周波：中国如何保护海外利益，又不卷入地区冲突？

编者按：因新一轮巴以冲突，红海再起危机，也门胡塞武装袭击该水域目标，美国宣布组建“繁荣卫士”护航联盟，并呼吁中国“发挥建设性作用”。

对此，清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波，在南华早报发表英文评论“How a ‘vulnerable’China can resolve its Indian Ocean security dilemma” (一个“弱势”的中国如何解决印度洋安全困境) 表示，中国军队出手保护中国的海外利益是应尽之责，但最好办法是将中国的海外利益与他国利益相融合，并以不卷入地区冲突为原则。观察者网全文翻译如下：

【翻译/李泽西，核译/ 韩桦】

为应对胡塞武装在红海袭击驶往以色列的船只，美国最近宣布了“繁荣卫士”行动，这一安全倡议最初包括巴林、英国、加拿大、法国、意大利、荷兰、挪威、塞舌尔和西班牙等20多个国家。

但据相关报道，法国、意大利和西班牙已退出美国领导的这一联盟，其他许多国家也拒绝承认参与。巴林是唯一公开表示支持的阿拉伯国家，这充分表明了阿拉伯世界对美国的冷漠乃至不满，尤其是不满美国大力支持以色列针对哈马斯的作战行动。

美军在也门周边的军力部署

这可不像是美国国务卿布林肯所呼吁的“尽可能广泛”的联盟。与亚丁湾反海盗行动不同的是，美国的亚洲盟友和伙伴这次集体缺席。

奇怪的是，美国却呼吁中国“在努力阻止这些袭击方面要发挥建设性作用”。中国对也门胡塞这样武装组织应无法施加这样的影响。相反，如果中国在红海地区的舰船参与美国领导的行动，将影响中国在巴以冲突中的立场，并危及中国船只。

当然，如果仍有中国商船在红海航行，中国军舰应该北上，去保护它们。此前，中国军舰曾从亚丁湾驰往战乱中的利比亚、也门和苏丹以帮助撤侨。

但是，如果胡塞武装袭击中国船只，而中国军舰予以回击，中国可能会被卷入这个最动荡地区的冲突。胡塞武装誓言要继续在红海发动袭击，直到以色列停止进攻加沙。

那么，中国人民解放军如何保护中国的海外利益，但又不卷入地区冲突呢？

中国是世界上最大的贸易国，而大部分国际贸易都通过海上进行。全球约12%的贸易通过红海，中国约62%的石油和17%的天然气进口通过马六甲海峡和南海。

路透社记者格雷格·托罗德（Greg Torode）近日发文称，印度洋或将是中国在台海爆发战争情况下的致命弱点，因为除了吉布提基地外，中国在印度洋上的海军部署没有陆上或空中掩护。这让人联想到有关中国印度洋战略的两个谜题：“珍珠链战略”和所谓的“马六甲困境”。

前者是2004年提出的一个叙事假设，其认定中国的目标是（在印度洋）建立一连串的军事基地和监测站，以支持海军向非洲之角方向拓展。“马六甲困境”指的则是，如果美国在战争中封锁马六甲海峡，切断中国的贸易往来，中国就会陷入困境。

“珍珠链战略”和“马六甲困境”示意图（图源：环球网）

二十年过去了，所谓的“珍珠链”并无踪影，出现的反而是一条海上丝绸之路，将中国港口与一连串的商业港口连接起来：希腊的比雷埃夫斯、缅甸的皎漂、巴基斯坦的瓜达尔、斯里兰卡的科伦坡和汉班托塔。

我们不知道美国是否会封锁马六甲海峡，但台湾海峡发生战争也绝非定局。大陆仍在强调与台湾实现和平统一。封锁马六甲海峡将削弱泰国、印度尼西亚、新加坡和马来西亚等沿岸国家的经济，并将沉重打击日本和韩国，这两个美国盟友比中国更依赖马六甲海峡的安全。

正因为马六甲海峡对中国的极端重要性，一旦因美国封锁海峡引发战争，很可能“不止于此地”。如果中美之间的战争波及印度洋，冲突将变得无法控制—一场涉及许多国家的大战会引发什么后果，大家尽可以联想。

表面上看，中国人民解放军海军虽然是世界上规模最大的海军，但在印度洋上确有弱势。在外国建立军事基地需要得到相关国家的许可，即使有些国家乐于接纳中国，他们又如何抵御来自美国或自誉为“印度洋纯粹安全提供者”的印度等国的压力呢？

但中国的所谓“弱势”未必是劣势。中国人民解放军的海外行动都是人道主义性质的，无论是维和、船只保护还是救灾。只要中国将其海外军事行动限于保护自身利益，并在必要时提供人道主义援助，那么中国就不需要许多耗资巨大且难以维护的军事基地。

中国在吉布提的基地

在缺乏海外基地的情况下，中国海军必须最大限度地与其他利益相关方合作。在打击海盗的过程中，尽管中国的船队是独立行动的，但它们与北约、多国海上力量、欧盟“阿塔兰塔行动”等各方共享信息并进行协调。

近年，中国海军舰艇在印度洋与俄罗斯、伊朗和巴基斯坦海军进行了联合演习，也与阿联酋和沙特阿拉伯进行了联合演习。

保护中国海外利益的最好办法，是将其与他国利益相融合。中国无需从别处寻找灵感。自2008年以来，中国护航舰队已护送约7200艘船只通过印度洋，其中包括外国船只。如果说，西太平洋是中国必须捍卫主权的地方，那么印度洋则更像一个试验场，展现一个强大的中国能给世界带来什么不一样的解决之道。

以下为南华早报英文原文：

In response to the Houthis attacking ships in the Red Sea bound for Israel, the US recently announced Operation Prosperity Guardian, a security initiative that initially included more than 20 countries, such as Bahrain, Britain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles and Spain.

But France, Italy and Spain have reportedly dropped out of the US-led coalition and many others decline to acknowledge their involvement. That Bahrain is the only Arab state offering public support speaks volumes about the Arab world’s apathy towards the US – if not resentment of America’s strong support for Israel’s war on Hamas.

This does not look like the “broadest possible” coalition US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has called for. Unlike the counter-piracy initiative in the Gulf of Aden, none of America’s Asian allies and partners appear to have turned up this time.

It is strange to hear the US call on Beijing to play “a constructive role in trying to prevent those attacks from taking place”. China should have no such influence on the Houthis, a Yemeni militant group. Instead, should the Chinese naval flotilla operating in the Bab-el-Mandeb strait join the American-led operation, it would compromise China’s position on the Israel-Hamas war and endanger Chinese ships.

If there are still Chinese merchant ships sailing through the Red Sea, the Chinese flotilla should sail northwards to protect them, of course. Chinese warships have previously sailed from the Gulf of Aden to evacuate Chinese nationals from war-torn Libya, Yemen and Sudan.

But should Chinese warships strike back against a Houthi attack on a Chinese vessel, China could be drawn into a conflict in a most volatile region. The Houthis have vowed to continue their Red Sea attacks until Israel stops fighting in Gaza.

So how can the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) protect China’s overseas interests without becoming embroiled in regional conflicts?

China is the world’s top trader and most of the international trade goes by sea. About 12 per cent of global trade passes through the Red Sea with about 62 per cent of China’s oil and 17 per cent of its natural gas imports going through the Malacca Strait and South China Sea.

Reuters journalist Greg Torode recently argued that the Indian Ocean could be Beijing’s Achilles’ heel in a Taiwan war because, apart from its Djibouti military base, China has no air cover from land or sea for Indian Ocean naval deployments. This brings to mind two myths about China’s Indian Ocean strategy: the “ string of pearls” and so-called Malacca dilemma.

The first, a 2004 hypothesis, assumed that China aimed to build a string of military bases and monitoring stations to support its naval outreach up to the Horn of Africa. The Malacca dilemma points to China vulnerabilities should the US blockade the Malacca Strait in a war, cutting off China’s trade flows.

But two decades later, the string of pearls is nowhere to be found. Instead, a Maritime Silk Road is linking Chinese ports to a string of commercial ports: Piraeus in Greece, Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Gwadar in Pakistan and Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka.

We can’t know if the US would blockade the Malacca Strait but neither is there a guarantee of war in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing still talks about a peaceful reunification with Taiwan. A Malacca Strait blockade would cripple the economies of littoral states such as Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. It would deal a heavy blow to Japan and South Korea, US allies that depend more heavily than China on the security of the strait.

Precisely because of the extreme importance of the Malacca Strait to China, a war triggered by an American blockade is unlikely to end there. If a war between China and the US involved the Indian Ocean, the conflict would have become uncontrollable – it would be a major war involving a lot of countries. The rest is up to everybody’s imagination.

On the face of it, the PLA Navy, albeit the largest in the world, does indeed look vulnerable in the Indian Ocean. Building a military base in a foreign land requires the permission of the country involved. Even if some countries are happy to accommodate, how would they resist pressure from, say, the US or India that sees itself as the “ net security provider” in the Indian Ocean?

But Beijing’s so-called vulnerability may not be a disadvantage. The PLA’s operations abroad are all humanitarian in nature, be it peacekeeping, vessel protection or disaster relief. So long as Beijing exclusively restricts its military operations to protecting its interests and providing humanitarian assistance when necessary, then China does not need a lot of military bases that are hugely costly and difficult to maintain.

Short of bases overseas, the Chinese navy has to maximise cooperation with other stakeholders. In countering piracy, although China’s flotillas work independently, they share information and coordinate with coalitions such as Nato, the Combined Maritime Forces, EU Atalanta and other independent deployers.

In recent years, the PLA’s naval vessels have conducted joint exercises with the Russian, Iranian and Pakistani navies in the Indian Ocean. Joint exercises have also been conducted with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

The best way to protect Chinese interests overseas is to blend them with the interests of others. Beijing does not need to look elsewhere for inspiration. Since 2008, Chinese flotillas have escorted some 7,200 ships transiting the Indian Ocean, including foreign ships. If the western Pacific Ocean is where China has to defend its sovereign rights, then the Indian Ocean looks more like a test ground for what a stronger China might mean for others.

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