陶勇翻译 兰德智库报告 《大国战争的回归——美中之间系统性冲突模式》第一章（中）_风闻

IntroductionAnother criticism of realist theory is its lack of attention to the structureand dynamics of the world economy.20 Critics Richard Lebow and Benjamin Valentino have also questioned the theory, arguing that power transitions have been “remarkably rare” and “tended to happen peacefully.”21Politicals cientists have offered alternative terms to describe a supremely powerful nation, such as that of a leading power or system leader. Associated with the theories of world systems or long cycle theory, such terms emphasize the role played by an exceptionally capable nation in organizing and leading the global economy. These experts tend to emphasize the way eco-nomic power underpins global military and political power. Immanuel Wallerstein’s “world systems” theory describes a group of core leading economies that dominated the global econ-omy.22 Long cycle theorists George Modelski and William Thompson have defined global system leaders as specialists in “long-distance commerce and advanced industrial produc-tion,” which also provide “political and military leadership at the global (intercontinental) level.” 23 The systems approach has drawn attention to the critical role that powerful nations play in leading and organizing global economic activity.

、对现实主义理论的另一个批评是它缺乏对世界经济结构动态的关注。20 批评家理查德莱博和本杰明瓦伦提诺也对这一理论提出质疑，认为权力过渡 “非常罕见”，“往往是和平发生的 “21。政治学家们提供了另一种术语来描述极其强大的国家（超级大国——译者注）——如领导国或系统领导者。与世界体系或长周期理论相关，这些术语强调了特别有能力的国家在组织和领导全球经济方面的作用。这些专家特别强调国家经济实力是支撑军事和政治力量的后盾。伊曼纽尔-沃勒斯坦的 “世界体系"理论描述了一批主导全球经济的核心经济体。22 长周期理论家乔治-莫德斯基和威廉-汤普森将全球体系的领导者定义为 “远程商业和先进工业生产 “的专家，他们还提供 “全球（洲际）层面的政治和军事领导力。“23 体系方法使人们注意到强国在领导和组织全球经济活动中的关键作用。它们还为经济优势、地缘政治优势和权力过渡战争之间的联系提供了有趣的解释。然而，基于系统的方法经受了一些批评，因为它过分关注技术和经济能力，而对政治和军事力量的重要性强调不足。

They also offer an intriguing expla-nation for the connection between economic predominance, geopolitical primacy, and wars of power transition. The systems-based approach has enduredsome criticism, however, for focusing excessively on technological and economic capabilities and underemphasizing the importance of political and military power.Both schools of thought have their advantages and disadvantages. The hegemonic stability/ realist approach notes the importance of preponderance in economic, political, and mili-tary power among top-tier powers. It also emphasizes the importance of international influ-ence as an aspect of strength. The system leader school complements these insights with its valuable insight into the way internationally preeminent nations organize and shape the structure of the global economy. We wish to capture these insights in our understanding of global primacy. Accordingly, we use the term leading great power to mean a country that has achieved a level of global preeminence—first rank—in terms of concentrated economic, political, and military power. Such a nation exerts a preponderant international influence and is also dominant in organizing and leading the global economic system. Global primacy is used interchangeably as the condition that characterizes the situation of the leading great power.

这两个学派都有其优点和缺点。霸权主义稳定/现实主义方法注意到顶级大国在经济、政治和军事力量上占优势的重要性，它还强调了国际影响力作为实力方面的重要性。系统领袖学派通过国际领军国家如何组织和塑造全球经济结构之高屋建瓴观点补充了这些见解。我们希望在对全球主导地位的理解中抓住这些见解。因此，我们使用领先大国一词，指的是在经济、政治和军事力量等方面达到全球领先水平的国家。这样的国家发挥了突出的国际影响力，并且在组织和领导全球经济体系方面具有主导地位。全球首要地位可交替使用，作为主导大国状况的特征条件.

The Return of Great Power WarDefining Systemic Conflict Among Rival Leading Powers界定对立领军国家之间的系统性冲突

Although both the hegemonic stability/realist and system leader schools of thought disagree on definitions and key points of emphasis, they agree that the global leading power tends to exert a stabilizing influence when at the height of its power, but that its ascent or descent is likely to coincide with considerable instability and/or conflict. The period of instability accompanying the rise or decline of great powers is, per Organski, often referred to as one of “power transition.”25 Since we are interested in analyzing potential scenarios of U.S.-China conflict, we focus on such a hypothetical period of Chinese ascent and U.S. relative decline. In our hypothetical scenarios, China may not have decisively achieved a position of global primacy yet, but it is poised to do so. Its situation may be described as one of nearing global primacy, but still in the processing of contending with the United States for that position. By many, but perhaps not all, measures of national power, China would have roughly equaled, slightly surpassed, or fallen just shy of those of the United States. China may be nearing or have gained a modest edge over the United States as a leading organizer of the global economy as well. In such a situation, Beijing’s claims to have secured global primacy would strike many people as plausible, though the claims could be debated given the intensity of U.S. efforts to fend off China’s challenge. It is important to emphasize how this hypothetical situation dif-fers from today. In 2022 China may be regarded as a serious competitor to the United States, but few would regard as credible any claim that it has neared the point of displacingUnited States to become the leading global power.

尽管霸权主义稳定/现实主义学派和体系领袖学派在定义和强调的关键点上都有分歧，但他们都认为，全球领先大国在其力量最强大的时候往往会发挥稳定的作用，但其上升或下降很可能与相当的不稳定/或冲突同时出现。按照奥根斯基的说法，伴随着大国崛起或衰落的不稳定时期通常被称为"权力过渡”。25 因为我们对分析潜在的美中冲突情形感兴趣，我们将重点放在中国崛起和美国相对衰落的这种假设时期。在我们的假设情景中，中国可能还没有决定性地取得全球首要地位，但它已准备好这样做。中国当前的状态可以被描述为接近全球首要地位，但却在与美国争夺这一地位的过程中。根据许多但也许不是所有的国力衡量标准，中国将大致等同于、略微超过或略微落后于美国。作为全球经济的主要组织者，中国也可能接近或获得对美国的适度优势。在这种情况下，北京声称已经获得了全球首要地位，这让很多人觉得颇有道理——尽管考虑到美国为抵御中国的挑战所做的努力，这种说法可能会引起争论。重要的是要强调这种假设的情况与今天有什么不同。2022年，中国可能被视为美国的强力竞争对手，但很少有人会认为任何关于中国已接近取代美国成为全球领先大国的说法是可信的。

We focus on this hypothetical moment of aggressive Chinese efforts to contend for global primacy because it carries the highest risks of major war according to the established find-ings of international relations theory.26 How the two countries manage that moment could carry immense implications for both countries and for the world. Although the possibility of a peaceful power transition exists, in this report we focus on the possibilities of systemic conflict. A key assumption of the report is that the United States has both the capability and the determination to resist its supersession and that both sides thus face compelling incen-tives to resort to force to assert or defend global primacy. Because this type of conflict is intricately related to the question of international leadership, it would not likely be resolved by a single battle. Rather, the conflict would assume a chronic, systemic form. As in past examples of power transition warfare, the two countries could fight in multiple engagements over a relatively long span of time, perhaps lasting for many years, and in a geographically unconstrained manner. Extensive conflict could involve many partner nations and manifest in various forms of interstate and intrastate conflict with varying levels of involvement by the two rivals as well. The escalation risks would remain high due to the underlying drive for supremacy. Conflict would thus assume a serial, persistent condition that could endure for years and that would end only when one side exhausted its ability to keep fighting and accordingly acknowledged its subordination to the other.

我们关注的是中国为争夺全球首要地位而进行的挑战性努力这一假设，因为根据国际关系理论的既定结论，它具有最高的大规模战争风险。两国如何应对这种状况可能对两国和世界产生巨大影响。虽然和平的权力交接的可能性是存在的，但在本报告中，我们关注系统性冲突的可能性。本报告的一个关键假设是，美国有能力也有决心遏制对它的超越，因此双方都面临着诉诸武力来维护或捍卫全球首要地位的强烈动机。由于这种类型冲突错综复杂地与国际领导权问题纠缠一起，它不可能一劳永逸地解决。相反，冲突会呈现出一种长期、系统性的形式。就像过去的权力过渡战争一样，两个国家可能在相对较长的时间内多次交战，可能会持续很多年，而且在地理上不受限制。广泛的冲突可能涉及许多伙伴国，表现为各种形式的国家间和国内冲突，两个对手也会有不同程度的参与。由于争夺霸权的潜在动力，冲突升级的风险仍然很高。因此，冲突将成为一种连续的、持续的状况，可以绵延数年。只有当一方耗尽其继续战斗的能力并相应地承认其对另一方的从属地位时才会结束。

IntroductionAn adversarial China that had neared a position of global primacy could pose an excep-tionally formidable challenge to the United States, which has not fought a great power from a position of parity or inferiority since the War of 1812. By the mid-1800s, the U.S. economy had already surpassed in size and wealth that of the United Kingdom—the leading great power of its day. By any economic measure, the United States became the world’s most powerful­ nation by 1916, although Washington resisted assuming global responsibilities commensu-rate with its strength until after World War II.27 The United States fought formidableCen-tral and Axis power adversariesin the two World Wars, but its industrial might gave it aninsuperable advantage. Even against the Soviet Union, the United States competed from a position of strength, with an economy many times more productive and richer than that of its communist rival. Lessons from past wars are also constrained by the fact that those wars happened in the past. Distinctive features of geopolitical arrangements, the state of military technology, and the nature of war all shaped past rivalries and conflicts in ways that may not be relevant today.

一个已接近全球首要地位的对手中国可能会对美国构成特别可怕的挑战，因为自1812年战争以来，美国还没有从平等或劣势的位置上与一个大国作战。到19世纪中期，美国的经济规模和财富已经超过了英国——当时的领先大国。从任何经济角度来看，美国在1916年成为世界上最强大的国家，尽管华盛顿一直到二战后才承担与其实力相称的全球责任。27美国在两次世界大战中跟强大的同盟国与轴心国敌手作战，凭借的就是其工业实力带来的不可超越之优势。即使是对阵苏联，美国也是以实力取胜，其产业生产力和富裕程度比其苏联对手高出许多倍。从过去的战争中得到的教训对于今天的警示有限，因为这些战争发生在过去。地缘政治安排的独特特点、军事技术的状况和战争的性质形成了过去的竞争和冲突，而那些既有的“经验”在今天可能已经不适用了。