美国《联邦党人文集》第十篇：麦迪逊文章的评注_风闻

     因为长期以来主导意识形态的西方舆论的洗脑，因为西方社会有效的决定学者职业前程兴亡的奖罚，今天许多人认识的西方社会与真实的西方社会是完全不同的。舆论描述的西方社会与现实的西方社会之间的差异之大，只要符合西方的利益，两者可以是毫不相关的，所以离开了西方的现实认识、评论西方最容易被欺骗。本文介绍一篇麦迪逊的重要文章，以便大家对他的政治思想和世界观有一个比较全面、客观的认识。麦迪逊是美国宪法之父，第四任美国总统。麦迪逊的政治思想与世界观同他的伙伴美国父们是基本一致的，更多的资料可以看文章：看看美国制宪的代表们对民主制度的憎恨。

    只要花一点时间看看美利坚制宪、建国的历史，了解美国父们的政治理念，结论再明显不过了：美国父们是在理想与精神上坚定地反对民主制度，而不是只反对在实践上民主制度出现了问题。因此，就像上帝决不会选择魔鬼做天堂的总管一样，美国父们决不会缔造一个民主的政治制度，更不会建立一个公平正义的社会；就像造物主坚信只要基因不变，猫与老鼠关系不会被改变一样，美国父们坚信只要他们的宪法不被推翻，美国就是极少数富人（包括精英）的国家。他们是这个国家的真正主人和保护者。极少数富人的经济利益（即实质上的贪污腐败性质的好处，但被美国的政治体系与意识形态合法化，合理化）直接与美国的政治制度挂钩，也就决定了他们象保护自己的生命与财产一样保护美国的政治制度。美国的政治制度是以反民主为核心的，为保护少数富人权利而修正的共和制。

    一些不了解西方的人们今天达到了刘姥姥境界：进入大观园后，看到大房子就当作神庙来跪拜。只要是西方的，就是神圣的。当他们看到美国父们说“不自由宁死”，“人生而平等”，就相信美国人，不管是白人黑人、穷人富人，从来都是自由的，平等的。当他们看到美国父们说“保护少数富人的权利”，就相信美国的多数不富裕的人同样是被保护的。只要对美国的历史与现实有一个基本的了解，就会发现这同看了婊子立的牌坊，就相信上面雕刻的每一个字一样的谎缪。更多的资料可以看：美国的政治制度是以反民主为核心理念的非人民的共和制；比尔德著作《美国宪法的经济观》；《联邦党人文集》。

Federalist No 10

The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

Friday, November 23, 1787；Author: James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

    AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. 【本文主旨：建立合众国最重要的是防止利益集团或政党之害】。The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

【1：美国父们与中国的贤哲们对朋党的判断、评价是一致的。这是他们基于对人的固有本性的认识、阅历而推断的结论，是美国政治理论与实践的最根本的基础。今天世界上许多民主制度的国家既没有能够，也不敢承认这一点。

2：从人的天性与政党的特性出发，从事实出发，美国父们最坚定的信仰就是根深蒂固的，毫无任何妥协余地的反对“实质的，真正的”民主制度（全文到处可见）。反民主制度是美国父们在政治制度设计中的核心指导思想。

3：在美国父们心中，公平正义是，也仅仅是少数富裕的人们的权利不被侵犯。如果只是从表面看，他们对多数的、不富裕的人们的权利没有关心。如果看到他们人生的经验，和制宪建国时他们正在从侵犯大多数人的利益中获得巨大的经济好处，他们是将少数富人侵犯多数的不富裕人的权利视为理所当然的“自然的公平正义”。从他们一边倒的、反复地强调的，一定要保护的富裕人的不平等的权利言行不难体会到。

4：孟子说：待文王而兴者，庶民也；豪杰之士，不待文王也兴。相对于少数富人来说，多数不富裕人的权利更需要保护，但美国父们有意识的忽视了这一点。在美国制宪建国过程中，既没有当时占有投票权的公民的绝大多数的不富裕的人（小农，手工艺者，富裕工人）的代表参加，也没有参加的人代表他们的利益。然而美国父们清楚地知道，几千年来西方贤哲们的警告与历史事实是：人民大众的政府从来是以合法的形式，渐进地，累积地侵犯多数的不富裕人们的权利；少数富裕的人的权利从来是被多数人以暴力形式侵犯。】

    By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. 【利益集团，朋党组织。】

    There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.【民主之害，一治本，二管控】

    There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.【具体化的平等】

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.【自由是更高原则。显而易见，自由更加是保护少数富人的权利（是指不平等的、高于多数人的权利，特别是不平等的经济、政治、文化、司法特权）必不可缺的条件。】

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. 【本质的反民主，而且反任何理论与实践上的平等，而结党营私的朋党组织是自然的，合理的。也是反卢梭而用之。】

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government. 【少数富裕人阶级之内的不同阶层。美国政治的现实是只有他们才能进入博弈场，参加利益爭斗。这一点，美国父们是心知肚明的。】

【1：美国父们认为：最根本的权利是以财富为标志的经济权利，人类争斗的最终本质是经济利益的争斗。这个争斗（极少数富裕人们与多数不富裕人）是人类社会最根本的，最暴力的，也是不可能调和的。悲剧的是他们理念是建立一个极少数富人可以合法的，以不平等、不公平正义的方式获得经济利益的政治制度。

2：政府的第一原则是反平等。美国父们是根本的、原则的反民主，但他们政治思想的精髓是反平等。任何形式的排除以财富为标志的（对经济、政治、文化、司法的）不平等影响在理论上，在实践是都是不能接受的。

3：如果第一原则是反平等，就必然反公平正义，那么整个社会的伦理道德就不可能是光明、进步的。由政治的伦理道德所决定的政治制度的本质也就是黑暗的；最终还是由社会现实决定的社会文化与文明的本质也是黑暗、反动、非人性的。这个结论虽然很激进，但成立，也同美国社会现实的观察是一致的。有关分析可以看：1，民主自由人权在近不在远，2，为什么西方没有中国式的王朝兴亡循环？

4：基于以上的事实，就不难理解，兰德（1905-1982）成为美国正统的意识形态中神一样的人物。她的书在美国的影响仅次于《圣经》，是美国精英、权贵、上层极力吹捧的对象。名人如格林斯潘，乔布斯，蒂尔，和许多总统、政治家都拜她为偶像。她宣扬自我实践是“绝对道德”。因此自私自利是绝对的道德。一切正善（如公平正义，平等，支持、照顾、同情、爱护其他人）都是不道德的，对弱者、不幸者的关怀也是错误的。

5：事实也是如此。两百多年来，美国的政治制度非常有效地按照美国父们设计的那样，在国内外全方位地反平等，反公平正义。在制宪建国时刻，就没有能保护占有投票权的美国公民的绝大多数人的权利。没有投票权的是当时美国人的绝大多数，他们根本没有被美国父们当作人，也就更谈不上什么权利了。“极端”如麦迪逊都评论说：制宪之争就是南北双方的经济利益之争。那一群持有政府公债的人，就是最积极推动成立联邦政府的人，最厚脸无耻为自己获取利益的人。长期以来，对于90%的美国人民而言，他们的意见（赞成也好，反对也好）对国会立法的影响是**微不足道的，是零。**而精英阶层（大概1%吧），他们强烈反对的法案，绝对不可能在国会通过，也就是说他们绝对有能力封杀任何他们不喜欢的法案。同时国会法案的通过率与他们支持率有清楚、明显的一致性。】

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.【人之天性到政党之天性。公平正义是指导原则，但仅仅是就保护少数富裕的人的权利而言。如果涉及多数不富裕人的权利，公平正义很明显是被否定的。因为谈论富人阶级的不同阶层当时所面临的重大问题，影响力更大。】

    It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.

【结论是人治不可靠。因为没有超越世俗权力的力量，追根求源，美国父们理想的、建立的制度还是人治，是为了极少数富裕人阶级的利益而精心改善的共和制度下的人治。看具体事例就更清楚了。如果美国的一切问题最后都是一个法律问题，那么法官是最终裁决者。法律是神圣的，但一切法理都是议员制定的，也总是可以请游说团体购买（美国父们反对平等，也自然反禁止捐款，反禁止游说团体）。法官在实践上比法律更神圣的。神圣的法律在实行中变成神圣的法官判决。美国到最高法院的一切问题都可以是，也都是由法官的立场决定的。精明的美国父们当然清楚明白：以法律形式的文斗不但能够保护极少数富裕人的权利，而且必然导致极少数富裕人阶级全面的侵犯绝大多数不富裕人阶级的权利。】

    The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.【结论。以后就是如何做到这一点的术了。】

    If a faction consists of less than a majority（两种不同的多数：整体公民中的多数，与决策委员会中的多数）, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind. 【美国政治制度具体的、技术的设计总原则。有意识地掩盖了人类社会的历史事实，最终还是少数富裕人的利益。参考孟子、卢梭论。】

    By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.

    From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.【可以参考马基雅维利有关罗马共和国的讨论，麦迪逊的讨论至少是片面的不正确。】

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

    The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

    The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations: 【修改民意是必要的】

    In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

    In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

    It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.

    The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

    Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage. 【与民主制度下的政治现实几乎完全相反！】

    The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.

【一个大合众国比一个个独立的州好。

不是代表人民，而是由民选的超越人民的决策者。修改民意（违背大多数人民的要求）是正确且必要的。

如其说是道理，不如说是态度。辩论而言，自相矛盾处很多。

一个替代：少数富裕人阶级的利益=国家利益。】

    In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.【一个坚决、有效地反民主制度的，有效地修正的能保护少数富人权利的共和制的合众国。】