北美帝国专家建议努力离间中央帝国与波斯帝国的合作关系——致喵星情报总局_风闻

喵星驻神圣泰拉秘密观察员 喵斯拉大王

致 喵星外时空种群特别情报局 第M78宇宙9527号星系第三悬臂分站

神圣泰拉历2020年7月20日；喵族公历MEOW-9999年 小鱼干月 营养膏日

分类：人类 军事 海军 武器

威胁评级：星球3级；星系0级

是否建议执行撤喵行动：否

**简报：**近日发表于北美帝国《帝国利益》杂志的这篇文章，尽管标题取得十分惊耸，颇有头条系的风范，细看其内容却十分空洞。两位所谓的专家拿着偏见放大镜细细查看了一番，但是并没有在中央帝国与波斯帝国的合作协议草案中找出什么破坏世界和平、危害区域稳定的具体干货来，甚至针对北美帝国的阴谋也没发现蛛丝马迹。于是，两位专家只得按照帝国惯例，对万里之外的两个主权国家发展正常经贸和外交往来的做法恶意揣测、横加指责、挑拨离间，状如泼妇骂街，实在是有损北美帝国国防大学的学术颜面。这种酸葡萄心态，在北美帝国频频退群、影响力大不如前的今时今日，似乎已经成了帝国专家们的常态。

    敌人反对的，就是我们要大力去做的。国际政治的根本原则之一，就是要把我们的朋友搞得多多的，把敌人搞得少少的。只要是平等互利、相互尊重，中央帝国历来愿意与世界各国发展良好的政治、经济、外交关系。值得注意的是，近日来北美帝国及其走狗犹太王国对波斯帝国进行了一系列军事和政治打击，似与协议的暴光有某种关联。这倒印证了文中关于“胡萝卜与大棒”的恫吓也不完全是虚言。北美帝国首相肥蓬更是放出狠话，绝不允许波斯帝国得到歼10战机。这种霸道行径，恐怕不仅起不到离间中波关系的目的，反而会进一步教育波斯人民，使他们彻底放弃对欧美帝国主义国家的幻想，更坚定地走向中波合作抗击霸权的道路。特此报告。

America Has Created a “China-Iran Collaboration” Monster

北美帝国创造了一个“中央帝国与波斯帝国合作”的缝合怪

Joel Wuthnow is a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (CSCMA) at the National Defense University.Phillip C. Saunders is the director of CSCMA.This piece reflects only their personal views and not those of NDU, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

乔.乌斯诺是北美帝国国防大学中央帝国军事研究中心（CSCMA）高级研究员。菲利普桑德斯也是该研究中心的职员。这个这篇文章反映了他们的个人观点。

Beijing and Tehran could use the prospects of deeper bilateral cooperation to generate leverage with foreign leaders—leaving Washington out in the cold.

中央帝国和波斯帝国可以利用更深层次双边合作的前景，对他国领导人产生影响，将北美帝国撇在一边。

News that China and Iran are nearing a twenty-five-year cooperation agreement has sparked concern about a growing alignment between two U.S. rivals. New York Times reporters Farnaz Fassihi and Steven Lee Myers disclosed details on the purported agreement claimed that it would “extend China’s influence in the Middle East, throwing Iran an economic lifeline and creating new flashpoints with the United States.”有关中央帝国和波斯帝国即将达成二十五年合作协议的消息，引发了人们对这两个北美帝国竞争对手之间联系日益紧密的担忧。 《纽约时报》记者法纳兹·法西和史蒂芬·李·迈尔斯披露了该协议的细节，称该协议“将扩大中央帝国在中东的影响力，给波斯帝国提供一条经济命脉，并成为中央帝国与北美帝国之间新的冲突爆发点。”

Those concerns seem overstated. The leaked text is apparently long on vision statements and short on actual commitments by either side. Both countries remain deeply wary about over-reliance on the other and have incentives to maximize their flexibility.

这些担忧似乎夸大了。已知协议文本虽然在合作愿景声明方面写了不少，但是双方都没有就具体问题作出实际承诺。显然，两国仍然对过度依赖对方保持高度警惕，并有意保持协议条款的高度灵活性。

Nevertheless, while the threat of a Sino-Iranian axis remains low, closer cooperation could still result in a stronger Iranian military and greater Chinese military and intelligence presence in the region. Those challenges, which are alluded to but not specified in the reported agreement, constitute the more difficult problems that will need to be addressed in the next few years.    

尽管目前来看，形成中央帝国-波斯帝国轴心的威胁仍然很小，但更紧密的合作仍可能导致波斯帝国军事力量的增强，以及中央帝国在该地区军事和情报力量的增加。协定中提到但未具体说明的这些挑战，构成了今后北美帝国需要解决的一些难题。

In January 2016, the two countries agreed to pursue a twenty-five-year “comprehensive cooperation agreement” as part of their new “comprehensive strategic partnership.” The eighteen-page leaked document indicates that the two sides are nearing completion on such an agreement—neither side has disputed its authenticity—although the final version could differ.

2016年1月，两国同意签署一项为期25年的“全面合作协议”，作为两国新的“全面战略伙伴关系”的一部分。长达18页的泄露文件表明，双方已接近完成这一协议。尽管最终协议文本可能有所不同，但双方都没有对协议的真实性提出异议。

The agreement anticipates that the two sides will continue or expand cooperation in six major areas, including Chinese investments and purchase of Iranian oil and natural gas, infrastructure (including Chinese assistance developing the Chabahar and Bandar-e-abbas ports), technology (including 5G and artificial intelligence), banking and trade, defense (focusing on counter-terrorism), and coordination in multilateral institutions. 

协议计划，双方将继续或扩大在六大领域的合作，包括中央帝国投资和购买波斯帝国石油、天然气；基础设施建设（包括中央帝国援助开发恰巴哈和阿巴斯港）、技术（包括5G和人工智能）、银行和贸易；国防（重点是反恐）；多边机构协调。

There are good reasons why China and Iran would want to cooperate in these areas. The two economies are complementary: China is the world’s largest oil importer and Iran is looking for purchasers willing to defy U.S. sanctions; Iran needs modernized infrastructure in areas such as rail and 5G networks, where Chinese firms have strengths.

中央帝国和波斯帝国希望在这些领域进行合作是有充分理由的。这两个经济体是互补的：中央帝国是世界上最大的石油进口国，波斯帝国正在寻找愿意违抗北美帝国制裁的买家；波斯帝国需要在铁路和5G网络等领域实现基础设施现代化，而中央帝国企业在这些领域有优势。

Beijing has also identified Iran as a link along the Belt and Road Initiative, connecting Xinjiang with the Middle East. Strategically, both states are motivated by a common perception of Washington as an adversary and concerns about U.S. military interventionism. Iran seeks Chinese weapons and expertise to expand its military influence in the region, while China is looking to cultivate Iran as a lucrative arms market and a strategic bulwark that ties up U.S. forces outside of Asia.  

北京还将波斯帝国视为“一带一路”倡议的一个纽带，将西部边疆地区与中东联系起来。在战略上，这两个国家的动机都是出于一个共同的看法，即华盛顿是一个对手，以及对北美帝国军事干预主义的担忧。波斯帝国寻求中央帝国的武器和专业知识来扩大其在该地区的军事影响力，而中央帝国则希望将波斯帝国培育成一个利润丰厚的军火市场和一个将北美帝国军队迟滞在亚洲以外地区的战略堡垒。

Cooperation was previously constrained by China’s opposition to Iran’s illicit uranium enrichment program and desire to avoid dealing directly with a pariah state, but the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action which imposed constraints on Iran’s nuclear program reduced both concerns. Only a week after that deal went into effect, Chinese president Xi Jinping visited Tehran and signed the “comprehensive strategic partnership.”

此前，由于中央帝国反对波斯帝国的非法铀浓缩计划，并希望避免直接与一个“贱民”国家打交道，这些合作受到了限制。但2015年的伊核协议（对波斯帝国核计划施加限制）减少了双方的担忧。该协议生效仅一周后，中央帝国领袖访问波斯帝国，并确定了“全面战略伙伴关系”

Since then, the two countries have built relations in multiple areas. This includes Chinese financing for Iranian rail projects, China’s emergence as Iran’s largest oil purchaser, and meetings between high-level officials. Military ties, which flourished in the 1980s when China became Iran’s largest arms supplier, have also started to re-emerge. In December 2019, Chinese, Iranian, and Russian naval ships carried out a drill in the Gulf of Oman, highlighting what some analysts described as a strategic alignment between the three countries. 

此后，两国在多个领域建立了关系。这包括中央帝国对波斯帝国铁路项目的融资，中央帝国成为波斯帝国最大的石油采购国，以及高层官员之间的会晤。上世纪80年代，中央帝国曾经成为波斯帝国最大的武器供应国，现在两国的军事关系也开始重新升温。2019年12月，中央帝国、波斯帝国和俄罗斯海军舰艇在阿曼湾进行演习，凸显了一些分析人士所称的三国战略结盟。

The leaked agreement appears to summarize this pre-existing cooperation and offers broad brush strokes for how the partnership could evolve in the future. Nevertheless, the details—or lack thereof—in the agreement suggest the limits of the partnership.

这份泄露的协议似乎是对先前存在的合作的总结，并为未来合作关系的发展提供了大致线索。然而，协议中的细节或缺乏细节都表明了这类合作的局限性。

Iranian analysts who have scoured the Farsi text report that it contains no precise investment or trade targets. China did not commit to purchase a specific amount of oil, but would “become a regular importer.”

仔细研究波斯语文本的波斯帝国分析人士报告说，该文本没有明确的投资或贸易目标。中央帝国没有承诺购买特定数量的石油，但将成为常规进口国。

There is no mention of previous Iranian claims that China would invest up to $400 billion in return for steep discounts in Iranian oil. Rumors that China would base up to five thousand troops to protect those investments, or that Iran would sell China the strategically located Kish Island, are not supported by the text. 

协议没有提及波斯帝国先前声称的中央帝国将投资高达4000亿美元，以换取波斯帝国石油的大幅折扣。有传言称，中央帝国将驻扎多达5000人的军队来保护这些投资，或者波斯帝国将向中央帝国出售战略位置优越的基什岛。这些传言都没有得到文本的支持。

Both sides have reasons to keep agreements as vague as possible. China has long tried to balance Sino-Iranian relations with its competing interests in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia remains a far more important oil supplier for China ($40 billion in sales versus $7 billion in 2019).

双方都有理由尽可能保持协议的模糊性。长期以来，中央帝国一直试图平衡中-波关系和其在海湾地区的竞争利益。半岛王国仍然是中央帝国更重要的石油供应国（2019销售额为400亿美元，对比同期中波石油贸易金额为70亿美元）。

While the purported Iran deal has made headlines, Beijing has been working simultaneously to enhance its “comprehensive strategic partnerships” with Riyadh and the UAE, in addition to “strategic partnerships” with Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman.

尽管这桩所谓的波斯帝国协议成为头条新闻，但中央帝国方面一直在同步努力加强与半岛王国和半岛联合酋长国的“全面战略伙伴关系”，此外还与其他海湾国家建立了“战略伙伴关系”。

The Gulf states have also been important diplomatic partners for China, taking common positions on issues ranging from Xinjiang to Hong Kong. Beijing would have little appetite to antagonize those countries by upgrading ties with Iran at their expense. 

海湾国家也是中央帝国重要的外交伙伴，他们在很多重要问题上采取共同立场。中央帝国方面不会以牺牲与这些国家的外交关系为代价来提升与波斯帝国的关系。

The U.S. factor also influences China’s calculations. During the 1990s, U.S. pressure led China to curtail nuclear and ballistic missile cooperation with Iran. U.S. leverage today is weaker but the threat of sanctions still discourages trade and investments by China’s major state-owned and private enterprises.

北美帝国因素也会影响中央帝国的计算。上世纪90年代，北美帝国的压力导致中央帝国削减与波斯帝国在核武器和弹道导弹方面的合作。虽然今天北美帝国的杠杆作用减弱了，但制裁威胁仍然阻碍了中央帝国主要国有和私营企业的贸易和投资。

Those constraints increased with the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018 and heightened U.S. sanctions (although Washington lifted sanctions against one Chinese firm to make progress on a bilateral trade deal).

2018年5月，北美帝国退出了伊核协议，进一步加强了对波斯帝国的制裁和封锁。（尽管北美帝国解除了对一家中央帝国公司的制裁，以便在双边贸易谈判上取得进展）。

The effects have been significant. Even before the coronavirus weakened demand, Chinese oil purchases in mid-2019 were down 60 percent from the previous year and a Chinese firm pulled out of a $5 billion deal to develop the South Pars natural gas field. Beijing wants access to Iranian oil and markets but is not prepared to make commitments that might completely cut off its access to the much larger U.S. economy. 

制裁效果显著。即使在冠状病毒削弱需求之前，中央帝国在2019年的石油购买量也比上一年下降了60%，一家中央帝国公司退出了一项价值50亿美元的开发南帕尔斯天然气田的交易。中央帝国希望进入波斯帝国的石油和市场，但并不准备做出可能导致其完全切断与北美帝国更大经济体接触的承诺。

Iran has its own reasons to hedge. While Iran’s supreme leader has signaled his support for the agreement, virtually guaranteeing its approval in the parliament, many remain skeptical about its potential benefits.

波斯帝国的犹豫有其自身理由。尽管波斯帝国最高领导人已表示支持该协议，实际上保证了该协议在议会被批准，但许多人仍对其潜在的好处表示怀疑。

One concern relates to the history of failed business deals between the two countries: as one parliamentarian noted on Twitter that, “Somebody should ask the other party to our 25-year pact why doesn’t it pay its debts to us?" As in many other countries, some are also wary of falling into a Chinese debt trap.

一个令人担忧的问题与两国间商业交易的失败历史有关。正如一位国会议员在推特上指出的那样，“有人应该问协议的另一方，为什么不向我们偿还历史债务？”与许多其他国家一样，一些国家也对陷入中央帝国债务陷阱持谨慎态度。（喵：波斯帝国内部始终有一部分势力对欧美心存幻想）

Those fears are exacerbated by rumors, apparently circulated by Iranian opposition figures, which suggest that Iranian territory could be sold to China. Iran’s leadership thus has incentives to keep commitments to China ambiguous.

波斯帝国反对派人士显然正在散布谣言，暗示其领土可能被出售给中央帝国，加剧了这些担忧。因此，波斯帝国的领导层有动机保持对中央帝国的承诺模棱两可。（喵：北美帝国的第五纵队哪里都有）

None of this, however, implies that Washington should dismiss the twenty-five-year agreement as empty rhetoric. Ambiguity can have benefits: both Beijing and Tehran can leverage the prospects of deeper bilateral cooperation to generate leverage with foreign leaders.

然而，所有这些都不意味着北美帝国应该将25年协议视为空洞的言辞。模棱两可会带来好处：中央帝国和波斯帝国都可以利用深化双边合作的前景，对其他国家领导人产生影响力。

With a future U.S. administration more open to negotiations, Iran could signal that it will avoid granting China base access or intelligence cooperation in return for sanctions relief. Just as Beijing curtailed military cooperation with Iran to improve ties with Washington in the 1990s, China could promise to “exercise restraint” in implementing a new accord with Iran if progress can be made in protecting Chinese interests on other issues. 

随着未来北美帝国政府对谈判更加开放，波斯帝国可能会暗示，它将避免给予中央帝国开设基地或情报合作的机会，以换取解除对其制裁。正如中央帝国在上世纪90年代为了改善与北美帝国的关系而削减与波斯帝国的军事合作一样。如果在其他问题上能够加强中央帝国的利益，中央帝国有可能承诺在执行与波斯帝国的新协议时“保持克制”。

Regardless of what appears on paper, several aspects of Sino-Iranian cooperation could pose problems for the United States. First, are the continued illicit Chinese oil transfers (some of which reportedly involve ships turning off their transponders to avoid detection), which provide cash for Tehran. Second is Chinese investments in strategic ports.

不管纸面上写着什么，中-波合作的几个方面都可能给北美帝国带来问题。首先，是中央帝国持续的非法石油转移（据报道，其中一些涉及船只关闭转发器以避免被发现），为波斯帝国提供现金。其次是中央帝国对战略港口的投资。

Iran’s welcoming of China to contribute to the development of Chabahar, and recent tensions that call India’s privileged status on that project into question could reduce New Delhi’s ability to serve as a regional counterweight and portend a larger Chinese naval presence in the region.

波斯帝国欢迎中央帝国为恰巴哈港的发展作出贡献，而最近的紧张局势使白象帝国在该项目上的优先地位受到质疑，这可能会降低白象帝国作为地区制衡力量的能力，并预示着中央帝国海军将在该地区有更大规模的存在。

Third, although China is unlikely to condone a full resumption of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, it could supply advanced conventional weapons to Iran once United Nations restrictions expire in October, following in Russia’s footsteps. 

第三，尽管中央帝国不太可能纵容波斯帝国全面恢复核武器计划，但一旦联合国制裁在10月到期，中央帝国可能会效仿罗刹帝国的脚步，向波斯帝国提供先进的常规武器。（喵：主要是歼10）

The United States will have to employ carrots and sticks to curtail Sino-Iranian cooperation in the areas it cares about most. But an effective U.S. strategy should start with a clear understanding of the inherent limits of the partnership. Mutual wariness and differing interests, as reflected in the lack of firm commitments in the leaked agreement, should reduce U.S. fears of a lasting strategic alignment and help undercut any attempts to use expanded cooperation as leverage. 

北美帝国将不得不采取“胡萝卜加大棒”的手段来遏制中波在其最关心的领域的合作。但是，一项有效的北美帝国战略应该首先清楚地认识到这种伙伴关系的内在局限性。协议中缺乏坚定承诺所反映的相互警惕和利益分歧，应该能减少北美帝国对持久战略结盟的担忧，并有助于削弱任何利用扩大合作作为地缘政治杠杆的企图。（喵：苍蝇不叮无缝的蛋。类似“神教国家一律不可信任”的挑拨离间言论正在不少场合散布，需要双方都保持清醒的头脑）

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