揭批马克.彭沛傲:野心家、阴谋家、两面派 ——兼谈北美帝国内部的外交路线斗争问题_风闻
喵斯拉大王-微信号:喵星军事观察组2020-07-28 19:38
(保罗希尔的这篇文章真是老太太的裹脚布又臭又长,但是熬过了他那装腔作势的文风,大家细细品味,还是能看出不少干货的。有兴趣的朋友建议好好读一下原文。我基本上工作日每天翻译或写一篇文章,周末不一定。喜欢的朋友可以关注我下)
揭批马克**.**彭沛傲:一个典型的资产阶级野心家、阴谋家、两面派
——兼谈北美帝国内部的外交路线斗争问题
喵星驻神圣泰拉秘密观察员 喵斯拉大王
致 喵星外时空种群特别情报局 第M78宇宙9527号星系第三悬臂分站
神圣泰拉历2020年7月28日;喵族公历MEOW-9999年 小鱼干月 化毛膏日
分类:人类 地缘政治 人物观察
威胁评级:星球1级;星系0级
是否建议执行撤喵行动:否
简报:

马克. 彭沛傲,意大利裔移民出身,现任北美帝国国务卿。
考察彭沛傲的人生轨迹,起点并不高,却凭自己的努力考入名校,投身军旅,自主创业,投靠财阀,当选议员,执掌CIA,成为国务卿,硬是闯出了一条标准的资产阶级政客发迹之路。客观来说,彭沛奥先生的意志不可谓不坚定,能力不可谓不出众,头脑不可谓不高超,手段不可谓不毒辣,简直就是一部励志剧的男主角。
可就是这么一位人生经历极端丰富的大人物,留给世界人民的第一印象却往往是浓郁的西西里匪气。他明明城府颇深,却偏偏要把自己打扮成一个敢打敢拼的斗将角色,甚至有时候故意在公众场合口不择言瞎说大实话。他明明心狠手辣满嘴谎言,却偏偏要每周上教堂塑造一个传统虔诚基督徒的假象。有时,彭沛奥先生甚至不惜以小丑弄臣的面具来掩盖自己的真面目,还落了一个“肥彭”的搞笑匪号。
所谓欲盖弥彰,彭沛傲先生种种违反常识的表演,在明眼人看来恰恰暴露了他不甘久居于人下的本性。他虽然凭着马屁功夫了得和为人做事毫无底线,一时成功地蒙蔽了北美帝国英明的大统领阁下,却还是在最近露出了狼子野心的马脚。
7月23日,他在尼克松图书馆公然僭越发表演说,模仿另一个胖子野心家的铁幕演说大放厥词,其调子之高,用力之猛,大有炸平国会山,停止地球转动之势。更有甚者,彭沛傲把自尼克松前大统领以来历届北美帝国政府的对华外交政策说成一团漆黑。拿中央帝国的老话来说,这是要拔掉北美帝国的政治正确红旗,是要独树一帜踩着外交界元老们的头顶向上爬,是要用前辈们的名誉染红自己的顶子。彭沛傲选择尼克松图书馆发表这样的讲话,那真是在帝国元老们的坟头蹦迪,公然欺负死人不会说话,充分暴露了其人品之低劣,手段之卑鄙。从结果来看,彭沛傲虽然留下的是挑动世界冲突的骂名,却也成功煽动起一些反华分子的情绪,很是捞取了一些政治资本。
是可忍孰不可忍。彭沛傲之流公然与大统领争夺民心,不顾国家利益为私人捞取政治资本,如此贪天之功为己功,到了罔顾事实不顾公义的地步,简直无耻之尤。不仅是民主党政敌,就连共和党内的同僚重臣都为之侧目。彭沛傲一贯老奸巨猾,善于伪装,这次之所以跳到聚光灯下自我暴露,实在是因为他的政治野心已经急不可待,更兼自我感动过了头,想当拯救自由世界圣人的欲望过于迫切。说到底,彭沛傲最终还是被名誉地位迷了心窍。
彭沛傲此次演出用力过猛,树敌过多,已经引起了北美帝国政界的反感和警惕。针对彭沛傲的一系列言论,北美帝国情报界元老保罗.希尔于日前在在《帝国利益》杂志刊发长文。该文虽然免不了惯例,对中央帝国进行了一番抹黑,却都是一些老生常谈的场面话。文章的重头部分,在于揭批彭沛傲作为北美帝国首席外交官的外行言论,其火力之猛言辞之烈,甚至到了逐段逐句一一驳斥其自相矛盾痴心妄想之处的地步,完全就是指着彭沛傲的鼻子在骂他无知无能祸国殃民,充分体现了一个资深专业人士对彭沛傲之流政客的深深蔑视,看来希尔老先生是动了真火的。
彭沛傲此人才华出众,人品却十分低下,又善于自我伪装,是一个标准的权奸。他对中央帝国人民而言自然是一个十分危险的敌人,对北美帝国特别是其大统领而言,同样是一条潜伏在身边的毒蛇。不过,此次彭沛傲国务卿的自我暴露,以及其政敌的反扑,却为我们揭开了北美帝国高层内部对华战略领域两条路线仍在激烈交锋的一角内幕。
细读希尔先生的文章,我们不难看出,不论是以彭沛傲为首的激进对抗派,还是以保罗希尔这样的资深外交和情报专家为代表的传统稳健派,在反华这个大方向是完全一致的。两条路线的不同之处在于,前者主张用外部压迫和武力手段逼迫中央帝国在短时期内实现政权更替,而后者主张继续实行和平演变的老套路。这套把戏,大约类似于当年日本帝国主义内部的对华缓和派和对华侵吞派之争。
希尔先生在文中明确表达,北美帝国对华政策的终极目的是颠覆政权(要害见正文划线部分),他只是觉得目前实力不够时机不到,对彭沛傲肆无忌惮地言论可能激起中央帝国人民反感和国际舆论反弹十分担忧,对激进派一些不顾事实异想天开的政策十分鄙视。他认为,应该继续祭起欺骗的武器来蒙蔽世界,不受意识形态干扰务实地开展反华融华外交。
针对北美帝国高层的这些情况,中央帝国作为其即定的冷战对手,一方面要对其反华战略的高度一致性保持清醒头脑,坚决地执行我们自己的斗争路线,切不可对所谓的“知华派”心存幻想;另一方面也不妨在具体事务性工作中尝试采用一些策略手段,激化和利用敌人的内部矛盾,在敌强我弱的形势下争取更多的发展时间。特此报告。
Paul Heer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. He served as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia from 2007 to 2015. He is the author of Mr. X and the Pacific: George F. Kennan and American Policy in East Asia (Cornell University Press, 2018).
作者保罗·希尔是帝国利益研究中心的杰出研究员,也是芝加哥全球事务委员会的非常驻高级研究员。2007年至2015年,他担任东亚国家情报官员。此前不久,他刚刚发表了《关闭中央帝国总领馆,大统领考虑过后果吗?》一文,对大统领的外交政策进行了抨击。
Mike Pompeo Challenges China’s Governing Regime
马克·彭沛傲正在挑战中央帝国的统治体制
The Secretary of State’s approach to Beijing risks confirming its suspicions about U.S. subversion while simultaneously alienating the very Chinese people that he aspires to “engage and empower.”
摘要:国务卿对中央帝国的态度有可能证实其对北美帝国颠覆行为的怀疑,同时也疏远了他渴望“参与并赋权”的中央帝国人民
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a speech on the Trump administration’s China policy at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library on July 23. It was the culmination of a series of speeches on the subject over the past several weeks by National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien, FBI Director Christopher Wray, and Attorney General William Barr.
北美帝国国务卿彭沛傲7月23日在理查德·尼克松总统图书馆就现政府的对中央帝国政策发表演讲。过去几周,北美帝国国家安全顾问罗伯特·奥布莱恩、联邦调查局局长克里斯托弗·雷伊和司法部长威廉·巴尔就这一主题发表了一系列演讲。国务卿的演讲使其达到了高潮。
Pompeo confirmed he had orchestrated the speeches and explained that their purpose was “to make clear the threats to Americans that President Trump’s China policy aims to address, and our strategy for securing our freedoms.”
**彭沛傲证实他策划了这些演讲,**并解释说,演讲的目的是“阐明帝国大统领为应对北美帝国人民受到的威胁而正在实施的对华政策,以及保障帝国自由的战略”
In many respects, Pompeo’s speech—like its predecessors—correctly identified many of the profound strategic challenges that China poses to the United States. Beijing has become increasingly competitive and assertive in its international pursuit of power, wealth, and strategic influence.
在许多方面,彭沛傲的讲话和前任一样,正确地指出了中央帝国对北美帝国构成的许多深刻的战略挑战。在追求权力、财富和战略影响力方面,中央帝国的国际竞争力和独断性越来越强。
In that pursuit, it has engaged in economic and military coercion, vituperative diplomacy, unfair trade practices, disregard of many elements of international law, and cyber theft and other forms of espionage aimed at acquiring trade and technology secrets.
在这方面,它进行了经济和军事胁迫、谩骂外交、不公平贸易做法、无视大量国际法、网络盗窃和旨在获取贸易和技术秘密的其他形式的间谍活动。
Moreover, China has used extensive propaganda and influence operations—both overt and covert—to advance Beijing’s global agenda. In these efforts, Beijing has attempted to exploit opportunities afforded it by the openness of the U.S. system—all while tightening authoritarian controls over China’s own system, and continuing its assault on the human rights of the Chinese population.
此外,中央帝国还通过公开和秘密的广泛宣传和影响行动来推进其全球议程。在这些努力中,中央帝国试图利用北美帝国体制的开放所提供的机会,同时加强对中央帝国自身制度的威权控制,并继续侵犯中央帝国人民的人权。(喵:以上全部抹黑言论,都是颠倒黑白。讽刺的是,把北美帝国和中央帝国在这些言论中的位置换一换,就是对北美帝国霸权行径和对内镇压的最好揭露。)
But Pompeo framed the challenge from China, and the requisite American response, in some terms that are both tenuous and historically inaccurate. He started, somewhat awkwardly, given that he was speaking at the Nixon Library, by mischaracterizing Nixon’s approach to China and mildly chastising the former president for that approach.
**但彭沛傲提出的来自中央帝国的挑战,以及北美帝国必要的回应,在某些方面既脆弱又不准确。**演讲一开始时,他就错误地描述了尼克松对中央帝国的态度,并对前总统的这种做法进行了温和的批评。这有点尴尬,因为他是在尼克松图书馆发表讲话的。
To be fair, Pompeo said Nixon “did what he believed was best for the American people at the time” and “deserves credit for realizing that China was too important to be ignored.” But Pompeo repeated the Trump’s administration’s mantra that “the engagement strategy”—which he credits Nixon for launching—has been a total failure because it “presumed that as China became more prosperous, it would become freer at home, and friendlier abroad” and “has not brought the kind of change in China that President Nixon hoped to induce.”
说句公道话,彭沛傲说,尼克松“做了他认为对北美帝国人民最有利的事”,“认识到中央帝国太重要而不能被忽视,这值得称赞”。但彭沛傲重申了现政府的口头禅,即他认为尼克松发起的“接触战略”是完全失败的,因为它“假设随着中央帝国变得更加繁荣,它在国内会变得更自由,在国外会变得更友好”,而且“并没有给中央帝国带来尼克松总统希望诱导的那种变化。”(喵:和平演变的春秋大梦早就该醒了,指望中央帝国变成赤色帝国第二,那是痴人说梦)
To make this point, Pompeo invoked Nixon’s famous 1967 article in the journal Foreign Affairs (“Asia After Vietnam”), in which he asserted:
“The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change. The way to do this is to persuade China that it must change; that it cannot satisfy its imperial ambitions, and that its own national interest requires a turning away from foreign adventuring and a turning inward toward the solution of its own domestic problems.”
为了说明这一点,彭沛傲援引了尼克松1967年在《外交事务》杂志上发表的著名文章(越南战争之后的亚洲),他在文章中断言:“除非中央帝国改变,否则世界就不会安全。因此,在我们能够影响的范围内,我们的目标应该是诱导改变。这样做的方法是说服中央帝国,它必须改变。它不能试图满足其帝国主义野心;中央帝国自己的国家利益需要其摆脱对外冒险政策,转向解决自己国内的内部问题。”
Like others before him, Pompeo fundamentally misinterprets this passage as aimed primarily at changing China internally. Other than aspiring to turn Beijing’s attention inward, that was not Nixon’s focus; indeed, in the 1967 article he expressed no preference for what the Chinese actually did internally.
彭沛傲就像其他不少人一样,把这段话误解为尼克松对华政策的重点在于促使对方进行根本改变。事实上,将中央帝国的注意力转向国内改革并不是尼克松的重点。在1967年的文章中,他对中央帝国人民在国内如何行动没有表示任何倾向。
On the contrary, he made explicit that he was talking about changing China’s external behavior when—in the next paragraph—he compared it to the Soviet Union and observed that “Moscow finally changed when it, too, found that change was necessary” after “the West was able to create conditions . . . that forced Moscow to look to the wisdom of reaching some accommodation with the West.” That was the kind of change Nixon was talking about: getting Beijing to seek accommodation with the United States. And it worked.
相反,在下一段谈论改变中央帝国的对外行为时,他明确将中央帝国与赤色帝国进行了比较,并指出,“在西方创造某些条件之后,莫斯科也将发现改变的必要性,并最终有所改变”。“这将迫使莫斯科寻求与西方达成某种妥协的智慧。”尼克松所谓的促使赤色帝国改变的“某些条件”,就是先让中央帝国寻求与北美帝国妥协。尼克松的策略奏效了,中央帝国与北美帝国的妥协,对赤色帝国的崩溃起到了重要作用。
Pompeo asks “What do the American people have to show for fifty years of engagement with China?” Success in the Cold War against the Soviet Union, which was aided in part by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping’s decision to align strategically with the United States during the 1970s and 1980s; Deng’s “reform and opening up,” which greatly expanded U.S.-China economic and cultural relations; decades of an endless supply of inexpensive imports and an export market for American farmers and manufacturers; a gradual Chinese embrace of multilateralism and more responsible proliferation behavior; and a dramatic opening up of Chinese society compared to what it had been. The fact that some of these trends remain works in progress—and in fact have sometimes regressed—does not negate how far we have come since Nixon’s time.
彭沛傲问:“北美帝国人民与中央帝国交往五十年,有什么可以拿得出手的成果?“对赤色帝国冷战的成功,部分得益于中央帝国老一辈领导人在上世纪七八十年代与北美帝国战略结盟的决定; “改革开放”政策极大地扩大了双方经济和文化交流。几十年来,廉价的进口商品源源不断,北美帝国农民和制造商的出口市场不断扩大;中央帝国逐渐接受多边主义,采取更负责任的扩散行为;与过去相比,中央帝国社会开放程度有了戏剧性变化。这些趋势中的一些仍在发展中。虽然有时出现一些倒退,但并不能否定我们自尼克松时代以来所取得的进展。
Pompeo, of course, is correct when he observes that “China today is increasingly authoritarian at home and more aggressive in its hostility to freedom abroad.” He is also correct that U.S. policymakers ever since Nixon have hoped that engagement would liberalize China over time. But that was not the original or the primary goal of engagement. And the fact that this hope has not yet been fulfilled does not mean that it should be abandoned. Pompeo asks: “Did the theories our leaders proposed of China’s evolution toward freedom and democracy prove true?” No, not yet. But nor have they been proven wrong. And the Chinese Communist Party’s 2013 “Document Number 9” on “the current state of the ideological sphere” shows that Beijing still fears Western efforts to “weaken the theoretical foundations of the Party’s leadership.”
当然,彭沛傲说的“今天的中央帝国在国内越来越专制,在国外对自由的敌意也越来越咄咄逼人”这是正确的。他还说,自从尼克松以来,北美帝国的政策制定者一直希望这种接触能够随着时间的推移使中央帝国自由化。但这并不是当时对华接触政策最初或主要目标。而且虽然这种希望尚未实现,并不意味着现在就应该放弃。彭沛傲问道:“历届领导人提出的关于中央帝国向自由和民主发展的理论是否能被证实?“不,还没有。但这些理论也还没有被证明是错误的。而中央帝国人民劳动党2013年关于“意识形态领域现状”的有关文件显示,他们仍然十分担心西方努力“削弱其领导能力的理论基础”。
Pompeo nonetheless insists that “the old paradigm of blind engagement with China has failed. We must not continue it. We must not return to it. . . . But even now, some are insisting we preserve the model of dialogue for dialogue’s sake.”
尽管如此,彭沛傲坚称,“与中央帝国盲目接触的旧模式已经失败。我们不能继续下去。我们决不能再回到过去的旧政策。但即便是现在,有些人坚持认为应该保留过去的对话模式,即使这样做仅仅是为了对话而对话”
This, he says, would be replicating past mistakes because “for a long time we let the Chinese Communist Party set the terms of engagement.” This is simply wrong. Engagement was never “blind”; no U.S. administration has pursued “dialogue for dialogue’s sake” or allowed the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to “set the terms of engagement.”
他说,这将是重复过去的错误,因为“在很长一段时间里,我们让中央帝国劳动人民党制定接触条件”,这是完全错误的。接触从来不是“盲目的”;没有一个北美帝国政府追求“为了对话而对话”,也没有允许中央帝国劳动人民党“设定接触条件”
Pompeo speculates that “perhaps we were naïve about China’s virulent strain of Communism, or triumphalist after the Cold War, or cravenly capitalist, or hoodwinked by Beijing’s talk of a ‘peaceful rise.’”
彭沛傲推测说,“也许我们对中央帝国邪恶的真理主义太幼稚,或者被冷战后的胜利主义者和资本主义的贪婪本性所误导,以及被中央帝国关于‘和平崛起’的言论蒙蔽了。”
He overlooks or dismisses the fact that there have always been policymakers in Washington—starting with Nixon—who recognized the autocratic nature and noxious character of the CCP regime, but who also recognized the limits on the United States’ ability to change that nature or to dictate China’s behavior.
他忽视或否认这样一个事实,即从尼克松开始,北美帝国一直有一些决策者承认中央帝国人民劳动党政权的专制性质和有害性质,但也承认北美帝国改变这种性质或支配中央帝国行为的能力是受到客观条件限制的。
One of the core themes of Pompeo’s speech, however, is his apparent belief that the United States can change the nature and thus the behavior of China’s governing regime. Indeed, the Trump administration is increasingly focused on this objective. All of the recent policy speeches have emphasized the CCP, as distinct from China or the Chinese people, as the core threat that needs to be confronted. In Pompeo’s words:
然而,彭沛傲演讲的一个核心主题是,他显然相信北美帝国可以改变中央帝国统治政权的性质,从而改变其行为。事实上,大统领政府越来越关注这一目标。最近所有的政策演讲都强调,中央帝国人民劳动党应该区别于中央帝国本身或中央帝国人民。中央帝国人民劳动党才是需要北美帝国面对的核心威胁。用彭沛傲的话说:
“Securing our freedoms from the CCP is the mission of our time. . . . If we don’t act now, ultimately, the CCP will erode our freedoms and subvert the rules-based order free societies have built. If we bend the knee now, our children’s children may be at the mercy of the CPP, whose actions are the primary challenge to the free world.”
“从中央帝国人民劳动党手中获得自由是我们这个时代的使命。如果我们现在不采取行动,归根结底,他们将侵蚀我们的自由,颠覆自由社会植根其上的基本统治秩序。如果我们现在屈膝投降,我们的后代可能会受到他们的摆布。他们的行动是对自由世界的主要挑战。”
Pompeo declares that we must thwart this: “We, the free nations of the world, must induce change in the CCP’s behavior. . . . If we don’t change Communist China, Communist China will change us.” (It is worth noting here the symmetry between Pompeo’s ideological missionary zeal and that which he attributes to the CCP, whose foreign policy is arguably less messianic than his.)
彭沛傲宣称,我们必须阻止这种做法:“我们,世界上的自由国家,必须促使他们的行为发生改变。如果我们不改变信仰真理主义的中央帝国,他们就会改变我们。”(这里可以注意到,彭沛傲的意识形态传教热情与他将两国矛盾归因于意识形态之争的对称性。中央帝国人民劳动党的外交政策十分务实,远没有他这样救世主般的情怀)
Moreover, “we must also engage and empower the Chinese people—a dynamic, freedom-loving people who are completely distinct from the Chinese Communist Party.” Pompeo notes, probably correctly, that “the CCP fears the Chinese people’s honest opinions more than any foreign foe. And save for losing their own grip on power, they have reason to.”
此外,“我们还必须与中央帝国人民接触并赋予他们权力。中央帝国人民是充满活力、热爱自由的人民,与中央帝国劳动人民党完全不同。”彭沛傲指出,“中央帝国人民劳动党比任何外国敌人都更害怕本国人民的真实意见。出于对失去控制权的担心,他们有理由这样做。”
The danger here is that Pompeo appears to be encouraging the Chinese people to overthrow their government. This echoes a speech in early May by Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger, who said “China today would benefit from a little less nationalism and a little more populism. . . .
这里的危险在于,彭沛傲似乎在鼓励中央帝国人民推翻他们的政府。这与5月初副国家安全顾问马特·波丁格的一次讲话相呼应,他说:“今天的中央帝国将受益于少一点民族主义和多一点民粹主义。
When a privileged few grow too remote and self-interested, populism is what pulls them back or pitches them overboard. It has a kinetic energy.” The problem with this rhetoric is that Chinese leaders will interpret Pompeo’s and Pottinger’s messages as corroborating Beijing’s perennial claims that Washington seeks regime change in China through subversion.
当少数特权阶层变得过于偏僻和自私自利时,民粹主义就是把他们拉回来或把他们扔回正确轨道上的东西。这种言辞的问题在于,中央帝国领导人会将彭沛傲和波廷格的信息,解读为证实其一贯主张的北美帝国正在通过颠覆寻求中央帝国政权更迭的说法。
Pompeo, in any event, observes that “changing the CCP’s behavior cannot be the mission of the Chinese people alone.” They will need outside help. But here Pompeo’s prescription becomes even more problematic.
无论如何,彭沛傲认为“改变中央帝国人民劳动党的行为不能仅仅是中央帝国人民的使命”,他们需要外界的帮助。但在这里,彭沛傲开出的处方将使问题变得更加棘手。
He focuses on the need for an international coalition to confront Beijing and pressure it to alter its behavior and, ultimately, its governing regime. But his presumptions about global support for this agenda are undermined by his miscalculation of the potential for such a mobilization effort.
他关注的是,需要一个国际联盟来对抗北京,并向其施压,迫使其改变行为,最终改变其执政机制。但是,他关于全球支持这一议程的假设,将由于他对这种动员所能唤起的支持潜力的错误估计而归于失败。(喵:直白来说就是不得人心)
On the positive side, he issues a powerful and appropriate “call on all nations to start by doing what America has done—to insist on reciprocity, transparency, and accountability from the CCP.” And he acknowledges that other countries will vary in their contributions to the cause: “Every nation will have to come to its own understanding of how to protect its national security, its economic prosperity, and its ideals from the tentacles of the CCP.”
从积极的一面来看,他发出了一个强有力而恰当的“呼吁所有国家以北美帝国为榜样,在与中央帝国人民劳动党的交往中坚持互惠、透明和负责任的原则”。他承认,其他国家对这一事业的贡献也会有所不同:“对于如何保护国家安全、经济繁荣以及意识形态不受中央帝国人民劳动党的牵制,每个国家都必须有自己的理解。”
But Pompeo appears to have a rosy and obsolete understanding of the current international situation. Observing that “we can’t face this challenge alone,” he contends that “the UN, NATO, the G7, the G20, our combined economic, diplomatic, and military power is surely enough to meet this challenge if directed properly.”
但彭沛傲对当前国际形势的理解似乎是过于乐观和过时的。他指出“我们不能独自面对这一挑战”,他认为“如果联合国、北约、七国集团、二十国集团、我们的经济、外交和军事力量联合起来,并且指导得当,肯定足以应对这一挑战。”
But surely China’s veto power in the UN and its pivotal role in the G20 make it impossible for the combined power within those organizations to be directed against Beijing.
但是,中央帝国在联合国安理会的否决权以及它在G20中的关键作用,无疑使这些国际组织不可能形成共识来对付中央帝国。
Pompeo also states that “It’s true that unlike the Soviet Union, China is deeply integrated into the global economy. But Beijing is more dependent on us than we are on them.” The latter appears to be a core belief of the Trump administration, and indeed a cornerstone of its China strategy: the conviction that U.S.-China interdependence clearly favors Washington and gives it decisive power over Beijing’s behavior. But it is not clear what the empirical basis is for this calculation if there is one. No doubt, Beijing’s calculation of the relative leverage in the U.S.-China relationship is different; it might be more current and more accurate.
彭沛傲还表示,“的确,与赤色帝国不同,中央帝国已深深融入全球经济。但中央帝国对我们的依赖要大于我们对他们的依赖。”后者似乎是大统领政府的核心信念,实际上也是其对付中央帝国战略的基石:两大帝国相互依存的信念显然有利于北美帝国,并赋予其对北京行为的决定性权力。但即使真的有这种所谓的战略优势存在,我们目前也尚不清楚这种计算的经验基础到底是什么。毫无疑问,中央帝国方面对两国关系中相对力量杠杆率的计算与此完全不同。而且,中央帝国的计算方式可能更符合时势,也更准确。
Pompeo insists that “the free world is still winning. People from all over the world still want to come to open societies to study, to work, to build a life for their families. They’re not desperate to settle in Chongqing.” No, but as the venerable American China scholar Ezra Vogel recently observed, the Trump administration’s own policies—especially those that restrict opportunities for young Chinese to study or work in the United States, and alienate those who already have—directly undermine both the vision Pompeo is presenting here and his core mission to “engage and empower the Chinese people.”
彭沛傲坚称“自由世界仍在获胜。来自世界各地的人们仍然希望来到开放的社会学习、工作和为家人营造生活。他们并不急于在中央帝国定居。”他说的有一定道理,但正如尊敬的学者埃兹拉·沃格尔最近观察到,正是大统领政府自己的政策,尤其是那些限制中央帝国年轻人到北美帝国学习或工作生活的政策,正在疏远那些彭沛傲提出要“与之接触并赋予权力“的人民,这直接破坏了他自己制订的政治愿景和核心任务。(喵:直指现行政策的自相矛盾之处)
In any event, he does not further specify what and where “the free world is still winning.” Finally, Pompeo declares that “Our approach isn’t destined to fail because America isn’t in decline.” And the United States “is perfectly positioned to lead” the mission of securing freedom against the threat of the CCP “because of our founding principles,” which have “made the United States a beacon of freedom for people around the world, including in China.”
无论如何,他没有进一步说明“自由世界仍在获胜”的具体内容和地点。最后,彭沛傲宣称,“我们的方法不会因为北美帝国没有衰落而注定失败。”而北美帝国“完全有能力领导捍卫自由,对抗真理党的威胁,因为我们的建国原则,使北美帝国成为包括中央帝国在内的全世界人民自由的灯塔”
Under normal historical circumstances, this would certainly be the case. But it is increasingly and painfully apparent that we are beyond normal historical circumstances.
在正常的历史条件下,情况肯定是这样。但越来越明显的是,我们已经超越了正常的历史条件。(喵:自己承认了历史终结论的破产)
The United States is in relative historical decline. This was already apparent in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008–09 before it was accelerated by the polarization and dysfunctionality of American politics since then and especially under the leadership of President Donald Trump—and now by the unfolding impact of the inadequate U.S. response to the coronavirus pandemic.
北美帝国正处于相对的历史性衰落之中。在2008-09年全球金融危机之后,这一点已经很明显,此后北美帝国政坛两极分化、功能失调,尤其是在大统领的领导下对冠状病毒大流行反应迟缓,进一步加速了危机的发展。(喵:北美帝国居然还有脑子这么清醒且胆子这么大的学者,实乃吾等心腹之患。建议大统领以妖言惑众之罪将其处决)
It cannot now be said that America is “perfectly positioned to lead” the world, or that it is setting an example of domestic governance or international credibility that other countries will be eager to follow. This seriously handicaps Washington’s capacity to lead a crusade to change China.
现在不能说北美帝国“完全有能力领导”世界,也不能说它正在树立其他国家渴望效仿的国内治理或国际信誉的榜样。这严重阻碍了北美帝国领导一次旨在改变中央帝国的新“圣战”的能力。(喵:狐狸尾巴终于露出来了!说来说去不是不想和平演变中央帝国,而是觉得目前实力不够做不到啊)
On balance, Pompeo is correct when he says that “we cannot treat this incarnation of China as a normal country” and that “free nations have work to do to defend freedom.” He is also right when he says China represents a “complex new challenge we’ve never faced before.”
总的来说,彭沛傲说“我们不能把中央帝国的化身当作一个正常的国家”和“自由世界必须行动起来捍卫自由”是正确的。他说中央帝国代表着一个“我们从未面对过的复杂的新挑战”也是对的
But he is wrong when he denounces engagement as a failure because China is not yet everything we want it to be. His approach to China risks confirming Beijing’s suspicions about U.S. subversion, while simultaneously alienating the very Chinese people that he aspires to “engage and empower.” And he overestimates both Washington’s leverage to impose its will on China and the potential for it to recruit other countries into supporting such a confrontational strategy.
但当他仅仅因为中央帝国至今还没有被我们和平演变,就断言两国关系完全失败的时候,他是错误的。他对中央帝国的态度有可能证实中央帝国对北美帝国颠覆行动的怀疑。同时,他也疏远了他渴望“接近并赋权”的中央帝国人民。他高估了北美帝国将其意志强加给中央帝国的能力,也高估了北美帝国召集其他国家支持这种对抗性战略的潜力。
The United States can and should take a leading role in responding to the China challenge. But that response will require a more accurate and realistic—and less ideological—assessment of the current international situation.
北美帝国能够而且应该在应对中央帝国挑战方面发挥主导作用。但是,这种反应将需要对当前的国际局势做出更准确、更现实、更少意识形态干扰的评估。
It will also require as much attention to the opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation as to the parameters of competition. Most importantly, Americans will need to come together and forge a domestic consensus on how best to deal with and compete with China, and to mobilize the resources and other requirements of doing so.
它还需要对两国合作或竞争的机会给予同样的重视。最重要的是,北美帝国人民需要团结一致,就如何更好地与中央帝国在竞争中共存达成内部共识,并为此调动充分的资源。
喵星万岁 阅后即焚