洪农：俄乌冲突和对俄罗斯的制裁如何使北极合作陷入僵局

【文/洪农】

2月下旬，北极理事会“成功破冰”，同意理事会的工作组重新以线上形式召开工作会议。自两年前的2022年3月，在俄罗斯担任轮值主席国期间，北极理事会的其他七个成员国就一直暂停参加北极理事会及其附属机构的所有会议，以抗议俄罗斯对乌克兰发动的军事行动。

在挪威2023年从俄罗斯手中接任轮值主席国之后，北极理事会过去6个月期间一直依靠“书面程序”维系其正常工作。北极理事会2月达成的协议有望为其下设诸多工作组增加互动和促进北极事务管理铺平了道路。除了俄罗斯，北极理事会还包括美国、挪威、加拿大、丹麦、芬兰、冰岛和瑞典。

在过去的两年里，北极地区的地缘政治发生了重大变化。俄乌冲突爆发后，瑞典和芬兰放弃了长期以来的军事不结盟政策，申请加入北大西洋公约组织（北约）。瑞典本月正式加盟为北约成员，芬兰则已在去年四月加入了北约。

随着北约向北方扩展，俄罗斯一直密切关注着“北欧响应”行动，这是芬兰、挪威和瑞典之间的军事演习，是今年北约规模最大的“坚定卫士”军事演习在北极地区的组成部分。

俄罗斯将北约部队在其边境附近的增加视为威胁，并已加强了其在北部和西部领土的军事能力，以应对北约的扩张。此外，虽然俄罗斯尚未考虑退出北极理事会，但已暂停向其支付年度费用。

在外界难以预判俄罗斯行为的背景下，丹麦格陵兰岛正在寻求与美国和加拿大建立更紧密的关系，并推动建立一个高级别的北极-北美论坛，该论坛将包括来自所有土著领土的领导人。与此同时，驻扎在阿拉斯加的美国部队在2022年被重新划分为北极部队，正在发展成为一个强大的北极军事力量，并与挪威、加拿大、芬兰和瑞典合作进行联合演习。

除了地缘环境变化之外，北极还面临着不可忽视的经济逆风。西方对俄罗斯施加的经济制裁以及西方公司（特别是在石油和天然气行业）的投资撤出，导致了俄罗斯控制的北极主要航运走廊-北方航道（Northern Sea Route）使用量减少。

2010 年至 2022 年间北方航道的过境通行量。（来源：极地与海洋门户）

2022年，该航线的过境货物从2021年的200多万吨下降至仅41,000吨。不过，在2023年间，该航线的航运量奇迹般的恢复至2.1百万吨，创下了新高，其中超过95%的货物是来往中国的。一些分析人士认为，这一创纪录的货物主要源自中国对俄罗斯原油的巨大需求。在欧盟停止进口俄罗斯石油之后，俄罗斯采取了一些措施，利用北方航道运输其部分产品。

乌克兰危机造成的另一经济挑战是俄罗斯在北极的液化天然气2项目（LNG2）的停滞。俄罗斯计划将其液化天然气全球市场份额从目前的8％提高到2030年的20％，“LNG2”对此至关重要，该项目一期原计划于去年年底投产（注：洪农原文为2024年初，但是南华早报的信息似乎确实更准确。）。

除了俄罗斯Novatek持有的60%股份外，该项目的股东还包括法国的TotalEnergies、中国石油天然气集团公司（中石油）、中国国家海洋石油公司（中海油）以及日本三井物产和JOGMEC组成的财团，后者各占10%股份。据俄罗斯媒体去年12月报道，这些外国股东在美国实施制裁后暂停了参与。据报道，三井正在撤回其投入该项目的员工，而TotalEnergies已经启动了不可抗力程序，并将不会在今年从该项目中采购液化天然气。

就中石油和中海油是否退出了LNG 2项目，中国外交部发言人毛宁表示，中俄开展正常的经贸合作，不应当受到任何第三方的干预和限制。据报道，中石油和中海油已要求美国政府豁免对LNG 2项目的制裁。

欧盟计划于4月投票决定就是否采取措施阻止从LNG 2进口。但欧盟国家就如何逐步淘汰俄罗斯北极液化天然气方面存在分歧，一些国家担心这些举措没法取消长期合同。

尽管存在地缘冲突和经济变化，但北极的科学合作仍然是为数不多的国际各方共识大于分歧的领域之一。

在北极地区，各国长期秉持国际科学合作的传统，但乌克兰冲突给研究气候变化的科学家带来了不小的挑战。自2022年3月以来，所有北极理事会的会议都已冻结，八个北极国家之间的科学合作也因此在制度层面停滞不前。

然而，全球迫切需要努力适应气候变化，并减轻其对北极地区的深远影响，包括占该地区十分之一人口的40个原住民部落。

北极理事会恢复对话既意义重大又及时，将有助于理事会履行其作为北极治理领先和永久论坛的使命。北极理事会工作组能有效应对环境、气候和社会发展问题，对北极地区的福祉至关重要。

尽管如此，围绕俄罗斯的不确定性仍然存在。

英文原文：

Last month, the Arctic Council broke the ice by agreeing to reconvene its working group meetings virtually, nearly two years after seven of its eight members, including the US, halted participation in protest against the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, which held the council chairmanship then.

The working groups had been relying on “written procedures” for the last six months, after Norway took over the chairmanship and found ways to resume project work. The latest development will hopefully pave the way for increased interaction and engagement between council members, which also include Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden.

Over the last two years, there has been a big shift in Arctic geopolitics. After the Ukraine war broke out, Sweden and Finland departed from their long-standing military non-alignment policy and applied to join Nato. Sweden officially became a member of the transatlantic security alliance this month, while Finland joined last April.

With Nato extending its northern reach, Russia has been keeping a close eye on the Nordic Response, military drills between Finland, Norway and Sweden that represent the Arctic arm of the Nato-wide Steadfast Defender military exercise this year, its largest ever.

Russia views the increasing presence of Nato forces near its borders as a threat and has reinforced its military capabilities in its northern and western territories to counter Nato’s expansion. While Russia has not yet considered withdrawing from the Arctic Council, it has suspended its annual payments to it.

Amid Russia’s unpredictability, Greenland is seeking stronger ties with the United States and Canada, and pushing to establish a high-level Arctic-North American forum that would include leaders from all the indigenous territories. Meanwhile, US troops stationed in Alaska, redesignated as the Arctic division in 2022, are developing as an Arctic force and collaborating with Norway, Canada, Finland and Sweden in joint exercises.

Besides the geopolitical shifts, it is imperative to acknowledge the notable economic challenges for the Arctic. Economic sanctions on Russia and the withdrawal of Western companies, particularly in the oil and gas sector, have led to reduced international traffic and operators using the Russian-controlled Northern Sea Route, the Arctic’s main shipping corridor.

Transit cargo along the route plunged to 41,000 tonnes in 2022, from just over 2 million tonnes the year before. Last year, it made a miraculous recovery to 2.1 million tonnes, a record high, with more than 95 per cent of it comprised deliveries to or from China. Some analysts attributed the record tonnage to China’s robust demand for Russian crude oil, with Russia taking steps to ship some of its product using the Northern Sea Route after the European Union stopped importing Russian oil.

The stalling of Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project is another economic aspect arising from the Ukraine crisis. This liquefied natural gas project, deemed crucial to Russia’s endeavour to increase its LNG market share to 20 per cent by 2030 from 8 per cent, was due to start production last year.

Besides Russia’s Novatek with a 60 per cent stake, the project’s shareholders are France’s TotalEnergies, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and a consortium of Japan’s Mitsui and Co and JOGMEC, each with 10 per cent. These foreign shareholders have suspended participation after the US imposed sanctions, according to Russian news last December. Mitsui is reportedly withdrawing its employees from the project while TotalEnergies has started a force majeure process and will not take any LNG from the project this year.

When asked whether China’s CNPC and CNOOC had pulled out of the LNG 2 project, however, foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said both countries were continuing “normal economic and trade cooperation” and that this “should not be subject to interference or restrictions from any third party”. Both CNPC and CNOOC have reportedly asked the US government for exemptions from sanctions on the LNG 2 project.

Next month, the EU is expected to vote on proposed measures to block imports from LNG 2. But EU countries remain divided on how to phase out Russian Arctic LNG, with some voicing concern that the proposed moves may not be enough to undo long-term contracts.

Despite the geopolitical and economic shifts, however, scientific cooperation in the Arctic remains one of the few areas where the international community shares more common concerns than divergent views.

There is a long tradition of scientific collaboration between nations in this region, and the conflict in Ukraine has presented a unique challenge for climate researchers and scientists. Official Arctic Council meetings have been paused since May 2022 and with that, scientific cooperation among the eight Arctic states at the institutional level.

Nevertheless, there remains an urgent need for a global effort to adapt to climate change and mitigate its profound effect on communities, including the 40 indigenous peoples who comprise roughly 10 per cent of the Arctic’s total population of four million.

The Arctic Council’s resumption of project-level work is both significant and timely, and will help the council to fulfil its mandate as the leading and permanent forum for Arctic governance. The effectiveness of the Arctic Council’s working groups in tackling environmental, climatic and social development issues is also vital for the welfare of the Arctic communities.

Nonetheless, the uncertainty surrounding Russia’s next steps persists.

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