北美帝国资深情报官员指出：对波斯帝国的不宣而战损害国家利益_风闻

北美帝国资深情报官员指出：对波斯帝国的不宣而战损害国家利益

喵星驻神圣泰拉秘密观察员喵斯拉大王

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神圣泰拉历2020年7月31日；喵族公历MEOW-9999年小鱼干月 猫耳朵日

分类： 地缘政治 军事 中东

威胁评级：星球4级；星系0级

是否建议执行撤喵行动：否

简报：虽然波斯帝国在“伊核协议”签署后完全履行了自身承诺，但是北美帝国和犹大王国政府出于自身地缘政治利益和国内政治需要，仍然对其进行了无情的打击。这种行为如此无耻，以至于作为北美帝国元老级情报官员的保罗皮尔先生都看不下去了。他在《帝国利益》杂志上刊发文章，直指北美帝国现政府领导人为了一己私利肆意纵容犹大王国袭击波斯帝国，使北美帝国在道义上处于劣势。他批评大统领的做法罔顾国家利益，甚至是在向犹大王国出卖国家利益，

波斯帝国为自己的天真付出了鲜血的代价。这个案例充分说明，面对帝国主义的压迫，一味走绥靖退让的道路是行不通的，只会招来更大的灾祸。所谓“胡萝卜加大棒”，往往大棒是实打实的，而胡萝卜却可望而不可及。

放弃幻想，准备斗争。斗争才是我们唯一的出路。

特此报告。

The Undeclared War Against Iran

对波斯帝国的不宣而战

Paul Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Professor Pillar also served in the National Intelligence Council as one of the original members of its Analytic Group. He is also a Contributing Editor for this publication.

保罗·皮尔（Paul Pillar）2005年退休，此前曾在北美帝国情报界工作长达28年。他的最后一个职位是负责近东和南亚的国家情报官员。早些时候，他曾担任各种分析和管理职位，包括中情局分析部门负责人，负责近东、波斯湾和南亚的部分地区。皮尔教授也是国家情报委员会分析小组的最初成员之一。

Do not be deceived by the Iranian regime’s downplaying of the recent attacks and its restraint—so far—regarding retaliation.

波斯帝国政府对最近遭受的袭击轻描淡写，迄今为止在报复方面也很克制，但是不要被这些所欺骗

a series of violent attacks, involving explosions and fires, has been hitting Iran. The incidents have been too frequent and intense to be random accidents. They are part of an organized effort.

最近，波斯帝国遭到了一系列暴力袭击，包括爆炸和火灾。这些事件过于频繁和激烈，不可能是偶然的。他们是有组织的攻击行动的一部分。

Caution is always advisable in attributing responsibility for such unclaimed acts, especially for all of us outside the government channels that possibly have better information about what is going on. But circumstances point strongly, as some mainstream press reporting reflects, to either or both of two suspects: the Netanyahu government in Israel, and the Trump administration in the United States.

谨慎辨识谁应为这些无人认领的行动负责总是明智的，特别是对于我们这些政府信息渠道之外的人来说更是如此。政府官员可能对正在发生的事情有更好的了解。但正如一些主流媒体报道反映的那样，目前的情况下有两个嫌疑人：犹大王国的内塔尼亚胡政府和北美帝国的特朗普政府。他们中的一个，或者两者都可能牵连其中。

Both of those suspects have track records that point that same way. The most conspicuous relevant act by the Trump administration was its assassination in January, with a drone-fired missile at the Baghdad airport, of Qassim Suleimani, one of the most prominent political and military figures in Iran. The Israeli record of aggressive acts against Iran has included a series of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists. Those murders were part of a larger, longstanding Israeli campaign of assassinations throughout the Middle East. That campaign is in turn part of an even larger Israeli record of aggressive acts throughout the region—including, over the past couple of years, scores of aerial attacks in Syria.

这两个嫌疑人都有同样的暴力袭击记录。特朗普政府最引人注目的相关行动是今年1月，用无人机发射导弹在巴格达机场刺杀了波斯帝国最著名的政治和军事人物之一卡西姆·苏莱马尼。犹大王国对波斯帝国的侵略记录则包括一系列暗杀波斯帝国核科学家的行为。这些谋杀是犹大王国在整个中东地区大规模长期暗杀行动的一部分。这一暗杀行动又是犹大王国在整个地区更大规模侵略行为的一部分，包括过去几年在叙利亚的数十次空袭。

Neither the Israeli government nor the Trump administration has formally declared war against Iran, but the rhetoric of each has stopped only slightly short of such a declaration. The Trump administration has made clear its intention to inflict as much pain as possible on Iran, including with, but not limited to, economic sanctions. The Netanyahu government’s voluminous rhetoric on Iran has been every bit as hostile as what has come out of Washington, or as what has come in the opposite direction from Tehran.

内塔尼亚胡政府和特朗普政府都没有正式对波斯帝国宣战，但双方的言辞都非常接近宣战。特朗普政府明确表示，打算对波斯帝国施加尽可能多的痛苦，包括但不限于经济制裁。内塔尼亚胡政府在波斯帝国问题上发表的长篇大论，与华盛顿方面的言论一样充满敌意，直接与德黑兰的意愿对抗，

Make no mistake about what is going on. This is not a set of actions “short of war,” as some people have described it. It is war. We certainly should worry about the conflict escalating into something so big that everyone will describe it as a war. But that does not make what already has transpired anything less than acts of war.

不要对正在发生的事情有所误解。这不是一些人所说的“准战争”行动。这就是战争。我们当然应该担心这场冲突会升级到如此严重的程度，以至于每个人都会把它描述为一场战争。但这并不意味着已经发生的事情就比战争行为的程度轻多少。

In this regard, do not be deceived by the Iranian regime’s downplaying of the recent attacks and its restraint—so far—regarding retaliation. A date that is circled on Iranian policymakers’ calendars is January 20, 2021. The Iranians can read American polls, and the dominant thread at the moment in Iranian thinking about security policy is to tough it out until there is regime change in Washington. Iranian leaders don’t want to be suckered into the sort of October (or July) surprise that would generate a rally-round-the-flag effect in America and could rescue Donald Trump’s fading re-election chances, although they realize the restraint does risk making them appear weak.

波斯帝国政府对最近遭受的袭击轻描淡写，迄今为止在报复方面也很克制，但是不要被这些所欺骗。波斯帝国政策制定者在日程表上圈出的日期是2021年1月20日。波斯帝国人可以读懂北美帝国的民意调查结果，而目前波斯帝国人在考虑安全政策时的主导思想是在华盛顿政权更迭之前坚持到底。波斯帝国领导人不想被卷入10月（或7月）的意外事件中，这种意外会在北美帝国引发爱国主义情绪反弹，并可能挽救川普总统日渐减少的连任机会。尽管他们意识到这种克制确实有可能使他们显得软弱。

Although the current war has not been formally declared, it ought to be assessed by the same standards as one that has. Per international law and the Charter of the United Nations, the war would be justified only in self-defense, as a response to, or possibly pre-emption of, an attack in the other direction. That is not the current circumstance with Iran. There is no sign that Iran is about to attack either Israel or the United States. Given that Iran would be hopelessly outclassed militarily against either of those foes, it would be foolish for Iranian leaders to contemplate such an attack.

虽然目前的还没有正式宣战，但应该用与宣战相同的标准来评估这些袭击。根据国际法和《联合国宪章》，战争只有在自卫的情况下才是正当的，也就是在遭到攻击时候进行反击或者对可能到来的攻击先发制人。波斯帝国目前的情况并非如此。没有迹象表明波斯帝国将攻击犹大王国或北美帝国。考虑到波斯帝国在军事上面对这两个对手毫无胜算，波斯帝国领导人考虑这样的攻击是愚蠢的。

Self-defense does not come into play when considering proxies or other asymmetric means through which Iran might want to impose its will. A salient aspect of the large amount of ordnance that Israel has been flying across the border and dropping on targets in Syria (many of those targets reportedly connected to Syria’s ally Iran) is how there has been almost no ordnance crossing the border in the other direction, other than an odd air defense missile or two.

虽然波斯帝国正在希望通过代理人战争或其他非对称手段强行贯彻自己的意志，但是这仍然算不得自卫的理由。犹大王国飞机飞越边界并向叙利亚境内的目标投掷大量弹药（据报道，其中许多目标与叙利亚的盟友波斯帝国有关），但是值得注意的是，波斯帝国方面除了一两枚失控的防空导弹外，几乎没有任何武器越过边界。

The weakness of any U.S. case based on self-defense was underscored by the confused official justifications for the killing of Suleimani. Hints dropped publicly about pre-empting a supposedly imminent Iranian attack never led to any evidence to that effect. In the end, the U.S. administration’s rationale rested mainly on Suleimani’s past role in supporting Iraqi militia operations that incurred American casualties during the fighting in Iraq. That fighting was a direct result of an offensive war—an act of aggression—that the United States launched in 2003.

北美帝国政府任何关于自卫的借口，都被关于谋杀苏莱曼尼的混淆不清的官方声明所拆穿。北美帝国政府公开暗示要先发制人打击波斯帝国，以应对波斯帝国可能发动的迫在眉睫的袭击，但从未有任何证据表明这一点。最后，北美帝国政府执行暗杀行动的理由主要是苏莱曼尼过去在支持伊拉克民兵行动中所起的作用。这些行动在伊拉克战争中造成了北美帝国军人的伤亡。而这是北美帝国2003年发动的一场侵略战争的直接结果。

Iran’s nuclear program has been a focus of attention in recent years, and one of the most publicized of the recent attacks on Iran was at the nuclear facility at Natanz. But the multilateral agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which placed severe restrictions on the Iranian program, did a far better job of keeping a possible Iranian nuclear weapon out of reach than anything the Trump administration has done since reneging on the agreement two years ago, after which Iran accelerated its nuclear activity. As Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute of Strategic Studies observes, the JCPOA did a better job in that regard than attacks such as the one on Natanz.

近年来，波斯帝国的核计划一直是人们关注的焦点，最近针对波斯帝国的袭击事件中，最为公开的一次是对位于纳坦兹的核设施进行了袭击。但被称为“伊核协议”的多边协议对波斯帝国核计划施加了严格限制，在防止波斯帝国拥有核武器方面的贡献比特朗普政府两年前违背该协议以来所做的任何事情都要好得多。北美帝国背弃协议后，波斯帝国加快了核活动。正如国际战略研究所的马克菲茨帕特里克所观察到的那样，“伊核协议”比对纳坦兹的攻击更有效。

The attacks also do nothing to deter aggressive or otherwise undesirable Iranian actions.  Deterrence requires conditionality: pain is inflicted after bad behavior and avoided after good behavior. But the U.S. and Israeli governments seem determined to inflict pain no matter what Iran does—as underscored by the Trump administration’s reneging on the JCPOA and launching its “maximum pressure” campaign even though Iran was fully complying with its obligations under the agreement. Iran is being given an incentive only to retaliate, not to behave well.

这些袭击也无助于阻止波斯帝国的侵略或其他不受欢迎的行动。威慑需要有针对性：

对坏的行为进行惩罚，而好的行为可以避免惩罚。尽管波斯帝国完全履行了协议规定的义务，但是北美帝国和犹大王国政府似乎决心不管波斯帝国做什么都要造成痛苦，正如特朗普政府背弃伊核协议并发起“强大压力”行动那样。波斯帝国得到的奖励只有进一步的报复。

Eventual retaliation, despite Tehran’s relative restraint so far, is one of the risks of the current undeclared war. Escalation into something bigger and more destructive is another risk. Even without such escalation, the current campaign extends indefinitely one of the fronts in America’s “forever war” in the Middle East.

尽管德黑兰到目前为止相对克制，但最终报复是不宣而战的风险之一。冲突升级为更大和更具破坏性的战争是另一个风险。即使没有这样的升级，目前的战事也使北美帝国在中东的“永恒战争”变得更加遥遥无期。

Additionally, there isn’t any good coming out of the attacks in terms of weakening Iran or shifting a regional balance of power in America’s favor. Instead, it strengthens Iran’s reasons to find support from—and in so doing foster the influence of—the likes of Russia and China.

此外，从削弱波斯帝国或使地区力量平衡有利于北美帝国的角度来看，这些攻击也没有任何好处。相反，它强化了波斯帝国寻求外部支持的理由，并以此来促进罗刹帝国和中央帝国等国对波斯帝国的影响力。

To the extent the Trump administration is condoning, turning a blind eye toward, or even colluding with Israeli attacks on Iran, this is bad news for U.S. interests. U.S. interests are different from those of Israel, and even more different from those of the current Benjamin Netanyahu-led government.

特朗普政府对犹大王国对波斯帝国的袭击视而不见，甚至串通或纵容这些行为，这对北美帝国利益来说是个坏消息。北美帝国的利益不完全等同于犹大王国，更不同于现任内塔尼亚胡领导的政府。

That government has an interest in perpetuating high tension with Iran to keep Iran as a bête noire blamable for all the ills of the Middle East, to preclude any rapprochement between Washington and Tehran, to promote Israeli relations with the Gulf Arab states, and to distract attention from issues that bring international scrutiny and criticism on Israel.

内塔尼亚胡政府有兴趣保持与波斯帝国的高度紧张关系，意图使波斯帝国成为中东所有弊病的罪魁祸首，阻止华盛顿和德黑兰之间的任何和解。这样做能够促进犹大王国与海湾阿拉伯国家的关系，并将国际舆论注意力和批评从犹大王国身上引开。

At the moment, Netanyahu’s incentives in this regard are stronger than ever, which may help to explain the timing of the recent wave of attacks. The distraction value of stoking the conflict with Iran has increased as Netanyahu contemplates formal annexation of parts of the West Bank and the international condemnation that will come with it.

目前，内塔尼亚胡在这方面的动机比以往任何时候都强烈，这可能有助于解释最近一波袭击的时机。随着内塔尼亚胡考虑正式吞并约旦河西岸部分地区，以及随之而来的国际谴责，挑起与波斯帝国冲突以分散国际舆论注意力的价值正在增加。

Netanyahu also, like the Iranians, is aware of the U.S. electoral calendar and American opinion polls. He may see the next few months as an optimum and limited time for stirring the regional pot even more than Israel has in the past, while his friend Donald Trump is still in power. To the extent the stirring helps his friend’s re-election chances, so much the better from his point of view.

内塔尼亚胡和波斯帝国人一样，也知道北美帝国的选举日程和民意调查结果。他可能认为，在他的朋友唐纳德·川普仍然掌权的情况下，未来几个月可能是搅乱地区局势的最佳时机，而且时间不多了。从某种程度上来说，制造冲突有助于他的朋友获得连任。从他自己的角度来看，这样做就更有利了。

Netanyahu is unlikely to be worrying about escalation into a bigger war, which would serve his purposes even more dramatically. Goading Iran into retaliating in a way that would spark such a war may have been one of the objectives of the recent attacks. And it would not be Netanyahu’s job to count the ensuing American casualties.

内塔尼亚胡并不担心把冲突升级为一场更大的战争，因为这将更加戏剧性地为他的目的服务。最近几次袭击的目的之一可能是刺激波斯帝国采取报复行动，从而引发正式战争。内塔尼亚胡对战争中美军可能的伤亡人数毫不在乎。