徐坡岭：金砖国家如何建立“经济集体防御机制”？

**按：**10月22日中午，中国国家主席习近平抵达喀山，出席金砖国家第16次领导人会晤。

此前，中国社会科学院俄罗斯东欧中亚研究所俄罗斯经济室主任、北京对话特约专家徐坡岭指出， 反次级制裁的合作是金砖国家合作的重要任务。中俄两国在贸易领域的合作虽持续展现稳健态势，但投资合作的步伐却显得相对迟缓。他主张向多边拓展，以更广阔的视野和更丰富的资源来推动中俄合作的全面深化。以下为讲话摘录：

徐坡岭：

我有两点感悟。

首先，相较于对安全形势的评估，专家们对于经济前景的预测显得更为乐观。在构建新的安全架构、维护既有和平秩序方面，都是比较悲观的。大国间的对抗和小国的选边站队，使得在各种红线被跨越的情况下，建立新的安全秩序显得尤为迫切。

在经济方面，虽然金砖国家之间的合作还面临很多的困难，但每个发言人都提出了实现合作与发展的建议或者方案。我想安全和经济的共同逻辑在于：在冲突中，大国对抗和小国选边站队的风险很高。然而，在建立合作体系，尤其是在美元体系之外建立新的合作体系时，小国或许可以两边获利。金砖机制在经济方面的努力，说明了经济是持续发展的动力。金砖在经济方面的前景是光明的。

我们一直主张，金砖不应该成为对抗的组织，而应成为替代性选项。这种替代性选项能够在多大程度上为发展中国家、特别是全球南方国家提供发展机遇，将决定金砖合作的深度、广度，以及成功的可能性和发展进程。金砖框架内的合作旨在建立一个替代性系统，这个替代性系统在初期可能效率不高。因为人们在现有体系中已经舒适地生活了很长时间，突然转变体系会带来挑战。这种低效率需要共同的理念的支持——必须要国家从上往下提供支持，这样才可能在低效率的时候抵消企业参与合作的成本、降低风险。

10月22日至24日，金砖国家领导人第十六次会晤在俄罗斯喀山举行，各国媒体齐聚喀山，聚焦“金砖”。 新华社

第二，所有专家提出的方案实际上都遵循了从易到难、从具体到细节的逻辑。我们不应一开始就追求完全替代性的结算性共同货币，因为共同货币的权重和定价机制极为复杂。我们可以像唐晓阳主任讲的那样，先实现短期利益，吸引各国参与，在此基础上推动相互合作和结算体系的发展。全球南方通过金砖机制的合作实际上是一场革命，金砖实际上是革命的平台，旨在解决当前直接制裁和次级制裁对我们发展机会的剥夺和威胁。对中国和俄罗斯而言，直接制裁不是问题，然而，美国基于其权力网络建立的次级制裁体系，构成了一张剥夺发展中国家的优势的网。因此，关于中俄经贸合作的水平和目前的变化的公开数据，大部分都不太准确。

实际上，中国海关提供的数据很多时候低估了中俄贸易。去年中俄经贸合作的贸易总额是2401亿美元，但是这一数字并不包括通过吉尔吉斯斯坦、哈萨克斯坦、亚美尼亚、乌兹别克斯坦、土耳其、阿联酋等国转口至俄罗斯的贸易额，如果把这些贸易额纳入统计，总额可能接近3000亿美元。去年，俄罗斯对外贸易72%来自亚洲，其中许多亚洲国家和中国的直接贸易、间接贸易，以及中间的生产贸易紧密相连。这表明中俄经贸合作的规模可能比现有数据所显示的更庞大。

今年1至7月，尽管中俄经贸合作总额呈现增长趋势，但中国对俄罗斯的出口是负增长（-1.2%）。8月，俄罗斯对中国能源出口有所下降，但管道气和液化气的贸易额仍然远超去年，这是因为俄罗斯在第一季度和第二季度加速对中国的出口。8月的变化与中国国内的经济形势有关系，但是影响有限，最主要因素仍是中国对俄出口的结算问题。

中俄经贸合作双边层面上也有好消息。2022年之前，中俄经贸合作模式主要以政府为主导、大企业执行项目、小企业跟进，这是是以安全为主导的贸易模式。2022年之后，民营企业家抓住机遇，积极参与贸易，让中俄贸易就从单一的安全主导向安全和市场双重主导转变。这种双轮驱动是2022年、2023年，乃至2024年中俄贸易额急速增长的源泉。

此外，中俄贸易长期面临的主要问题是，虽然贸易合作顺利，但是投资合作相对滞后，部分由于中俄2006年签订的《中华人民共和国政府与俄罗斯联邦政府关于促进和相互保护投资协定》。今年，李强总理正式访问俄罗斯，在联合声明中表示，该谈判已基本结束，有关协议将于今年年底签署。如果投资合作项目得以实施，以投资带动贸易，产量将大幅增长，这是好消息。

2024年8月21日上午，国务院总理李强在莫斯科同俄罗斯总理米舒斯京共同主持中俄总理第二十九次定期会晤。 新华社

实际上，中俄合作的需求和解决内部问题的途径，在双边层面上已经难以解决了，必须走向多边。中俄面临的内外部挑战和合作条件相对严峻。就合作的外部条件而言，中美现在的竞争实际上是决战式的。美国通过在中国周边“搞事儿”来迟滞遏制中国的发展。中国通过开放和联合其它国家，推动再全球化，以应对美国的打压。然而，目前全球秩序正处于一种混沌状态，处于后冷战时期与新秩序形成之前的过渡期。正如去年两国首脑在讨论中指出的，“百年大变局”正在发生，我们需要共同推动其发展。最关键的是，尽管美国的霸权地位正在衰弱，但我们不能期待其快速崩溃，因为美国是有韧性的。中国在成长，俄罗斯也在重回大国之路，但是我们还不能决定未来政策主导。

俄罗斯和中国实际上都面临一些内部挑战，我们都需要一个和平的发展环境来调理内部问题。俄乌冲突持续延宕，俄罗斯现在还在隧道里，还没看到曙光。美、西方的制裁是会越来越紧的，对推动经济增长带来了严峻的挑战。

中国现在也面临诸多挑战，国内经济不确定性导致了民间投资下降。尽管1至7月中国总投资增长3.6%，出口增长7%，PMI（采购经理人指数）逐步上升，但是民众和企业家普遍觉得赚钱更为困难，对于未来的预期比较弱。很多南方企业家在对西方的出口下降的时候，转而开拓俄罗斯市场。佛山今年上半年出口负增长24.6%，我看到这一数据时特别吃惊。

中国处于经济结构调整和解决问题的关键时期。虽然我们面临预期减弱的问题，但最主要的挑战还是中美竞争正处于关键时期。怎么解决这个问题？中俄合作为对方的发展提供了条件。过去两年，俄罗斯运用中俄的经贸合作平台实现了增长，而中国一些商人也通过开发俄罗斯市场获得了丰厚的回报。但是这种双边合作现在遇到了问题，这些问题在双边层面上难以解决。

2024年1月29日，中俄代表进行集中签约136亿元合作项目。 新华社

中国在整体战略布局上，设立了五年期限，到2029年基本建成高质量的中国特色社会市场经济体系。我们将通过改革解决内部问题，以扩大开放解决外部挑战。简而言之，就是决战2029。

走向开放和多边合作的过程中，我们需要注意，中俄各自的侧重点有所不同，但我们在许多方面有着共同目标。中国现在的多边合作机制主要集中在亚太经贸框架内，包括上合、金砖、东盟和RCEP。我们还在发展中亚5+1合作机制，推动中非合作。俄罗斯基本盘是欧亚经济联盟、集安条约组织和上合。现在，俄罗斯正重点推动金砖合作，也重视G20和中非合作。普京总统还提出了欧亚安全新框架。

中国和俄罗斯在解决自己内部问题和建立国际联盟方面，虽然存在差异，但我们在反对美国霸权、推动世界多极化，形成全球南方国家合作机制方面有着共同的目标。在这个机制上，我们可以在多边平台上反对次级制裁联盟，否则我们无法解决中俄经贸合作的结算问题，也无法实现我们对其它发展中国家提供机会的承诺。因此，我认为我们从双边走向多边，推动全球秩序的变化，塑造一个对我们双方都有利的国际环境，是解决这个问题的最佳途径。

以下为英文译文：

Abstract: Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Kazan to attend the 16th BRICS leaders’ meeting. Earlier, Xu Po Ling, Director of the Russian Economy Room at the Institute of Russian East European and Central Asian Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a senior fellow with Beijing Club for International Dialogue, pointed out that cooperation against sub-sanctions is an important task for BRICS cooperation. Also, although the cooperation between China and Russia in the field of trade continues to show a solid trend, the pace of investment cooperation is relatively slow. He is in favor of expanding to the multilateral level to promote the comprehensive deepening of China-Russia cooperation with a broader vision and richer resources.

I have two points to make in this session. First, compared to the assessment of security, experts seem more optimistic about economic prospects. There is a rather pessimistic outlook when it comes to building new security structures and maintaining existing peace orders. The escalating confrontations among major powers, coupled with the pressure on smaller countries to choose sides, underscore the urgent need to establish a new security order as numerous red lines are being crossed.

On the economic front, although cooperation among BRICS countries still faces many challenges, each speaker proposed suggestions or plans for achieving collaboration and development. I believe that the common logic between security and economics lies in the fact that in conflicts, the risks of major power confrontations and small states choosing sides are very high. However, when establishing cooperative frameworks, especially those outside the U.S. dollar system, smaller nations can benefit from both sides. The efforts of BRICS in the economic sphere illustrate that the economy is a driving force for continued development, and the economic prospects of BRICS appear bright.

We have always advocated that BRICS should not become an antagonistic organization but rather serve as an alternative option. The extent to which this alternative can provide development opportunities for developing countries, particularly those in the Global South, will determine the depth, breadth, and potential success of BRICS. Cooperation within the BRICS framework aims to build an alternative system that may initially be less efficient. As people have comfortably lived within the existing system for a long time, the sudden systemic changes pose challenges. This initial inefficiency requires the support of a shared vision—nations must offer top-down support to offset the costs of business participation and mitigate risks during periods of low efficiency.

Second, all the proposals put forward by the experts follow a logical progression of “from simple to complex” and “from the specific to the detailed”. We should not rush to establish a fully alternative settlement currency at the outset, as the weighting and pricing mechanisms of a common currency are highly complex. Instead, as Director Tang Xiaoyang suggested, we can first achieve short-term gains to attract countries to participate, lay the foundation for further cooperation and the development of settlement systems. Cooperation among the Global South through the BRICS mechanism is, in fact, a revolution. BRICS serves as a revolutionary platform aimed at addressing current direct sanctions and secondary sanctions that deprive us of and threaten our development opportunities. For China and Russia, direct sanctions are not the main issue; rather, the web of secondary sanctions established by the U.S. through its power network poses a significant threat, as it deprives developing countries of their advantages. Thus, countering secondary sanctions is a crucial task for BRICS cooperation.

I believe one possible approach is to establish clauses that ask Western companies and banks that conduct business in Global South markets to be subject to exclusive clauses. Companies that participate in sanctions against BRICS countries should be barred from profiting in the markets of Global South nations. This would ensure that BRICS countries are willing to build a coalition against secondary sanctions. This is an essential and long-term mission.

Public data on the level and recent changes in China-Russia economic and trade cooperation are often inaccurate. In fact, data provided by Chinese customs frequently underestimates the volume of China-Russia trade. Last year, the total trade volume between China and Russia was reported as $240.1 billion, but this figure does not include re-exports to Russia via countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and the UAE. Including these would likely bring the total trade volume closer to $300 billion. Last year, 72% of Russia’s foreign trade came from Asia, many of which trade with China through direct and indirect ways, as well as intermediary production. This suggests that the scale of China-Russia economic and trade cooperation could be much larger than the current data indicates.

From January to July this year, although the total trade volume between China and Russia showed a growth trend, China’s exports to Russia declined slightly (-1.2%). In August, Russia’s energy exports to China decreased, but trade volumes of pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas still far exceeded those of last year due to Russia’s accelerating exports to China in the first and second quarters. August’s changes are related to China’s domestic economic situation, but the impact is limited; the main factor remains the settlement issues related to China’s exports to Russia.

On the bilateral level, there is good news for China-Russia economic and trade cooperation. Before 2022, China-Russia economic and trade cooperation mainly followed a government-led model with large enterprises executing projects and small enterprises following suit. This is a security-driven trade model. After 2022, private entrepreneurs seized opportunities and actively engaged in trade, shifting the China-Russia trade model from a purely security-driven approach to one driven by both security and market forces. This dual-driver approach is the source of the rapid growth in China-Russia trade volumes in 2022, 2023, and likely 2024.

However, a long-standing issue in China-Russia trade is that while trade cooperation proceeds smoothly, investment cooperation lags behind, partly due to the 2006 Agreement between the governments of China and Russia on promoting and mutually protecting investments. This year, during Premier Li Qiang’s official visit to Russia, the joint statement noted that negotiations on this agreement are essentially concluded, with the new agreement expected to be signed by the end of the year. If investment cooperation projects are implemented, trade will be driven by investment and the output will increase significantly—this is positive news.

In reality, the need for China-Russia cooperation and resolving respective internal issues are increasingly difficult to address on a bilateral level, necessitating a shift towards multilateral level. The internal and external challenges and conditions for cooperation faced by China and Russia are relatively severe. Regarding external conditions, the U.S.-China competition is effectively a showdown. The U.S. attempts to stymie China’s development through a series of actions in China’s surrounding regions, while China responds by opening up and aligning with other countries to promote re-globalization as a counter to U.S. suppression. However, the current global order is in a state of flux, transitioning between the post-Cold War period and the formation of a new order. As the two leaders from both sides noted in their discussions last year, the world is undergoing “great changes unseen in a century” and we need to jointly promote its development. The key point is that although U.S. hegemony is in decline, we should not expect a rapid collapse because its economy is resilient. China is growing, and Russia is reclaiming its status as a major power, but neither can yet play the leading role in future policymaking.

Both Russia and China face internal challenges and require a peaceful development environment to address domestic issues. Specifically, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict persists without an end in sight. Sanctions from the U.S. and the West are tightening, presenting severe challenges to economic growth.

China faces numerous challenges, with domestic economic uncertainties leading to a decline in private investment. Although China’s overall investment grew by 3.6% and exports by 7% from January to July, and the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) has been gradually rising, people and entrepreneurs generally find it harder to make profits, and expectations for the future remain weak. Many entrepreneurs in Southern China have turned to the Russian market as exports to the West decline. I was particularly surprised to see that exports from Foshan City, Guangdong Province, in the first half of this year decreased by 24.6%.

China is at a critical stage of economic restructuring and problem-solving. Although we face weakened expectations, the primary challenge is that the U.S.-China competition is at a crucial point. How can this problem be solved? China-Russia cooperation offers opportunities for their respective development. Over the past two years, Russia has utilized the China-Russia economic and trade cooperation platform to achieve growth, while some Chinese businesses have also gained substantial returns by exploring the Russian market. However, bilateral cooperation now faces problems that are difficult to resolve at the bilateral level.

China has set a five-year goal in its overall strategic layout to establish a high-quality, socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics by 2029. We plan to address internal issues through reform and external challenges through expanded opening-up. In short, it can be described as “fighting the battle of 2029.”

As we move towards openness and multilateral cooperation, we must recognize that China and Russia have different focal points, but we share many common goals. China’s current multilateral cooperation mechanisms mainly focus on Asia-Pacific economic and trade frameworks, including the SCO, BRICS, ASEAN, and RCEP. We are also developing the Central Asia 5+1 cooperation mechanism and promoting China-Africa cooperation. Russia’s core platforms include the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the SCO. Currently, Russia is focusing on promoting BRICS cooperation and values G20 and China-Africa cooperation. President Putin has also proposed a new Eurasian security framework.

While China and Russia have different ways of addressing internal issues and enhancing ties with international partners, we share common objectives in opposing U.S. hegemony, promoting multipolarity and forming cooperation mechanisms among Global South countries. As such, we can oppose the secondary sanctions alliance on multilateral platforms; otherwise, we cannot resolve settlement issues in China-Russia economic and trade cooperation, nor fulfill our commitments to providing opportunities to other developing countries. Therefore, I believe that moving from bilateral to multilateral cooperation is the best way to address this issue, as it can drive changes in the global order and shape an international environment beneficial to both of us.

（发言摘自徐坡岭教授在9月11日举行的“中俄合作：推动多极世界”对话会上的发言。来自中俄两国的20多位专家学者齐聚莫斯科，深入讨论了全球政治安全格局、金砖国家合作、全球南方发展以及中俄关系等重要议题。此次对话会由北京对话和俄罗斯国际事务委员会联合主办）