周波：中国不是印度洋的新来者，印度要适应中国的“南亚存在”

【文/观察者网专栏作者 周波】

中国与绝大多数南亚国家友好。展望未来, 中国在南亚的最大挑战是如何同印度和平相处。具体来说，需要考虑四个问题：1、中印如何在边界问题没有解决的情况下保持实控线的和平和安宁； 2、印度如何以开放的心态看待中国在南亚的经济活动和军事存在；3、印度会在美国遏制中国的印太战略中扮演什么角色；4、在亚洲世纪来临之际，中印如何为新的世界秩序发挥积极的作用。

一、边界问题

坦率地说，困扰中印关系的边界问题在可见的未来不可能解决，原因是边境地区实际控制线没有划定，而中印对如何解决边界问题有不同的看法。基本上，中国希望采取自上而下的方法，首先确定互谅互让的政治原则，然后再处理边界问题；而印度的观点是采取自下而上的方法，希望通过核定实际控制线来维持现状。

2020年6月15日发生的加勒万冲突打破了中印边境长达四十多年的和平。这虽然极为不幸，但两只现代化的军队实际上是以石器时代的方式，用石头和棍棒斗殴。这意味着他们清楚在任何情况下都不应向对方开枪，也说明中印过去建立信任的措施在一定程度上起到了作用。如果双方从20个印度士兵和4个中国士兵死亡中充分吸取教训，加强风险管控，那么也许我们可以在今后的四十年甚至更长的时间和平相处。

中印加勒万冲突一度打破了中印边境的和平（图片来源：观察者网）

当下我们应该做什么？目前双方都在边境部署了大量部队。首先，双方已经在班公湖和温泉地区等地脱离接触，这种做法应该在其他地方效仿，使双方部队从最危险的地方脱离接触，维持中印边境实际控制线地区的和平安宁。

其次，双方应该很好梳理、落实过去的建立信任措施。中印有五个关于信任的协定和协议，比中国与任何其他国家之间的双边信任措施都多，且内容丰富具体。例如，中印在边境实控线军事领域建立信任措施协定规定，在实际控制线附近，不应该举行师级演习，也就是不超过15000人，如果要举行旅级的演习，也就是5000人，应该事先通知对方，而且不应该在距离实际控制线10公里的近距离内出现军用飞机。在边境部队协议规定，当一方的部队在巡逻时，另一方不应尾随。我认为，如果双方都认真执行了这些规定，中印并不需要建立新的信任措施。

由于加勒万河谷发生的事情，我认为印度政府仍然处于一种怨恨、情绪化的状态。苏杰生外长最近表示亚洲的未来与印中关系的发展相连，边界的状态将决定两国关系的状态。前半句我同意，但是后半句倒退到印度政府在1988年拉吉夫·甘地访华前的立场。

边界问题不是中印独有的问题，印度也不仅仅是只同中国有边界问题。如果巴基斯坦也要求只有解决了克什米尔问题才能发展印巴关系，这听起来合理吗？中印边界问题不应该是两国关系正常化难以跨越的障碍，况且冲突中中方也有伤亡。加勒万河谷事件后，在印中资企业处境艰难，但2021年，中印双边贸易创下了1256亿美元的历史新高，这说明中印经济关系的活力已经超越了人为的障碍。

二、中国在南亚的经济和军事存在

中国必须保持在南亚的经济和军事存在。中国在包括印度在内的南亚国家有大量投资。对于聚焦经济发展的其他南亚国家而言，“一带一路”也是难得的机遇。90%的全球贸易都通过海路运输，印度洋是世界上最主要的交通枢纽和贸易通道之一。作为世界上最大的贸易国，中国自然会关注海上战略通道的安全。

印度不愿意看到中国在南亚扩大影响不是秘密，事实上，许多南亚国家同中国的双边关系都在不同程度遭到印度的干涉和打压。2017年，中国和印度在中国和不丹争议地区洞朗对峙长达73天。2014年，斯里兰卡允许一艘中国潜艇在科伦坡停靠，引发了印度的强烈反对。2017年，斯里兰卡拒绝了一艘中国潜艇停靠科伦坡补给的请求，人们普遍认为这是新德里向斯里兰卡施压的结果。当斯里兰卡在今年7月12日宣布允许中国科考船“远望5号”将停靠汉班托塔港进行补给时，印度又对此提出抗议，导致科伦坡一度要求中国科考船推迟其到港计划。

中国企业向斯里兰卡交付大型工程机械（图片来源：新华网）

2014年莫迪政府上台后推出对其南亚邻国的“邻国优先”政策，如果这一政策是印度对过去自己以老大哥的心态习惯性地干涉其弱小邻国事务的反省和调整，那么我认为该政策应该包括印度对其邻国发展与中国关系的尊重，印度不应该干涉其南亚邻国主权，逼其在中印之间选边站队。

相比之下，中国从来没有阻挠印度的“向东看”或者“向东行动”计划。东南亚对中国地缘环境重要，但是中国从来没有干涉印度同东南亚任何国家发展政治、经济和军事关系。印度总是抱怨中国向巴基斯坦提供军事装备，但是中国从来没有抱怨俄罗斯向印度提供军事装备。2017年，中国以宽厚的胸襟接纳印度和巴基斯坦同时加入上合组织。

我想无须提醒大家，明朝时，郑和舰队—世界上最强大的舰队就7下西洋，所以中国不是印度洋的新来者。为了维护中国在印度洋不断增长的利益，维护海上战略通道的安全，中国海军必须保持甚至加强其在印度洋的存在。中国航母打击群出现在印度洋只是时间问题。

自2008年底以来，中国海军一直不停地派出海军编队在印度洋的亚丁湾和索马里盆地进行巡逻。2017年，中国在吉布提建立了第一个海外军事基地，以保障反海盗行动。但没有任何例子可以证明中国在印度洋的军事存在给印度造成安全损害。事实上，双方有过卓有成效的合作。2011年5月，中印两国海军曾与北约合作，营救了被索马里海盗劫持的中国“富城”号商船。今后，中国和印度的海军舰艇势必会更频繁地在印度洋海上相遇。如果印度以“大婆罗多(Akhand Bharat)”心态认为印度洋是“印度教徒的伟大海洋”(Hindu Mahasagar) 或者印度是印度洋“净安全提供者”，双方之间的摩擦甚至冲突就有可能发生。

三、美国的印太战略

美国的印太战略以遏制中国的发展为中心，为此，印度对美国的重要性必定会增加。公平地说，印度尽管希望限制中国在南亚的存在，但迄今为止抵挡住了把四国安全对话机制(Quad)变成一个反华俱乐部的诱惑。在Quad中，其他三个国家都已经是盟友，所以印度的态度对机制的生存和发展至关重要。有人称Quad为“亚洲版北约”，我不这么认为。Quad实际上正在朝向许多其他方向，如基础设施建设、气候变化或向东南亚国家联合分发疫苗等发展。就其军事内容而言，目前仅有一个名为“马拉巴尔”的军事演习。

如果印度选择投入美国的怀抱，不仅中印关系将恶化，印俄关系也会下滑。同中国一样，俄罗斯也被美国视为战略竞争对手之一。俄罗斯是印度最大的武器供应国，占据了印度一半以上的市场份额。印度对于美国的任何示好都会引起俄罗斯的警觉，结果是印度的战略自主性和在大国间的回旋余地将大大萎缩。

印度总理莫迪与俄罗斯总统普京（图片来源：ICphoto)

作为不结盟运动的创始国之一，中立公正的立场而不是权宜之计最符合印度的国家利益。在过去几年中，印度几乎在以美国的口吻地谈论“自由开放的印太”，问题是印度的立场实际上与中国的更像，而不是与美国的更近。中国和印度都反对外国在自己的专属经济区的军事活动。印度法律规定，当有外国军舰进入印度的专属经济区进行军事演习时，如果涉及弹药和爆炸物，印度政府会要求他们首先征得印度政府的同意。这与中国的相关法律相比更严苛。中国在2006年即根据《公约》第298条将涉及海洋划界、历史性海湾或所有权、军事和执法活动等方面的争端排除出《公约》强制争端解决程序，同中国一样，印度也对《联合国海洋法公约》第298条持有保留。

真正在印度洋挑战印度权益的是美国。2021年4月，美国约翰·保罗·琼斯号驱逐舰驶入了印度西南部的专属经济区，美国海军第七舰队发表书面声明称这样做是因为美国将挑战印度的“过度海洋主张”，印度为此抗议。印度专属经济区占印度洋的三十分之一。换言之，美国挑战印度的主张意味着，至少在美国人眼里，1/30的印度洋是因为印度才不自由、不开放的。

最近印度和美国宣布计划在10月举行一次联合演习，演习地点距离中国和印度的实际控制线只不到100公里。我不清楚为什么印度要跟美国在中印边境附近搞这种象征意义大于实际内容的演习。难道印度是想让中国相信，如果中印边境再次爆发战争，美国会出兵帮助印度吗？如果不是，这种姿态显然并不明智。

四、亚洲世纪

在可见的将来，国际秩序将是混乱的多极。在欧洲，俄乌战争不知道会持续多久，但是之后肯定会迎来另一场冷战，因为欧洲的安全说到底是俄罗斯如何和北约共处的问题。在亚洲，美国的印太战略清晰地以遏制中国为目标，中方没有奢望中美关系将会大幅改善。

21世纪最大的问题不是中国是否能够崛起。如果中国保持5.5%的增长率，这个问题将于10年内中国成为世界第一大经济体划上句号。最大的问题是美国的衰落是相对的还是绝对的？虽然结论尚早，但是美国已经从二战后占世界GDP的1/2下降到今天大约25%。考虑到美国国内族群不可调和的矛盾、两党没有底线的相互攻讦和民众普遍对未来甚至打内战的担忧，如果说美国已经失去了方向感，恐怕并不为过。美国对印太的关注其实是其全球实力下降后收缩的必然反映，但是打压一个完全融入国际体系的中国不仅是美国自911以来最严重的战略误判，也是徒劳无益的，很难得到其他国家的支持。

1988年邓小平会见拉吉夫·甘地时说：“中印两国不发展起来就不是‘亚洲世纪’。真正的‘亚太世纪’或‘亚洲世纪’，是要等到中国、印度和其他一些邻国发展起来才算到来”。国际社会普遍认为国际地缘政治和经济重心正在向亚洲转移，到2030年，中国会成为世界第一大经济体，而印度会超过日本成为亚洲第二大经济体。所以亚洲的崛起是包括中印在内广大亚洲国家集体的崛起，但是如果中印都发展起来，却彼此关系紧张，这也不能说明亚洲世纪已经到来。

1988年邓小平会见拉吉夫·甘地（图片来源：网络）

由于目前中印关系的氛围不佳，印度政府对中国采取了一些看似强硬的态度以试图吸引公众舆论。例如，在俄乌冲突中，中印立场高度相似，双方不约而同保持中立。但印度政府刻意试图表现其立场上如何与中国不同。坦率地讲，双方的区别可能是两只苹果之间的差别，而不是一个苹果和一个梨子之间的差别。

在过去相当长的一段时间内，中国有不少人认为中国同美国的关系是“好也好不到哪里去，坏也坏不到哪里去”，现在估计很少人这么想了。那么中印关系是不是也是“好也好不到哪里去，坏也坏不到哪里去”呢？如果听天由命，这种态度不仅是不负责任的， 而且真的可能促使双方关系朝坏的方向发展。中印社会制度不同，但都是全球化的受益者，都是新兴经济体，都支持世界多极化和国际关系民主化。在世界秩序更加不确定的时代，如果中印以开放的心态看待对方的发展，管控彼此的分歧，这一重要的双边关系可以成为世界的稳定器。

作者发言原文：

Can China and India coexist in South Asia?

China is on friendly terms with the vast majority of South Asian nations. In the years ahead, China’s biggest challenge in South Asia is how to live peacefully with India. Specifically, four issues need to be considered: 1. how China and India can maintain peace along the Line of Actual Control where the border dispute has not yet been resolved; 2. how India can view China’s economic activities and military presence in South Asia with an open mind; 3. what role India will play in the American Indo-Pacific strategy to contain China; 4. how China and India can play a positive role in the new world order at the dawn of the Asian century.

1.The Sino-Indian Border Dispute

Frankly speaking, the border dispute plaguing China-India relations cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future due to the lack of demarcation of the Line of Actual Control and the different views China and India have on border dispute resolution. Essentially, China hopes to take a top-down approach by first agreeing on the political principles of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation before dealing with the border dispute, while the Indian perspective consists a bottom-up approach, which involves an intent to maintain the status quo by verifying the Line of Actual Control.

The Galwan clash on June 15, 2020 shattered more than 40 years of peace in the Sino-Indian border. While this is extremely unfortunate, the two modern militaries actually fought in Stone Age fashion, with stones and clubs. This meant that they knew they should not shoot at each other under any circumstances, and also revealed that past confidence-building measures between China and India have worked to a certain extent. If the two sides can fully learn from the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and 4 Chinese soldiers and strengthen risk management, it is possible that we can live in peace for the next 40 years or even more.

So, what should we do now? Both sides are currently deploying large numbers of troops along the border. First, both sides have already disengaged in areas such as Pangong Lake and Hot Spring, and this practice should be followed in other places to disengage both nations’ militaries from the most dangerous places and maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-Indian border areas.

Second, the two sides should tease out and implement past confidence-building measures. China and India have five agreements and protocols on confidence--more than any other bilateral confidence measures between China and other countries, and they are rich and specific. For example, the Agreement between India and China on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas stipulates that division-level exercises should not be held near the Line of Actual Control, that is, they should not involve more than 15000 personnel. If brigade-level exercises are to be held, that is, if they involve 5000 personnel, the other side should be notified in advance, and military aircrafts should not be present within a close range of 10 kilometers from the Line of Actual Control. The Agreement stipulates that when troops from one side are patrolling, the other side should not trail behind closely. I do not think there is a need for new confidence-building measures between China and India if both sides are serious about implementing these established provisions.

Because of what happened in the Galwan Valley, I think the Indian government is still in a state of resentment and affect. Indian Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar recently stated that “the future of Asia is linked to the development of India-China relations and the state of the border will determine the state of the relationship.” I agree with the first half of the statement, but the second half goes back to the Indian government’s position before Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988. Border disputes are not unique to China and India, and India does not only have border disputes with China. If Pakistan also requires that the Kashmir issue to be resolved before developing India-Pakistan relations, does that sound reasonable? The Sino-Indian border issue should not be an insurmountable obstacle to the normalization of relations between the two countries, not to mention that the Chinese side also suffered casualties in the clash. After the Galwan skirmish, Chinese-funded enterprises in India were in a difficult situation, but by 2021, bilateral trade between China and India rose to a record $125.6 billion USD, demonstrating that vitality of China-India economic relations has surpassed man-made obstacles.

2.China’s Economic and Military Presence in South Asia

China must maintain an economic and military presence in South Asia. China has substantial investments in South Asian countries, including India. For other South Asian countries focusing on economic development, the Belt and Road Initiative is also a rare opportunity. Up to 90% of global trade is transported by sea, and the Indian Ocean is one of the most important transportation hubs and trade routes in the world. As the world’s largest trading nation, China naturally pays much attention to the security of strategic sea lanes.

It is no secret that India does not want to see China’s expanding influence in South Asia. In fact, the bilateral relations between many South Asian countries and China have been interfered with and suppressed by India to varying degrees. In 2017, China and India faced off for 73 days in Doklam, a disputed region between China and Bhutan. In 2014, Sri Lanka allowed a Chinese submarine to dock in Colombo, triggering strong opposition from India. In 2017, Sri Lanka rejected a request by a Chinese submarine to dock in Colombo for replenishment, and the rejection was widely believed to be the result of New Delhi’s pressure on Sri Lanka. When Sri Lanka announced on July 12 this year that it would allow the Chinese research vessel Yuanwang-5 to dock in the Hambantota Port for replenishment, India protested again, leading Colombo to request the Chinese research vessel to delay its planned arrival at the port.

After the Modi government came into power in 2014, it launched a Neighborhood First policy for its South Asian neighbors. If this policy is a retrospection and adjustment of India’s past tendency to interfere in the affairs of its weaker and smaller neighbors with a big brother mentality, then I think this policy should also include India’s respect for its neighbors in developing relations with China, and India should not interfere with the sovereignty of its South Asian neighbors and force them to take a side between China and India. In contrast, China has never thwarted India’s “Look East” or “Act East” policy. Southeast Asia is important to China’s geographical environment, but China has never interfered in India’s development of its political, economic, and military relations with any Southeast Asian country. India always complains about China’s provision of military equipment to Pakistan, but China never complains about Russia’s provision of military equipment to India. In 2017, China accepted India and Pakistan into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with openness and generosity.

I do not think it’s necessary to remind everyone that during the Ming Dynasty, Zheng He’s fleet, the most powerful fleet in the world, went to the Indian Ocean seven times. Therefore, China is not a newcomer to the Indian Ocean. To safeguard China’s growing interests in the Indian Ocean and maintain the security of strategic sea lanes, the Chinese navy must maintain or even strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean. It is only a matter of time before a Chinese carrier strike group appears in the Indian Ocean. Since the end of 2008, the Chinese navy has been sending naval formations to patrol the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin in the Indian Ocean. In 2017, China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti to safeguard anti-piracy operations. But there is no instance of Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean causing security damage to India. In fact, the two sides have had fruitful cooperation. In May 2011, the Chinese and Indian navies cooperated with NATO to rescue the Chinese merchant vessel Full City, which was hijacked by Somali pirates. In the future, Chinese and Indian naval vessels are bound to meet more frequently in the Indian Ocean. Friction and even conflict between the two sides is possible if India, with an Akhand Bharat mentality, regards the Indian Ocean as the “Great Ocean for Hindus” (Hindu Mahasagar) or India as a “net security provider” for the Indian Ocean.

3.The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States

The American Indo-Pacific strategy centers around containing Chinese development, and to that end, India’s importance to the U.S. is bound to increase. To be fair, India, despite its desire to limit China’s presence in South Asia, has so far resisted the temptation to turn the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) into an anti-China club. Within the Quad, the other three nations are already allies, so India’s attitude is crucial to the survival and development of the Quad. Some call the Quad the “Asian NATO.” But I don’t think so. The Quad is actually heading in many other directions, such as infrastructure development, climate change, and the distribution of vaccines to Southeast Asian countries. In terms of its military dimension, there is currently only one military exercise—the Malabar Exercise.

If India chooses to fall into the arms of the United States, not only will China-India relations deteriorate, India-Russia relations will also decline. Like China, Russia is also seen by the United States as one of its strategic competitors. Russia is India’s largest arms supplier, accounting for more than half of India’s market share. Any gesture of favor by India to the United States will arouse Russia’s alarm, resulting in the reduction of India’s strategic autonomy and room for maneuver among major powers.

As one of the founding nations of the Non-Aligned Movement, India has an interest in taking a stance of neutrality and impartiality rather than expediency. For the past few years, India has been talking about a “free and open Indo-Pacific” almost in the language used by the United States, but the problem is that India’s position is actually more like that of China than that of the United States. Both China and India oppose foreign military activities in their exclusive economic zones. Indian law stipulates that when foreign warships enter India’s exclusive economic zone for military exercises and ammunition and explosives are involved, the Indian government will require them to obtain the consent of the Indian government first. This is more stringent than the corresponding relevant laws in China. In 2006, China excluded disputes involving maritime delimitation, historic bays or ownership, and military and law enforcement activities from the compulsory dispute settlement procedures of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in accordance with Article 298 of the Convention. Like China, India also has reservations on Article 298 of the UNCLOS.

The real challenger to India’s rights and interests in the Indian Ocean is the United States. In April 2021, destroyer USS John Paul Jones sailed into the exclusive economic zone in southwest India. The US Navy’s Seventh Fleet issued a written statement saying it did so because the US would challenge India’s “excessive maritime claims,” which was met with Indian backlash. India’s exclusive economic zone covers one-thirtieth of the Indian Ocean. In other words, the United States’ claim to challenge India means that, at least in the eyes of Americans, 1/30 of the Indian Ocean is not free and open because of India.

India and the United States have recently announced plans to hold a joint exercise in October, at a location less than 100 kilometers from the Line of Actual Control between China and India. I am not sure as to why India is engaging with the US in exercises that are more symbolic than substantive near the Sino-Indian border. Does India want China to believe that if war breaks out again along the Sino-Indian border, the United States will send troops to help India? If not, the gesture is clearly unwise.

4. The Asian Century

In the foreseeable future, the international order will be chaotic and multipolar. In Europe, it is uncertain how long the Russo-Ukrainian war will last. However, there will definitely be another Cold War following that, because the security of Europe is ultimately a question of how Russia and NATO intend to coexist. In Asia, the American Indo-Pacific strategy clearly aims to contain China, and China has no high hopes that China-U.S. relations will improve drastically.

The biggest question of the 21st century is not whether China can rise. If China maintains a growth rate of 5.5%, this question will come to an end within 10 years of China becoming the world’s largest economy. Rather, the biggest question is, will America’s decline be relative or absolute? Although it is too early to conclude, the United States has fallen from one-half of world GDP after World War II to about 25% today. Considering the irreconcilable tensions between racial groups in the United States, the willingness of the two political parties to criticize each other to no limit,  and the general public’s worries about the future or even a civil war, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the United States has lost its sense of direction. The American focus on the Indo-Pacific is actually an inevitable reflection of its shrinking global power. Suppressing a China that is fully integrated into the international system is not only the most serious strategic miscalculation by the U.S. since 9/11; it is also a futile plan that has difficulty attracting support from other countries.

When Deng Xiaoping met with Rajiv Gandhi in 1988, he said: “There will not be an ‘Asian century’ unless if China and India develop. The real ‘Asia-Pacific century’ or ‘Asian century’ will wait until China, India, and some other neighboring countries have developed and risen.” The international community generally believes that the international geopolitical and economic center of gravity is shifting to Asia. By 2030, China will have become the world’s largest economy, while India will have surpassed Japan to become the second largest Asian economy. Therefore, the rise of Asia entails the collective rise of a vast number of Asian countries, including China and India. However, if both China and India develop but their relations are tense, this will not mean that the Asian century has come.

Due to the current poor outlook of Sino-Indian relations, the Indian government has taken some seemingly tough stances towards China in an attempt to attract public attention. For example, in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the positions of China and India are considerably similar, and both sides have maintained neutrality. But the Indian government is deliberately trying to demonstrate how its position differs from that of China. Frankly, the differences between the two nations are similar to the differences between two apples, not to the differences between an apple and a pear.

For quite a long time in the past, many people in China believed that relations between China and the United States were “not going to get much better, and not going to get much worse.” However, few people would think this way now. So, are China-India relations also “not going to get much better, and not going to get much worse”? If left to fate, such an attitude is not only irresponsible but can also push China-India relations in a deleterious direction. China and India have different social systems, but they are both beneficiaries of globalization. They are both emerging economies, and both nations support world multi-polarization as well as the democratization of international relations. In an era of increasingly uncertain world order, if China and India view each other’s developments with an open mind and are able to manage their differences, this important bilateral relationship can become a stabilizer for the world.

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