周波：“中国现在不诉诸武力，但将来强大了呢？”西方真是多虑了

**编者按：**英国《旁观者》（The Spectator）杂志播客专题“Chinese Whispers”（“中国私语”）月前专访清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波。主持人表示，了解中国的观点非常重要，播客旨在让西方知识界听到原汁原味的中国声音和中国观点。

针对中国政府在乌克兰危机中扮演的角色等问题，周波在访谈中剖析了中俄发展良好关系的双边背景和时代背景，中国面对乌克兰冲突所做的贡献，台海问题与国际形势等。英国《旁观者》杂志于1828年创刊，英国前首相约翰逊曾任该杂志编辑。

观察者网编译访谈如下：

《旁观者》：周波，欢迎来到“中国私语”播客专题。中国的立场经常被西方批评为过于支持俄罗斯。您如何看待中国在乌克兰危机问题上的立场？

**周波：**就中俄关系而言，我认为西方相对忽视的一点是，在看待世界上最重要的双边关系时，首先需要考虑这一关系的双边背景，就如同我们看待中美关系一样。中国和俄罗斯彼此互为最大邻国。中国现在面临的问题是，由于其分量和影响力，外界将中国与许多似乎与中国无关的事情联系在一起，这是作为大国必须付出的代价。由于中俄的良好关系，由于俄乌战争，人们肯定会对这个关系提出问题，这可以理解。

面对乌克兰危机，我认为中国已经做出了很多贡献，其中最基本的两方面，还没有得到西方的充分认知。正如我之前在《金融时报》上所写的：

首先，中国没有“火上浇油”，这听起来可能有些空洞，但想想中国的分量，想想中国的军力，如果中国挺俄罗斯，那现在已是第三次世界大战的前夜了。因此，人们必须认识到，中国不选边站队，实际上就已为欧洲和平做出了贡献。

其次，中国明确表示，我们反对在欧洲使用核武器。我（去年）在《金融时报》发表了这一观点。习主席在会见德国总理舒尔茨时，重申了中国坚持数十年的坚定的核政策。在（去年）G20峰会上与拜登会面时，他再次重申了这一政策。

这是迄今为止，中国为欧洲和平作出的两项独特贡献。当然，中国接下来还会做得更多。有人谈论中国向俄罗斯提供杀伤性武器的可能性，这是根本不可能的。如果中国真做了，也不可能不被发现。何况，中国提出了和平倡议（注：即《关于政治解决乌克兰危机的中国立场》），为什么还要同时提供武器呢？

《旁观者》：关于提供杀伤性武器的问题，有些人认为，如果美国情报部门确信中国正在考虑这个问题，这就赋予了相关说法一种权威性和可信度，尽管我们还没有看到证据。您怎么能确定中国没有考虑这样做呢？

**周波：**因为这不符合中国的自身利益。中国为什么要被卷入一场距自己那么远的冲突？这场冲突发生在俄罗斯和乌克兰之间，俄罗斯是地球上最强大的国家之一，而中国是乌克兰最大的贸易伙伴。这是在欧洲心脏地带发生的一场战争。中国为何要选边站队，将自己卷入其中？这没有任何意义。

《旁观者》：您提到，既然中国已经是个全球参与方，因此可以理解外界对中国的关注。我们常说美国是全球警察，而中国作为世界第二大经济体，明显愿意在世界上承担更多责任。但您又说中国不想在这场战争中偏袒任何一方。这不是在推卸其作为全球参与方的责任吗？

**周波：**中国不是一个小国，小国可能会更多地考虑自身利益及周边环境，其军队只想维护自己的主权和领土完整。中国也不例外。但中国作为一个大国，还有另外两点要做：一是要维护我们在全球的经济利益，二是大国有大责任，中国理应承担。

中国要维护自己的主权和领土完整，我们还没有实现统一，这对中国这样的大国来说是不寻常的。同时，中国也要考虑另外一些问题，那就是如何捍卫自己的海外利益，如何承担重大的国际责任。在安全领域，中国最关心的仍然是自己家门口的安全，即南海、台海等问题。

因此，如果你了解中国是如何看待这些问题的，包括反对外国干涉内政，那么你就会明白，中国根本没有兴趣卷入远在欧洲的战争。

《旁观者》：据我所知，中俄之间有漫长的边界线，目前其军事化程度是近几十年来最低的。这是否也是中国不想与俄罗斯为敌的部分原因？

**周波：**邻居是搬不走的，这就是中俄面对的事实，我们是彼此最大的邻国。历史上有过龃龉，既然现在中俄边界问题已经完全解决，中国有充分的理由与俄罗斯保持睦邻政策，相信俄罗斯也会这么想。

这就是我一开始所说的，人们在考虑两国关系时，大多会把它放在不同的背景下，用第三方角度去看。但如果你专注双边关系，无论是中国人还是俄罗斯人，都知道首要任务是必须与这个最大的邻国保持友好关系。这就是外交政策。就实际问题而言，我们还应该考虑很多事情，从长远来看，中俄在经济上有互补，因此，两国关系发展有着巨大的利益。

当下，因为俄乌战争，西方只是从西方的立场来审视中俄关系，因此是自戴有色眼镜的。

《旁观者》：您提到了中国发布的和平计划，第一点是您刚才提及的尊重主权。考虑到各种与俄罗斯友好的理由，尊重主权在中国的外交政策中是否已经退居次要位置了？中国一直把尊重主权作为外交政策的重要组成部分，我理解中国强调主权源自中国自身近代所遭受的侵略。但现在，当一个主权国家遭到侵略，中国却无所作为时，这一提议就令人感觉很空洞。

**周波：**不，我不认为中国的和平倡议是空洞的，因为从这场战争爆发的第一天起，中国就一直在谈事情的正反两面。我认为是西方对同一枚硬币的两面选择性无视，因为他们声称中国没有清楚地说明这是一场侵略战争。但是，当中国谈尊重主权时，我们实际上已经委婉地批评了俄罗斯。因为中国与俄罗斯的友好关系，所以我们没有说得那么直白。但这种尊重主权的态度是中国从一开始就强调的，是不会被误解的。另一方面，我们对俄罗斯关于战争起因的说法也有一些同情，因为从苏联戈尔巴乔夫开始到俄罗斯领导人叶利钦和普京总统，俄方一直在警告反对北约的东扩。

1990年6月，苏联总统戈尔巴乔夫与老布什在白宫讨论两德统一安全事宜（图源：美联社）

北约当时承诺不东扩，但实际上并没有遵守这一承诺。我分析其原因是军事联盟基本上是靠所谓的“威胁”才能存在和发展。像北约这样的巨无霸，并没有随着冷战的结束而消失。相反，它还想扩张。因此，它必须要有一个巨大的威胁来证明自己存在的意义。这个威胁不止于反恐，应对这类小打小闹虽然有用，但无法成为如此庞大的军事集团存在的理由。因此，它需要更大的威胁，而这个威胁必须是俄罗斯。谁最像苏联？俄罗斯不是苏联，但俄罗斯当然最像苏联。因此，（俄罗斯是威胁）就成了现实。北约一直对俄罗斯的警告充耳不闻，可能是因为赢得了冷战，所以太自大了。

然后是“势力范围”这个概念，这是一个脏词，没人会公开谈论它。但是，如果俄罗斯认为存在势力范围，如果俄罗斯认为与乌克兰真是同一个民族，如果俄罗斯想用武器和武力捍卫自己的势力范围，那么结论就是，对俄罗斯来说，势力范围是存在的。

当然，每个人都明白战争是残酷的，但如果西方只谈论乌克兰领土上发生的事情，而不提及战争的根源，为什么会发生这场战争，那么欧洲就没有安全可言。因为在欧洲，安全架构实际上是建立在俄罗斯与北约之间的妥协之上，未来也会是这样。北约可以声称自己没有强迫任何国家加入，为了不怕俄罗斯，所有国家都会自愿加入。这些都是完全真实的。

但这种扩张让俄罗斯非常不舒服。在某种程度上，北约实际上已经把自己推向了核战争的门槛。因此，我形容北约现状是“仍在行走的僵尸”，而不是马克龙说过的北约“脑死亡”。这就是欧洲当前局势。无关好恶，欧洲都必须与俄罗斯达成妥协。否则，欧洲将永远生活在恐惧之中。

《旁观者》：您对北约历史的描述是不是有点片面？不只是西方仍将俄罗斯视为前苏联，俄罗斯也很有一些人希望回到前苏联的光辉岁月。然后，他们就把自己与西方对立起来。西方有些人会说，如果俄罗斯实现民主化，如果俄罗斯尊重主权，那么北约本身就非常欢迎俄罗斯加入。俄罗斯不一定是敌人，但当下的俄罗斯成了敌人。当下的俄罗斯不就是苏联解体后，尤其是在普京治下形成的俄罗斯吗？

**周波：**我觉得你有关俄罗斯对国际秩序的态度不尽合理这点说得对。我认为俄罗斯是以过去展望未来。这是俄罗斯的问题所在。俄罗斯很恋旧，普京谈论过苏联的鼎盛时期，质疑过“没有俄罗斯的世界”有什么用。我在《金融时报》发表的评论中提出了这样一个问题：“没有世界，俄罗斯何在？”如果你使用核武器，世界何在？俄罗斯又何在？这是一个问题。总之，我认为这种“俄罗斯是大国”的心态已经深深地扎根于俄罗斯人的意识中，而苏联的解体可能也加剧了这种苦涩之感。

让我们谈谈国际秩序吧。我参加的慕尼黑安全会议，其得出的基本结论是完全错误的，简直错得离谱。会议报告结论称，世界一边是中国、俄罗斯这两个专制修正主义国家，另一边是西方民主国家，中国和俄罗斯正在挑战国际秩序，而西方面临的问题是对全球南方国家的关注不够，需要改善自己。

但这一基本结论是错误的。中国对国际秩序的态度与俄罗斯不同，中国自改革开放以来就受益于与西方的互动。中国之所以取得巨大成就，是因为中国愿意学习，愿意与包括西方在内的世界各国融为一体。

但西方的问题在于它的自恋心态，认为二战后的国际秩序只是自由主义的国际秩序。这是完全错误的。为什么呢？因为我们必须承认，无论我们生活在什么地方，都存在着一种秩序，这种秩序可能是平衡的，也可能是失衡的，但秩序是存在的。问题是，我们如何定义这种秩序？在我看来，秩序本身是由不同部分组成的：首先，它是由不同的社会制度、不同的宗教、不同的文化、不同的民族特性组成的，其中有些民族特性可能已经延续了几千年，相对比较静态，并不那么易变。

二是那些不断塑造国际秩序的重大事件，例如，第二次世界大战之后发生了多少重大事件！比如非洲大陆的独立运动，包含了53个国家。53个国家的独立可不是小事。当时也存在两个阵营的对抗，一边是以北约为首的阵营，另一边是以华约为首的阵营。从这个角度来看，你怎么能说第二次世界大战后的秩序就完全是自由主义的国际秩序？西方就这么无知吗？此外，中国的崛起又怎么说？这些都发生在第二次世界大战之后。

因此，是各种重大事件塑造了国际秩序。而西方的问题在于，它认为它帮助建立的经济规则、制度和一些宪法就是国际秩序，而对我来说，这些只是世界的一部分，而不是整个世界。

《旁观者》：您看到了一个由不同国家文化、不同政治文化形成的更多元的大环境，自由主义只是其中一个分支，即西方分支。就国际社会而言，自二战以来，一直存在着其他的政治文化。

**周波：**是的。这种西方信仰的危险在于，如果只相信自由主义的国际秩序，变得自恋，又认为民主制度不再强劲发展——“自由之家”的报告显示自2006年以来，西方民主一直在衰退——西方就会被反噬，就开始指责其他国家，相信自己才是正确的，相信自己是维护自由国际秩序的主体。当西方发现世界并不是在民主化，就变得沮丧，环顾四周，就找到中国和俄罗斯背锅。当然，中国和俄罗斯也是不同的。

**《旁观者》：我在想，西方对自由主义所持有的那种近乎普世主义的世界观，是否是西方如此担心中国崛起的部分原因，因为西方认为，在冷战之后，自由主义秩序在统治着世界。因此，如果有人要挑战自由主义秩序，那么对方的秩序也是普世主义的。**但你的意思是说，如果中国成为世界超级大国，超越美国，中国人希望看到的其实更是一个多极世界，而不是一个由中国领导的独裁世界秩序。我认为这正是西方国家对中国崛起的担忧所在。

**周波：**我认为确实是这样的，因为中国从来没有提出要建立一个单极世界。中国从来没有像美国那样说自己是“山巅之城”，也从来没有像前美国国务卿奥尔布赖特（Madeleine Albright）那样自称“不可或缺的”，中国从来没有这样说过。中国常说，因为这涉及多方，那就让我们一起来做。中国谈论的是人类命运共同体，习近平主席提出的这一宏伟构想有三大支柱。一个是全球安全倡议，另一个是全球发展倡议，还有一个全球文明倡议。

一些批评者说，这些都是非常笼统的原则，没有细节。他们错了。为什么呢？在全球发展倡议下，已经有“一带一路”倡议，这是很具体的，虽然只有十年的历史。十年前，没有人知道它是什么。但10年之后，这已经成为几乎家喻户晓的国际概念。因此，这不是一个空洞的想法，中国为此投入了数万亿美元。一些人质疑“一带一路”是中国的陷阱，我会反问，你会花数万亿美元去布设一个陷阱吗？你会这么做吗？

关于“全球安全倡议”，我们在其框架下也有一些海外行动。目前，解放军在海外有三种行动，即反海盗、维和和救灾。这三种行动有个统称，从专业角度讲，这是一种“非战争军事行动”，我们称之为 MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War)，都是人道主义性质的。

例如，在亚丁湾打击海盗的行动中，我们驱散了海盗，我们抓捕了海盗，但没有试图杀死他们，我们不想杀任何人。迄今为止，中国在海外也没有杀过一个人。我们对这样的行为非常谨慎。这与北约、美国在海外的活动和军事行动形成了鲜明对比。在他们的行动中，有多少人被蓄意或无意地杀害或受伤？

《旁观者》：您不认为这只是一个时间问题吗？从中国和美国成为超级大国的时间线来看，美国已经领先了100年，从20世纪初就是超级大国。而中国，正如你所说，只有在改革开放后才真正成为世界强国，而且仍在不断进步中。中国的军队当然还没有去当世界警察，因为还没有必要，也没钱这么做。但是，当中国变得更强大，如果对台湾采取军事行动，难道也不会考虑杀台湾人吗？还有人会提到，在中印边界上那些被中国士兵伤害和杀害的士兵。是否因为中国还没走到那步？现在没有不意味着将来不会有。

**周波：**这（和平）是我对中国未来最大的期望。我相信这是可能的。没有人能肯定地说中国将来会像一个和平主义者一样不杀一人。但历史会给我们一些指引，那就是如果与其他一些国家相比，中国的崛起确实是非常和平的。

让我们来谈谈中印之间的边境冲突，即使这次冲突已造成20名印度士兵和4名中国士兵丧生，但这只是一场致命的斗殴，意味着双方并没有试图向对方开枪。也就是说，在21世纪，中印两国军队在以石器时代的方式打斗。为什么？因为双方潜意识都知道，在任何情况下都不应该向对方开枪。印度士兵确实朝天鸣枪示警过，但到目前为止，我们并没有相互开枪。中印冲突似乎是你能找到（中国参与冲突）的唯一例子。

2020年6月，中国与印度边防部队在加勒万河谷发生冲突（图源：CCTV）

至于台湾问题，不用说，这是一个中国内政问题。但我真诚地相信，我们有最大的诚意，会尽最大的努力争取和平统一。对大陆来说，台湾被打得支离破碎又有什么用呢？何况岛上还有那么多同胞，代价太大了。

《旁观者》：但据我了解，自蔡英文2016年当选以来，北京还没有与她谈过话。

**周波：**没错。那我问你，北京为什么要跟蔡英文的前任马英九谈，而不跟她谈？因为大陆认为，虽然马英九没有给出统一的时间表，大陆也没有给出统一的时间表，但大陆对马英九仍然同意台湾是中国的一部分是有一定信心的。

所以，虽然我们不知道什么时候可以统一，但我们知道，只要沿着这条路走下去，总有一天，我们仍然可以成为一个大家庭，这就是我们的信心，所以我们并不那么担心。

因此，我们给了马英九当局很多优惠的经济利益。我们也没有试图干扰台湾与十几个国家的“外交”关系。但是蔡英文的情况就完全不同了，我们对她完全没有信心。

《旁观者》：但这不仅仅是她的问题，因为她曾两次当选。我认为台湾不希望成为中华人民共和国一部分的民意在增加。与之相关的是，你如何看待中国处理香港问题的方式？在《国家安全法》颁布后，香港有人移居台湾，台湾看到一国两制的走向，为什么想要参与其中呢？

**周波：**我觉得这跟教育有很大关系，因为台湾跟大陆分离了那么久，所有这些声音都在鼓吹“台独”。

但我也在思考这个问题。例如，中国很快就将成为世界最大经济体。在新冠疫情之前，英国人预测这在2028年就会发生，这是最乐观的预测。现在，鉴于中国人口老龄化和经济明显放缓，人们似乎不那么乐观了。但我相信，即使再过几年，这个目标还是可以实现的。这难道不会改变台湾人的思维，让他们认为自己是世界上最强大国家的一部分吗？有些人的心态不会因为任何原因而改变，但有些人是有可能改变心态的。在这个问题上，需要看的不仅是台湾人会怎么想，还要关注大陆人怎么看待两岸统一。

《旁观者》：此话怎讲？

**周波：**我的意思是，台湾的未来不仅由台湾人决定，也由大陆人决定，因为我们认为台湾是中国的一部分。因此，不仅他们可以决定自己的未来，大陆也可以决定台湾的未来。

**《旁观者》：你关于经济的观点非常有趣，因为这是我在与中方就香港和台湾问题交谈时经常听到的，他们非常看重更好的经济、更强大的国家等物质因素的重要性，而很少提及民主、言论自由等价值观的追求，一说后者就提到教育问题，正如你今天所说的那样。**既然台湾此刻并不为中国经济实力所动，而台湾自身在各个领域的经济表现都非常好，那为什么将来就会变化呢？我觉得这暴露了一种特别唯物主义的世界观，我认为北京的很多人都有这种世界观，这很有意思。

**周波：**事实就是台湾通过与大陆的经济互动获益匪浅。有很多台湾人生活在大陆，比如在上海，据说共有150万台湾人在大陆生活。提到这个数字，我就在想，可能很多台湾中产阶级实际上生活在大陆。在上海，他们的生活非常舒适。这些人至少应该是中产阶级，否则他们可能住不起上海。我曾与一位法国人交谈，他说仅在上海就可能有10万法国人。也就是说，这种社会制度上的差异对他们来说并不重要。

11月23日，台湾大选候选人确认前最后一次一次讨论“蓝白合”的会谈（图源：台湾联合报）

此外，我相信大陆实际上会为台湾提供相当宽容的统一条件，中央政府已经提出了许多提议。我们已经多次表示，这些提议都是可以谈判的。但是，将台湾从中国分离出去，这对我们来说是无法承受的。

《旁观者》：我想回到俄乌战争上。但在此之前，我想问最后一个关于台湾的问题，那就是，您认为中国对台湾采取军事行动的可能性有多大？一些美国军方消息来源称可能在2025年之前。鉴于您与军队的联系，您的看法是是什么？如果没有时间表，那么您认为什么是红线，会让中国觉得和平统一已不可能，是时候采取军事行动了？

**周波：**你提了几个要点。首先，我知道你说的美国军方是谁，那是美国四星上将迈克·米尼汉，他是美国空中机动司令部司令，他说过类似的话。

但问题是，就连他的上级五角大楼也不同意他的说法。五角大楼指出，他的言论与五角大楼的评估不符。因此，我对他的言论有很多疑问。

每个人都有自己的直觉，这没问题。但他怎么能单凭直觉说出这些会产生严重后果的话，而且还以备忘录的形式发给下属？这让我感到非常奇怪，我阅读了所有关于他的言论的媒体报道，却找不到任何支持他的论点的统计数据。这种直觉真可怕。

这也表明了中美关系当前的一些挑战，那就是美国国内政策的分裂实际上会给其外交政策带来混乱。人们并不经常谈论这一点，但外交政策无疑是国内政治的延伸。现在看美国，即使作为局外人，看到美国国内变得如此分裂，我们也很担心，因为这也会给我们带来麻烦。

这种分裂表现在不同层面，包括三个军种之间以及军队内部，比如一位将军和他的上司表达了不一致的意见。而立法部门和行政部门之间也存在分歧。例如，拜登和五角大楼都不支持佩洛西窜访台湾，但她还是去了。这些情况加在一起，实际上会产生很多问题。坦率地说，拜登本身就是个弱势总统。因此，总的看来，要处理好这种关系是非常困难的。这对我们来说是一个巨大的挑战。

再回到你关于大陆发动军事攻击的可能性有多大这个问题上。在我们的反分裂国家法中，我们已经明确指出，大陆只可能在三种情况下以非和平方式解决台湾问题。一是台湾宣布独立，这看起来是不可能的，他们不会那么愚蠢。第二种情况是导致台湾与大陆分离的重大事件，我努力思考这种事件可能是什么，我认为佩洛西窜访台湾可能属于这一类。

第三种情况是，大陆认为和平统一的可能性已经不复存在了。因此，关于最后一点，我的建议是，必须让中国大陆相信，我们仍然可以与台湾实现和平统一，要让我们相信有值得维护的和平，就像我们在维和中常说的那样。要让我们相信台湾海峡的和平能够维持。

那么问题来了，美国该怎么做？美国向中国和台湾地区释放的信号不仅是矛盾的，而且完全是混淆视听，完全是不负责任的。我认为，中国和美国都不想发生冲突，这是事实。但问题是，首先，我们必须在手段上达成一致，即通过什么渠道才能真正努力维持这种关系，使其尽可能和平？其次，有哪些真正可能破坏双边关系稳定的问题？这是可能导致我们陷入冲突的两方面。我不认为我们现在能就这些问题达成一致，所以两边的言辞越来越激烈，这是不健康的，也引出了一个问题，到底谁应为此负更大的责任？

《旁观者》：您关于军事行动前提条件的第二和第三点，看上去涵盖范围都很大。如果佩洛西到台湾都可以被视为台湾从中国大陆分离的一步，那么我认为太容易将很多事情归入这一类了。去年发生这件事时，我不明白的是，为什么北京不能说，我们欢迎佩洛西议长访问我们美丽的台湾省，也请到大陆来访问。为什么选择以非常强硬的方式正面交锋，而不是使用更为圆滑的外交手段？我本认为后者是中国文化的精妙之处。为什么在海峡两岸问题上没有更多地使用这种方式呢？

**周波：**西方有些人和你观点一样，这其中当然有很多原因。中国大陆认为台湾是中国的一部分。由于两岸关系非常不融洽，所以不可能出现你所描述的那种“美好”的情况，现阶段是不可能的。

2022年8月2日，美国时任众议长佩洛西窜访台湾（图源：纽约时报）

《旁观者》：我想把话题拉回到俄罗斯上，因为中国提出了我们一直在谈论的和平计划。但如果中国真的关心和平，难道不应该在这方面做得更多，而不仅仅是说说而已吗？

**周波：**我觉得我们要有耐心。耐心确实是中国人的美德。当你思考中国人的心态时，你也必须牢记这一点。

让我举两个例子。一是中国的改革开放。中国当时没有路线图，但我认为，到目前为止，中国人可以说是善于在没有路线图的情况下找到前行道路。如何在40年内让8亿人摆脱贫困？没有路线图，但我们做到了。我刚才提到的“一带一路”倡议，十年前无人理解，但10年后，你会看到它产出的无数个具体项目。

因此，我认为中国在此次俄乌战争中扮演的角色，首先是以建设性的方式向前迈出了真正的一步。因为在过去，中国的立场更多的是一种微妙的中立。但提出这一和平立场本身就是向前迈出的一大步。

而中国的思维方式总是先考虑一些大的概念，先把结构搭好，然后再用砖块填充。你可以看一下中国在六方会谈中的角色，也就是在朝鲜半岛无核化问题上的角色，以及中国在伊朗核问题上的角色，也就是所谓的 JCPOA(《关于伊朗核计划的全面协议》 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action)。在六方会谈中，中国就是事实上的倡导者，协调各方，发挥了非常重要的作用。而在 JCPOA 中，中国只是一个平等的参与者，中国的作用并不比六方会谈中的作用大。因此，中国在以不同的方式发挥作用。

在俄乌战争这个问题上，中国有一个独特的优势，那就是中国与俄罗斯的良好关系。如果俄罗斯愿意听取任何一方的意见，这一方最有可能就是中国。因此，中国有很多发挥的潜力。这场战争不会很快结束，我相信，在未来的日子里，由于世界在某种程度上将会更加仰仗中国。只要战争久拖不决，人们就会更加期待中国发挥积极作用，而这种期望有时会成为压力，促使中国做得更多。我们不走回头路，中国已经向前迈出了建设性的一步，我相信还会有第二步、第三步。

关于中国能做什么，这不是个问题。中国当下其实什么也做不了，因为参与方都不愿意停火，无论是俄罗斯、乌克兰还是美国。如果我们要谈论和平，第一步当然是停火。但现在这些国家都不想停火。因此，只有当这些国家决定停火时，中国才能提供帮助，届时不仅是中国提供帮忙，可能还有其他国家也想帮助。因此，中国只能在最合适的时候介入。

《旁观者》：AUKUS（注：美英澳三边安全伙伴关系）也有最新消息。英国首相与美国总统和澳大利亚总理一起站在讲台上，谈论其前景。他们没有过多提及中国，但这一安排显然跟中国有关。所以我想知道，从您的角度来看，中国如何看待AUKUS？

**周波：**AUKUS肯定是针对中国的，否则你无法解释澳大利亚为什么需要核动力潜艇。假设中澳发生冲突，冲突会发生在哪里？不可能在澳大利亚海域吧？我们对澳大利亚没有任何企图，我们的战略重点也不在那里。所以，冲突只能在南海、台湾海峡或台湾海峡附近。也就是说，他们的军舰会靠近中国。这是唯一合乎逻辑的结论。

11月14日，澳方指责中方对澳军舰“图文巴”（Toowoomba ）号护卫舰水手使用声呐脉冲（图源：路透社）

但是，这八艘潜艇能对澳大利亚有多大帮助呢？我认为，这实际上会给他们带来更多的麻烦，而不是好处。为什么这么说呢？澳大利亚没有核工业，为了这八艘核潜艇，他们必须从零开始发展核工业，而这些核潜艇还必须在其他地方建造。核潜艇的维护将是一个大问题。因此，这些事情实际上会给他们带来很多麻烦。此外，从根本上说，我认为这种投入是由于（美国对）澳大利亚的忽悠，澳大利亚实际上是在补贴美军，美军在这一地区没有足够的舰艇和人力。

从历史上看，具有讽刺意味的是，澳大利亚总是在打别人的战争，他们都不是为自己打仗，无论是（土耳其）加里波利、越南还是阿富汗战争，他们总是在打别人的战争，他们从未认真考虑过如何搞外交平衡。

我认为，从战略上讲，他们会真正感受到持续的痛苦，因为他们就位于亚太地区。随着中国日益强大，我想很多人都会质疑澳大利亚如此盲目地与美国结盟，是否是正确的决定，因为这是非常仓促的决定，没有经过充分的协商，很多人都表示反对，无论是前总理保罗·基廷总理还是前总理特恩布尔，他们都表示反对。

《旁观者》：那么在台湾问题上，正如您所说，这一切都与中国有关，与台湾海峡有关。AUKUS如何改变中国对解决台湾问题的打算？

**周波：**AUKUS当然会使中国政府的决策变得更加复杂，但它不会改变游戏规则，就这么简单。想想那八艘核动力潜艇吧，它们何时能够生产，何时能够部署，何时能够投入使用？这至少需要10年的时间。然而此前，人们基本上认为第一艘潜艇将在2040年前部署。

即使在10年后就开始部署，让我问你，解放军海军在此期间将会变得有多强大？就潜艇而言，解放军的潜艇数量甚至超过了美国，虽然其中也需要考虑质量差异，中国大多数潜艇都是常规潜艇，但量变可带来质变，数量也很重要。中国的潜艇在质量上也有很大的提高。10年后，中国人民解放军海军会变得有多强大？这八艘潜艇对我们又有多大实际意义呢？正如我之前所说，这可能只是使我们的决策复杂化，因为我们必须将其考虑在内，但这并不会改变游戏规则。

《旁观者》：谢谢你接受采访。

（翻译：李泽西 核译：韩桦）

英文原文如下：

The Spectator: Zhou Bo, welcome to Chinese Whispers. Now, China’s position has often been criticized in the west for being too supportive of Russia. What’s your understanding of China’s position on the war?

Zhou Bo: I think, as a comment on China Russian relationship, it’s really not said in the West that if you look at this most important relationship in the world, just like China US relationship, you have to put it first of all on a bilateral context. And if you put that in bilateral context, you would know that China is Russia’s largest neighbor and vice versa. The problem with China now is that China, because of its weight and heft, is actually associated with everything that doesn’t seem to have anything to do with China. And this is the price you have to pay as a great power. And because of the war in Ukraine, of course, and because of the China Russia’s good relationship, definitely people would ask a question about this relationship that makes a lot of sense.

But on this Russia Ukrainian war, I think China has already contributed a lot, at least on two issues that are basically underappreciated in the west, as I have written in Financial Times a few days ago. First of all, China didn’t throw wood into the fire. Well, this may just sound somewhat empty, but think of China’s weight and think of China’s military. If China joins Russia, this is already the dawn of the Third World War. So people have to realize that how China actually has contributed to peace in Europe, by not picking a side. Then the second thing is China has made it crystal clear that we are against any possible use of nuclear weapons in Europe. I first wrote on this that was published in FT. When President Xi Jinping met with Olaf Shultz, the German chancellor, he reiterated this firm decade old Chinese policy, which was reiterated during his meeting with Joe Biden at G20.

So far, we have made two distinctive contributions for peace in Europe. And then China, of course, is going to do more. And people talk about China’s possibility of providing lethal military support to Russia, which is totally impossible because that doesn’t make any sense. If China does, of course, it won’t go unnoticed. And why should China do that when China actually is tabling a peace proposal for resolution of the conflict?

The Spectator: On the question of lethal aid, some people would say that if American intelligence is so confident that China is considering this, that kind of affords it an authority, a trustedness in this kind of intelligence, even though we haven’t seen it ourselves. How can you say for sure that China is not considering it?

Zhou Bo: Because it’s not in China’s own interests. The question is, why should China be dragged into a conflict that is far away from China, which is between Russia, one of the strongest nation on earth, and Ukraine, which has China as its largest trading partner. And this is an unprecedented war in the heart of Europe. And why should China pick a side and get yourself involved? It doesn’t make any sense.

The Spectator: So, you’ve mentioned that this is a question that makes sense to ask of China because China is now a global player. And we talk about America being this global policeman, and China is clearly wanting to take more responsibilities in the world now that it’s the second largest economy. But you then say it doesn’t want to take sides in this war. I mean, isn’t it shirking its responsibilities as a global player?

Zhou Bo: China is different from a small country in that a small country would probably consider more about itself and its ambience, right? And its military would simply want to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity. China is no exception. But China as a major power has two things more. One is it has global economic interests that it has to safeguard. Besides, great power shoulders great responsibility. Therefore, China also shoulders a greater responsibility. China has to safeguard its own sovereignty and territory integrity, which is unusual for a major power like China because China has not become reunified. But at the same time, it has to also consider something else, that is how to defend its overseas interest and how to shoulder these great international responsibilities. But in terms of security, China’s primary concern is still about his doorsteps, that is South China Sea, that is Taiwan Strait, all these kinds of issues. So if you know how China has been concerned with all these issues, which are becoming more and more suffice with what we perceive to be foreign interferences, you would understand China should have no interest whatsoever to be involved in a war far away in Europe.

The Spectator: The lengthy border between China and Russia at the moment I understand is the least militarized it has been in decades. And is that part of the reason why China doesn’t want to make an enemy of Russia as well?

Zhou Bo: You see, neighbors won’t move away. So this is just the reality, both for China and for Russia. And we are just the largest neighbor to each other. And because of the not necessarily all pleasant history, China now with its border issue totally resolved with Russia, should have all reasons to maintain this good neighbor policy with Russia. And they would think likewise, I believe. That’s what I said in the beginning. When people think about relationship, mostly they think they would put it in a different context and would look at it through third eye. But if you look at this relationship, either by Chinese or by Russians, they know this is the priority, that we must remain friendly with this biggest neighbor. And this is about the foreign policy. And in terms of practicalities, there are also so many things that we should consider because even in the long run, Russia would be useful for China economically and vice versa. So there are huge interests.

Right now, I think the west is somewhat biased because the war in the heart of Europe, they would just examine this relationship from a kind of western context, which automatically would become somewhat biased.

The Spectator: Now, you mentioned the peace plan that China has recently released. The first point of the peace plan is respect for sovereignty, something that you’ve also mentioned so far. In light of all of these different interests and reasons to be friendly with Russia, isn’t it the case that sovereignty has taken a back seat when it comes to China’s foreign policy? China has always talked about sovereignty as an important part of its foreign policy. I understood that respect for sovereignty as a legacy of our brutalized recent history. But now it feels pretty empty when a sovereign nation is being invaded and China won’t do anything about it.

Zhou Bo: No, I don’t think China’s proposal is empty, because ever since day one when this war came out, China has been talking about two sides of the same coin. The only thing is, I think the West has become kind of selectively blind towards the two sides of the same coin, because they talked about how China has not been crystal clear about this war being an invasion. But when China talks about respect for sovereignty, we actually have gently criticized Russia. But because China’s relationship with Russia is friendly, so we did not put it out so bluntly. But this attitude about respect of sovereignty is talked about in the very beginning and it could not be misunderstood. But on the other hand, we do have some sympathies toward Russia as to why this war just came out, because ever since Soviet Union, soviet leader like Gorbachev down to Russian leader Boris Yeltsin and President Putin have invariably warned against such NATO expansions.

NATO from time pledged not to expand, but it didn’t actually keep this promise. And I have a reason why this has happened, because military alliances basically live on so called threats. They need threats to survive and to thrive. And for such juggernauts like NATO, it did not go away with the end of the Cold War. Instead, it wants to expand. Therefore, it has to have a big threat to justify its own existence. It’s not about counter terrorism, these kinds of things, petty small things that are useful, but not totally useful for such big military bloc. So they need something bigger, which has to be Russia because who looks most like Soviet Union? Russia is not the Soviet Union, but of course, Russia looks most like Soviet Union. So in this regard, this turned out to be the reality. They have been turning the deaf ear to whatever warnings from Russia, probably they’re just a bit too arrogant because they have won the Cold War.

Then come this concept of sphere of influence, it of course is a dirty word, nobody would really talk about it openly. But if Russia believes there is sphere of influence, if Russia believes Ukrainian are really one people, you can imagine how they feel. So if Russia would like to defend its sphere of influence with arms, with forces, then the conclusion is, for Russia, there is sphere of influence. So right now the west just talk about what is happening on the soil of Ukraine. Of course, everybody understand war is cruel, but without referring to the very causes, why it happened at all, there is no security in Europe, because in Europe the security architecture actually stands only on compromises between Russia and NATO, and even in the future, it would be something like this. NATO can say, NATO is not forcing any country to join and all countries to be not afraid of Russia would volunteer to join. These are totally true. That is correct. But with this kind of expansion makes Russia extremely uncomfortable. And to some extent, NATO has actually driven itself to the threshold of a nuclear war. So this is a zombie that is still walking. This is not a brain dead as Macron said, I described as a zombie that is walking. So right now, this is what is happening in Europe. You have to find a compromise with Russia, like it or not. Otherwise, you will always live in fear, in panic.

The Spectator: Well, Zhou Bo, isn’t your version of history of NATO a little bit one sided by the sense that, I mean, it’s not just the west that still sees Russia as the USSR, it seems that some people in Russia still see themselves or want to go back to the glory days of the Soviet Union. And then they put themselves against the west as a kind of counter. Some people in the west would say if Russia were to democratize, if Russia were to respect sovereignty, then it would very well much be welcomed into NATO itself. Russia is not necessarily the enemy, but Russia as it is at the moment is, I mean, it isn’t that part of what has been brought on by how Russia has been governed since the fall of the Soviet Union as well, especially under Putin?

Zhou Bo: I think you’re right in that Russia is not totally justifiable in the attitude toward the international order, for example, because I believe Russia would look to the future from the past. And that is the problem with Russia. Russia’s nostalgic, Putin talked about the heydays of the Soviet Union and he talked about what is the use of the world without Russia. And then in my opinion that was publishing the FT, I ask this question, and where is Russia without the world? If you use nuclear weapon, where is the world? And then where is Russia? That’s a problem. So I believe this kind of mentality of Russia being a great power is deeply embedded in Russian people’s mentality. And probably this kind of dissolution of Soviet Union has actually add to this kind of acrimony.

But then let’s talk about something else, about international order. When people at this Munich security conference, which I attended recently, the basic conclusion is totally wrong, and it cannot be more wrong, because according to the report, Munich Conference, the conclusion is that on one side is China, Russia, two autocratic revisionist and then on the other side is western democracy. And the conclusion is China and Russia are challenging international order and the west, yes, has also met some problems, that is, it has not pay enough attention to the countries in the global south. Therefore, we should do something to improve ourselves.

But this kind of basic conclusion is wrong. China’s attitude toward international order is different from Russia’s because China has benefited from interacting with the west since reform and opening up. So China’s tremendous achievements is because it is ready to learn. It is ready to integrate itself with the rest of the world, including the west. But the problem with western mentality is that it is narcissistic, because it believes the international order after Second World War is just Liberal international order. This is totally wrong. Why? Because we must admit that whenever we live, there is something like order and this order may be balanced or imbalanced somewhere but there is an order. But the question is how do we define this order? The order itself, in my opinion is made of different legs: first it is composed of different social systems, different religions, different cultures, different national identities and some of these may just have lasted for millenniums, this identity of a nation. So this kind of thing, some of them are very static, they’re not so volatile.

The second layer is the major events that have constantly shape this international order, for example after second world war, you can imagine how many major events have occurred. We’re not talking about some small things. We’re talking about the Independent movement of Africa continent, which include 53 countries. The independence of 53 countries is no small thing. Then there was also the rivalry of two camps led by NATO on one side and Warsaw Pact on the other side. So even talking about this, how do you know that the order of the Second World War is totally liberal international order? Are you so ignorant? And then how about the rise of China? This all happened after Second World War. So these major events have shaped this order. And the problem with the west is that it believes that the economic rules and regimes and some of the constitutions it has helped to established are the international order, which for me are just a part of the world but not the whole world.

The Spectator: So you see a much more diverse environment of different national cultures, political cultures, that liberalism is just one strand of that, the western strand. But internationally, there are other political cultures that have always existed since World War Two.

Zhou Bo: Yeah, but the danger of this kind of western belief is that if you believe in the Liberal international order, actually it hurts yourself because you become narcissist, and because if you believe democracy is no longer thriving as found by Freedom House, ever since 2006, western democracy has been declining. So you start to blame other countries, because you believe you’re the right one, because you believe you’re the one holding the Liberal international order. And you find that the world is not moving this way, and the world in the future is not moving this way. So you become frustrated and you start to look around. And then you find China and Russia to blame. But China, Russia are still different.

The Spectator: I wonder if that almost universalist view of the world that the west holds about liberalism is partly why it fears so much China’s rise, in that it believes that there’s a Liberal order ruling the world after, let’s say, the Cold War. And so if anyone’s going to challenge that Liberal order, then their order would also be universalist. But are you saying that if China were to be the world superpower, it were to overtake the US, what the Chinese see is actually more of a multipolar world rather than a Chinese led authoritarian world order. I think that’s a large part of the fear of western countries about China’s rise.

Zhou Bo: I think that is true, because China never propose to have a unipolar world. China never talks like the United States that it a city upon the hill. China never said like Madeleine Albright that United States is indispensable，either. China never talked in that way. China always says that, okay, because this involves everybody, let’s do it together. And China talks about the humanity of shared future. This grandiose concept of president Xi Jinping right now has three pillars under it. One is a global security initiative; another is global development initiative and the third one is global civilization initiative. Some critics say that these are very general principles without details. They’re wrong. Why? Let me tell you, under the global development initiative, we have already seen Belt and Road initiative, which is totally tangible because this has only a history of 10 years. Ten years ago, few people know what it means. But in 10 years, this becomes international phrase that almost all educated people know. So this is not empty idea. We have spent billions or trillions of dollars in it. It’s not an empty idea. So that’s why I talk to some people who say this is Chinese trap. I said, okay, would you spend trillions of dollars to lay a trap? Would you do that?

Then about Global Security Initiative, we also have something under it net that is a place operation overseas. Right now there are three types of operations by PLA overseas, that is counterpiracy, that is peacekeeping and that is disaster relief. But if you put all these operational altogether, they have a common name. Professionally speaking, it is a military operation other than war, what we called MOOTW. But these operations are just humanitarian in nature. For example, in counterpiracy in Gulf of Aden, we dispel pirates. We apprehended piracy, but we didn’t try to kill them. We do not want to kill anyone. And so far overseas, China has not killed anyone. And we are extremely cautious in behaving like that. And this would come into such a sharp contrast with NATO, with the US activities, military operation overseas. How many people have been killed or injured purposefully or inadvertently by these operations?

The Spectator: Don’t you think that’s just a matter of time in the sense that in the timeline of China and the US being superpowers, the US has had 100 years head start, let’s say since the beginning of the 20th century. Whereas China, as you say, only really from reform and opening has it become a strong country internationally, and it is still a work in progress. So, of course, its army hasn’t been going out there being the global policeman because it hasn’t had needed to, hasn’t had the money to do so. But are you really telling me that as China gets stronger, that it wouldn’t consider killing people in Taiwan if it were to take military action over Taiwan? I mean, some people are talking about the Indian border would point to the soldiers who are hurt and killed by Chinese soldiers. I mean, isn’t it just that China hasn’t had that kind of role so far, but that doesn’t mean it won’t have it in the future.

Zhou Bo: Well, this is my best hope for China in the future. And I believe it is still possible. Nobody can say for sure that China would really behave like a pacifist without any killing in the future. But history may just give us some guidance, that is China’s rise is very peaceful indeed if you compare it with some other countries. So let’s talk about the border clash between China and India. Even if this clash has claimed the life of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese soldiers. This is deadly brawl. That means we did not try to shoot at each other. So that means in 21st century, the troops of China and India are fighting in a manner only found in Stone Age. And why is that? Because both sides subconscious know that they should not shoot at each other in any circumstances. The Indian soldiers did shoot into the sky to give a kind of warning, but so far we have not been shooting at each other. So this is true, and this is almost the only example that you can find in the kind of clashes.

And then about the Taiwan issue, this is, of course, needless to say, this is a domestic issue. But I genuinely believe that we have uttermost sincerity and would make utmost efforts to try to get reunified peacefully, because what is the use of Taiwan that totally battered and shattered for us, let alone there are so many people on the island. So the cost would be too high for us.

The Spectator: But as I understand it, President Xi hasn’t talked to President Cai since she was elected in 2016.

Zhou Bo: That is true. But then come this question, why would President Xi talk to, Ma Ying-jeou, Cai’s predecessor and not to her? Because we in mainland believe Ma Ying-jeou did not give a timetable for reunification. Mainland did not give out timetable for reunification. But we in the mainland are somewhat confident that Ma Ying-jeou still agree to this kind of a general concept of Taiwan being part of one China. So we have some confidence in him. So that is why we know, we don’t know when we could become reunited, but we know so long as we walk down the road, one day, we can become still a big family. This is our confidence. So we’re not that much worried. Therefore, we give Ma Ying-jeou’s authority a lot of preferential economic benefits. And we did not try to disturb Taiwan’s diplomatic relationship with about a dozen countries. But Cai, of course, is, it is a totally different story. And we don’t have confidence in her either at all.

The Spectator: But it’s not just the question of her, right? I mean, she was elected twice. And I think there is increasing public opinion in Taiwan that doesn’t want to become a part of the People’s Republic of China. Part of that, in this greater context, what do you think of how China has dealt with Hong Kong? Not least because of the Hong Kong people who’ve moved to Taiwan in general after the National Security Law. But Taiwan can see what one country, two systems turns into. So why would it want to be a part of that? I mean, hasn’t China kind of messed this one up?

Zhou Bo: I think it is also true that Taiwan has benefited hugely from economic interaction with mainland. And there are so many Taiwanese living in China, for example, in Shanghai, it’s a huge number. I don’t know exactly how many people live in the mainland, but sometimes people would talk about 1.5 million. I don’t know. So when that figure was raised, I was thinking about this, probably a lot of people above middle class in Taiwan actually live in China. So these people of course should be middle class at least. Otherwise they cannot not afford to live in Shanghai. So that means in Shanghai, their lives are very comfortable. I once talk to a Frenchman and he said that there are probably 100,000 Frenchmen living in Shanghai alone. So that means this kind of a difference in social system doesn’t really matter to them. Besides, we actually would make this kind of conditions for reunification quite tolerant for Taiwanese, I believe, because the central government has put forward a number of measures as proposals. And then, of course, this kind of things are always negotiable. And we have expressed time again that these kind of things are negotiable. But for Taiwan to be separated from mainland, this is not affordable for us.

Zhou Bo: I think it has a lot of things to do with education, because Taiwan has been separated from mainland for so long. And if all these voices are promoting a kind of independence.

But I’m also thinking about this issue. For example, it won’t be too long before China becomes the largest economy in the world. Some people talked about 2028 in Britain, before pandemic. So that is the most optimistic forecast. Now people seems to be less optimistic given China’s aging population and apparent slowdown economy. But I would believe, even if we take a few years more, this is still achievable. Then wouldn’t that be a turning point in changing the mentality of Taiwanese people, if they consider themselves to be part of the strongest national on earth, wouldn’t that change the mentality? Some people won’t be changed for any reasons, but then there is, there is a possibility for them to change the mentality. And besides, on this issue, it’s not only what Taiwanese would think about, it’s also about what the mainlanders would think about these two parts of being one China that also matters.

The Spectator: What do you mean by that?

Zhou Bo: I mean, the future of Taiwan is not only determined by Taiwanese, it is also determined by mainlanders because we believe Taiwan is part of China. So it’s not only they can decide on their own future, it’s that mainland could also decide on the future of Taiwan.

The Spectator: Your point about economics is really interesting because it’s something that I’ve heard a lot from speaking to Chinese interlocutors about Hong Kong and about Taiwan, that so much is placed on the material goods of a better economy, of a stronger country, all of these sort of things, and very little is put on to a pursuit of values like democracy, freedom of speech, which then the answer becomes was one about education, as you’ve said today. Why would Taiwan care about China being the world’s largest economy if it doesn’t currently care now, and when Taiwan as a, you might not call it a country, but Taiwan as a set of islands is economically doing very well in all sorts of areas, I just don’t know if—— I think it betrays a particularly materialistic view of the world that I think a lot of people in Beijing have, which I think is fascinating.

The Spectator: I want to bring this back to the Russia Ukraine war. But before I do, just one final question on Taiwan, which is that, what do you think is the possibility of military action over Taiwan from China in terms of an invasion? I mean, some American military sources have said it’s before 2025, for example. You’re someone with links to the military. I mean, what do you think about that? And what would be the threshold if not a timeline, then what would be the threshold that you think China would decide that peaceful reunification is not possible and therefore, this is the moment.

Zhou Bo: Your question that raise a few good points. First of all, I know who you’re referring to, that is Americans four-star general Mike Minihan, who was the commander of Americans air Mobility Command, he said something like that. But the question is, even his superior Pentagon didn’t agree with him. And Pentagon pointed out that his remarks are not in accordance with assessment of the Pentagon. So I have a lot of questions for his remarks. First of all, it is fine if someone has his gut feeling, right, we all have our own gut feeling on something. But how come that you would say something that is so consequential based on your gut feeling and you would send it in a memo to your subordinates? This is very weird for me because I have read all the media report on his remarks, but I could not find any statistics supporting his argument. And this kind of gut feeling is really horrendous.

And it tells me something about the difficulties in China US relationship, that is how a divided American domestic policy could actually bring chaos to its foreign policy. People don’t often talk about that, but definitely foreign policy is the extension of domestic politics. And right now in the United States, even as outsiders, we are worried to see how the United States is becoming so domestically divided because this would create a problem for us. You see, this kind of division is manifested at different layers. It is between or among the three branches. It is within the military itself, just like the remarks of a general in disagreement with his superior. And it is found of apparently between the legislative branch and the executive branch. For example, like Nancy Pelosi’s visit, Biden didn’t like it, Pentagon didn’t like it. But still, she went there, so all these things put together would actually create a lot of problems. And Biden himself is a weak President, frankly speaking. So putting all this together, it is extremely difficult to manage this relationship. That is a big challenge for us.

And then coming back to your questions about how likely a military attack is。In our anti-secession law, we have made it clear that this kind of non-peaceful means of resolving the Taiwan issue by mainland could only occur in three situations. One is that Taiwan would declare independence. This doesn’t look possible. They’re not so stupid to do that. The second thing is major events leading to the separation of Taiwan from mainland. I try to think hard about what this kind of events might be. And I would consider Nancy Pelosi’s a visit might be in this category.

The third situation is that mainland believe that the prospect for peaceful reunification is exhausted for good. So about this last point, my advice is that you have to let Chinese Mainland believe we can still reach peaceful reunification with Taiwan, so this won’t happen. And for us to believe there is a peace to be maintained, as we often say in peacekeeping, right? For us in peacekeeping, we have to make sure that there is peace to be kept. And for us to believe that there is a peace to be kept across Taiwan Strait, then the question is, what United States should do? All these kind of signals sending to China, send to Taiwan are not conflicting, they’re totally confusing, they’re totally irresponsible. I think it is true that neither China nor the United States wants to have a conflict. But the problem is, first of all, we have to reach agreement on the instruments, through what channels could we actually try to maintain this relationship to make it as peaceful as possible? Second, what are the genuine issues that could actually destabilize this relationship? Two steps that we might slide into conflict. So all these things together, I don’t believe we right now have an agreement on this, so you’re saying the tones actually rising higher and higher, this is not healthy, but raises as a question, who is more responsible for this?

The Spectator: In your second and third points about those conditions for a military action, I mean, they’re pretty big categories, they’re really big categories. If Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan can be seen is a step towards Taiwan being separated from Chinese Mainland, then I think the bar is very low for something to count in that category. What I didn’t understand when that was happening last year was, why Beijing couldn’t say, we welcome Speaker Pelosi to our beautiful province of Taiwan, please come see us and do come into the mainland as well. You know, this kind of going head to head in a very strong way, instead of using slightly more diplomacy would I consider as Chinese deftness in cultural senses. Why isn’t more of that being used when it comes to the problem over the strait? You know, why does a Pelosi visit have to become such a big deal, which I think partly was made such a big deal by Beijing’s reaction.

Zhou Bo: There are some people in the west who have argued like you and I believe there are, of course, a number reason for that. The Chinese Mainland believes Taiwan is part of China. For the central government, you cannot go there to visit someone without my permission. And because this cross-strait relationship is so sour, there is no possibility for what you have described beautifully. So it is impossible at this stage.

The Spectator: And I want to bring us back to the Russian invasion because China has proposed this peace plan that we’ve been talking about. But if it really cares about peace, shouldn’t it do more about that than just talk about it?

Zhou Bo: I think we’ll have to be patient. Patience is really a virtue of Chinese. And so you, when you think about the Chinese mentality, you also got to bear this in mind. Let me give you two examples. One is China’s reform and opening up. China didn’t have a roadmap. But Chinese, I believe so far, can be said to be good at finding the road without a map, because the reform and opening up, they didn’t have a map. And there is no such a map how you can shake off poverty of 800 million people within four decades. There is no roadmap. And we did it. And then about this Belt and Road Initiative which I mention just now, 10 years ago, what was it? In a nutshell, nobody understood it. But in 10 years’ time, you see how it actually proliferated into so many things, so tangible around the world.

So, I believe China’s role in this Russia Ukrainian war, firstly is a genuine step forward in a constructive way. Because in the past, China’s position is more kind of nuanced neutrality. But putting forward this peace plan itself is a major step forward. And Chinese thinking is always think about some big concepts to lay out the structure first before fulfilling it with concrete bricks, for example, and so forth. Then you come to think about the China’s role first in the six Party talks, which is on the denuclearization in Korean Peninsula and China’s role in the Iranian nuclear issue, which is called JCPOA. So in the first example, China basically is the de facto leader, coordinating all the parties together. So China played a very significant role. And then in JCPOA, China is just an equal participant. China role is not bigger than the one in the six party talks. So China have different ways of playing its role.

But on this issue, the conflict in Europe, China has a unique advantage, that is China’s good relation with Russia. If Russia would like to listen to anyone, most probably it is China now. So China has a lot of potentials to play. And this war would not finish very soon. So I believe, in the days to come, because in part the world is looking up to China all the more, so long as the war drags on, people would simply have more expectation for China to play positive role. And this kind of expectation can sometime become the pressure for China to do more. So there is no going back. China has already made a constructive step forward and I believe there would be second or third steps to come.

But then the question is, what can China do? It’s not really a question of what China can do. China cannot do anything right now because no one would like to see a ceasefire, be it Russia, Ukraine, or the United States. So if we talk about peace, the first step, of course, is ceasefire. But none of these countries now want to ceasefire. So China can only help when these countries decide to have a ceasefire, right? And it’s not only China that is helping. There might be other countries who wants to help. So China can only jump in at a time that is most appropriate.

The Spectator: There’s also been this announcement around AUKUS, where the British prime minister has stepped on the podium with the American president and the Australian prime minister to talk about what this deal could look like. Now, they didn’t mention China much, but it’s clearly got China in mind. So I wondered, from your perspective, what does the view look like on AUKUS from Beijing?

Zhou Bo: AUKUS is definitely against China, because otherwise you cannot explain why Australia would need nuclear power submarines. Just give you a scenario. If China and Australia have a conflict, where can it be? It cannot be in the waters of Australia, right? We have no purposes whatsoever against Australia, and our strategic focus is not in that direction. It can only be in South China Sea or in the Taiwan Strait or near Taiwan Strait. That means their ships would come close to China. This is the only logical conclusion.

But then how helpful are these 8 submarines to Australia? I would argue that it actually gives them more trouble than pleasure. Why? Because Australia has no nuclear industry. And because of these eight nuclear summaries, they have to develop the industry from scratch, and these nuclear summaries have to be built elsewhere. Then, about nuclear submarines, the maintenance would be a big issue. No ships need to be maintained. And for nuclear submarines, these ships have to be sent somewhere for maintenance. So all these kind things would actually give them a lot of trouble. And besides, basically, I believe this kind of effort is because the Australia was sweet talked, therefore is actually subsidizing American military which doesn’t have enough ships or manpower in this region.

Historic speaking, the irony is, Australia always fought other people’s war, because they do not have wars of its own, be it Gallipoli, Vietnam or Afghanistan, they always fought others people’s war and they never think really hard about how to strike a balance. But now I think, strategically speaking, they would really feel the constant agony because they’re just located in this region. And to see China growing ever stronger, I think a lot of people would think whether this right decision or not, to just gang up with United States so blindly, because this decision was made in a very rash manner, it’s not fully consulted and a lot of people spoke against it, be it PM Paul Keating or PM Turnbull, they all talked against it.

The Spectator: So in relation to Taiwan then, because as you say, it is all about China and it is about the Taiwan Strait. How does AUKUS change China’s calculations about what to do with Taiwan?

Zhou Bo: AUKUS would certainly complicated Beijing’s decision making, but it’s not a game changer. It’s just as simple as that. Well, think of the eight nuclear power submarines. When could they be produced and when can they be deployed and when can they become operational? It is at least 10 years away. And in the beginning, people basically talk about the first submarine be deployed before 2040. Okay, even in 10 years’ time, let me ask you, how strong would then PLA Navy become? Okay, let’s talk about submarine. In terms of submarine, PLA has more submarines than even in the United States. Of course, there is a question of quality. And most of the submarines, they’re conventional submarine, but quantity has its own quality, numbers also matter. And Chinese ships are also being improved with quality tremendously. So in 10 years time, how strong would PLA Navy become? Then, how would these eight submarines really matter for us? As I said before, it may just complicate our decision making because we have to take them into account, but that is not a game change.

The Spectator: Zhou Bo, thank you so much.

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