基式外交：对华遏制政策行不通 @《基式外交研究》2025年第12期_风闻

**作者：**亨利・A・基辛格

**来源：**大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第12期

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A. “China: Containment Won’t Work.” The Washington Post, June 13, 2005.

**声明：**基式外交研究中心转载、编译与翻译的内容均为非商业性引用（学术研究），不作商用，如有问题请即刻联系

一、中文

**美中关系始终笼罩在不确定性之中。**一方面，这一关系或许是美国两党长期外交政策中最为连贯一致的体现。自理查德・尼克松总统以降，七位美国总统均重申了对华合作关系的重要性，以及美国对“一个中国”政策的承诺——尽管里根、克林顿和小布什政府执政初期曾出现短暂偏离。布什总统及其国务卿康多莉扎・赖斯、科林・鲍威尔多次强调，当前美中关系已达到1971年两国关系正常化以来的最佳状态。布什总统与胡锦涛主席计划互访，并将在多边论坛中多次会晤。

然而，矛盾心态突然再度浮现。美国政府官员、国会议员及媒体正从汇率政策到军事建设等多个领域对中国展开批评，诸多言论暗含中国正处于某种“观察期”的意味。对许多人而言，中国崛起已成为美国国家安全面临的最重大挑战。

在探讨如何避免两国关系因相互摩擦而陷入僵局之前，我必须声明：本人担任董事长的咨询公司为全球（包括中国）商业利益相关客户提供咨询服务。此外，今年五月初，我以中国政府特邀嘉宾身份对中国进行了为期一周的访问。

未来数十年，中国与亚洲的崛起将深刻重塑国际体系格局。世界事务重心正从维系三百年主导地位的大西洋向太平洋转移。亚洲聚集着全球发展最快的经济体，其维护国家利益诉求的能力与日俱增。

中国的崛起常被类比为20世纪初的德意志帝国，暗含战略对抗不可避免、美国需做好准备之意。这一假设既危险又谬误。19世纪欧洲体系笃信列强终将通过武力实现利益诉求，各国均认为战争将速战速决，并在战后巩固自身战略优势。

**在核武器全球化的当今世界，唯有鲁莽之辈才会重蹈覆辙。大国冲突将是全人类的灾难：没有赢家，重建成本将远超冲突根源。**试想，若1914年轻率卷入一战的决策者能预见1918年的世界惨状，又岂会不望而却步？

一个世纪前，德国挑衅性外交风格成为国际体系走向对抗的关键诱因。1900年，俄、法、英三国因彼此矛盾看似绝无联合可能，但十四年后，德国霸凌式外交迫使三国结成同盟——通过海军扩张挑战英国，1908年波斯尼亚危机羞辱俄国，1905年与1911年两次摩洛哥危机中挑衅法国。

军事扩张主义绝非中国行事逻辑。西方战略思想鼻祖克劳塞维茨强调“决战”的筹备与实施，而中国兵学圣祖孙子则注重“不战而屈人之兵”。中国始终通过审慎研究、战略耐心与细节积累实现目标，极少采取孤注一掷的摊牌行动。

**以冷战思维将中国等同于苏联、推行军事遏制政策实为不智之举。**苏联继承了自彼得大帝至二战结束的帝国扩张传统，将势力从莫斯科周边延伸至欧洲心脏。而当今中国的疆域版图已延续两千年之久。沙俄以武力维系统治，中华帝国则以文化认同为根基、辅以必要武力保障。二战结束时，苏联面对孱弱邻邦，错误采取超出国力的占领威慑政策。

亚洲战略格局截然不同。美国在亚洲的政策不应被中国军事现代化所迷惑。诚然，中国正加强曾在经济改革初期被忽视的国防力量，但即便按最高估算，其军费仅为美国的20%，勉强与日本持平（若确实存在优势），更远远低于中日印俄四国总和——遑论美国2001年决策支持下的台湾军事现代化。俄印拥有核武器，日本在生存危机下可迅速获取核能力，若朝核问题无解甚至可能公开拥核。中国反复申明合作意愿、否认军事威胁，这更多是对战略现实的清醒认知，而非主观选择。未来中期，中国的挑战将集中于政治经济领域，而非军事层面。

**台湾问题是唯一例外，常被视作潜在冲突导火索。若任何一方打破维系数十年的克制，危机确有可能爆发，但绝非必然。几乎所有国家——包括主要大国——均承认中国对台湾的主权主张。**美国七任两党总统亦均确认此原则，小布什总统态度尤为坚决。双方以高超政治智慧管控着这一复杂局面：1972年北京接待尼克松访华时，美国仍承认台北为“中国首都”；1975年福特总统在同样框架下访华；1979年两国正式建交。尽管美国持续对台军售，但基于三项原则，中美关系稳步发展：美国承认一个中国原则并反对台独；中国理解美国要求和平解决台湾问题并准备捍卫该原则；各方保持克制，避免台海局势升级。

当前要务是将台湾问题纳入谈判框架。台湾三大政党中两党领袖近期访京或为积极信号，削减台海军事部署的对话具备可行性。

从全局平衡看，中国庞大的高素质人口、广阔市场、在全球经济金融体系中的影响力与日俱增，预示其运用激励与威慑手段的能力将持续增强——这正是国际影响力的核心要素。然而，除非美国试图摧毁中国作为现代国家的存在，否则这种能力是美国主导构建的全球经济金融体系的必然产物。

检验中国意图的关键在于：其增长的实力将用于将美国逐出亚洲，还是融入合作框架。矛盾的是，实现反霸权目标的最优策略恰恰是与包括中国在内的亚洲主要力量保持紧密关系。从这个意义上说，亚洲崛起将考验美国在新兴世界格局中的竞争力，特别是在亚洲地区的领导力。美国反对亚洲霸权的历史目标——1972年《上海公报》与中国共同确立的原则——至今仍具现实意义。实现这一目标需以政治经济手段为主导，辅以必要的军事存在。

**若中美陷入对抗，绝大多数国家将保持中立。但相较于排他性的亚洲民族主义，它们更倾向于参与美国主导的多边体系。各国不愿被视为美国战略棋盘上的棋子。**以印度为例，其在反恐、防扩散及维护东盟完整性等领域与美国利益趋同，但拒绝将这些合作意识形态化或赋予反华色彩。印度在深化美印关系的同时发展对华战略伙伴关系，认为二者并无矛盾。美国若坚持意识形态对抗与冷战式遏制，可能迫使更多国家采取类似策略，并激化印度国内宗教矛盾。

出于自身利益考量，中国寻求与美国合作有多方面动因：缩小区域发展差距的现实需求、政治体制适应经济科技变革的迫切任务、以及冷战对民生改善的灾难性影响——后者关乎政权合法性基础。但这并不意味着冷战对中国的损害会转化为美国的收益。在亚洲，美国将难寻盟友，而亚洲国家将继续与中国保持经贸往来。无论发生何种情况，中国都不会消失。美国对华合作的根本利益在于构建稳定的国际秩序。

对中国这样量级的国家，先发制人政策不可行。让中国新生代形成“美国永久敌对”的认知不符合美国利益；让美国社会认为中国仅关注狭隘的国内或地区利益亦不符合中国利益。

朝鲜核问题是重要试金石。该问题常被用以指责中国未能充分发挥作用，但熟悉中国过去十年外交实践的观察家皆知，中国在确立无核化共同利益方面已取得重大进展。中国在处理该问题上的耐心虽令部分美国决策者感到挫败，但这反映了一个现实：朝鲜问题对中国而言更为复杂——美国聚焦核武本身，中国则担忧边境动荡风险。二者并非不可调和，或许需要将讨论框架扩展至整个东北亚地区。

心理层面的态度至关重要。中国需审慎处理可能被解读为“排美”的政策，同时关注美国在人权问题上的敏感性——这将影响美国对华立场的弹性空间。美国则需认识到，居高临下的口吻会唤醒中国对“帝国主义傲慢”的历史记忆，这种态度不适用于与一个拥有四千年连续自治传统的文明对话。

新世纪伊始，中美关系或将决定人类命运：我们的后代将面临比20世纪更剧烈的动荡，还是见证一个符合全人类和平发展愿景的新秩序？

二、英文

The relationship between the United States and China is beset by ambiguity. On the one hand, it represents perhaps the most consistent expression of a bipartisan, long-range American foreign policy. Starting with Richard Nixon, seven presidents have affirmed the importance of cooperative relations with China and the U.S. commitment to a one-China policy – albeit with temporary detours at the beginning of the Reagan, Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. President Bush and Secretaries of State Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell have described relations with China as the best since the opening to Beijing in 1971. The two presidents, Bush and Hu Jintao, plan to make reciprocal visits and to meet several times at multilateral forums.

Nevertheless, ambivalence has suddenly reemerged. Various officials, members of Congress and the media are attacking China’s policies, from the exchange rate to military buildup, much of it in a tone implying China is on some sort of probation. To many, China’s rise has become the most significant challenge to U.S. security.

Before dealing with the need of keeping the relationship from becoming hostage to reciprocal pinpricks, I must point out that the consulting company I chair advises clients with business interests around the world, including China. Also, in early May I spent a week in China, much of it as a guest of the government.

The rise of China – and of Asia – will, over the next decades, bring about a substantial reordering of the international system. The center of gravity of world affairs is shifting from the Atlantic, where it was lodged for the past three centuries, to the Pacific. The most rapidly developing countries are in Asia, with a growing means to vindicate their perception of the national interest.

China’s emerging role is often compared to that of imperial Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, the implication being that a strategic confrontation is inevitable and that the United States had best prepare for it. That assumption is as dangerous as it is wrong. The European system of the 19th century assumed that its major powers would, in the end, vindicate their interests by force. Each nation thought that a war would be short and that, at its end, its strategic position would have improved.

Only the reckless could make such calculations in a globalized world of nuclear weapons. War between major powers would be a catastrophe for all participants; there would be no winners; the task of reconstruction would dwarf the causes of the conflict. Which leader who entered World War I so insouciantly in 1914 would not have recoiled had he been able to imagine the world at its end in 1918?

Another special factor that a century ago drove the international system to confrontation was the provocative style of German diplomacy. In 1900, a combination of Russia, France and Britain would have seemed inconceivable given the conflicts among them. Fourteen years later, a bullying German diplomacy had brought it about, challenging Britain with a naval buildup and seeking to humiliate Russia over Bosnia in 1908 and France in two crises over Morocco in 1905 and 1911.

Military imperialism is not the Chinese style. Clausewitz, the leading Western strategic theoretician, addresses the preparation and conduct of a central battle. Sun Tzu, his Chinese counterpart, focuses on the psychological weakening of the adversary. China seeks its objectives by careful study, patience and the accumulation of nuances – only rarely does China risk a winner-take-all showdown.

It is unwise to substitute China for the Soviet Union in our thinking and to apply to it the policy of military containment of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was heir to an imperialist tradition, which, between Peter the Great and the end of World War II, projected Russia from the region around Moscow to the center of Europe. The Chinese state in its present dimensions has existed substantially for 2,000 years. The Russian empire was governed by force; the Chinese empire by cultural conformity with substantial force in the background. At the end of World War II, Russia found itself face to face with weak countries along all its borders and unwisely relied on a policy of occupation and intimidation beyond the long-term capacity of the Russian state.

The strategic equation in Asia is altogether different. U.S. policy in Asia must not mesmerize itself with the Chinese military buildup. There is no doubt that China is increasing its military forces, which were neglected during the first phase of its economic reform. But even at its highest estimate, the Chinese military budget is less than 20 percent of America’s; it is barely, if at all, ahead of that of Japan and, of course, much less than the combined military budgets of Japan, India and Russia, all bordering China – not to speak of Taiwan’s military modernization supported by American decisions made in 2001. Russia and India possess nuclear weapons. In a crisis threatening its survival, Japan could quickly acquire them and might do so formally if the North Korean nuclear problem is not solved. When China affirms its cooperative intentions and denies a military challenge, it expresses less a preference than the strategic realities. The challenge China poses for the medium-term future will, in all likelihood, be political and economic, not military.

The problem of Taiwan is an exception and is often invoked as a potential trigger. This could happen if either side abandons the restraint that has characterized U.S.-Chinese relations on the subject for over a generation. But it is far from inevitable. Almost all countries – and all major ones – have recognized China’s claim that Taiwan is part of China. So have seven American presidents of both parties – none more emphatically than George W. Bush. Both sides have managed the occasional incongruities of this state of affairs with some skill. In 1972, Beijing accepted a visit by President Nixon, even while the United States recognized Taipei as the capital of all of China, and by another president – Gerald Ford – under the same ground rules in 1975. Diplomatic relations were not established until 1979. Despite substantial U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Sino-American relations have steadily improved based on three principles: American recognition of the one-China principle and opposition to an independent Taiwan; China’s understanding that the United States requires the solution to be peaceful and is prepared to vindicate that principle; restraint by all parties in not exacerbating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

The task now is to keep the Taiwan issue in a negotiating framework. The recent visits to Beijing by the heads of two of Taiwan’s three major parties may be a forerunner. Talks on reducing the buildup in the Taiwan Strait seem feasible.

With respect to the overall balance, China’s large and educated population, its vast markets, its growing role in the world economy and global financial system foreshadow an increasing capacity to pose an array of incentives and risks, the currency of international influence. Short of seeking to destroy China as a functioning entity, however, this capacity is inherent in the global economic and financial processes that the United States has been preeminent in fostering.

The test of China’s intentions will be whether its growing capacity will be used to seek to exclude America from Asia or whether it will be part of a cooperative effort. Paradoxically, the best strategy for achieving anti-hegemonic objectives is to maintain close relations with all the major countries of Asia, including China. In that sense, Asia’s rise will be a test of U.S. competitiveness in the world now emerging, especially in the countries of Asia. The historical American aim of opposing hegemony in Asia – incorporated as a joint aim with China in the Shanghai Communique of 1972 – remains valid. It will have to be pursued, however, primarily by political and economic measures – albeit backed by U.S. power.

In a U.S. confrontation with China, the vast majority of nations will seek to avoid choosing sides. At the same time, they will generally have greater incentives to participate in a multilateral system with America than to adopt an exclusionary Asian nationalism. They will not want to be seen as pieces of an American design. India, for example, perceives ever closer common interests with the United States regarding opposition to radical Islam, some aspects of nuclear proliferation and the integrity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It sees no need to give these common purposes an ideological or anti-Chinese character. It finds no inconsistency between its dramatically improving relations with the United States and proclaiming a strategic partnership with China. American insistence on an ideological crusade and on a Cold War-type of containment might accelerate such gestures. And it would risk inflaming India’s Muslim population.

China, in its own interest, is seeking cooperation with the United States for many reasons, including the need to close the gap between its own developed and developing regions; the imperative of adjusting its political institutions to the accelerating economic and technological revolutions; and the potentially catastrophic impact of a Cold War with the United States on the continued raising of the standard of living, on which the legitimacy of the government depends. But it does not follow from this that any damage to China caused by a Cold War would benefit America. We would have few followers anywhere in Asia. Asian countries would continue trading with China. Whatever happens, China will not disappear. The American interest in cooperative relations with China is for the pursuit of a stable international system.

Preemption is not a feasible policy toward a country of China’s magnitude. It cannot be in our interest to have new generations in China grow up with a perception of a permanently and inherently hostile United States. It cannot be in China’s interest to be perceived in America as being exclusively focused on its own narrow domestic or Asian interests.

The issue of nuclear weapons in North Korea is an important test case. It is often presented as an example of China’s failure to fulfill all its possibilities. But anyone familiar with Chinese conduct over the past decade knows that China has come a long way in defining a parallel interest with respect to doing away with the nuclear arsenal in North Korea. Its patience in dealing with the problem is grating on some U.S. policymakers, but it partly reflects the reality that the North Korean problem is more complex for China than for the United States. America concentrates on nuclear weapons in North Korea; China is worried about the potential for chaos along its borders. These concerns are not incompatible; they may require enlarging the framework of discussions from North Korea to Northeast Asia.

Attitudes are psychologically important. China needs to be careful about policies seeming to exclude America from Asia and our sensitivities regarding human rights, which will influence the flexibility and scope of the U.S. stance toward China. America needs to understand that a hectoring tone evokes in China memories of imperialist condescension and that it is not appropriate in dealing with a country that has managed 4,000 years of uninterrupted self-government.

As a new century begins, the relations between China and the United States may well determine whether our children will live in turmoil even worse than the 20th century’s or will witness a new world order compatible with universal aspirations for peace and progress.