基式外交：第二阶段与伊拉克 @《基式外交研究》2025年第1期_风闻

**​作者：**亨利・A・基辛格

**来源：**大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第1期

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A. “Phase II and Iraq.” The Washington Post, January 13, 2002.

**声明：**基式外交研究中心转载、编译与翻译的内容均为非商业性引用（学术研究），不作商用，如有问题请即刻联系

一、全文翻译

随着阿富汗军事行动逐渐收尾，我们应当牢记布什总统的警告：这些行动仅仅是一场长期战争的首轮战役。

**在实现以下目标方面已迈出重要一步：打破政府与受其支持或默许的恐怖组织之间的纽带；削弱伊斯兰原教旨主义的影响力，使伊斯兰世界的温和派能够从狂热分子手中夺回对宗教的主导权；将反恐斗争与萨达姆・侯赛因统治下的伊拉克对地区稳定及美国盟友和利益构成的地缘政治威胁相结合。**然而，仍有大量工作亟待完成。

倘若我们退缩，阿富汗的胜利终将被解读为仅针对最薄弱、最偏远的恐怖主义中心，而对更核心地区的恐怖主义问题避而不谈。

**部分联盟成员主张单纯依赖外交手段，认为剩余任务可通过国际协商及情报和安全部门的合作完成。**但单纯依赖外交将重蹈美国在过去半个世纪每场战争中的覆辙。由于将军事行动与外交割裂并按顺序处理，美国在朝鲜战争中因对手走向谈判桌而立即停止军事行动；在越南战争中为换取巴黎和谈机会而停止轰炸北越；在海湾战争中因伊拉克撤离科威特而终止军事行动。

**每次军事压力的解除均导致外交僵局。**朝鲜停战谈判耗时两年，期间美军伤亡人数与整个战斗阶段相当；越南谈判陷入更棘手的僵局；在波斯湾，萨达姆・侯赛因利用停火协议保留的共和国卫队重新控制领土，并系统性破坏停火协议中的核查条款。

若无武力威胁支撑，反恐政策将沦为空谈。军事行动的反对者及其潜在目标只会拖延或同意象征性举措。具有讽刺意味的是，那些默许恐怖分子在其领土活动的政府，除非不合作的后果比与恐怖分子的暗中交易更危险，否则极难真正配合。

**因此，反恐战役第二阶段必须提出一套具体要求，设定明确时间表，并辅以可信的强制力量。**这些应尽快作为框架提出，且时间至关重要。第二阶段必须在美国遭受袭击的记忆仍鲜活、美军部署力量可支持外交行动时启动。

**第二阶段不应与阿富汗的绥靖行动混淆。**美国的战略目标是摧毁恐怖网络，这已基本实现。阿富汗全境的平定从未被外国势力完成，也不应成为美军的目标。美国应慷慨提供经济和发展援助，但第二阶段的战略目标应是摧毁全球恐怖网络，防止其在阿富汗死灰复燃，而非卷入阿富汗内战。

索马里和也门常被提及为第二阶段的可能目标。这一决策应取决于能否确定当地政府有能力打击的目标，以及若当地政府无力或不愿行动时美军是否适合完成任务。鉴于这些限制，美国需判断对其采取行动是否具有战略价值。

所有这一切都指向伊拉克构成的不可回避的挑战。**问题不在于伊拉克是否参与了对美国的恐怖袭击，而在于其本质上的地缘政治威胁。**伊拉克的政策对美国及某些邻国具有强烈敌意。它拥有不断增加的生物和化学武器库存（萨达姆・侯赛因曾在两伊战争中对伊朗及本国人民使用过这些武器），并正致力于发展核能力。侯赛因违背对联合国的承诺，驱逐了作为结束海湾战争停火协议一部分进驻其领土的国际核查人员。华盛顿与巴格达之间不存在谈判可能，也没有任何依据信任伊拉克对国际社会的承诺。

若这些能力未被消除，它们可能最终被用于恐怖主义目的，或在萨达姆・侯赛因引发的新地区或国际动荡中被使用。若其政权在海湾战争和反恐战役后仍存活，仅此一点就将使其成为潜在的巨大威胁。

**从长远看，第二阶段的最大机遇是使伊拉克在地区中回归负责任角色。**若伊拉克由不对邻国构成威胁且愿意放弃大规模杀伤性武器的团体执政，地区稳定将得到极大提升。其余与恐怖主义原教旨主义暧昧不清或默许其勒索的政权将被迫停止支持恐怖主义。

至少，我们应坚持建立联合国核查体系，以消除伊拉克的大规模杀伤性武器，赋予核查人员无限核查权和行动自由。但目前此类体系尚未形成书面方案，而建立该体系所需的努力可能等同于推翻萨达姆・侯赛因所需的行动。尤其值得注意的是，鉴于生物和化学武器的易生产性，核查必须极为深入，而经验表明，任何核查都无法长期抵御一个坚决反对的东道国的阻挠。

但若要认真考虑推翻萨达姆・侯赛因，必须满足三个前提条件：（1）制定迅速而果断的军事计划；（2）就取代侯赛因的政权结构达成初步共识；（3）获得实施军事计划所需关键国家的支持或默许。

对萨达姆・侯赛因的军事行动不能旷日持久。否则，战争可能演变为伊斯兰世界与西方的对抗。这还将使侯赛因有机会通过对以色列发动袭击（可能使用生化武器）将其卷入冲突，从而在穆斯林世界制造混乱。一场持续六个月以上的战争还将使美国更难维持盟友及俄罗斯、中国等国的支持——这些国家虽未必加入行动，但更不愿公开反对。

因此，布什政府在与伊拉克对抗前需极其谨慎地审视隐含的军事战略。十年前海湾战争所需的大规模兵力可能不再必要，但仅依赖美国空中力量和当地反对派力量将是危险的。诚然，当代精确武器在海湾战争时尚未达到现有规模，禁飞区也将使伊拉克增援困难。可通过将禁飞区升级为禁止特定类别武器移动的 “禁行区” 来强化其效果。

**然而，我们不能将美国国家安全完全（甚至主要）寄托于尚未形成且作战能力未经检验的当地反对派力量。**或许如某些人所言，伊拉克军队会在首次交锋时崩溃，但这种可能性只有在美国军事力量以压倒性姿态直接支持当地力量时才会大幅增加。

**对伊拉克军事行动的第二个前提是明确政治结局。**当地反对派很可能由北部的库尔德少数民族和南部的什叶派多数构成。但若要争取目前主导伊拉克的逊尼派少数参与推翻萨达姆・侯赛因，必须明确美国的政策目标并非肢解伊拉克。这一点尤为重要，因为对伊拉克的军事行动需要土耳其的支持和沙特阿拉伯的默许。若预见到北部出现独立库尔德国家、南部出现什叶派共和国，两国均不可能合作。库尔德国家将煽动土耳其境内的库尔德少数民族，而南部的什叶派国家将威胁沙特的达兰地区，并可能为伊朗提供新的基地以谋求主导海湾地区。建立联邦制统一伊拉克是解决这一问题的途径。

**为这一行动组建合适的联盟并为美军部署寻找基地将困难重重。第二阶段可能使那些加入联盟旨在对美国行动行使否决权的成员，与愿意采取坚决战略的成员产生分歧。**然而，塑造反恐第一阶段的娴熟外交将为后续行动奠定基础。萨达姆・侯赛因在海湾地区没有盟友。英国基于与美国的特殊关系，不会轻易放弃其在危机演变中赢得的关键角色。德国（尤其在选举年）也不会积极反对美国。俄罗斯、中国和日本同样如此。因此，美国的坚定政策拥有比普遍认为更大的回旋余地。

但第二阶段将远比第一阶段艰难。当地（尤其是伊拉克）的抵抗将更坚决、更残酷。许多国家的国内反对声浪将加剧。美国公众舆论对维持这一进程至关重要，需要布什总统在危机第一阶段展现的那种果断而巧妙的领导力来引导。

二、材料全文

As military operations in Afghanistan wind down, it is well to keep in mind President Bush’s injunction that they are only the first battles of a long war.

An important step has been taken toward the goals of breaking the nexus between governments and the terrorist groups they support or tolerate, discrediting Islamic fundamentalism so that moderates in the Islamic world can reclaim their religion from the fanatics, and placing the fight against terrorism in the context of the geopolitical threat of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to regional stability and to American friends and interests in the region. But much more needs to be done.

Were we to flinch, the success in Afghanistan would be interpreted in time as taking on the weakest and most remote of the terrorist centers while we recoiled from unraveling terrorism in countries more central to the problem.

Sole reliance on diplomacy is the preferred course of some members of the coalition, which claim that the remaining tasks can be accomplished by consultation and the cooperation of intelligence and security services around the world. But to rely solely on diplomacy would be to repeat the mistake with which the United States hamstrung itself in every war of the past half-century. Because it treated military operations and diplomacy as separate and sequential, the United States stopped military operations in Korea as soon as our adversaries moved to the conference table; it ended the bombing of North Vietnam as an entrance price to the Paris talks; it stopped military operations in the Gulf after the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

In each case, the ending of military pressure produced diplomatic stalemate. The Korean armistice negotiations consumed two years, during which America suffered as many casualties as in the entire combat phase; an even more intractable stalemate developed in the Vietnam negotiations; and in the Persian Gulf, Saddam Hussein used the Republican Guard divisions preserved by the armistice to restore control over his territory and to dismantle systematically the inspection provisions of the armistice agreement.

Anti-terrorism policy is empty if it is not backed by the threat of force. Intellectual opponents of military action as well as its likely targets will procrastinate or agree to token or symbolic remedies only. Ironically, governments on whose territory terrorists are tolerated will find it especially difficult to cooperate unless the consequences of failing to do so are made more risky than their tacit bargain with the terrorists.

Phase II of the anti-terrorism campaign must therefore involve a specific set of demands geared to a precise timetable supported by credible coercive power. These should be put forward as soon as possible as a framework. And time is of the essence. Phase II must begin while the memory of the attack on the United States is still vivid and American-deployed forces are available to back up the diplomacy.

Nor should Phase II be confused with the pacification of Afghanistan. The American strategic objective was to destroy the terrorist network; that has been largely accomplished. Pacification of the entire country of Afghanistan has never been achieved by foreigners and cannot be the objective of the American military effort. The United States should be generous with economic and development assistance. But the strategic goal of Phase II should be the destruction of the global terrorist network, to prevent its reappearance in Afghanistan, but not to be drawn into Afghan civil strife.

Somalia and Yemen are often mentioned as possible targets for a Phase II campaign. That decision should depend on the ability to identify targets against which local governments are able to act and on the suitability of American forces to accomplish this task if the local governments can’t or won’t. And given these limitations, the United States will have to decide whether action against them is strategically productive.

All this raises the unavoidable challenge Iraq poses. The issue is not whether Iraq was involved in the terrorist attack on the United States. The challenge of Iraq is essentially geopolitical. Iraq’s policy is implacably hostile to the United States and to certain neighboring countries. It possesses growing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, which Saddam Hussein has used in the war against Iran and on his own population. It is working to develop a nuclear capability. Hussein breached his commitment to the United Nations by evicting the international inspectors he had accepted on his territory as part of the armistice agreement ending the Gulf War. There is no possibility of a negotiation between Washington and Baghdad and no basis for trusting Iraq’s promises to the international community.

If these capabilities remain intact, they could in time be used for terrorist goals or by Saddam Hussein in the midst of some new regional or international upheaval. And if his regime survives both the Gulf War and the anti-terrorism campaign, this fact alone will elevate him to a potentially overwhelming menace.

From a long-range point of view, the greatest opportunity of Phase II is to return Iraq to a responsible role in the region. Were Iraq governed by a group representing no threat to its neighbors and willing to abandon its weapons of mass destruction, the stability of the region would be immeasurably enhanced. The remaining regimes flirting with terrorist fundamentalism or acquiescing in its exactions would be driven to shut down their support of terrorism.

At a minimum, we should insist on a U.N. inspection system to eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, with an unlimited right of inspection and freedom of movement for the inspectors. But no such system exists on paper, and the effort to install it might be identical with that required to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Above all, given the ease of producing biological and chemical weapons, inspection must be extremely intrusive, and experience shows that no inspection can withstand indefinitely the opposition of a determined host government.

But if the overthrow of Saddam Hussein is to be seriously considered, three prerequisites must be met: (a) development of a military plan that is quick and decisive, (b) some prior agreement on what kind of structure is to replace Hussein and (c) the support or acquiescence of key countries needed for implementation of the military plan.

A military operation against Saddam Hussein cannot be long and drawn out. If it is, the battle may turn into a struggle of Islam against the West. It would also enable Hussein to try to involve Israel by launching attacks on it — perhaps using chemical and biological weapons — in the process sowing confusion within the Muslim world. A long war extending to six months and beyond would also make it more difficult to keep allies and countries such as Russia and China from dissociating formally from what they are unlikely to join but even more unlikely to oppose.

Before proceeding to confrontation with Iraq, the Bush administration will therefore wish to examine with great care the military strategy implied. Forces of the magnitude of the Gulf War of a decade ago are unlikely to be needed. At the same time, it would be dangerous to rely on a combination of U.S. air power and indigenous opposition forces alone. To be sure, the contemporary precision weaponry was not available in the existing quantities during the Gulf War. And the no-fly zones will make Iraqi reinforcements difficult. They could be strengthened by being turned into no- movement zones proscribing the movement of particular categories of weapons.

Still, we cannot stake American national security entirely, or even largely, on local opposition forces that do not yet exist and whose combat capabilities are untested. Perhaps Iraqi forces would collapse at the first confrontation, as some argue. But the likelihood of this happening is greatly increased if it is clear American military power stands in overwhelming force immediately behind the local forces.

A second prerequisite for a military campaign against Iraq is to define the political outcome. Local opposition would in all likelihood be sustained by the Kurdish minority in the north and the Shiite majority in the south. But if we are to enlist the Sunni minority, which now dominates Iraq, in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, we need to make clear that Iraq’s disintegration is not the goal of American policy. This is all the more important because a military operation in Iraq would require the support of Turkey and the acquiescence of Saudi Arabia. Neither is likely to cooperate if they foresee an independent Kurdish state in the north and a Shiite republic in the south as the probable outcome. A Kurdish state would inflame the Kurdish minority in Turkey and a Shiite state in the south would threaten the Dhahran region in Saudi Arabia, and might give Iran a new base to seek to dominate the gulf region. A federal structure for a unified Iraq would be a way to deal with this issue.

Creating an appropriate coalition for such an effort and finding bases for the necessary American deployment will be difficult. Phase II is likely to separate those members of the coalition that joined so as to have veto over American actions from those that are willing to pursue an implacable strategy. Nevertheless, the skillful diplomacy that shaped the first phase of the anti-terrorism campaign would have much to build on. Saddam Hussein has no friends in the gulf region. Britain will not easily abandon the pivotal role, based on its special relationship with the United States, that it has earned for itself in the evolution of the crisis. Nor will Germany move into active opposition to the United States — especially in an election year. The same is true of Russia, China and Japan. A determined American policy thus has more latitude than is generally assumed.

But it will be far more difficult than Phase I. Local resistance — especially in Iraq — will be more determined and ruthless. Domestic opposition will mount in many countries. American public opinion will be crucial in sustaining such a course. It will need to be shaped by the same kind of decisive and subtle leadership by which President Bush unified the country for the first phase of the crisis.