陶勇翻译 南德智库报告：《大国战争的回归：美中之间系统性冲突模式》二_风闻

本报告最后对解放军在上述战斗场景中的表现提出了一些看法和假设。报告还回顾了关键的挑战和弱点。Summary摘要that could affect the PLA’s battlefield performance. The implications and recommendations herein would apply chiefly to a hypothetical conflict situation in which China had neared global primacy. However, the conclusions could inform defense planning for potential con-tingencies even today. Our first finding is that planners may need to consider a broader range of contingencies for low- or high-intensity war when contemplating possible combat involv-ing China. Most defense planning scenarios focus on flash points such as Taiwan within an assumed context of U.S. primacy. These scenarios tend to envision a relatively contained set of combat operations that concludes with the resolution of China’s attempt to subjugate the island. This approach might make sense in a situation in which China experienced signifi-cant inferiority compared with the United States, such as Iraq did when the United States defeated its efforts to annex Kuwait in the first Gulf War. But China could consider combat options in a dramatically different way in conditions in which it had grown powerful enough to more aggressively contend for global primacy. In such circumstances, the drive to escalate an initial clash to a broader war of power transition could be difficult to resist, regardless of the outcome of the initial battle near a flash point such as Taiwan.在此，我们将对可能影响解放军战场表现的因素进行分析。本文的意义和建议主要在于假设与接近全球首要地位的中国发生冲突的情形。因此，这种假设甚至可以为今后潜在冲突的防御计划提供参考。我们的第一个发现是，防御计划制定者在考虑可能涉及中国的冲突时，可能需要考虑更广泛的低强度或高强度战争之意外情形。大多数国防规划方案都集中在诸如台湾这样的热点地区，并假定美国占主导地位。这些方案倾向于设想一套相对封闭的作战行动，以瓦解中国征服该岛的企图。在中国与美国相比处于明显劣势的情况下，这种方法可能是有意义的，比如在第一次海湾战争中，美国击败了伊拉克吞并科威特的努力，伊拉克就是这样。但是，在中国已经强大到可以更积极地争夺全球首要地位的情况下，中国可以以一种截然不同的方式考虑作战选择。在这种情况下，将最初的冲突升级为更广泛的权力过渡战争的动力可能难以抵挡，无论在台湾这样的热点地区周围最初战斗结果如何。Second, planners may need to consider U.S.-China conflict less as a single battle or war than as a series of sequentially related, geographically dispersed clashes between U.S.- and Chinese-aligned forces. A systemic war could last years, involve many participants, and span virtually all domains, even if it stayed at the level of low-intensity conflict. The possibility that U.S. military forces might be severely stressed by competing demands for security assistance by allies and partners or to tackle severe transnational threats should be considered as well. Third, the United States should consider bolstering its ability to wage indirect war, given our conclusion that a scenario of indirect, low-intensity conflict is more plausible than that of high-intensity war. Fourth, the analysis of high-intensity war has underscored the impor-tance of ensuring the U.S. ability to defend and secure vital choke points in the Middle East and along the Indian Ocean. Fifth, U.S.-China conventional conflict scenarios outside the first island chain could consist mainly of engagements between intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensors and modest-size units of long-range strike systems, as well as poten-tial clashes involving irregular and proxy forces. Planners who seek to anticipate such sce-narios may want to focus on weapons and platforms that help gain the information advantage and mitigate long-range strike capabilities. Alliance building to develop counterinsurgency capabilities could be useful as well.其次，规划者可能需要将美中冲突视为美国和中国结盟部队之间一系列顺序相关、地理上分散的冲突，而不是单一的战斗或战争。一场系统性的战争可能会持续数年，涉及许多参与者，并且几乎跨越所有领域，即使它停留在低强度冲突的水平上。美国军事力量可能会因为盟友和合作伙伴对安全援助的竞争性要求或应对严重的跨国威胁而受到严重压力，这一点也应予以考虑。第三，鉴于我们的结论是，间接的、低强度的冲突比高强度的战争显然更为“划算”，因此，美国应该考虑增强其发动间接战争的能力。第四，对高强度战争的分析强调了确保美国在中东和印度洋沿岸的重要咽喉部位的防御和安全能力的重要性。第五，第一岛链以外的中美常规冲突模式可能主要包括情报、监视和侦察传感器与中等规模的远程打击系统之间的交战，以及涉及非正规部队和代理部队的潜在冲突。作为预判未来形势的规划者也许应该把防范重点放在有助于获得信息优势和减轻远程打击能力的武器和平台上。当然，建立联盟以发展反叛乱能力也是值得考虑的选择。Acknowledgments鸣谢The authors thank the reviewers of this report, Michael J. Mazarr, Phillip C. Saunders, and Mike Bond. They also thank the sponsors of the study.作者感谢本报告的审稿人Michael J. Mazarr, Phillip C. Saunders和Mike Bond。与此同时，还感谢本研究的赞助商。xvAbbreviations缩略语A2/AD anti-access/area denialA2/AD 反介入/区域拒止AI artificial intelligenceAI 人工智能BRI Belt and Road InitiativeBRI 一带一路倡议C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissanceC4ISR 指挥、控制、通信、计算机、情报、监视和侦察。CCG Chinese Coast GuardCCG 中国海岸警卫队CCP Chinese Communist PartyCCP 中国共产党DoD Department of DefenseDoD 美国国防部GDP gross domestic product国内生产总值ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceISR 情报、监视和侦察NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNATO 北大西洋公约组织PAP People’s Armed PolicePAP 中国人民武装警察部队PGM precision-guided munitionPGM 精确制导弹药PLA People’s Liberation ArmyPLA 中国人民解放军SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization上海合作组织SLOC sea lines of communicationSLOC 海上交通线