周波：如果中美在台湾问题上摊派，美国的盟友会参战吗？

**编者按：**如果中美在台湾问题上爆发冲突，美国盟友会参战吗？清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波的回答是，不一定。日前，周波在南华早报发表英文评论《Who can the US really count on in a war with China over Taiwan?》（在台湾问题上与中国发生战争，美国到底能指望谁？）指出，美国在全球虽然有60多个盟友和伙伴，但当最坏情况发生时，站队美国的盟友，恐怕一只手都数得过来。观察者网受权翻译并发布本文：

【翻译/赵欣  核译/韩桦】

在中美就台湾问题上摊牌的最坏情况下，美国的盟友会全力支持它吗？我的回答是：不一定。美国在全球有60多个盟友和伙伴。但是，当中美爆发冲突时，对美国有帮助的盟友恐怕一只手就数得过来。

以泰国为例。自国王拉玛四世（1851-1868）以来，泰国的外交政策一直是“随风折腰”。这种“竹子外交”政策使该国成为唯一摆脱殖民统治的东南亚国家。

如今，北京和曼谷的关系被官方描述为“中泰一家亲”。在过去几年里，中国已经超过美国，成为泰国坦克和船坞登陆舰等军事装备的主要供应商。

韩国有着相似的情况。首尔对拥核的朝鲜深感担忧，但不能对北京表现出任何敌意。因为北京按照条约（《中朝友好互助条约》）对朝鲜有潜在的军事援助义务。

最好的例子是看似顽固的亲美总统尹锡悦。2022年，时任美国众议院议长佩洛西窜访台湾，引发中国人民解放军在台湾岛周边进行实弹演习。之后，佩洛西访韩，尹锡悦决定不与之会见。这充分说明了首尔在中美之间如履薄冰，极力平衡。

2022年8月4日，韩总统府曾表示尹锡悦只与佩洛西通话，没有面对面会晤安排。图自澎湃影像

日本按照条约有义务向冲突中的美国军队提供后勤支持，也可能会让美国使用其基地，但它自己参战的可能性不大。日本舆论普遍反对卷入台湾海峡冲突。根据《朝日新闻》去年的一项民意调查，只有11%的日本受访者表示，日本自卫队应该在战斗中加入美方；27%的人表示日本自卫队根本不应该与美军合作。

自二战以来，澳大利亚参与了每一场美国卷入的战争，看起来是最可靠的盟友。近年来，澳大利亚带头联合华盛顿打压华为，并支持建立安全组织，如“奥库斯”（澳大利亚、英国和美国的三方军事联盟，AUKUS）以及重振“四方会谈”（美国、日本、澳大利亚和印度组成的多边安全协商机制，QUAD）。

在台湾海峡冲突中，澳大利亚也可能让美国使用其军事基地。但堪培拉方面也明确表示，它没有向美国承诺一定参与台海冲突，以换取美国核动力潜艇。

菲律宾总统马科斯似乎已经铁了心要加入美国阵营，这是其他东盟领导人极力避免的。美国已获准在菲部署九个军事基地，这些基地将大大加强美国在所谓的“第一岛链”沿线急需的前沿存在。最近，美陆军在菲律宾的演习中部署了中程陆基导弹系统。

但菲律宾外交部长马纳洛去年4月也表示，菲律宾不会让美国囤积武器用于任何对台行动，也不会允许美军在这些地点加油、维修和重新装弹。时间会证明这些承诺是否可靠。

马科斯于4月15日表示不打算开放或建立更多美菲《加强防务合作协议》架构下的基地。图自澎湃影像

那么，美国能否像有些人所说的那样，在印太地区发展一个“小型北约”？“奥库斯”看起来太小了，英国也不会在该地区发挥什么大作用。即使日本加入，彼此的配合也不会紧密。

至于“四方会谈”，它有安全因素考虑，这在其联合军事演习中已有反映。但印度的存在使它不会成为军事联盟。作为一个正在崛起的大国和不结盟运动的发起者之一，信心满满的印度不需要依附于任何大国，它的雄心是有朝一日成为像中国一样的全球大国。印度应该不希望被外界视为与经济和军事实力远超自己的北方邻居做对。

美国的盟友是否加入美国与中国的对抗，首先取决于美国自己是否参战。如果华盛顿认为台湾最新领导人是一个“麻烦制造者”，像之前传言美国前总统布什称呼台湾前领导人陈水扁一样，美国人凭什么要用自己的鲜血为台湾开一张空白支票呢？

俄乌冲突也让人三思。由32个国家组成的北约不敢与俄罗斯直接较量。俄罗斯的核弹的确比中国多，但中国军队的规模是俄罗斯军队的两倍，国防开支是俄罗斯的三倍多。众所周知，中国人民解放军还拥有更先进的无人机、预警机和其他力量倍增器，如高超音速武器。

2023年9月14日，第六届天津国际直升机博览会上解放军陆军多型号现役直升机亮相。图自澎湃影像

为什么美国会有信心联合几个三心二意的盟友对抗中国呢？

美国的“战略模糊”已经说得够多了。该战略没有明确表示是否会在冲突中向台湾提供军事援助。但对华盛顿来说，最大的战略模糊来自北京：一个越来越强大的中国会对最终的和平统一更有信心，还是会越来越不耐烦并诉诸武力？

好几个美国将军已经公开预测了一些最坏的情况，但迄今为止，尽管台湾民进党再次上台，北京仍在强调和平统一。

华盛顿指望盟国站队参战，可能是最佳状态，但更有可能是一厢情愿。结盟乃权宜之计。美国在本地区的联盟更像是萧伯纳对婚姻的描述—一个关窗就睡不着的男人和一个开窗就睡不着的女人的结合。

英文原文：

In the worst-case scenario of a China-US showdown over Taiwan, will America’s allies stand with it back to back? My answer is: not necessarily. America has over 60 allies and partners around the globe. But when it comes to a war with China, those that are helpful to the US won’t be more than a handful.

Take Thailand for example. Since King Rama IV (1851-1868), Thailand’s foreign policy has been one of “bending with the wind”. This “bamboo diplomacy” allowed Siam to be the only Southeast Asian country to escape colonisation.

Today, the Beijing-Bangkok relationship is described by both governments “as close as one family”. In the past few years, China has surpassed the United States as the primary supplier of Thai military equipment such as tanks and an amphibious dock ship.

It’s a similar situation with South Korea. Deeply worried about a nuclearised North Korea, Seoul cannot afford to show any hostility towards Beijing, which has a latent treaty obligation of military help for North Korea.

The best example is that President Yoon Suk-yeol, a seemingly diehard pro-American president, decided not to meet the visiting then-US House speaker Nancy Pelosi after her Taiwan visit in 2022, which triggered live-firing by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around the island. It speaks volume about Seoul’s tiptoeing between China and the US.

Japan has treaty obligations to provide logistical support to the American military in a conflict. It might let the US use bases in Japan, too, but its own participation is unlikely. Public opinion in Japan is generally against getting ensnared in a Taiwan Strait conflict. According to a poll for the Asahi Shimbun last year, just 11 per cent of Japanese respondents said their armed forces should join the US in the fighting, and 27 per cent said their forces should not work with the US military at all.

Having fought in every major US war since the second world war, Australia looks the most reliable ally. In recent years, Australia has pushed Washington to curb the influence of Huawei Technologies, and supported the creation of security groupings such as Aukus (between Australia, Britain and the US) and the reinvigoration of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (between the US, Japan, Australia and India).

In a war in the Taiwan Strait, Australia, too, is likely to let the US use its military bases. But Canberra also makes clear it has not promised the US to take part in any Taiwan conflict in exchange for American nuclear-powered submarines.

In the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr seems determined to join the American camp, something other Asean leaders have tried their utmost to avoid. US access has been granted to nine military bases that would be most useful in strengthening America’s badly needed forward military presence along the so-called first chain of islands. AND RECENTLY, THE US ARMY’S MID-RANGE CAPABILITY GROUND-BASED MISSILE SYSTEM WAS DEPLOYED TO EXERCISES IN THE PHILIPPINES.

BUT Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo ALSO said last April that the Philippines will not let the US stockpile weapons for use in any Taiwan operation. US troops will also not be allowed to refuel, repair and reload at those sites. TIME WILL TELL WHETHER THESE PROMISES ARE RELIABLE.

Then, can the US develop a “mini Nato” in the Indo-Pacific as some have argued? Well, Aukus looks too mini and Britain won’t be a major player in the region. Even if Japan joins, the glue that binds still won’t be strong enough.

As for the Quad, it has a security element, which is reflected in its joint military exercises, but it won’t become a military alliance because of India. As a rising power and a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, India is too proud to be dependent on any major power. Its ambition is to become a global power like China one day. It shouldn’t wish to be seen to be antagonising its northern neighbour, whose economic and military strength far outweighs its own.

Whether American allies join the US in a war with China depends first on whether the US gets involved. If Washington concludes that the latest Taiwanese leader is a troublemaker – as president George W. Bush was rumoured to have referred to former president Chen Shui-bien – then why would it write a blank cheque with American blood?

The conflict in Ukraine is also giving people second thoughts. If Nato, an alliance of 32 states, can hesitate to take on Russia, then what gives the US the confidence to fight China with a few half-hearted allies? Yes, Russia has more nuclear bombs than China. But the PLA is twice as large as the Russian army, and has a military budget over three times bigger. The PLA is also known to have better drones, early warning aircraft and other force multipliers such as hypersonic weapons.

Much has been said about America’s “strategic ambiguity” – not specifying whether it would assist Taiwan militarily in a conflict – but for Washington, the biggest strategic ambiguity comes from Beijing: will a stronger China become more confident in an eventual peaceful reunification or will it become more impatient and resort to force?

Quite a few American generals have publicly predicted some worst-case scenarios, but so far, Beijing is still talking about a peaceful reunification, even as Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party has been re-elected.

That Washington can count on its allies is a best-case scenario – and more likely, wishful thinking. Alliance is a marriage of convenience. America’s alliances in the region are more the sort of marriage described by George Bernard Shaw – between a man who can’t sleep with the window shut and a woman who can’t sleep with the window open.