周波：朝鲜出兵改变不了欧洲战局_风闻

编者按：近期，多家媒体报道，朝鲜已开始依据今年签署的《俄朝全面战略伙伴关系条约》相关条款，向俄乌冲突前线派遣士兵。美国国务卿安东尼·布林肯于10月31日指出，目前已有多达8000名朝鲜士兵部署在俄罗斯库尔斯克地区，且即将投入战斗。随着特朗普的再度当选，朝鲜的这一新动向引发了对俄乌战局可能出现新变数及其更广泛的地缘政治影响的担忧。

清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波，11月7日在南华早报发表题为**（《朝鲜对俄的支持不会使其成为乌克兰危机的变局者》）的评论文章，表示就算朝鲜派兵属实，对俄而言更多的也是政治而非军事意义。朝鲜此举意在表现存在，打破孤立，换取俄军事技术。**

观察者网和北京对话受权翻译、发布中文版如下。

（翻译：王凡非 ｜ 核译：李泽西）

乌克兰官员上周一（11月4日）称，乌军首次与被俄罗斯部署到其西部库尔斯克州的朝鲜士兵交火。全世界很快就会知道这一说法是否正确。美国国务卿布林肯10月31日则表示，部署在俄罗斯库尔斯克地区的朝鲜士兵已多达8000人，并即将投入战斗，尽管朝鲜此前已否认。

那么，朝鲜军队能否改变这场长时间僵持的俄乌冲突局势呢？我的判断是，不太可能。俄军在战场上已占上风，而乌军则面临精疲力竭、弹药短缺以及兵力不足的困境。因此，尽管朝鲜派兵可以为俄罗斯所用，但其意义更多体现在政治层面。

此外，朝鲜增援的部队不可能帮助俄罗斯快速赢得战争，反而会促使美国和欧洲加大对乌克兰的支持力度。乌克兰一直要求美欧提供重型攻击武器，以便深入打击俄罗斯腹地。

在欧洲战场上，唯一受益方似乎是朝鲜这位迟到的参战者。朝鲜首次派兵前往遥远的欧洲堪称是前所未有的公关努力，无疑会吸引全球关注。长期被孤立与制裁的朝鲜，自诩为核大国，其最迫切的愿望，是被国际社会视为“正常的”拥核国家。为了这一目标，朝鲜迫切需要在全球舞台上引起广泛关注，以此为契机，寻求突破国际制裁。

朝鲜频繁的导弹试射，乃至近期宣布将韩国视为“敌对”国家，实际上都是为实现这一战略目的。朝鲜的目的不是有朝一日对韩国进行自杀式袭击，而是吸引国际社会，尤其是美国的注意。在特朗普上届2017-2021执政期间，美国曾尝试接触朝鲜，而拜登政府则更倾向于战略忽视。

此外，朝鲜可借此机会获得急需的粮食、燃料和其他物资，同时让其军队积累自朝鲜战争以来的首次实战经验。朝鲜人民军拥有128万兵力，他们可以在现代战争背景下，检验本国制造的弹药和近程导弹的有效性。他们将学会应对无人机攻防。朝军士兵将经过战火的淬炼。

因此，战争越长越对朝鲜有利。即使朝鲜确实决定派遣1.2万名士兵参与战斗，这一数字也不到朝鲜现有军力的1%。这不会使半岛军力平衡朝着对平壤不利的方向发展。

作为持续提供弹药和兵力的回报，金正恩希望俄罗斯提供更先进的军事技术，尤其是在卫星、导弹和潜艇等领域。只要朝鲜军队与俄罗斯并肩作战，金正恩就会指望普京总统予以某种回馈。

美国将如何对朝施压有待观察。韩国尹锡悦政府一贯主张通过“压倒性力量”确保和平，因此可能认为有必要采取更强硬的对朝政策，甚至可能向乌克兰提供更多经济和人道主义援助，乃至军事支持。具有讽刺意味的是，在半岛局势缓和多年之后，朝鲜和韩国可能会成为代理国参与欧洲的战争。

中国迄今为止的立场克制冷静。中国三缄其口不无道理，毕竟朝鲜明确否认参与乌克兰战争。中国不希望欧洲战局变得更加复杂。然而，一些认为中国对朝鲜的影响力正被俄罗斯取代的观点过于简单。尽管朝鲜与俄罗斯的军事合作愈加紧密，但对中国的经济依赖是朝鲜的生存之本。

事实上，朝鲜士兵出现在欧洲战场上，将进一步增强中国对朝鲜半岛的影响力，因为美国和欧洲都在呼吁中国对平壤施加影响。上周，布林肯表示，中美已就此问题“深入交换意见”，并敦促中国“利用其影响力来遏制这些活动”。

许多人声称，美韩日同盟与中俄朝轴心对垒正在形成，这是无稽之谈。中国、俄罗斯和朝鲜眼中的全球秩序并非完全一样。朝鲜期待新冷战，俄罗斯认为我们已处于冷战之中，但中国则反对新冷战。

乍一看，朝鲜与中国（1961年）和俄罗斯（2024年）签订的条约似乎有某些相似之处，两个条约都提及共同防御。实际上，中朝之间的军事接触寥寥无。例如，中俄每年几乎都会举行联合军演，但人们很难想起中朝何时举行过联合演习。

中国和朝鲜在 60 多年前结成的联盟条约，只有在中国希望它发挥作用时才会有用。即便俄罗斯和朝鲜乐见中美竞争加剧，只要中国认为与美国的关系仍在可控范围内，这份条约将继续处于休眠状态，因此中俄朝三国形成同盟的可能性极低。在全球政治的大棋盘上，朝鲜的角色更像是搅局者，而非变局者。

It won’t be long before the world finds out if Ukrainian officials were right in saying on Monday that their forces had fired at North Korean soldiers in combat for the first time since they were deployed by Russia to its western Kursk region. Despite denials from Pyongyang, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on October 31 that as many as 8,000 North Korean troops were in Russia’s Kursk region and expected to enter combat.

Are North Korean troops a game changer in the grinding Russo-Ukrainian conflict? I think not. Russia has already gained the upper hand on the battlefield against the Ukrainians, who are weary, short of ammunition and outnumbered. So while a dispatch of North Korean troops may be useful, its significance would primarily be political.

Besides, such added strength from Pyongyang would not help Moscow claim a quick victory. It would, however, most certainly make the United States and Europe more determined to provide extra aid to Ukraine, which has been asking for heavy attack weapons to strike deeper into Russia.

On the European battlefield, the only beneficiary, it seems, is North Korea, a latecomer. First, the unprecedented public relations effort of sending its soldiers to faraway Europe is guaranteed to attract global attention. Isolated and sanctioned, North Korea sees itself as a nuclear power – what it wants most is to be treated as a nuclearised “normal” country. For that to happen, it needs to get the world to sit up so it can attempt to break international sanctions.

North Korea’s periodic missile launches and recent declaration that South Korea was now a “hostile” state are in the same vein. Pyongyang’s campaign is not to launch a suicidal attack against South Korea one day; it is to draw attention, especially from the US. Unlike Donald Trump, who spent time dealing with Pyongyang when he was president between 2017 and 2021, the Biden administration’s attitude has been more one of strategic negligence.

Second, North Korea can benefit from much-needed supplies of food, fuel and other material from Russia even as its soldiers gain their first combat experience since the Korean war. The Korean People’s Army, 1.28 million strong, can find out how effective their munitions and short-range ballistic missiles are on a battlefield. They will learn how to deal with drones and counter-attacks. North Korean soldiers will be combat-hardened.

So, the longer the war, the better it is for North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Even if he has decided to send 12,000 troops to Russia, as alleged, it is still less than 1 per cent of North Korea’s standing military. This would not tip the military balance on the Korean peninsula unfavourably for Pyongyang.

And, in return for a reportedly steady flow of munitions and soldiers to a most important ally, Kim is hoping for access to Russia’s higher-end military technology, especially regarding satellites, missiles and submarines. As long as North Korean soldiers fight alongside Russian soldiers, Kim is counting on Russian President Vladimir Putin feeling obliged to give something back.

Meanwhile, it remains to be seen how the US administration will turn the screw on North Korea. The Yoon government in South Korea believes in ensuring peace through “overwhelming force” and will almost certainly feel it has to respond more forcefully to the North now, and possibly provide more economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine, even direct military assistance. Ironically, we could see the two Koreas fighting as proxies in Europe after years of detente on the peninsula.

China’s attitude so far is a measured calmness. There is good reason for Beijing not to say too much when North Korea has flatly denied its involvement in the war in Ukraine. Beijing will not be happy to see the situation in Europe become more complex.

Arguing that Beijing is losing its influence over Pyongyang to Moscow is simplistic. However close Moscow and Pyongyang might become militarily, North Korea’s economic dependence on China remains the foundation of its survival.

In fact, the presence of North Korean troops on a European battlefield will bolster China’s influence over the Korean peninsula as Beijing faces calls from Washington and European capitals to use its leverage on Pyongyang. Blinken last week said the US and China have had “a robust conversation” where China was urged to “use the influence that they have to work to curb these activities”.

Much has been said about the alliance between the US, South Korea and Japan battling an axis represented by China, Russia and North Korea. This is bunkum. China, Russia and North Korea do not necessarily see the world through the same prism. North Korea will welcome a new cold war and Russia believes we are already in one – but China is opposed to a new cold war.

At first glance, North Korea’s treaties with China in 1961 and Russia this year look similar when it comes to how one party should render military aid to the other when attacked. In reality, military interactions between Beijing and Pyongyang are scant. For instance, Chinese and Russian militaries have joint exercises practically every year but one would be hard-pressed to think of the last time Beijing and Pyongyang organised a joint military drill.

The treaty alliance between China and North Korea made over 60 years ago is only useful when Beijing wants it to be. Even if Russia and North Korea are happy to see the competition between China and the US intensify, as long as Beijing believes that its relationship with Washington is still manageable, the treaty will remain dormant, making a Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang alliance impossible. On the grand chessboard, North Korea may look like a spoiler – but it is not capable of being a game changer.