陶勇翻译 兰德智库报告 《大国战争的回归——美中之间系统性冲突模式》第一章（上）_风闻

​CHAPTER ONE第一章

Introduction报告简介

This report explores scenarios of systemic U.S.-China conflict in a situation in which China has neared global primacy. To help illuminate how a U.S.- China war might unfold in such a circumstance, the authors examine trends in warfare and geopolitics, the behavior of select past great powers, and relevant patterns of interstate conflict. From these data, the authors formulate two scenarios of systemic U.S. China conflict war—one that is low-intensity and another that is high-intensity.

本报告探讨当中国接近全球主导地位的情况下，美中系统性冲突模式。为了有助于说明美中战争在此前提下将如何展开，作者研究了战争和地缘政治趋势、既往一些大国行为与国家间冲突相关模式。根据这些数据，作者提出了美中系统性冲突战争的两种模式：一种是低强度的，另一种是高强度的。

Background: An Intensifying Great Power Competition背景：不断加剧的大国竞争

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States of America enjoyed a position of global supremacy unsurpassedin human history. At the height of its power, the United States accounted for a quarter of global economic activity, deployed the world’s most advanced mil-itary, and experienced unmatched political and cultural influence.1 Currently, however, the nation’s unipolar moment is ending. By virtually every measure of national power, the strate-gic position of the United States has weakened as its economic growth rate has slowed relative to that of many other countries, including China. Whether and how much longer the United States can retain its position of global leadership has proven a topic of intense debate.2 At the very least, experts acknowledge that U.S. primacy can no longer be regarded as uncontested.3 The 2021 Interim National Security Strategy acknowledged that the “distribution of power across the world is changing” and characterized China as the “only competitor” that could “mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”

冷战结束后，美国获得了人类历史上无可比拟的全球霸主地位。在其权力巅峰时期，美国经济分量占据全球四分之一比重，部署了世界上最先进的军事力量，并拥有无与伦比的政治和文化影响力。然而，目前美国的单极荣光时刻正在结束。从衡量国家实力的几乎所有标准来看，美国的战略地位已经减弱，因为相对包括中国在内的许多其他国家，美国经济增长率已经放缓。事实上，美国是否能够继续保持全球领导地位以及还能保持多久，是一个激烈争论的话题。2至少，专家们承认，美国的首要地位已经不是无可争议了。3 《2021年国家安全临时战略》承认，“全球权力分配正在发生变化”，并将中国定性成 “唯一的竞争者”，可以 “对稳定和开放的国际体系发起持续地挑战”。

The Return of Great Power WarSecond only to the United States in the size of its economy and with a leadership eager to realize the nation’s revitalization, China stands as the nation’s only credible contender for global leadership. It should be noted that China’s ability to surpass the United States as a global leader is far from clear; there are ample reasons to doubt the prospect. Decades of robust growth obscure a Chinese economy encumbered by severe weaknesses. Moreover, the nation faces a gloomy demographic outlook and restrictive political geography. The apparent strength and resolve of the central political leadership scarcely conceals fragility arising from an overly centralized and repressive authoritarianism.5 China also does not appear to have an ambition to replicate U.S.-style global leadership, which may not be feasible in any case. Yet the possibility that China overcomes many or most of these formidable obstacles and begins to more aggressively contend for global primacy cannot be completely ruled out either. Given the potential implications for U.S. security of such an outcome, an analysis of what conflict under such conditions mean for America’s security seems prudent.

当前，中国的经济规模仅次于美国，其领导层急于实现民族复兴，是中国在全球领导力竞争中唯一可信的代表。应该指出地是，中国是否有能力超越美国成为全球领导者还不明晰；但却有足够的理由怀疑这一前景。因为，几十年的强劲增长掩盖了中国经济的严重弱点；除此之外，中国还面临着惨淡的人口前景和限制性的政治地理环境。中央政治领导层表面上的力量和决心几乎掩盖了过度集中和压制的威权主义所带来的脆弱性。5 中国似乎也没有复制美国式全球领导地位的雄心，这在任何情况下都是不可行的。然而，也不能完全排除中国克服许多或大部分这些巨大的障碍，开始更积极地争夺全球主导权的可能性。鉴于这种结果对美国安全的潜在影响，分析这种条件下的冲突对美国的安全意味着什么似乎不是多余的。

The intensification of U.S.-China strategic competition introduces political and secu-rity challenges that in key ways exceed what U.S. policymakers faced during the Cold War. Although the U.S.-Soviet zero-sum ideological conflict may be absent, the United States faces a far stronger contender in China than it ever faced in the Soviet Union. Moscow posed a powerful military challenge in Europe and owned a massive nuclear arsenal. It also exercised significant international political influence, especially among decolonizing Third World countries. But outside these areas, Soviet power lagged that of its American competitor by wide margins. Its economy never reached more than a fraction of that of the United States. The Soviet military maintained robust ground forces in Europe, but it suffered an overall technological inferiority and lacked the ability to project power globally.

美中战略竞争的加剧带来了政治和安全挑战，甚至在关键方面超过了美国政策制定者在冷战期间面临的挑战。虽然美苏零和的意识形态冲突可能不复存在，但美国当前面临的中国竞争者远比过去面临的苏联竞争者更为强大。莫斯科在欧洲形成了强大的军事挑战，并拥有一个庞大的核武库。它还发挥了重要的国际政治影响，特别是在非殖民化的第三世界国家中。但在这些领域之外，苏联的力量远远落后于美国竞争对手。它的经济实力仅占美国的小部分。苏联军队在欧洲保持着强大的地面部队，但它在总体技术上处于劣势，缺乏全球投射能力。

By contrast, U.S.-China competition has rapidly expanded beyond the military to techno-logical, ideological, political, and economic domains. The two sides continue to face danger-ous flash points near China and argue over the role of human rights, democracy, and indi-vidual freedoms in international politics. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has grown into a formidable force possessing impressive technological capabilities, even if it continues to lag the U.S. military in key ways.6 Moreover, unlike during the Cold War, which saw the United States enter the contest near the zenith of its economic might, in the current rivalry, the nation is in a period of relative decline. Even as its growth trajectory slows, Chinese national power continues to accrue at a faster rate than that of its American competitor. The size of China’s economy could exceed that of the United States in nominal terms by the 2030s, although experts continue to debate that possibility.7 If current trends continue, a U.S. mili-.tary facing flat budgets could confront an increasingly powerful and modern Chinese mili-tary.8 The same trends raise the risk that Chinese leaders could become emboldened in their approach to long-standingflash points such as the South China Sea or Taiwan and might risk conflict to achieve their goals.9 Nor is there likely to be a quick and easy resolution to this imposing strategic challenge. Owing to deep structural drivers, the U.S.-China competition is expected to last many years, if not decades.

相比之下，美中两国的竞争已经迅速扩大到军事以外的技术逻辑、意识形态、政治和经济领域。双方在中国周边继续面临危险的爆发点，并就人权、民主和个人自由在国际政治中的作用进行争论。中国人民解放军（PLA）已经成长为一支强大的力量，拥有令人印象深刻的技术能力，尽管它在关键方面仍然落后于美国军队。此外，与冷战时期不同的是，美国是在其经济实力接近顶峰的情况下参加（军备）竞赛的。而在当下的竞争中，美国正处于一个相对衰落的时期。而中国即使增长有所放缓，但国力的增强速度仍然比竞争对手美国更快。预计到2030年，中国经济规模按名义价值计算可能超过美国，尽管专家们对这种可能性仍有争议。如果目前的趋势继续下去，面临预算持平的美国军队将面对日益强大和现代化的中国军队。同样的趋势也使中国领导人在处理南海或台湾等长期存在的热点问题时更加无所顾忌，并可能冒着冲突的风险来实现其目标。对于这一严峻的战略挑战，也不可能有一个快速和简单的解决方案。由于深层次的结构性因素，美中之间的竞争预计将持续多年，甚至几十年。

Introduction同样的趋势也使中国领导人在处理南海或台湾等长期存在的热点问题时更加胆大妄为，并可能冒着冲突的风险来实现其目标。由于深层次的结构性因素，美中之间的竞争预计将持续多年，甚至几十年。

Defining a Leading Great Power界定一个领先的大国

Should China successfully realize its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a Chinese-led effort todevelop a massive trade and infrastructure network spanning much of Africa and Eurasia, the United States could one day find itself confronting a peer rival for global leadership possessing immense national power. Theorists of international relations have long concluded that the struggle for international primacy among rival great powers tends to be prone to systemic conflict. It is this moment of near global primacy—that is, a moment at which China as a peer power begins to more aggressively contend for the mantle of global leadership—that we focus on in this report. But before we can proceed with analyzing such a situation, we will clarify what we mean by global primacy and why this could drive systemic conflict.

如果中国成功实现其雄心勃勃的一个由中国主导的、横跨非洲和欧亚大陆的大规模贸易和基础设施网络之 “一带一路 “目标（BRI），美国就会发现自己面对的是一个国力强盛的全球领导地位的同级竞争对手。国际关系理论家早就得出结论，竞争大国之间争夺国际首要地位的拼斗往往容易发生系统性冲突。我们在本报告中关注的正是这种接近全球主导地位的时刻——即中国作为一个匹敌大国开始更积极地争夺全球领导地位的时刻。但在我们着手分析这种情况之前，我们将澄清我们所说的全球首要地位是什么意思，以及为什么这可能造成系统性冲突。

In every age, one country or set of countries tends to stand out as the most powerful. Yet how to define and measure the strength of these high performers remains much disputed. Scholars have employed a variety of terms to communicate different aspects of national strength, such as great powers, world powers, or first-rate powers. Typically, scholars use the term great power to refer to a class of powerful countries with the ability to profoundly shape international politics. Paul Kennedy has highlighted the importance of economic and military power as essential to this class of nations.11 Realist theorist Kenneth Waltz, by contrast, proposes five criteria for defining a great power: population and territory; resource endowment; economic capability; political stability and competence; and military strength.12 William Wohlforth and Steven Brooks argue against the concept of “polarity” in favor of a method that measures national power in terms of military, economic, and techni-cal capacity.

在各个时代，一个国家或“一群”国家往往会作为最强大的国家脱颖而出。然而，如何定义和衡量这些崛起国家的实力，仍然存在很大争议。学者们采用了各种术语、从不同角度表述国家实力，如大国、世界大国或一流大国。通常情况下，学者们用大国这个词来指代一类有能力深刻影响国际政治的强大国家。保罗——肯尼迪强调了经济和军事力量对于这类国家的重要性。11 而现实主义理论家肯尼思——华尔兹则提出了定义大国的五个标准：人口和领土；资源禀赋；经济能力；政治稳定和能力；以及军事力量。12 威廉-沃尔福斯和史蒂芬-布鲁克斯反对 “极性 “的概念，赞成用军事、经济和技术能力来衡量国家实力的方法。

The Return of Great Power WarAmong the great powers, different configurations with different risks of conflict are possible. Some theorists have argued that a diffusion of power among states, such as in “multipolar” situations, may offer the best prospects for international stability.14 Other the-orists have focused on the dynamism of situations featuring a high degree of concentrated power. Specialists in power transition scenarios in particular have claimed that great power wars fundamentally aim to decide the issue of hegemony and leadership in a system or subsystem.15 For these scholars, the terms preeminenceor primacy describe a country that enjoys the first rank, or highest-level status, among other countries. Such countries have an unusually high concentration of national power, as measured by a greater share of eco-nomic, military, and political power than any other country. Such powerful states also are typically understood to have greater international influence than others.

在大国之间，有可能出现具有不同冲突风险的不同配置。一些理论家认为，国家间的权力分散，如在"多极 “情况下，可能为国际稳定提供最佳前景。其他理论家则关注以高度集中的权力为特征的情况动态。特别是研究权力过渡情况的专家声称，大国战争的根本目的是决定一个系统或子系统中的霸权和领导权问题。15 对这些学者来说，“优势"或"首要地位 “这些术语描述了一个国家在其他国家中享有第一等级，或最高级别的地位。这类国家的政府权力异常集中、以比其他国家更多的生态、军事和政治权力份额来衡量，这种强国通常也被理解为比其他国家具有更大的国际影响力。

For such states, scholars have highlighted qualities such as the possibilities of domination and control. The term hegemon, often associated with a variant of realist international relations theory that emphasizes the role of a single, dominant hegemonic power, refers to the idea that one coun-try exercises political, economic, or military predominance or control over other states. Robert Gilpin, a foremost theorist of the role of hegemons, has argued that the international order is most stable when there is one hegemon and that, as the power of the incumbent hegemon wanes, dissatisfied rising hegemons will contend for a position of primacy. The clash between the incumbent and rising hegemons will, according to this theory of “hege-monic stability,” result in war.16 A. F. K. Organski, in particular, has developed the theory of “power transition warfare,” in which the status quo and rising hegemons fight to decide the issue of international primacy. 17 The theory of power transition warfare between rising and declining great powers has found some empirical support.18 However, the theories have been criticized as well. One criticism of the term hegemon is that it implies that a country can exercise a level of oppressive domination and control that most countries might find intolerable and that few countries can exercise in practice. Chinese official documents rou-tinely hurl the accusation of hegemonic behavior against the United States with this argu-ment in mind.

对于这样的国家，学者们强调了诸如支配和控制的可能性等品质。霸权一词，通常与现实主义国际关系理论的一个变种相关，强调单一的、占主导地位的霸权国家的作用，指某个国家利用政治、经济或军事上的优势对其他国家实施掌控的企图。最重要的霸权作用理论家罗伯特-吉尔平认为，当只有一个霸权时，国际秩序是最稳定的，但随着唯一霸权国家的衰落，挑战现实的后起霸权将争夺首要霸权地位。根据这一 “霸权稳定 “理论，现任霸权和崛起霸权之间的冲突将导致战争。特别是奥根斯基提出了 “权力过渡战争 “的理论，在这个理论中，现任霸权和崛起霸权将为争夺国际首要地位而战。大国崛起与衰落之间的权力过渡战争理论已经找到了一些经验上的支持。然而，这些理论也受到了批评。对 “霸权 “一词的批评是，它意味着一个国家可以行使一定程度的压迫性统治和控制，而大多数国家可能认为这是不可容忍的，在实践中，很少有国家能够行使这种权利。中国的官方文件经常对美国的霸权主义行为提出指责，并以此为论据。