基式外交：德国联合政府能否行稳致远？ @《基式外交研究》2025年第14期_风闻

**作者：**亨利・A・基辛格

**来源：**大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第14期

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A. “Will Germany’s Coalition Work?” The Washington Post, November 22, 2005.

**声明：**基式外交研究中心转载、编译与翻译的内容均为非商业性引用（学术研究），不作商用，如有问题请即刻联系

一、中文

安格拉・默克尔就任德国总理之际，这个国家正处于多重危机的交织点：国内改革与经济低迷的博弈，社会僵局与创新突破的角力，欧洲一体化停滞与重构的抉择，以及大西洋联盟传统模式与新定位的碰撞。

当首轮选举结果揭晓并组建大联合政府时，我曾担忧会陷入政治僵局。这位在选举中未能赢得绝对优势的女总理，将如何驾驭两个历史上长期处于尖锐对立状态的政党联盟？在刚刚结束的大选里，两党几乎在所有议题上都存在严重分歧。而外交政策领域——特别是与美国的争端——已在德国民意中根深蒂固，任何重大调整都可能举步维艰，更何况新任外长是卸任总理最亲密的政治盟友之一。

然而，我正逐渐倾向于另一种可能性：联合政府的两大政党都深知，若彼此掣肘，联盟终将破裂，而双方都将重新面对迫使他们组建联合政府的根本性困境。前总理施罗德尝试的边际改革已导致社民党面临分裂风险；默克尔提出的激进市场化改革方案则使选民近乎分裂——若计入前共产党势力，甚至形成了微弱的左倾多数。这种政治僵局可能导致主流政党在选举中失势，选民大规模转向小党或极端政治光谱的新兴力量。

新任总理的个人特质为破局提供了额外希望。竞选期间，舆论曾热衷于批评默克尔缺乏个人魅力。但对于总理职位而言，其崛起本身就是非凡成就：从东德籍籍无名的科研人员，在没有特殊政治根基的背景下，短时间内击败党内资深政客，最终登顶权力巅峰。这种执着于核心目标的坚定意志，或将在日常治理中转化为独特的政治驱动力。

外交政策领域最能彰显领导力。冷战时期，欧洲安全依赖美国力量支撑，而战争创伤催生了德国以美国伙伴身份重返国际社会的道德诉求。这种共同命运感促成了大西洋联盟的建立，推动了欧洲一体化进程，并有效弥合了战术分歧。

苏联解体终结了欧洲对美国的战略依赖，新生代崛起消解了德国对美国政策的情感依附。对于在60年代及之后成长起来的德国人而言，越南战争和在德部署中程导弹是最深刻的政治记忆。这种与美国的疏离感演变为大规模抗议运动，尤以1968年和1982年为甚。当苏联解体遭遇德国政府更迭，跨大西洋关系的基调与实质变革已呼之欲出。与此同时，美国的代际更迭也将政治重心转向对欧情感纽带较弱的地区。

任何德国总理都可能对加入伊拉克战争持谨慎态度，但唯有“68一代”的政治人物才会将政策建立在公开反对美国的基础上，并在两次大选中以质疑美国终极动机为核心诉求。若非如此，德法俄三国也不可能在联合国采取联合行动挫败美国外交努力。

大西洋两岸都存在决策失误。布什当局提出的先发制人战略新学说即为典型案例。从技术变革、大规模杀伤性武器扩散和恐怖主义威胁角度看，该理论有其合理性，但单方面宣布如此激进的战略转变，显然违背了传统联盟惯例。

本质而言，多边主义与单边主义之争并非程序问题，而是实质分歧。当战略目标一致时，多边决策自然水到渠成；当目标相悖时，多边机制则沦为空壳。大西洋联盟面临的根本挑战，并非程序规则的废弛，而是共同命运感的逐渐消解。

当前双方都展现出修复合作关系的意愿。美国国务卿赖斯在2月的演讲中提出新型协商机制；德国默克尔政府标志着战后第三代领导人的登场——既不盲目追随50、60年代的亲美主义，也未被“68一代”的反美情绪所塑造。社民党新任外长的背景正是这种代际转变的缩影，而总理本人的经历更具典型意义。

默克尔将以系统科学家的思维方式，避免在大西洋主义与欧洲主义之间做非此即彼的选择，也不会将对俄情感亲近误判为大战略。这位务实、严谨而深思熟虑的领导人，将致力于构建适应新国际秩序的伙伴关系框架——既不选边站在法美之间，而是创建兼容并蓄的合作体系。

布什当局已表现出合作意愿，但需警惕将合作异化为对短期方案的盲目追捧。美国应克制将协商机制变为推销自身政策偏好的倾向，为德国参与塑造未来国际秩序留出空间。

在圣战主义肆虐、亚洲崛起、贫困与疾病蔓延、能源危机等全球性挑战日益凸显的时代，大西洋国家的核心使命在于重塑共同命运感。这种战略共识的重建，将决定跨大西洋伙伴关系能否在21世纪续写新的历史篇章。

二、英文

Angela Merkel takes office as chancellor of Germany at a moment of crisis for a country poised between domestic reform and economic doldrums and social deadlock, between stalemate and new creativity on European integration, and between tradition and the need for new patterns in the Atlantic Alliance.

When I first saw the close election results and the makeup of the Grand Coalition that is to govern, I feared deadlock. How would a chancellor with disappointing electoral results tame a coalition of parties historically in strident opposition to one another, and that had bitterly split on almost all issues in the recent election? And the foreign policy issues – especially the disputes with the United States – have become so embedded in German public opinion that significant modifications might prove unfeasible, especially as the new foreign minister is one of the closest associates of the outgoing chancellor.

But there is an alternative prospect to which I am increasingly leaning. Both coalition parties know that if they frustrate each other, the coalition will break up and each will face the dilemmas that obliged them to form it in the first place. When the departing chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, attempted marginal reforms, it threatened to split the Social Democratic Party. When Merkel offered a far-reaching, market-oriented alternative, it divided the electorate almost evenly – indeed, with a slight majority for the left if one includes former communists. Thus a deadlock might make the dominant parties irrelevant by producing a major electoral shift to minor parties or to new ones at the extremes of the political spectrum.

The personality of the new chancellor provides additional hope. It was fashionable to deprecate Merkel’s apparent charisma deficit during the electoral campaign. But for the chancellor’s office, the extraordinary achievement of her rise may prove more relevant. Within a short time, she advanced from obscure scientific researcher in communist East Germany to chancellor, without representing a special constituency of her own, against opponents in her own party who had spent their lives scrambling up the political ladder. Her single-minded persistence in the pursuit of substantive goals may create its own impetus in the day-to-day business of governing.

Foreign policy is the field where the scope for leadership is greatest. During the Cold War, Europe needed American power for its security. And the trauma of its wartime history produced a moral impulse in Germany to return to the world community as a partner of the United States. A sense of a common destiny evolved which led to the foundation of the Atlantic Alliance, spurred European integration and helped submerge tactical differences.

The collapse of the Soviet Union ended Europe’s strategic dependence on the United States; the emergence of a new generation ended Germany’s emotional dependence on U.S. policy. For those who came to maturity in the 1960s and afterward, the great emotional political experience was opposition to the Vietnam War and deployment of medium-range missiles in Germany. This dissociation from the United States escalated into massive demonstrations, especially in 1968 and ’82. When the collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with a change of government in Germany, the stage was set for a modification in the tone as well as the substance of allied relationships. A similar shift of generations in the United States moved the center of gravity of U.S. politics to regions less emotionally tied to Europe.

It is likely that any German chancellor would have been reluctant to join the war in Iraq. But no chancellor or foreign minister not of the ’68 generation would have based his policy on overt opposition to the United States and conducted two election campaigns on a theme of profound distrust of America’s ultimate motives. Nor would demonstrative joint efforts with France and Russia to thwart American diplomatic efforts at the United Nations have been likely.

Mistakes were made on both sides of the Atlantic. The proclamation by the Bush administration of a new strategic doctrine of preemptive war was one of them. The doctrine was intellectually defensible in light of changed technology, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism. But announcing unilaterally what appeared as a radical change of doctrine ran counter to traditional alliance practice.

In the end, the issue of multilateralism vs. unilateralism does not concern procedure but substance. When purposes are parallel, multilateral decision follows nearly automatically. When they diverge, multilateral decision making turns into an empty shell. The challenge to the Atlantic Alliance has been less the abandonment of procedure than the gradual evaporation of a sense of common destiny.

Both sides seem committed to restoring a more positive collaboration. In America, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice outlined a new consultative approach in a February speech. In Germany, the Merkel government marks the advent of a third postwar generation: less in thrall to the emotional pro-Americanism of the 1950s and ’60s but not shaped by the passions of the so-called ’68 generation. This will be the case with the new foreign minister from the Social Democratic Party. The generational change is especially pronounced in the case of the chancellor.

With her systematic scientist’s approach, Merkel will avoid choosing between Atlanticism and Europe or confusing sentimental moves toward Russia with grand strategy. Matter-of-fact, serious and thoughtful, she will strive to be a partner for a set of relationships appropriate to the new international order – one that refuses to choose between France and the United States but rather establishes a framework embracing both.

The Bush administration has shown willingness to cooperate. Indeed, one concern is that cooperation may shade into an enthusiasm that overwhelms the dialogue with short-term schemes drawn from the period of strain. The administration needs to take care to restrain its proclivity to conduct consultation as a strenuous exercise in pressing American preferences. Scope needs to be left for the elaboration of a German view of the future.

The key challenge before the Atlantic nations is to develop a new sense of common destiny in the age of jihad, the rise of Asia, and the emerging universal problems of poverty, pandemics and energy, among many others.