周波对话陶文亚：中国努力促成“中东和平”，对以色列意味着什么？-周波、陶文亚

3月2日，在以色列特拉维夫举行的国家安全研究所（INSS）第16届年会期间，INSS研究员、大西洋理事会全球中国中心非常驻研究员陶文亚（Tuvia Gering）邀请参会的中国嘉宾、清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波，就中国提出的“中东安全新架构”进行对话。

中东局势的最新进展是，3月6日至10日，沙特阿拉伯和伊朗两国代表在北京对话，并于10日和中国发表联合声明，宣布沙伊将尽快恢复外交关系，开展各领域合作，三方愿尽一切努力加强国际地区和平与安全。

INSS授权观察者网发布对话中文版。

**Tuvia Gering (陶文亚)：**欢迎收听收看以色列国家安全研究所（INSS）的播客系列。我是今天的主持人陶文亚 ，我是Diane and Guilford Glaser以色列-中国政策中心的研究员，也是大西洋理事会全球中国中心的非常驻研究员。

去年9月在北京，有一场相当重要的活动，即第二届中东安全会议，时任国务委员和外交部长王毅发表了主旨演讲，并公布了中国的“中东安全新架构”。会议持续了数日，来自中东的约70名政要出席了会议，他们就中国提出的地区问题解决方案开展了讨论。

去年12月初，中国国家主席习近平访问沙特阿拉伯，参加了三个峰会：第一个与沙特阿拉伯，第二个与海湾合作委员会（GCC），第三个与阿拉伯联盟的21个成员。这些峰会产生了一系列重要成果，包括价值约500亿美元的合作备忘录，以及许多关于中国与中东开展战略合作的宏伟声明。此外，中国和海湾合作委员会还发布了一份联合声明，也提到了中国的“中东安全新架构”。

几周前，伊朗总统莱西访问北京时，双方签署了价值约200亿美元的合作备忘录，复制了习主席访问沙特的模式。双方在联合声明中再度提及“中东安全新架构”，并用“战略”一词来描述双边关系。

为了帮助我们更好理解中国的“中东安全新架构”，我们请来了周波大校（退役）。周波是清华大学战略与安全研究中心（CISS）的研究员，曾任国防部国际军事合作办公室安全合作中心主任。非常欢迎你的到来，周波。

**周波：**陶文亚，感谢你的邀请。

**陶文亚：**在过去一周的以色列国家安全研究所（INSS）国际会议期间，我们着重讨论了安全、中国在中东的作用、乌克兰战争等话题。我今天想与你讨论所有这些话题。首先，中国何时对中东产生了兴趣，而中东何时对中国产生了兴趣？过去双方来往并不是很密切。

**周波：**中国在中东的利益肯定在扩大。首先，最显著的就是中国对能源进口的兴趣，大多数人只关注到这一点。但其实不止于此。当下，中国的影响力是全球性的，中国的经济活动也是无处不在的。中国在中东的投资非常多元化。我几年前在阿布扎比参观了被称为“龙城”的中国城，遇见了很多中国人，据说（那里）的中国侨民高达20万名——

**陶文亚：**我看到有40万的说法。

**周波：**好，我知道了。我当时问一位企业家，基础设施建设的原材料有多少来自中国？他停顿了一下，告诉我：“百分之百。”这让我很吃惊，说 100%需要勇气和实力。中国能在中东市场占据绝对份额，太棒了。中国工人也参与了以色列的建筑等行业，在几乎所有国家都是如此，包括以色列的对手伊朗。中国国际合作所涵盖的范围确实很广。总的来说，中国与中东有十分密切的往来。当然，这也会带来经济以外的问题，比如安全问题，如何保护港口或这里的中国工人。

**陶文亚：**确实如此。习主席最近对中东的访问是他执政10年来第二次对该地区的正式访问，今年也是2013年宣布的“一带一路”倡议10周年。自2013年以来，双边贸易迅速扩大； 2021年，中国和阿拉伯国家之间的贸易额达到了3300亿美元，这还不包括伊朗、以色列和土耳其。中国已经参与了200多个重大基础设施项目：港口、桥梁、公路、铁轨、发电站，甚至埃及的新行政首都。这真的很壮观。

中石化承建的中东地区最大炼油厂——科威特阿祖尔炼厂

除了传统基础设施，中国还参与建设各种各样的“丝绸之路”，我称之为“未来基础设施”：网络丝绸之路，例如智能城市和华为的5G和6G通信；绿色丝绸之路，包括可再生能源和核能项目；太空丝绸之路，包括联合卫星发射和北斗导航卫星合作；还有健康丝绸之路，特别是在新冠疫情之后，中国已经建立了疫苗的分发和制造中心，这是很了不起的。

退一步看，中国已经真正成为中东地区的一个重要角色。我们无需使用“中心”或 “最重要 ”这样的字眼， 但对本地区人民来说，没人会否认中国角色的重要性，甚至认同在某些方面，中国是不可或缺的。但在安全和政治领域，中国并没有在像我们提到的广泛领域那样参与进来。中国似乎在这一领域仍有所顾虑。你同意吗？

**周波：**我认为是的。当你们讨论所有这些事情时，我所想的是，世界不仅仅是“西方与非西方”之间的问题。如果你考虑一下全球南方，“非西方”在全球实际上要大得多。中国当然在中东投资很多，但同样在非洲和大洋洲等地大举投资。可谓无处不在。

中东的不同之处在于，其内部的混乱以及潜在的冲突。中国希望所有的热点和冲突都消失，但这当然是一厢情愿的想法。这就是为什么到目前为止，中国非常谨慎，主要关注商贸，而没有过多地军事介入中东。

当然，形势可能会发生变化。首先，如果中国工人被劫持了怎么办？这种情况经常发生，连巴基斯坦俾路支省都发生了，而巴基斯坦的外交政策一贯重视与中国友好。劫匪本身不一定反感中国人，但为了赎金或出于对巴基斯坦政府的怨恨而绑架中国人。这种情况也可能在以色列发生。随着中国参与的扩大，这类事情发生的概率几乎肯定会增加，这是自然的。

此外，中国需要避免被吸入一个无底洞。考虑到例如以色列和伊朗的敌对关系，中国要想做出选择是很困难的。此外，中东还有不少冲突热点，所以中国必须格外小心。

**陶文亚：**显然，中东不太平。 甚至在我们谈论西方之前，中东国家本质上就难以和平共处，这显然不理想。中国的地区利益正在增长，参与程度正在扩大，但不得不和我们一样，依靠冷战后美国构建的安全架构。

当时，世界是单极的。虽然这不会太长， 但还是发生在过去30年左右的时间里，美国的参与把它自己变成了中东不可或缺的大国，这一点不会改变。我不同意美国正在从该地区撤出的观点，也许有一些表层的变化，但本质上我并没有看到美国的撤出。这可能会造成复杂的情况。

问题是，中国是否仍能保持这种不过多参与的姿态？随着中国与中东增加接触，有必须保护的海上交通线，还有中国人被绑架现象；在阿拉伯之春期间，2010-2011年，中国不得不从利比亚撤走35,000名中国公民。在那段时间，中国不得不依仗其他国家，以西方国家为主。

中国在利比亚撤侨（图片来源：网络）

而随着大国竞争，以及中国与西方—美国和欧洲—关系的紧张性质，情况已经变了一些。我们在中国的许多同事，例如前外交官杨成教授，最近分析乌克兰战争，以及它将如何影响中国在中东的地位。他认为，现在中国学者之间有一个共识，即中国必须增加在中东安全和政治议题上的参与程度，别无选择。

不过，也有像中国现代国际关系研究院的牛新春这样的学者，认为此事仍有待商榷。当然，他们都同意，即使东方在崛起，西方在衰落，仍然只是相对的。美国不会撤出中东。那你是怎样看待此种局面的？

**周波：**这些只是学术上的争论，但我有很多年的实操经历。我曾是中国在印度洋亚丁湾反海盗行动的协调人。我认为中美竞争主要局限于西太平洋，那是中国的家门口。除了南海，中美在安全问题上也没有大的竞争，因为中国无意成为世界警察。

真正的问题是印度如何看待中国在印度洋的军事部署，因为印度传统上认为自己是该地区的 “净安全提供者”，即唯一的安全提供者。这一点我是不同意的。考虑到印度洋充满了国际海上战略通道，而且我们也在那里活动，印度凭什么自立为整个印度洋的 “净安全提供者”？

这种印度教的民族主义，也被称为 “大一统印度”，认为印度包括不丹、西藏和斯里兰卡在内的广大地区。这帮印度原教旨主义者也认为印度洋是 “印度的洋”。这是不正确的。这是为什么不时有报道，说中国靠泊在斯里兰卡的军舰是事关印度的问题（如“远望号”）。即使印度相信这是一艘间谍船，它也是在斯里兰卡领海内进行补给，而且这艘所谓的 “间谍船 “其实是为了观察外太空的活动。这可能与印度有关系，也可能没有关系。如果中国航空母舰在不久的将来驶入印度洋，印度将如何反应？印度一直在努力在大国之间找到平衡。然而，由于他们的心态，找到平衡点对他们将是个挑战。

在中东，中国和美国的利益都将继续保持，后者是以色列的铁杆盟友。我同意你的观点，美国的所谓撤离只是表面现象。他们可能不再需要中东的石油，但他们依然在中东有强大的利益。问题是，中国和美国（在中东）的利益在什么情况下会发生冲突？我很难想到一个具体场景，尤其当我们已经如此深入地参与当地经济时。“中美肯定会（在中东）发生利益冲突”的想法不一定对。

我们暂且假设以色列发现自己处于一个两难境地：以色列一方面是美国的坚定盟友，但另一方面继续与中国在农业和其他非敏感部门进行合作。这本身应该是可以的，而且以色列也可以直接告诉美国，为什么中国和以色列不能在这些领域开展合作？

**陶文亚：**我想进一步探讨一下。你和其他专家，如牛新春，认为中美之间在中东没有利益冲突。当然，两国在其他地区和领域有很多冲突点。但在中东，可能像一个小“天国”，我们所有利益都保持一致，毕竟中美双方都对地区和平、安全、繁荣有兴趣。每个人都能认同这一点，对吗？

然而，在我们谈到的第二届中东安全会议中，中国或许正开始触及美国在该地区的安全部署。这不仅仅是在农业、教育等非军事层面的参与；中国宣布希望参与地区安全，将论坛称为中东安全会议。王毅公布了“中东安全新架构”。我认为，“新”是这里的关键词，因为这意味着中东有一个 “旧”的安全架构，而中国认为它可以在此基础上进行改进。这样的说法正确吗？

**周波：**中国一直在大力参与中东事务，所以它对中东安全的关注是可以理解的。而且，由于该地区的安全形势如此复杂，中国希望在这方面有所作为。

沙特阿拉伯与伊朗在北京发布声明，尽快回复外交关系（图片来源：外交部网站）

谈论中东安全的原则是没问题的，这表明中国确实在发挥作用。然而，“中东安全新架构”与中国对乌克兰提出的和平倡议一样，还没有明确的路线图。中方的建议在性质上更加宽泛，侧重于原则。

**陶文亚：**既然宽泛且并不明确，为什么要提出（乌克兰冲突）和平倡议？

**周波：**让大家了解中国的立场总是很好的，中国的提议在未来时机成熟时就会演进。例如，虽然朝鲜半岛无核化六方会谈（2003年）最终失败，但大家都认为中国在促成会谈方面发挥了积极作用。

2013年，当 “一带一路 ”倡议被首次提出时，没有人知道它是什么，但你刚才已经描述了它的发展过程。因此，随着时间的推移，中国的建议可能会变得更有建设性。这些建议不是静止的；它们有潜力不断完善。

**陶文亚：**作为一个中东人和一个以色列人，我想说，既然旧的没有失灵，为什么要去建立一个新的架构？我们地区现在已经有了一个安全架构，它绝不是完美的，我们喜欢美国人，他们不是完美的，我们也不是完美的。但我们有一个美国领导下的安全架构。以色列和海湾国家的繁荣和生存需要这一安全架构。

我们当然可以谈论旧的安全架构造成的许多问题。但它对中国也起了积极作用，因为中国大约50%的能源来自中东，通过霍尔木兹海峡；美国的威慑力确保贸易得以稳定继续，至少以色列是这么认为的，这就是为什么我们需要它。当我读到中国的中东安全新架构时，我就会想，为什么你们不参与到现有的安全架构中，并从内部改进它？在我们看来，中国提出了个替代品，但我们不想要替代品，我们想要改进现有的架构。这你觉得有道理吗？

**周波：**当然，如果有一个能满足各方需求的建议，你说的也不无道理。例如，亚伯拉罕协议（2020年9月以色列与阿联酋、巴林、摩洛哥和苏丹关系正常化的协议）是积极的，因为以色列改善了与邻国的关系。如果某件事被证明是好事，大家应该接受它。

但中国提出这个建议（新安全架构）也是有充分的理由的。中国和美国能否在区域安全方面真正合作？亚丁湾的反海盗行动是一个典型的例子，证明大国实际上可以为了一个共同的目的形成临时联盟。

如果你观察中国解放军的海外行动，就会发现所有行动都是在人道主义领域，无论是维和还是救灾等。中国并没有试图轰炸或杀害任何人。如果美国的实力真的在下降，那么我们一起努力捍卫这些海上战略通道如何？

中国海军正在成长。如果你数数中国南海舰队（SSF）或东海舰队（ESF）的军舰数量，其中任何一个舰队都比曾经首屈一指的英国皇家海军水面舰艇全部加一起还大。拥有如此庞大的舰队，当然是为了保护中国的海外利益，并使中国能够履行其国际义务。除了在中国家门口的的主权问题，我们与美国在安全上没有太多分歧。中国的心态是开放的。我们为什么不放弃冷战思维，携手使世界更安全？

**陶文亚：**作为一个以色列人，这真令人高兴，我别无他求。我相信中东地区的大多数人都厌倦我们的小家成为大国竞争的擂台。但是，我们并没有生活在一个理想的世界里。而且我认为，要创造你提到的这种合作存在重重障碍。

我想邀你回到25年前，你在剑桥读书时，写了一篇关于“东盟与集体安全”的硕士论文。我认为这就是中国的 “集体/共享安全”与西方的 “传统安全”之间的差异所在。也许你可以谈谈中国看待安全的不同方式，不论是关乎东盟还是中东，以及你认为的美国看待安全的方式。

**周波：**两者有一个根本的区别。习近平主席在外交方面提出了“人类命运共同体”的顶层设计。在此下面，有两个重要的倡议，即全球安全倡议（GSI）和全球发展倡议（GDI）。中国善于先提出一些宽泛的概念，然后将其塑造成为一个个更具体、更实在的想法。全球发展倡议已经有很多“干货”了，比如 “一带一路 ”倡议。这是全世界每个人都能看到的实实在在的事，它是全球发展倡议的一个支柱。

另一个倡议即全球安全倡议正在发展中，但已经有一些具体内容，比如解放军的海外行动仅限于人道主义领域。这表明中国起码希望同美国那种血淋淋的做法保持距离。解放军在海外没有杀过任何人，甚至没有杀过海盗。

**陶文亚：**因为美国的参与，所以不需要你们（杀人）。

**周波：**无论如何，中国人对动武还是相当谨慎的。例如，在打击海盗和维和行动中，各国被允许使用武力。联合国授权维和行动并没有明说 “你可以杀人”，但确实授权 “使用一切必要手段”。即便如此，中国在维和行动中还是非常谨慎的。在打击海盗的过程中，我们驱散海盗或逮捕他们，但我们并没有试图杀死他们。

**陶文亚：**回到中东地区。这里的人们一直在互相残杀。涉及到具体的安全问题，中国到底能不能与美国合作？

让我举一个最明显的例子—伊朗核协议：就在2月23日，我们得到消息，伊朗的铀浓度已经达到84%（离核弹所需的90%只差一点）；这远高于民用铀浓度。即使实际上“只是”60%，即伊朗过去一段时间所维持的浓度，伊朗依然似乎一心想要获得核弹。

我们都可以认为这不符合中国的利益或官方立场，因为中国是《核不扩散条约》（NPT）的签署国。中国对于2015年达成伊朗核协议（JCPOA）也起到重要角色。当时，前大使华黎明在促进伊朗和美国谈判方面发挥了作用。

但现在的情况非常不同；美国和中国之间的关系几乎跌入历史最低点，气球事件就能证明这一点。而现在我们正在接近一个至关重要的临界点，要么伊朗造出核弹，将其装在导弹上；要么以色列、海湾国家和美国发动先发制人的打击。届时中国会怎么办？中国的安全新架构又会如何实践？中国将如何参与并帮助？这时候，具体方案和举动就会变得极其重要。中国会做什么？

**周波：**最直接的回答是：作为美国的坚定盟友，你们为什么没有告诉他们，不要废除伊朗核协议？特朗普制造了一场混乱，本来每个人都在为核不扩散努力，而伊朗总体上也遵守了该协议。为什么要把它扔掉？你们应该告诉美国政府这一点，因为你们是他们的盟友，这本身也符合你们的利益。单是为了对以色列的所谓“毫不动摇的安全承诺”，美国也不应该把伊朗核协议扔掉。

你可以想象在核问题上达成协议是多么困难。六方会谈没有成功，但这边的情况不同，伊朗核协议几乎达成。中国参与其中，但由于以色列的一些人，主要是由于特朗普，他们废止了这份协议。结果，我们现在处于一个更危险的境地。

伊朗总统在新闻发布会上表示，伊核谈判达成协议需要解决核保障问题（图片来源：ICphoto)

**陶文亚：**对于特朗普的做法，我同意你的评价。顺便说一句，是以色列游说美国废除该协议，因为以色列当时的决策者认为该协议很糟糕。即使在其生效阶段（从2015年到2018年），伊朗也在继续扩大其影响力，扶植本地区的多个代理人，特别是在以色列周围。

而如果我们考虑中国对乌克兰战争的官方立场，例如，是北约东扩引发了这场战争。尽管俄罗斯发起了攻击并侵犯了人权。中国表示，战争的根本原因是美国和北约在过去20年的扩张，以及没有听取俄罗斯的意见和考虑其势力范围。

那么，把中国的这一逻辑应用到中东，在过去的不是二十年而是四十年间，伊朗这个自封的“革命政权”，一直在中东传播极端主义，扶植代理人，从而创造它自己的“专属安全区域”。那么，以色列和海湾地区的“合理安全利益”呢？在伊朗核协议的执行阶段，我们并没有享受到安全，现在也没有。中国在这方面的立场是什么？

**周波：**那我先问你一个简单的问题。我首先必须说，就对伊朗的看法而言，几乎每个以色列人都持有与你同样的立场，这是完全可以理解的。但是，我问你，与伊朗核协议被废止之前的情况相比，现在的情况是否更加危险？

**陶文亚：**对中国来说，是的；但对我们来说，不是。我认为，这就是这一情况中的道德风险。一些犹太人或阿拉伯人被伊朗恐怖主义杀害，并不会危害到中国的利益。如果伊朗获得了核武器，沙特将立即效仿，然后是阿联酋和埃及，甚至可能发生战争，危及中国在该地区的所有利益。这就是我们的安全与中国的安全之间的区别。

**周波：**你自己已经回答了这个问题。如果你认为现在的局势比伊朗核协议废止之前更危险，那就意味着以色列做出了错误的决定。显然，局势变得更加危险了。因此，以色列实际上已经招致了这种危险。

**陶文亚：**如果大概率中东出现摊牌，我们应该怎么办？中国会怎么做？中国是否能够与美国合作，或至少不干涉美国的行动？也许，中国甚至可以支持以色列和海湾国家保护自己的安全，而不是伊朗的专属安全及其代理人？或者，因为现在的大国竞争非常激烈，伊朗与中国更亲近，两者都反对美国，中国会不会只是袖手旁观？

**周波：**我不认为中国会袖手旁观。在防止核扩散问题上，中国和其他国家一样，坚定认为伊朗不应发展核武器。这一立场是坚决的，基于我们几十年来一以贯之的政策。多年来，中国改变了许多国防政策，但在不对无核国家或地区使用核武器这个问题上没有改变。中国承诺永远不会首先使用核武器，这一承诺重如泰山，唯一的问题是我们如何实现无核化这个目标。

根据我同一些人的谈话，我相信伊朗人并没有那么执着于发展核武器，因为他们知道后果。他们很难预测以色列是否真会先发制人发动打击，因为你们一直刻意保持这个选项的模糊性，称“不排除任何可能性”。

然而，打击伊朗并不能解决问题，甚至可能引发更多问题，因为伊朗在军事上不是一个弱国。没有人希望这种情况发生。但我相信，伊朗这种不确定的态度，对所有人来说都是一个机会；我们必须把握机会，避免最坏的可能性。现在还有时间。

**陶文亚：**我也希望如此。最后，我想问问你的个人意见，不是中国的官方立场。通过在以色列的一周时间里，你的想法有没有什么变化？你从这次访问中有什么重大收获？

**周波：**不，我没有改变自己的想法，但我更了解以色列人的看法。我想到的一件事是，中美竞争可能会加剧，而这可能会使作为美国坚定盟友的以色列处于更不利的地位。这对你们来说将是非常困难的。这就是为什么昨天会议结束时，我说：“众所周知，犹太人是世界上最聪明的人——

**陶文亚：**我不是那么确定……

**周波：**有人这么说。但你们也是美国的坚定盟友——

**陶文亚：**这个的确是。

**周波：**这两点放在一起，意味着以色列不应该盲目地遵循其他人的指示。你们应该根据你们自己的国家利益做出决定。我们知道你们无论如何都不会站在中国这一边，那会使你们处于非常困难的境地。但我们还是不希望你们选边站队。

**陶文亚：**我们绝不想要什么“边”， 那是冷战思维。

**周波：**是的，但遇到这种情况时，你们首先应该考虑自己的国家利益，应该不偏不倚地判断事情本身的是非曲直，并做出自己的正确决定。

**陶文亚：**我完全同意。非常感谢你，周波。

**周波：**谢谢你。

（翻译：李泽西  核译：韩桦）

访谈英文原文：

The following conversation took place on March 2nd, 2023 at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) after the INSS 16th annual conference in Tel Aviv, Israel. It is shared with Guancha with the INSS’s permission. The English transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.

Tuvia Gering (陶文亚): Welcome to the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) podcast series in Tel Aviv. I’m your host for today, Tuvia Gering , I’m a researcher with the Diane and Guilford Glaser Israel-China Policy Center, and a non resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council global China Hub.

In September we had a pretty major event in Beijing, the Second Middle East Security Conference, headed by then Foreign Minister and State Councilor Wang Yi, who gave the keynote speech. That is when he unveiled what he called China’s New Security Architecture for the Middle East. The forum lasted a few days and was attended by about 70 dignitaries from all over the region, who discussed China’s solutions to the problems that plague the Middle East.

A few months later, in early December, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia for three summits. The first one was hosted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; the second with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the third with with 21 members of the Arab League. They made some significant announcements, including $50 billion in MoUs and numerous grand statements about the strategic nature of cooperation between China and the region. In addition, China and the Gulf have released a joint statement, and there, too, they mentioned China’s New Security Architecture for the Middle East.

This framework was repeated a third time just recently, a few weeks ago, when Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi, visited Beijing. His visit mirrored Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia in that both sides issued a joint statement and signed MOU worth approximately $20 billion. They, too, used the word “strategic” to describe the nature of the relationship.

To help us understand what China’s New Security Architecture for the Middle East means, I’m very happy to welcome today, senior Colonel (retired) Zhou Bo. Zhou is a senior fellow with the Center for International Security and strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, and a China Forum expert. In his military capacity, Professor Zhou was director of the Center for Security Cooperation of the Office for International Military Cooperation of the PLA. A very warm welcome to you, Zhou Bo, thank you for joining us today.

Zhou Bo (周波): Thank you for having me, Tuvia.

Tuvia: Over the last week, during the INSS International Conference we got to talk a lot about security, China’s role in the region, and the war in Ukraine. I would love to touch on all these topics today, but just to kick us off, when did China become interested in the Middle East, and when did the Middle East become interested in China? This wasn’t always the case.

Zhou: Well, I think China’s interests the Middle East are certainly growing. The most obvious point is that China is interested in energy input, and most people are focused solely on that. But there is more than that; nowadays, China’s influence is global, so China’s economic activities are also ubiquitous.

So with that, and nowadays, we couldn’t see, you know, a very much diversified investment in the Middle East. I was in Abu Dhabi a few years ago, where I visited the so-called Dragon City and discovered a large number of Chinese nationals. People are talking about 200,000 Chinese expats –

Tuvia: I saw 400,000 last time.

Zhou: Oh, I see. Yeah. I asked one entrepreneur how much of the materials for infrastructure construction come from China. And he paused for a moment and said, “100 percent.” That really surprised me. It takes some guts to say “100%,” don’t you think? It is outstanding how China has actually occupied lion share in the in the Middle East market. Chinese workers are also employed in construction and other industries in Israel. This must be true for almost all countries, including your rival, if not enemy, Iran. China’s coverage of cooperation is truly intensive. Putting all this together, China is deeply, deeply engaged in the Middle East. And, of course, this would raise issues other than economic ones, right? Then there’s the issue of security, such as protecting harbors or the Chinese workers here.

Tuvia: Yeah, for sure. And when Xi Jinping visited the region just recently, that was his second in his official capacity after 10 years in power, and this is also the 10th year anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative 一带一路, which he unveiled back in 2013. And since that time, some of the numbers that we’re talking about just to give the viewer some idea, in 2021, the trade was to the tune of $330 billion between China and just the Arab states, excluding Iran, Israel and Turkey. China’s has been involved in over 200, major infrastructure projects - and I’m talking about ports and bridges, roads, rail tracks, power stations, and even entire cities, when it comes to Egypt’s New Administrative Capital. It really is spectacular.

It’s not just physical infrastructure either. You can see it in other sectors, in the infrastructure of the future, as I call it, in all these different types of Silk Roads: a big web of the Digital Silk Road, e.g., smart cities and 5G and 6G communications by Huawei; the Green Silk road, with renewable energy, nuclear energy; a space Silk Road, with joint satellite launches, and BeiDou navigation satellite cooperation; there is also a Health Silk Road, especially after COVID. China has established redistribution and manufacturing centers for vaccines, which is pretty amazing.

When you take a step back, you see that China has really become an important player. We don’t need to use the word “central” or “the most important,” but certainly, no one will object that it’s important. It is very important to local people, perhaps indispensable in some ways. However, there is one area where it has not been as involved in the wide range of fields we mentioned: security and politics - it appears that China is still a little hesitant on these topics, do you agree?

Zhou: I think so. Well, when you’re talking about all these things, what I’m thinking is that the world is not only about the “West versus the rest.” The rest is actually much bigger, if you consider the Global South. Just in this region, China is certainly investing a lot in the Middle East, but equally in Africa and Oceania. Everywhere.

So what makes the Middle East different is its internal chaos, the underlining potential for conflict. China would wish for all the hotspots and conflicts to disappear, but this is, of course, wishful thinking. That is why, so far, China has been very cautious, walking on a tightrope and focusing primarily on business without getting too involved militarily in the Middle East.

But things could change. First of all, what if Chinese workers are hijacked? It happens all the time, even in Baluchistan, Pakistan, whose foreign policy is friendly with China. They don’t necessarily despise Chinese people, but they kidnap them for ransom or out of resentment toward the Pakistani government. This could happen here as well. This type of thing will almost certainly increase as Chinese involvement grows. This is only natural.

The other thing is how could China avoid being sucked into this black hole. Even you don’t like each other, as in the case of Israel and Iran, so for us, this is difficult to for us to make a choice. Furthermore, there are many subregional hotspots, so China has to be very careful.

Tuvia: Of course, our situation in our neighborhood is not very quiet. And even before we talk about the West, it’s just intrinsically, here, in our neighborhood, we don’t get along, as you said; this is not an ideal world. Facing these facts, that China’s interests are increasing, its engagement is growing, until now, we had this arrangement where China had to rely, like all of us, on the American security architecture after the Cold War, where it’d become a unipolar moment. Sure, it’s been only for a short while, but still, in the last 30 years or so. US involvement turned it into the indispensable power, and this is something that is not going away. I of disagree with the idea that the US is withdrawing from the region. I don’t see it, maybe just superficially. But the US is still here to stay. That’s how they say it. That’s the way we see it. And now this may create complications. And the question is, will China be able to still maintain this balance - or this more aloof position - because we have growing engagement, we have sea lines of communications that you have to protect, you talk about hijacking, and it was just over 10 years ago, during the Arab Spring, in 2010-2011, when China had to evacuate 35,000 Chinese nationals just from Libya. During that time, China had to rely on the benevolence of other actors, namely Western.

And now with a great power competition and the fraught nature of the relationship between China in the West - the US and Europe - the situation has changed a bit. And this led leads many of our colleagues in China, for example, Professor Yang Cheng , a former diplomat. He was talking recently about the war in Ukraine, and how it will affect the China’s posture in the Middle East. He thinks that there’s now a consensus among Chinese scholars that China has to increase its security and political involvement in the Middle East; there’s just no way around it.

On the other hand, you have people like Niu Xinchu from CICIR. And he thinks that it’s still up for debate. And of course, all of them agree, even when they say the East is rising, the West is declining. It’s still just relative. America is here to stay. So how do you reconcile with this situation?

Zhou: Those are just academic debates. But I used to be a practitioner for many, many years. And I myself have been China’s coordinator for counterpiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden in the Indian Ocean. When we talk about the China-US rivalry, I believe it is primarily limited to the Western Pacific, which is on China’s doorstep, and aside from the South China Sea, we don’t have any significant rivalry on security issues, because China has no intention of becoming the world’s police. 

The real question is how India views China’s military presence in the Indian Ocean, because India has traditionally regarded itself as the region’s “net security provider,” that is, its sole security provider. This is something I disagree with. How do you establish yourself as a “net security provider” for the entire Indian Ocean, considering the fact that it is full of strategic international sea lanes and that we operate there as well.

This is based on Hindu nationalism, also known as “Akhand Bharat” which believes that India possesses a vast region that includes Bhutan, Tibet, and Sri Lanka. They consider the Indian Ocean to be “India’s Ocean,” which is not true. That is why, from time to time, we hear about Chinese military vessels berthed in Sri Lanka reported as a problem for India (such as the case of the “Yuan Wang”). Even if you believe it’s a spy ship, it was restocking in Sri Lankan territorial waters, and this “spy ship” was in fact for observing activities in outer space, which may or may not have anything to do with India. How will India react if Chinese aircraft carriers sail into the Indian Ocean one day, which I don’t think is far away? And India has been working hard to strike a balance between the major powers. However, because of their mindset, this presents a challenge to them.

In the Middle East, China’s interest will remain, as will the Americans, your ironclad allies. I agree with you that American withdrawal is only superficial. They may no longer require Middle Eastern oil, but they continue to have a strong interest in the region. The question is, under what conditions would Chinese and American interests collide? I can hardly think of a tangible scenario, when we are so deeply involved in economic activities. The idea that we will undoubtedly have a clash of interests does not appear to be correct. 

For example, in a hypothetical situation, Israel may find itself in a difficult situation because, on the one hand, it is a staunch ally of the United States, but on the other hand, it continues to do business with China in agricultural and other non-sensitive sectors. This should be fine, right? And Israel can speak directly to America about this. Why can’t we collaborate in these areas?

Tuvia: I would love to explore this a bit more. So from what you’re saying - and other experts like Niu Xinchun said so as well - there’s no conflict of interest between China and the US. In other areas, of course, there’s a lot of conflict. But here in the Middle East, this can be like our small Kingdom of Heaven, where all of our interests are aligned, because after all, both sides, China in the US, are interested in regional peace， security, prosperity - everyone can agree on that, right? 

However, in the security second security forum that we talked about, in the beginning, in September, China is beginning to perhaps step on the toes of the US security posture in the region. Then, it’s not just in agriculture, and education, and all these various civilian non military aspects; China is, by definition, declaring that it wishes to become involved in security. They called it the Middle East Security Forum. Then, a senior Chinese diplomat, Wang Yi, unveiled this New Security Architecture for the Middle East. And the word “new,” I think, is the key word here. Because this implies there’s an “old” security architecture for the Middle East, that China thinks it can improve upon. Is that a correct way to put it? 

Zhou: China has been heavily involved in the Middle East, so it is understandably concerned about security. And, because the security situation in the region is so complicated, China wishes to do something about it.  

Talking about it in principle is fine, and it shows that China does play a role. However, this is similar to its peace proposal for Ukraine, which lacks a tangible roadmap. China’s proposal is more general in nature, focusing on principles.

Tuvia: So, why offer a peace plan at all, if it is general and not tangiable?

Zhou: It is good for people to know China’s attitude, and China proposal might evolve in the future, when time is right. For example, consider China’s role in the Six-Party Talks on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (in 2003), which ultimately failed, but everyone agrees that China played a positive role in bringing the talks together. 

When the Belt and Road Initiative was put forward 10 years ago in 2013, nobody knew what it was. But you have now described how it has evolved. So, as time passes, China may become more constructive in its proposals. These proposals are not static; they have the potential to thrive.

Tuvia: But still, for me, as a Middle Easterner and an Israeli, I say that if it isn’t broken, why fix it? We already have us an existing security architecture. It’s by no means perfect. I mean, we like the Americans, but they’re also not perfect, we’re not perfect. But we have a security architecture led by America. Israel wants it and the Gulf countries need it for their own prosperity and survival. 

And it works. I mean, of course, we can talk about the many problems that it has caused. But it has also worked for China, because China gets approximately 50 percent of its energy from the Middle East, it passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and it is US deterrence that keeps the whole thing from falling apart, at least the way we see it here in the Middle East. That’s why we need it. When I read about China’s New Security Architecture for the Middle East, I ask myself, why don’t you just become involved in what exists and improve it from the inside? Or, in other words, integrate instead of interfere? Because in my mind, it looks like something that is alternative. We don’t want an alternative. We want better, but not an alternative. Does that make sense? 

Zhou Bo: Of course, there is some truth to what you said if there is a proposal that meets the needs of all parties. For example, the Abraham Accords (the normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan in September 2020) are positive because you improved your relationship with your neighbors. If something is proven to be good, people should accept it. 

But China’s attitude, if China puts forward this proposal, I believe it is for good reasons. And, as a result, you may wonder whether China and the US can actually cooperate in terms of regional security. Counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden is a typical example of how major powers can actually become a coalition for a common purpose. 

If you look at the PLA’s overseas operations, you will notice that they are all in humanitarian areas, whether it is peacekeeping or disaster relief. China is not trying to bomb or kill anyone. If America’s strength is truly declining, how about we work together to safeguard these strategic sea lanes? 

The Chinese navy is growing. If you count the ships of China’s South Sea Fleet (SSF) or East Sea Fleet (ESF), each of them is larger than the surface ships combined of the whole British Royal Navy, which was once second to none. What’s the use of having such a large [fleet]? Of course, it is to protect China’s interests overseas and to enable the Chinese people to [fulfill] their international obligations. Apart from issues of sovereignty closer to home for China, we do not have many disagreements with the US in terms of security. China is open minded. Why don’t we just abandon the Cold War mentality and join hands to make the world safer?

Tuvia: For me, as an Israeli, this is music to my ears. I would love nothing more. And I’m sure most people in the Middle East are tired of having our little region become an arena for great power competition. But again, we’re don’t live in an ideal world. And I think there are some barriers to create this sort of cooperation that you mentioned. 

I want to take you back 25 years to your time in Cambridge. You wrote a master’s thesis about ASEAN and collective security. And I think this is where the difference lies between China’s “collective/shared security”. And then you have the Western “traditional security.” And maybe if you can talk about the different ways in which China views security, it could be for ASEAN and for the Middle East, and the way the US views security.

Zhou: There is a fundamental difference, because if you look at Xi Jinping Thought, in terms of foreign policy, I consider his ideas about a Community of Shared Destiny for Mankind is a top hat. Underneath it, there are two important initiatives, the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI). China is good at developing some general ideas and then make them become a more tangible and concrete. On the GDI, I would say that we already have a lot of things in it, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. It is something that everyone can see and grasp around the world, and it serves as a pillar for the Global Development Initiative 

The other pillar of security is currently being developed, but there is already something in it, such as PLA operations overseas that are only limited to humanitarian areas. This reveals a great deal. That indicates that China wishes to distance itself from America’s practice, which has proven to be more bloody, to say the least. The PLA have not killed anybody overseas, not even pirates.

Tuvia: You didn’t have to because the US was involved.

Zhou: But Chinese are still more cautious about using force. For example, in counter piracyand peacekeeping you are allowed to use force. The UN mandates for peacekeeping operations do not say “you can kill,” but they do authorize you to “use all necessary means.” Even so, China has been extremely cautious in its peacekeeping efforts. In counter piracy we scattered the pirates or apprehended them but we didn’t try to kill them.

Tuvia: Back to our region here in the Middle East. Of course, people here kill each other all the time. And when it comes to the tangible, concrete areas of security, will China be able to cooperate with the US or not? Because if China does not offer anything tangible, and let’s take the most glaring example, the Iran nuclear deal - just a week, week and a half ago, we got the news that Iran has reached 84% of uranium enrichment (just short of the 90% required for the bomb). That is way above civilian use, and even if we say it’s “only” 60%, something they’ve been doing for a long while now. Iran appears to be hell-bent on obtaining the bomb, and we can all agree that this is not in China’s interest or declared position, as China is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China also important in reaching the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) in 2015. At the time, former ambassador Hua Liming (华黎明) was instrumental in facilitating the relationship between Iran and the United States. 

But now we’re in a very different situation, where the relationship between the US and China has almost never been lower. Just look at the balloon incident. And now we’re are reaching closer to a point that is very possible, where either Iran is going to reach a bomb and mount it on a missile or you’re going to have a preemptive attack by Israel, the Gulf countries and the US. What will China do then, and what will become of China’s security architecture? How will it help? This is where the tangible aspect becomes extremely important. What will China do?

Zhou: My direct answer is, why hadn’t you, as America’s staunch allies, told them not to scrap the JCPOA? Donald Trump made a mess; everybody was working towards non-proliferation, and to a great extent the Iranians have abided by the deal. Why would you just throw it away? You should have told the American government, because you’re your allies and it served your best interest. Even for the sake of your so-called ironclad commitment to Israel, they shouldn’t have thrown it away. 

You can imagine how difficult it is to reach an agreement on nuclear issues. Whereas the Six-Party Talks simply failed, the situation was different here, and an agreement was almost reached. Despite the fact that China was involved, they scrapped it due to some people in Israel, but primarily due to Donald Trump. As a result, we are now in a more dangerous situation.

Tuvia: I can’t disagree on what Trump did. And by the way, it was Israel that lobbied the US to scrap the deal because Israeli policymakers thought at the time that the deal was terrible. Even during the implementation phase (from 2015 to 2018), Iran continued to expand and strengthen its proxy powers throughout the region, particularly around Israel.

And if we consider China’s official position on the Ukrainian war, for example, that NATO’s expansionism started the war, even though Russia is carrying out the attack and violating human rights. China claims that the root cause is the United States and NATO’s expansion over the last 20 years, as well as a failure to listen to Russia and consider its spheres of influence. 

If we apply this logic of China here in the Middle East, we have not twenty years, but forty years, the Iranian regime, a self-described “revolutionary” regime, has been spreading its extremism and expanding its proxies throughout the region, thereby creating its own ‘exclusive security.’ What about Israel’s and the Gulf’s ‘legitimate security interests’? We didn’t enjoy security during the implementation phase of the JCPOA, and we don’t have it now. Where does China stand on that?

Zhou: But first, let me ask you a simple question. Before I go any further, I must state that what you said in regards to Iran is something that almost every Israeli would say in a tone that is completely understood. But let me ask you one very simple question: comparing the situation now and the time before the JCPOA had been scrapped, is the situation now more dangerous or not?

Tuvia: For us no, for China yes. This, I believe, is the story’s moral hazard. Because the deaths of some Jews or Arabs killed by Iranian terrorism do not jeopardize China’s interests. If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will immediately follow suit, followed by the UAE and Egypt. We might even have a war, putting all of China’s interests in the region at risk - this is our security versus China’s security.

Zhou: You have already answered this question. If you believe the situation right now is more dangerous than before the JCPOA had been scrapped, that means you made the wrong decision. This clearly made the situation more dangerous. Therefore, you actually have invited this kind of danger.

Tuvia: But what do we do now in case that this not so speculative scenario where we might have a showdown in the Middle East, what will China do? Will China be able to cooperate with the US, or, at least, not interfere; perhaps, it could even support Israel and the Gulf countries in protecting their own security over Iran’s exclusive security and its proxies - or is the great power competition so [fierce] right now, and because Iran is leaning closer to China today, and both are against the US, will China just stand with folded arms in the sidelines?

Zhou: I don’t think so. On the issue of non-proliferation, China is as decisive as anyone else in the belief that Iran should not develop nuclear weapons. This position is absolute, because it is based on a decades-old policy. China has changed many of its defense policies over the years, but not on this issue on the use of nuclear weapons against countries without nuclear weapons or regions, and China is committed to never be the first to use a nuclear weapon. China’s commitment is ironclad. Therefore, I do not believe that there is a difference, even with the major power rivalry. The only question is how can we achieve denuclearisation. 

Through my conversations with people, I believe that the Iranians are not as adamant about developing a nuclear weapon because they understand the consequences. It’s difficult to predict whether you’ll launch a preemptive strike or not because you’ve kept this option deliberately ambiguous. You said that “all the options are on the table.” 

However, striking Iran will not solve the problem. It may even cause more problems, because Iran is not a weak country militarily. So, nobody wants this to happen. But I believe that this kind of attitude, this Iranian uncertainty, is an opportunity for all of us; we must consider this opportunity so that the scenario does not become reality, making the situation even more dangerous. There is still time.

Tuvia: I hope so too. To wrap up, I’d like to ask your personal opinion rather than China’s official position. Has anything changed your mind during your week in Israel, or do you have a major takeaway from this trip? 

Zhou: No, I haven’t changed my mind, but I am more aware of how Israelis perceive the situation here. One of the things that comes to mind is how the China-US competition might intensify, and how that might put you, as a staunch US ally, in a worse position. That would be extremely difficult for you. That is why, at the end of yesterday’s conference, I stated, “We know that the Jewish people are the most clever people in the world” -

Tuvia: - I don’t know about that… 

Zhou: Some people say it, but we also know that you are staunch allies of the United States

Tuvia: That’s true. 

Zhou: So, putting all this together, that means you should not blindly follow other people’s instructions. You should make the decisions on things the concern your national interest. We know you won’t take China’s side, even in the most extreme scenario - that would put you in a very difficult situation. But we do not want you to pick sides - 

Tuvia: We don’t want “sides” at all; that is Cold War mentality.

Zhou: Yes, but when such a situation arises, you should first consider your national interests. Be impartial in determining who is right and who is wrong, and make your own correct decision.

Tuvia: On that, I absolutely agree. Thank you very much, Zhou Bo. 

Zhou: Thank you. 

本文系观察者网独家稿件，文章内容纯属作者个人观点，不代表平台观点，未经授权，不得转载，否则将追究法律责任。关注观察者网微信guanchacn，每日阅读趣味文章。