the European Union (EU), ever realize its full potential as a self-governing European nation if it remains under de facto international administration?

Obviously, continued international interference is turning Bosnia and Herzegovina into a modern-day protectorate, a precedent unimaginable in any sovereign democratic state.

The Constitutional Architecture: A Delicate Balance

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country with a complex and decentralized system of governance, reflecting the diverse ethnic and political realities of its people. The country is made up of two highly autonomous entities: Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, latter further divided into ten cantons, along with the self-governing Brčko District. Power is shared among three constituent peoples - Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.

The Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the conflict, established a democratic constitutional structure intended to ensure that no single group could dominate the others.

It also created a structure in which key competencies—such as education, healthcare, and internal security—remain under the authority of the entities, rather than a central government. In many areas, the state-level government functions primarily as a coordinating body. This decentralized system is not a weakness, but a reflection of Bosnia’s multi-ethnic society— and a vital component of the Dayton peace framework.

To understand this system more clearly,it is useful to compare it with Belgium. Belgium, anotherEuropean decentralized state with multiple linguistic communities, operates through separate governments and parliaments for its regions. Power-sharing designed to reflect diversity and the prevention of centralized dominance are key principles. However, unlike Bosnia, Belgium does not have an unelected foreign authority empowered to impose laws or override the decisions of its democratic institutions.

Beyond Dayton: Who Governs Bosnia Today?

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional setup was established through the General Framework Agreement for Peace, known as the Dayton Accords, signed in 1995.

The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was also created by Dayton to oversee civilian aspects of the peace agreement andensure the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina during its post-war transition. Originally envisioned as a coordinating and supportive role, the position of the High Representative has gradually expanded its influence and powers over time.

In 1997, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)—a group of international actors involved in the peace process—granted the High Representative additional powers, known as the “Bonn Powers,” which allowed the position to impose laws, bypass parliamentary processes, and remove elected officials.

It is important to emphasize that the PIC, as defined in the Dayton, hold the authority to make recommendations, but not to issue legally binding decisions. Moreover, the so-called Bonn Powers are not explicitly mentioned in the original text of the Dayton Agreement, were never agreed upon by all three constituent peoplesof Bosnia and Herzegovina, and have no basis in the country’s Constitution.

While these powers were initially introduced with the intention to “stabilize the country in its fragile early years”, their continued use almost three decades later has become a source of growing controversy. The legitimacy of these powers, especially in the absence of clear legal grounding, is now being questioned.

At the heart of the debate lies a critical question: Should powers that lack clear constitutional or legal grounding— which have no direct legal foundation in the Dayton Agreement—still be exercised in a sovereign, democratic state? For Bosnia and Herzegovina to move forward, this question must be addressed through an inclusive and transparent dialogue that prioritizes domestic ownership and constitutional integrity.

The High Representative Debate: The Schmidt Controversy

The legitimacy of the current High Representative, Mr. Christian Schmidt, who assumed office in 2021, remains a point of contention. According to the Dayton Agreement, the United Nations Security Council must formally approve the appointment of the High Representative. However, Schmidt took office without this crucial step, raising serious question about the legality and validity of his mandate.

His recent actions have only fueled these concerns. Notably, his imposition of controversial amendments to the Criminal Code has sparked fears of political repression. These amendments enable to arrest, prosecution, or removal of elected officials who oppose the High Representative’s decisions, reinforcing the perception that the office has become a political instrument rather than a neutral arbiter in the peace processSchmidt’s rule by personal decree represents a stark violation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s democratic constitution and a direct affront to the civil and political rights of its citizens.His edicts are immune from review by any court or governing body, inside or outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. He practically answers to no one.

Trust in Democracy: A Legitimate Question

As a sovereign state, Bosnia and Herzegovina should be trusted to manage its own affairs through democratic means. Can true democracy exist when an unelected authority—answerable to no one in Bosnia and Herzegovina—holds the power to override the decisions of elected representatives? Bosnia’s democratic institutions may not be perfect but they are chosen by the people, and these institutions must have the final say in governing the country. The continued presence of an unelected foreign official with the authority to bypass democratic processes raises serious concerns about the legitimacy of the system.

Bosnia’s ability to mature as a democracy depends on trust—trust in its own institutions and trust in the capacity of its people to govern themselves. Continued international interference risks keeping Bosnia in a state of dependency. There is a growing recognition that Bosnia and Herzegovina has progressed politically and institutionally. The time has come for international supervision to step back and give a way to local leadership. The imposition of laws from externally sources must come to an end. 

National Holidays and Symbolism: Divided Identities:

Even symbolic matters, like national holidays, reveal the broader tensions between imposed narratives and democratic consensus in Bosnia. Dates like March 1st (Independence Day) and November 25th (Statehood Day) are primarily observed by Bosniaks and some Croats, while many Serbs, especially those in Republika Srpska, do not recognize these dates as official national holidays. This is largely due to the fact that there is no state-level law formally declaring them as national holidays of Bosnia and Herzegovina.Consequently, these dates cannot be considered national holidays in the truest sense, as they are not universally celebrated across the country nor embraced by all three constituent peoples.

In contrast, January 9th, celebrated in Republika Srpska, has faced constitutional challenges, despite being established by law at the entity level.

This reflects the broader challenge of creating a unified national identity in a country with deeply divided communities. National holidays should promote unity, but in Bosnia, they often deepen existing divides. Foreign actors who publicly endorse certain holidays without regard to their contested status may inadvertently reinforce division through selective recognition rather than reconciliation. A more inclusive approach—one that respects the country’s legal framework and encourages domestic dialogue around commemorative practices —would be a more productive way to move forward.

Shifting Roles: International Actors as Partners, Not Overseers

Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to attract considerable attention from international actors, including regional powers and global institutions. Their contributionsin Bosnia’s post-war recovery—economic aid, peacekeeping, institution-building—cannot be dismissed. However, as the country moves forward, the nature of international engagement must evolve. Rather than maintaining a supervisory role, these actors should shift to a role of partnership: supporting Bosnia’s political institutions while respecting Dayton Agreement, the country’s sovereigntyand internal political dialogue.

Foreign actors should not impose decisions or provide selective support for particular political agendas. Their role should be to encourage dialogue and assist Bosnia’s leaders in finding common ground to address national challenges. The emphasis must be on strengthening local institutions, fostering their independence, and supporting collaboration among the country’s legitimate representatives—not sustaining external oversight.

Only by reinforcing domestic political agency and respecting the specific constitutional roles of Bosnia’s entities can international actors contribute positively to the country’s long-term stability. 

Toward a Future of Ownership and Dialogue

Despite its political crisis, security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not under threat. The challenges the country faces are primarily political in nature, not existential. This makes constructive and inclusive institutional dialogue not only possible but essential.

As we approach the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Agreement, there is an urgent need to return to its core principles, which emphasizing constitutional dialogue, mutual respect, and domestic ownership of the country’s future. This includes taking full responsibility through domestic institutions and revisiting externally imposed laws that lack political legitimacy.

Phasing out the role of the High Representative must be part of this process. Bosnia’s entities and state-level institutions are fully capable of managing their own affairs, and international supervision is no longer necessary. Political disputes should be resolved internally through the mechanisms outlined in country’s constitution.International actors should support this transition, not stand in its way.

Bosnia and Herzegovina remains committed to its path to EU membershipand the European Commission has made it clear that the OHR’s “supervision” of Bosnia contradicts the country’s sovereignty and, therefore, its EU aspirations.

Priorities moving forward should include ending the imposition of foreign laws, promoting constructive dialogue between entities, and nurturing interethnic cooperation based on equal partnership.

**Conclusion:**A Future Written by Bosnia’s People

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s peace and constitutional framework remain intact but are increasingly strained by external pressure and imposed decision-making. The country’s complex structure built around two entities, and one self-governing district, must be recognized as a foundation of diverse society, not as an obstacle.

Sustainable peace, functional governance, and democratic legitimacy will only be achieved when Bosnia and Herzegovina is allowed to function as a truly independent state—governed by the will of its people, not dictated by foreign officials.

International actors should acknowledge this reality and recalibrate their approach. The path to stability lies not in more supervision and imposing decision, but in supporting Bosnia’s institutions, respecting its Constitution and Dayton, and empowering its elected representatives to lead without external interference. This is not a call for Bosnia to reject international support, but rather a plea for international actors to recognize that Bosnia has matured politically and is ready to chart its own course. It should be clear that Bosnia seeks partnership, not patronage.

The responsibility also lies with domestic leaders. They must embrace ownership of the Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future by engaging in meaningful dialogue, demonstrating political courage, and putting the common good above narrow interests.

Let the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina be written not by outsiders, but by the hands of its own people through dialogue, dignity, and democratic will.