【独家揭秘】【印度真相】VOL.7 印度特别边境部队SFF（5）战力平平_风闻

“真探”要告诉大家，网上关于SFF的文章中照片和影片，除了老照片是真的以外，都不是SFF，你在新的照片和影片中看不到任何“藏独”的样子，如果你看了那些新的照片和影片后认为SFF战力强悍，那么你被“移花接木”式的手法欺骗了。

另外细心的网友一定发现“真探”的标题也改变了，因为在“真探”在研究后发现SFF根本达不到正常特种部队的战斗力，所以认为“特别边境部队”是SFF最合适的名称。

首先，SFF的定位并非是“战斗型”，而是“特务型”—搜集情报和破坏为主。比如SFF的空降训练是因为当时空降是最主要也几乎是唯一的渗透方式，所以他们不是“空降兵”部队。

其次，藏独恐怖分子有两2个主要聚集地，最早的一个在尼泊尔的木斯塘（Mustang），第二个才是印度。所以，SFF在CIA的扶助计划（资金和培训）中，属于“新生儿”，各种资源供应远远不比不上前辈，甚至在CIA的1964年拨款（见下图）中，在尼泊尔2100名藏独恐怖分子获得50万美元，占了总拨款近30%（总拨款为173.5万美元），而且拨款中也没有明确提及SFF。

以下内容绝大部分来自参与培训计划的前CIA成员的叙述：（原文就不再贴出来了）

在刚到SFF时，美国人立即被藏独分子的年龄所震惊。 虽然有新兵涌入，却有将近一半的年龄超过四十五岁。 一些甚至接近六十。 就像发生在尼泊尔的木斯塘（Mustang）一样，年长的藏独分子利用其资历优势在难民营的招募活动中淘汰了年轻的候选人。

CIA偶尔从佩里营（Pamp Peary）派遣的教练参加简短的专业课程。Henry “Hank” Booth于1967年被派遣来提供狙击课程。为期六周的计划进展顺利，藏独分子用1903式春田步枪证明了自己的能力。在毕业典礼上，Booth授予他的学生1944年美国陆军狙击手野战手册的副本。

接下来发生的事情展现了是藏独分子与其印度主人之间的龌龊。藏独分子正在将野战手册翻译成藏语，每个营地负责手册的一部分。正在制作多份副本-包括图表的手绘复制品-，当每个单位都有野战手册的完整副本时，印度人就进来把野战手册给没收了。

CIA was relegated to funding and bringing in the occasional instructor from Camp Peary for brief specialist courses. One such instructor, Henry “Hank” Booth, was dispatched in 1967 to offer a class in sniping. The six-week program went well, with the Tibetans proving themselves able shots with the 1903 Springfield rifle. For graduation, Uban held a small ceremony, during which Booth awarded his students a copy of the 1944 U.S. Army field manual for snipers.

each unit had a complete copy of the book, and the Indians moved in to confiscate the manual.

在1971年11月第二个星期初，SFF开始了“鹰行动”。

乌班将军（SFF的指挥官）在电台里听着着急。当他协调SFF和他的孟加拉国民兵时，他对孟加拉国人几乎没有疑虑-他们是当地人，但他知道藏独分子未经实战测试，在自由行军中也很粗心。

很快，他的恐惧得到了证实。 11月14日，SFF的主力溃退冲回了印度边界。乌班得知Dhondup Gyatotsang（藏独分子的重要头目之一）也被射杀。乌班在电台中，对藏独分子咆哮着要他们恢复前进。他说：“我告诉他们不得后退直到阵地被占领。”

强硬的命令产生了影响。逆转过程中，SFF分成几个小组，缠绕在巴基斯坦人后方，采用经典游击队风格。

At the beginning of the second week of November, the SFF began Operation EAGLE. Taking leave of Demagiri, the guerrillas used nineteen canoes to shuttle across the Karnaphuli River and steal into East Pakistan. Coming upon an outpost that night, the Tibetans overran the position while the Pakistanis were eating. Boosted by their swift victory, they made plans to hit the next post the following morning. 

Listening over the radio, General Uban was anxious. As he moved into Demagiri to coordinate both the SFF and his Bangladeshi force, he had few qualms about the Bangladeshis -- they were native boys and could live off the land -- but he knew that the Tibetans were untested under battle conditions and careless in open march. 

Very quickly, his fears were confirmed. On 14 November, the lead element of Tibetans came running back toward the Indian border. Dhondup Gyatotsang, Uban learned, had been shot dead. The cousin of Mustang commander Wangdu and a Hale graduate, Dhondup had been one of the most senior political leaders in the force. Realizing that he could lose momentum, Uban got on the radio and barked at the Tibetans to resume their advance. “I told them not to come back until the position was taken, " he said. 

The strong words had an effect. Reversing course, the SFF split into small teams and curled behind the Pakistanis in classic guerrilla fashion.

到1970年代后期，SFF的未来不再确定。随着中印紧张关系有所缓和，有人批评说，维持一支藏独突击队是不必要的支出。但是，SFF很快被赋予了新的使命：反恐。因为藏人是外国人，所以它们与印度的社会政治没有直接关系，因此被视为理想的，无偏见的的反恐力量。

1977年，RAW主任KAO（也是安全局局长）部署了500 SFF突击队前往萨尔萨瓦（Sarsawa），以便在全国大选期间针对暴动者采取行动。选举后，在没有重大事件的情况下，只有六十名藏独分子被留在萨萨瓦（Sarsawa）从事反恐工作。

三年后，英迪拉·甘地（Indira Gandhi）和Kao再次当政时，SFF的反恐战争得到了大幅提升。 500多名学员被派往萨尔萨瓦（Sarsawa）接受反恐训练。毕业后，他们成立了SFF的新的特种小组（SG）。重要的是，没有藏独分子被并入这个新单位中。

By the late 1970s, the future of the SFF was no longer certain. With Indo-Chinese tensions easing somewhat, there was criticism that maintenance of a Tibetan commando force was an unnecessary expense. However, the SFF was soon given a new mission: counterterrorism. Because the Tibetans were foreigners, and therefore did not have a direct stake in Indian communal politics, they were seen as an ideal, objective counterterrorist force.

 In 1977, RAW director Kao (who wore an additional hat as director general of security) deployed 500 SFF commandos to Sarsawa for possible action against rioters during national elections. After the elections, which went off without major incident, only sixty Tibetans were retained at Sarsawa for counterterrorist duties. 

Three years later, when Indira Gandhi (and Kao) returned to power, the SFF’s war against terrorism received a major boost. Over 500 trainees were sent to Sarsawa for counterterrorist instruction. Upon graduation, they formed the SFF’s new Special Group. Significantly, no Tibetans were incorporated into this new group within the force.

1978年，在印度军队的行动控制下,查克拉塔又增加了三个SFF藏独营；，这三个营被派往拉达克，锡金和阿萨姆邦Doom Dooma的空军基地。1986年，在锡亚琴冰川与巴基斯坦军队作战时，拉达克营的17个成员被击毙。

In 1978, three additional Tibetan battalions were raised at Chakrata; under the operational control of the Indian army, these three battalions were posted to Ladakh, Sikkim, and Doomdoomah air base in Assam. Seventeen members of the Ladakh battallion were killed while fighting Pakistani troops on the Siachen Glacier in 1986

下期预告：关于SFF的连载终于迎来了完结篇，“真探”继续为您独家揭秘，敬请密切关注！