周波：中美海军频频相遇，如何避免误判？

周波：

德意志帝国宰相俾斯麦有句名言：“法律就像香肠，最好不要看到它们的制作过程”。果如其言，联合国海洋法公约（UNCLOS）像是有史以来制作时间最长的一根“香肠”。大约140个国家围绕公约制定进行了长达9年的谈判，使其成为历史上持续时间最长的国际法谈判。可以理解的是，各方都做出了妥协，但是有些条款仍然模棱两可，各方可以灵活解读。

中国早在1996年就批准了《联合国海洋法公约》，美国至今仍未批准《联合国海洋法公约》，双方对公约的例如航行和飞越自由的概念有不同的阐释。中国认为，美国的军事活动，如美国海军在中国专属经济区的抵近侦察，侵犯了中国的国家安全及利益，因此不能简单地归类为航行自由。美国则坚持认为，其军事活动可被归类为航行自由和其他针对海洋的国际合法权利范围。但我要指出的是，中国并不是持此立场的唯一的国家，至少还有25个国家对外国在本国专属经济区或毗连区的军事活动有不同程度的限制。

这种差异是可以理解的，但美国根据其对《联合国海洋法公约》的单方面解释，表现得好像自己是海洋法的唯一捍卫者。根据五角大楼的说法，从2019年10月1日到2020年9月30日，美军以军事行动对“全球19个不同声索国提出的28项不同的过度海洋声索”提出了挑战。因此，一个简单的问题出现了：如果公约是好的，你美国为什么不批准它？如果不是，你为什么要以它的名义挑战别人？

中国是唯一对美国挑衅做出军事反应的国家。2001年发生过一起致命的中美军机相撞事故，在海上也发生过多起危险的中美军事对峙。二十多年来，中美两国海军的对话是有益的，但成果并不显著：美方希望就如何避免舰艇和飞机近距离危险接触进行技术性讨论，而中方则指出，美国海军在中国海域的高强度大范围侦察和监视是对中国主权的挑衅，因而应该禁止或至少减少次数；美方要求监视美国军舰的中国军舰保持安全距离，中方则认为，如果美国军舰根本不进入中国海域，它们自然安全。公正地说，中国和美国都不希望发生事故。但根本问题从一开始就存在：如果美国不想让水沸腾，为什么还要火上浇油？毕竟，是美国军舰定期到中国家门口挑衅，而非中国军舰到美国家门口滋事。

辽宁舰航母编队在南海航行。图片来源见水印

理论上，下一次危机发生只是时间问题。如今，降低北京和华盛顿之间的风险，比降低冷战期间美苏之间的风险更为困难，原因有两个：首先，华盛顿和莫斯科之间有明确界定的势力范围，即便双方在其他地方打代理人战争，他们也避免直接对抗。但是中美之间甚至连缓冲区都没有，美国军舰定期在中国南海和台湾海峡航行。

其次，美国和苏联通过拥有相互确保毁灭能力的军事威慑达到了平衡，这在北京和华盛顿之间是不存在的。但在西太平洋，由于中国人民解放军在过去几十年里的长足发展，中美军事力量的差距正朝着有利于中国的方向缩小。一支更强大的中国人民解放军，只会更加坚定地维护中国的主权和领土完整。在过去三年我读到的所有美国智库的报告里，没有一篇断言美军在西太平洋地区一定能够战胜解放军。

如果我们不能解决问题，我们只能尽力应对危机，使之不至于滑入双方都不希望发生的冲突。隧道的尽头或许有光亮。2020年10月，中国国防部和美国国防部官员远程召开了第一次危机沟通工作小组视频会议，讨论危机沟通、危机预防和危机管理的概念。这是第一次如此强调“危机”概念，因为之前的会谈都是围绕避免“事故”或“事件”展开的。现在，最重要的讨论是危机管理，即事故发生后该如何做，这是以前从未讨论过的情况。

中美两国要想在海上化解冲突，双方都需要遵守在“西太平洋海军论坛”上多边制订的《海上意外相遇规则》（CUES）和中美双边制订的《海空相遇安全行为准则》（ROB）的规则和规定，以避免误判。避免事故的关键是军舰和军机要保持安全距离。但安全距离究竟是多少？根据《海上意外相遇规则》，在保持安全距离时，必须考虑能见度状态、两船的机动性和对另一船操纵意图的理解等7个因素。显然，这不仅需要认真讨论，还需要定期培训，以确保良好的航海技术。中美两军在2014年、2015年和2016年进行了联合《海上意外相遇规则》演习。这种演习应该保持下去，部分原因是将来更强大的中国人民解放军海军必将在国际海域更频繁地与美国海军相遇。

中国海军辽宁舰航母与美军“马斯廷”号驱逐舰在南海“同框”。（美国海军官网）

会议组织者要求我们讨论新常态下基于规则的秩序。那么新常态是什么？所谓的“自由开放的印太”不是新常态，而是一个新神话。扪心自问，印度洋—太平洋地区何时不自由不开放？海洋是相通的。在人类历史上，很少有国家试图封锁国际海峡或海上通道。印太地区最突出的问题是2008年至2013年在亚丁湾和索马里盆地猖獗的海盗行为。现在，在国际海军的共同努力下，这种现象已基本铲除。

“自由开放的印太”实际上是对中国欲盖弥彰的攻击，也是以东盟的“中心地位”为代价的。原因很简单，从地理上讲，如果东盟位于太平洋的中心，就不能同时处于印度洋—太平洋的中心。

观察美日澳印四方安全对话（QUAD）会如何演变将很有趣。如果这是基于对中国的共同不满，那么将四国联系在一起的纽带不可能牢固。中国是美国最大的贸易伙伴之一，也是日本、澳大利亚和印度的最大贸易伙伴。至少可以说，他们都不愿意为了其他三国的利益而牺牲自己与中国的经济关系。

在国际海事领域，一个新常态就是中国人民解放军海军越来越强大，它已经拥有世界上最多的舰艇，它的目标是到本世纪中叶发展成为世界一流海军。任何时候，都有中国海军舰艇在世界某地航行。

这对世界意味着什么？当然，一支更强大的中国海军将在维护中国主权和领土完整方面发挥更重要的作用，但在台湾问题或者南海问题上并不需要这么多舰艇。是中国巨大且不断增长的海外利益和一个大国义不容辞的国际责任，促使中国建设世界一流海军。在国防白皮书中，维护中国海外利益，参与地区和国际安全合作以维护地区和世界和平，被描述为解放军的“战略任务”。

另一个新常态是，中国是一个不同于历史上所有其他大国的新型海洋强国。中国无意当世界警察，因此，它不会试图扼住国际海峡的咽喉要道。它不会建立所谓的“珍珠链”。相反，中国通过国际合作维护自己的海外利益，承担自己的国际责任。在印度洋打击海盗是中国海军如何实现这一目标的一个杰出范例。在中国海军编队护航的大约7000艘船只中，有一半是外国船只。中国海军加入多国海军在亚丁湾护航意义有三：一是打击海盗；二是维护海上通道安全；三是共同捍卫航行自由。这种践行也许是弥合《联合国海洋法公约》模糊之处的一个有效办法。

（翻页查看英文版）

Rules-based Maritime Order in The New Norm

Zhou Bo

Chancellor of the German Reich Otto von Bismarck famously said, “Laws are like sausages, it is better not to see them being made”. In this regard, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) looks like the longest sausage ever made. It was negotiated for nine years by around 140 countries, making it the longest-running international law negotiation in history. Understandably, compromises are made and ambiguities that could be flexibly interpreted still found.

China, a country that has ratified the UNCLOS as early as 1996 and the US, a country so far hasn’t ratified the UNCLOS have different interpretations of the UNCLO, say, on freedom of navigation and overflight. China believes that American military activities, such as the close-in reconnaissance and surveillance by the US Navy in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), infringe on China’s security interests and therefore cannot be simply categorized as freedom of navigation. The US maintains that its military activities fall within the freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of the sea. But I wish to point out that China is not the only country that holds such a view. At least 25 other countries also have restrictions regarding foreign military activities in their exclusive economic zones or contiguous zones to varying degrees.

Such difference is understandable, but the US, based upon its own interpretations of the UNCLOS, would behave as if it is the sole guardian of the maritime law. According to the Pentagon, from October 1, 2019 to September 30, 2020, U.S. forces operationally challenged “28 different excessive maritime claims made by 19 different claimants throughout the world”. Therefore, a simple question arises: If the Convention is good, why don’t you ratify it? And if it is not, why would you challenge others in the name of it?

China is the only country that has responded militarily to American provocations. There were a deadly aircraft collision in 2001 and a number of dangerous encounters at sea. For over two decades, the Chinese and American navies’ dialogues are useful but not fruitful: the American side wanted technical discussions on how to avoid close and dangerous encounters between ships and aircraft while the Chinese side would point out that American navy’s intense surveillance and reconnaissance in China’s waters were provocations to China’s sovereignty that should be stopped or at least reduced; Americans asked Chinese ships monitoring American ships to keep safe distance and Chinese believe the American ships are most safe if they don’t come at all. It is fair to say that neither China nor the US want an accident. But the fundamental problem exists from the very beginning: if the US doesn’t want the water to boil, why keep throwing wood into the fire? Afterall, it is the American ships that have come regularly to China’s doorsteps and not the other way round.

In theory, it is only a matter of time before the next crisis occurs. Today, risk reduction for Beijing and Washington is more difficult than that between the US and the Soviet Union during the cold war for two reasons. First, there are clearly defined spheres of influence between Washington and Moscow which allows them to avoid direct confrontations even if proxy wars had to be fought elsewhere. But between China and the United States, there isn’t even a buffer zone in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Straits where the American naval vessels sail regularly.

Second, the United States and the Soviet Union were balanced by mutually assured destruction which is not found between Beijing and Washington. But in the Western Pacific, the gap in military strength is shrinking in China’s favor thanks to the advances of the PLA in the past decades. A stronger PLA can only become more determined to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Of all the reports by American think tanks that I read in the last three years, none of them concludes that within the Western Pacific, the US military is guaranteed to win over the PLA.

If we cannot resolve the problem, we can only try our best to manage a crisis sliding into a confrontation that neither wants. Perhaps there is some light at the end of the tunnel. In October 2020, officials of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and the US Department of Defense convened the first Crisis Communication Working Group meeting by video teleconference to discuss concepts of crisis communications, crisis prevention and crisis management. This is the first time that crisis is stressed as such because previously talks were centered on avoiding “accidents” or “incidents”. The most significant part is management of crisis, that is, what to do after an accident has happened, a scenario never discussed before.

For China and the US to deconflict at sea, both sides need to observe the multilaterally agreed rules and regulations of the “Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea” (CUES) made at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the bilaterally agreed “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” (ROB) to avoid miscalculations. The key to avoid an accident is for ships and aircraft to keep safe distance. But what exactly is the safe distance? According to CUES, seven factors ranging from the state of visibility, the maneuverability of both vessels and understanding of the maneuvering intentions of the other vessel have to be considered in keeping safe distance. Apparently, they require not only serious discussions, but also regular training to ensure good seamanship. The two militaries conducted joint drills on CUES in 2014, 2015 and 2016. Such exercises should continue, partly because a stronger PLA Navy is bound to meet the US Navy more often in the international waters in days to come.

The organizer of the conference asks us to discuss the rules-based order in the new norm. Then what is the new norm? The so-called “free and open Indo-Pacific” is not the new norm, it is a new myth. Ask yourself when the Indo-Pacific is not free and open? Oceans are interconnected. In human history, few countries have attempted to block international straits or sea lanes. The most outstanding problem in the Indo-Pacific was piracy that was rampant in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin from 2008 to 2013. Now it is basically eradicated thanks to the joint efforts of the international navies.

The “free and open Indo-Pacific” is in fact thinly-veiled attack on China. It also comes at a cost on the centrality of the ASEAN. The reason is simple, geographically speaking, if ASEAN lies at the heart of the Pacific, it cannot be at the center of the Indo-Pacific at the same time.

It would be interesting to see how the Quad might evolve. If it is based upon a common resentment of China, then the glue that binds the four won’t be strong enough. China is one of the top trading partners of the US and the largest trading partner of Japan, Australia and India. None of them would wish to sacrifice their own economic ties with China for the interests of the other three countries, to say the least.  

In the international maritime domain, one of the new norms is that the PLA Navy is getting stronger and stronger. It already has the largest number of ships in the world. It is aiming to grow into a world-class navy by mid-century. At any given time, there are Chinese naval vessels sailing somewhere in the rest of the world.

The question is what this means for the world. Of course, a stronger Chinese navy will play a more important role in safeguarding China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but the PLA Navy doesn’t need so many ships for Taiwan issue or the South China Sea issue. It is China’s tremendous and ever-growing overseas interests and international obligations which are incumbent upon a major power that call for China to build a world-class navy. In the defense white paper, safeguarding China’s overseas interests and participating in regional and international security cooperation to safeguard regional and world peace are described as “strategic tasks” of the PLA.

Another new norm is China is a new type of sea power different from all others in history. China has no intentions to police the world. Therefore, it won’t attempt to control the chokepoints in the international straits. It won’t establish the so-called “string of pearls”. Instead, China will safeguard its overseas interests and shoulder its international obligations through international cooperation. Countering piracy in the Indian Ocean is a brilliant example of how the Chinese navy might achieve that. Half of all the 7000 or so ships escorted by the Chinese naval flotillas are foreign ships. The significance of the Chinese navy joining the international navies in counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden is three-fold: it is counter-piracy; it is maintenance of sea lines of communication, and it is also perseverance of freedom of navigation. Such a practice might be a useful way to mitigate the ambiguity of the UNCLOS.

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