转自维基 - 河豚计划_风闻

https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%B2%B3%E8%B1%9A%E8%AE%A1%E5%88%92

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_settlement_in_the_Japanese_Empire

一个少数族群，就敢跑到多数族群的土地上，恐吓、排挤、控制多数族群，甚至他们连国民都还不是呢。这得需要多大的心啊。

这西天龙人果然名不虚传

河豚计划，亦称豚鱼计划（英语：Fugu Plan）。是指大日本帝国在1930年代制定的一份计划，准备为了日本的利益，将逃避纳粹德国的欧洲犹太难民安置在日本控制的亚洲大陆。1934年，该计划首次提出，在1938年的五相会议上得到确认，但是到了1940年日本加入轴心国及签署三国同盟条约以后，以及其他许多状况的影响，这一计划未能得到充分实施。

语源

这个计划相信，犹太人将非常有利于日本，但也非常危险。因此，这一计划被特意命名为“河豚”，因为河豚如果没有经过正确、精心的烹饪，会将人毒死。[1]

计划

河豚计划的核心是将数千名、甚或数万名犹太人定居在当时日本的傀儡政权满洲国，或者日本占领下的上海[2]。这样不仅可以获得预想的经济利益，而且可以取悦美国，特别是美国犹太人，推动他们向日本投资。这个计划是基于对欧洲反犹太主义宣传的相信，例如所谓的《犹太人贤士议定书》[1]。

计划人员最终提出了详细的方案，包括如何组建居留地，以及如何取得犹太人的支持——包括采取投资和实际定居两种形式。在1939年6月和7月，这些方案被编成《通过利用在中国有权势的犹太人使得美国总统紧密圈的远东外交政策舆论转变为对日友好的具体措施》和《引入犹太人资本的研究分析》，并得到日本在中国的最高官员批准。

吸引犹太人和美国好感的方法包括，派遣代表团前往美国，向美国的犹太教拉比介绍犹太教与神道教的类似之处，并将这些拉比带到日本，向日本人介绍他们和他们的宗教。还包括吸引美国新闻业和好莱坞的好感，因为他们相信犹太人即使没有完全控制、也是强烈地影响这两个行业。

但是，还是制定了许多建立居留地的详细计划，地点包括满洲的许多地方以及上海附近。这些计划允许犹太移民的人数从18,000人上升到600,000人，还包括在各种人口规模情况下，居留地土地规模的详细资料，以及学校、医院等设施的安排，计划同意这些犹太人居留地将享有完全的宗教自由，以及文化和教育实行自治；同时日本人提放给与犹太人过多的自由，他们感到给与一些自由对于维持他们的好感是必须的，以及他们的经济利益。批准该计划的官员们强调，居留地表面上实行自治，但同时必须进行幕后的控制，将犹太人置于密切监视与控制之下。他们害怕犹太人将会逐渐进入日本的主流政治与经济，如同《犹太人贤士议定书》所描述的，像在其他许多国家一样，将会控制日本。

最后，该计划委托世界犹太人社团资助这个居留地，供应定居者。

历史

主条目：上海隔都

这个计划起初只是一小群日本政府和军事官员的主意。他们认为建设满洲国需要一批能够帮助日本在那里建立工业和基础设施的人。这个小团体的基本成员包括日本的“犹太专家”犬冢惟重大佐（Inuzuka Koreshige）和安江仙弘大佐，实业家鲇川义介（Yoshisuke Aikawa），以及许多关东军军官，称为满洲系。

他们决定吸引犹太人到满洲国，是因为他们相信犹太人拥有大量金钱和政治权势，而且拥有神奇的能力来获取这些。他们所认识的一位美国犹太银行家雅各布·希夫，曾在30年前由于，向日本政府提供天文数字的巨额贷款，帮助日本赢得日俄战争。此外，他们和许多日本官员都相信《犹太人贤士议定书》的谎言，认为全球犹太人阴谋控制世界经济和政治。这些信仰使得一些日本权威人士过高地估计了犹太人的经济和政治权势，以及他们由于流散世界各地带来的国际便利。他们相信，从纳粹手中援救欧洲犹太人，将会使日本得到美国犹太人坚定和永久的支持。

1922年，两位被派往西伯利亚帮助帮助白俄抵抗红军进攻的日本军官——安江仙弘和犬冢惟重回到了日本。在西伯利亚，他们第一次听说了《犹太人贤士议定书》，立刻对所谓犹太人的权势极度着迷。在整个1920年代，他们写了许多关于犹太人的报告，并且到今天的以色列国（当时的英属巴勒斯坦委任统治地旅行，研究犹太人，并与犹太人领袖哈伊姆·魏茨曼和大卫·本-古理安交谈。安江仙弘甚至将《犹太人贤士议定书》翻译成日语。安江仙弘和犬冢惟重设法使日本外务省对犹太人产生了兴趣，要求每一个日本大使馆和领事馆密切关注所在国犹太人社团的活动。外务省收到了许多报告，但没有一个报告能证实确实存在所谓的全球阴谋。

就在1931年日本入侵满洲的九一八事变的前夕，两位所谓的犹太专家加入了军队“满洲系”，许多日本军官希望日本扩张到满洲。这个派系的首领是板垣征四郎和石原莞尔，他们在吸引日本人定居和投资满洲的过程中遇到了困难，于是被河豚计划所吸引。但是，河豚计划在开始执行之前，就遇到了第一次重大挫折。1933年，哈尔滨犹太人Simon Kaspe遭到诱拐、拷打和杀害，于是已经在该市定居的大批犹太人，不再信任日本军队，大批逃往上海，将这恐怖的故事告诉周围的人。1937年，安江仙弘与哈尔滨犹太人领袖谈话以后，使他们确信日本人已经改邪归正，于是成立了远东犹太人大会，随后数年中举行了多次会议，讨论在哈尔滨市内和郊外建立犹太人居留地的问题。

1938年召开了五相会议：日本的5位最高官员聚集讨论“犹太专家”的这个计划。他们是：首相近卫文麿、外相有田八郎、陆军大臣板垣征四郎、海军大臣米内光政，和通产大臣池田成彬。大臣们面临两难的选择。一方面，日本与纳粹德国结盟签了反共协定，任何帮助犹太人的做法都会危及这一同盟。另一方面，水晶之夜事件以后，犹太人对德国产品的抵制，显示了犹太人的经济实力和全球一致，如果日本希望得到犹太人的好感，这是一个绝佳的机会，因为许多犹太人逃离欧洲，正在寻找避难的去处。由于日本内阁当时需要一致通过，而不是多数通过，这次会议成为内阁最漫长、最复杂的会议之一。但是最终还是达成了一致意见，政府批准实施河豚计划，但是任何行动都不得有损与德国的关系。

但是，该计划从未正式付诸实施。1939年，上海犹太人请求不要 再允许犹太难民进入上海，因为他们的支持能力已经达到极限。当时，美国犹太人社团最有影响力的人物之一Stephen Wise，表达了激烈的主张：任何与日本合作的犹太人都是卖国分子，违反了美国对日本的道义禁运。

1939年，苏联与纳粹德国签订了互不侵犯条约，使得犹太人从欧洲到日本的交通变得极为困难，1940年的事件使得河豚计划以正式的官方渠道执行变得不切实际。苏联吞并了波罗的海国家，进一步切断了犹太人逃离欧洲的可能性。日本政府与德国、意大利成立三国轴心，完全排除了来自东京的对这一计划进行官方援助的可能。

不过，驻立陶宛考纳斯的日本领事杉原千亩，不顾东京的命令，向逃离的犹太人签发过境签证，允许他们前往日本，并逗留一段时间，然后前往最终目的地，不需要入境签证的荷兰在加勒比海的殖民地库拉索。数千名犹太人得到了他批准的签证。有些杉原千亩的签证甚至被抄写了下来。许多犹太人经过艰难的过程，得到了苏联政府的出境签证，被允许经过西伯利亚铁路穿越苏联，从海参崴上船到敦贺，最终定居在日本神户。

1941年夏天，日本政府开始担心如此众多的犹太难民住在日本的这个主要城市，而且靠近军港和商港，于是要求住在神户的犹太人迁往日本占领下的上海，只有难民抵达前就住在神户的犹太人才可以留下。德国违反了互不侵犯条约，对苏联宣战，使得俄国与日本也成为敌人，因此结束了从海参崴到敦贺的航线。几个月后，就在1941年12月袭击珍珠港之后，日本夺去了上海租界，占领整个上海，来自美国犹太人的金钱帮助、甚至通讯全部停止了， 富有的巴格达犹太人，其中许多人是英国公民，被作为敌对国公民逮捕。美国财政部准备对资助上海犹太难民网开一面，放松管制，但是美国的犹太人组织执意要坚定地表现他们的爱国精神，放弃任何不忠于美国的行动。

1942年，日本政府正式废除了五相会议的决议，正式完全废除对这个几乎不存在的河豚计划的几乎不存在的支持。德国盖世太保首领Josef Meisinger，绰号“华沙的屠夫”，到达上海。他要求日本地方当局“清除”犹太难民，或将他们送到盐矿做苦工；也就是说，把阿道夫·希特勒和希姆莱的最终解决带到亚洲。东京政府无法不支持，但是 Meisinger的计划被削弱为只是成立了上海隔都：上海的犹太人现在被迫住进一个隔离区，禁止离开。

1943年2月18日，日本当局宣布成立“无国籍难民隔离区”，命令上海所有犹太人迁入这个位于虹口区的面积一平方英里的地区，直到战争结束，大部分犹太人处于饥饿之中。就在战争结束前几个月，上海隔都遭到轰炸，盟军飞机试图摧毁上海市内的一个无线电广播发射机。

意义

由安江仙弘等人设计的河豚计划失败了。那些到达日本以及日本占领下的中国的犹太人，并没有达到很大的数量，远远低于申请签证的人数。犹太人也没有得到日本政府的大规模或正式的帮助。让计划者失望的是，那些住在神户和上海的犹太人几乎没有人对日本经济起到了复兴和支持的作用。这些来到日本的身无分文的难民并不是安江仙弘听说过的富有又博爱的美国银行家，也没有能力让日本人得到那些人的好感和资助。不过，由于日本临时的亲犹政策，以及杉原千亩的努力，使大约24,000名犹太人被援救出来[3]，逃离了几乎必死无疑的欧洲。这个数量大约只有原来估算的五万人的一半[4]。1985年，以色列政府授予杉原千亩国际义人（Righteous Among the Nations）的荣誉。此外，位于波兰的米尔研道中心，今天世界上最大的犹太宗教教育中心之一，亦是当年唯一的能够在犹太大屠杀之后幸存的欧洲研道中心。

Jewish settlement in the Japanese Empire 日帝时期犹太人定居点（中文版相对有滞后，但主体内容正确）

Shortly prior to and during World War II, and coinciding with the Second Sino-Japanese War, tens of thousands of Jewish refugees were resettled in the Japanese Empire. The onset of the European war by Nazi Germany involved the lethal mass persecutions and genocide of Jews, later known as the Holocaust, resulting in thousands of Jewish refugees fleeing east. Many ended up in Japanese-occupied China.

Memoranda written in 1930s Imperial Japan proposed settling Jewish refugees escaping Nazi-occupied Europe in Japanese-controlled territory. As interpreted by Marvin Tokayer and Swartz (who used the term “Fugu Plan”, “河豚計画”, that was used by the Japanese to describe this plan), they proposed that large numbers of Jewish refugees should be encouraged to settle in Manchukuo or Japan-occupied Shanghai,[1] thus gaining the benefit of the supposed economic prowess of the Jews and also convincing the United States, and specifically American Jewry, to grant political favor and economic investment into Japan. The idea was partly based on the acceptance of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as being a genuine document by at least part of the Japanese leadership.[2]

The detailed scheme included how the settlement would be organized and how Jewish support, both in terms of investment and actual settlers, would be garnered. In June and July 1939, the memoranda “Concrete Measures to be Employed to Turn Friendly to Japan the Public Opinion Far East Diplomatic Policy Close Circle of President of USA by Manipulating Influential Jews in China” and “The Study and Analysis of Introducing Jewish Capital” came to be reviewed and approved by the top Japanese officials in China.

Methods of attracting both Jewish and American favor were to include the sending of a delegation to the United States, to introduce American rabbis to the similarities between Judaism and Shinto, and the bringing of rabbis back to Japan in order to introduce them and their religion to the Japanese. Methods were also suggested for gaining the favor of American journalism and Hollywood.

The majority of the documents were devoted to the settlements, allowing for the settlement populations to range in size from 18,000, up to 600,000. Details included the land size of the settlement, infrastructural arrangements, schools, hospitals etc. for each level of population. Jews in these settlements were to be given complete freedom of religion, along with cultural and educational autonomy. While the authors were wary of affording too much political autonomy, it was felt that some freedom would be necessary to attract settlers, as well as economic investment.

The Japanese officials asked to approve the plan insisted that while the settlements could appear autonomous, controls needed to be placed to keep the Jews under surveillance. It was feared that the Jews might somehow penetrate into the mainstream Japanese government and economy, influencing or taking command of it in the same way that they, according to the forged Protocols of the Elders of Zion, had done in many other countries. The world Jewish community was to fund the settlements and supply the settlers.

History Before World War II Koreshige Inuzuka

Originally the idea of a small group of Japanese government and military officials who saw a need for a population to be established in Manchukuo (otherwise known as Manchuria) and help build Japan’s industry and infrastructure there, the primary members of this group included Captain Koreshige Inuzuka and Captain Norihiro Yasue, who became known as “Jewish experts”, the industrialist Yoshisuke Aikawa and a number of officials in the Kwantung Army, known as the “Manchurian Faction”.

Their decision to attract Jews to Manchukuo came from a belief that the Jewish people were wealthy and had considerable political influence. Jacob Schiff, a Jewish-American banker who, thirty years earlier, offered sizable loans to the Japanese government which helped it win the Russo-Japanese War, was well known. In addition, a Japanese translation of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion led some Japanese authorities to grossly overestimate the economic and political powers of the Jewish people, and their interconnectedness across the world due to the Jewish diaspora. It was assumed that by rescuing European Jews from the Nazis, Japan would gain unwavering and eternal favor from American Jewry. However, this was not always the case. Anti-semitism had greatly expanded in Japan following Russia’s 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.[3]

In 1922, Yasue and Inuzuka had returned from the Japanese Siberian Intervention, aiding the White Russians against the Red Army where they first learned of the Protocols and came to be fascinated by the alleged powers of the Jewish people. Over the course of the 1920s, they wrote many reports on the Jews, and traveled to the British Mandate of Palestine (now Israel) to research the subject and speak with Jewish leaders such as Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion. Yasue translated the Protocols into Japanese. The pair managed to get the Foreign Ministry of Japan interested in the project. Every Japanese embassy and consulate was requested to keep the ministry informed of the actions and movements of Jewish communities in their countries. Many reports were received but none proved the existence of a global conspiracy.

In 1931, the officers joined forces to an extent with the Manchurian faction and a number of Japanese military officials who pushed for Japanese expansion into Manchuria, led by Colonel Seishirō Itagaki and Lieutenant-Colonel Kanji Ishiwara just before the Mukden Incident.

Harbin, before 1945

Of Harbin’s one million population, Jews represented only a tiny fraction. Their numbers, as high as 13,000 in the 1920s had halved by the mid-1930s in response to economic depression and after events relating to the kidnapping and murder of Simon Kaspé by a gang of Russian Fascists[4] and criminals under the influence of Konstantin Rodzaevsky.[5]

Although Russian Jews in Manchukuo were given legal status and protection, the half-hearted investigation into Kaspé’s death by the Japanese authorities, who were attempting to court the White Russian community as local enforcers and for their Anti-Communist sentiments,[6] led the Jews of Harbin to no longer trust the Japanese army. Many left to Shanghai, where the Jewish community had suffered no anti-semitism,[7] or deeper into China. In 1937, after Yasue spoke with Jewish leaders in Harbin, the Far Eastern Jewish Council was established by Abraham Kaufman, and over the next several years, many meetings were held to discuss the idea of encouraging and establishing Jewish settlements in and around Harbin.

In March 1938, Lieutenant General Kiichiro Higuchi of the Imperial Japanese Army proposed the reception of some Jewish refugees from Russia to General Hideki Tojo. Despite German protests, Tojo approved and had Manchuria, then a puppet state of Japan, admit them.[8][9][10]

On December 6, 1938, Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, Foreign Minister Hachirō Arita, Army Minister Seishirō Itagaki, Naval Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and Finance Ministry Shigeaki Ikeda met to discuss the dilemma at the “Five Ministers’ Conference”. They made a decision of prohibiting the expulsion of the Jews in Japan, Manchuria, and China.[11][12] On the one hand, Japan’s alliance with Nazi Germany was growing stronger, and doing anything to help the Jews would endanger that relationship. On the other hand, the Jewish boycott of German goods following Kristallnacht showed the economic power and global unity of the Jews.

Shanghai in 1930s

As an immediate result of the Five Ministers’ Conference, 14,000–15,000 Eastern European Jews were granted asylum in the Japanese quarter of Shanghai; the European quarters, in contrast, admitted almost no Jews. 1000 Polish refugees who had not been able to obtain visas for any country were also given asylum in Shanghai.[13]

The next few years were filled with reports and meetings, not only between the proponents of the plan but also with members of the Jewish community, but was not adopted officially. In 1939, the Jews of Shanghai requested that no more Jewish refugees be allowed into Shanghai, as their community’s ability to support them was being stretched thin. Stephen Wise, one of the most influential members of the American Jewish community at the time and Zionist activist, expressed a strong opinion against any Jewish–Japanese cooperation.

During World War II Main article: Shanghai ghetto

In 1939 the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, making the transport of Jews from Europe to Japan far more difficult. The events of 1940 only solidified the impracticality of executing the Fugu Plan in any official, organized way. The USSR annexed the Baltic states, further cutting off the possibilities for Jews seeking to escape Europe. The Japanese government signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, completely eliminating the possibility of any official aid for the plan from Tokyo.

Despite this, the Japanese Consul in Kaunas, Lithuania, Chiune Sugihara, began to issue transit visas to escaping Jews against orders from Tokyo. These allowed them to travel to Japan and stay for a limited time on their way to their final destination, the Dutch colony of Curaçao, which required no entry visa. Thousands of Jews received transit visas from him, or through similar means. Some even copied, by hand, the visa that Sugihara had written. After receiving exit visas from the Soviet government, many Jews were allowed to cross Russia on the Trans-Siberian Railway, taking a boat from Vladivostok to Tsuruga and eventually settling in Kobe, Japan.

By the summer of 1941, the Japanese government was becoming anxious about having so many Jewish refugees in such a major city, and near major military and commercial ports. It was decided that the Jews of Kobe had to be relocated to Shanghai, occupied by Japan. Only those who had lived in Kobe before the arrival of the refugees were allowed to stay. Germany had violated the Non-aggression Pact, and declared war on the USSR, making Russia and Japan potential enemies, and therefore putting an end to the boats from Vladivostok to Tsuruga.

“Shanghai ghetto” around 1943

Several months later, just after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Japan seized all of Shanghai. Monetary aid and all communications from American Jews ceased due to the Anglo-American Trading with the Enemy Act and wealthy Baghdadi Jews, many of whom were British subjects, were interned as enemy nationals. The US Department of Treasury was lax regarding communications and aid sent to the Jewish refugees in Shanghai,[14] but the American Jewish organizations provided aid.[citation needed]

In 1941 the Nazi Gestapo Obersturmbannführer (Lt. Col.) Josef Meisinger, the “Butcher of Warsaw”, acting as the Gestapo’s liaison with the German Embassy in Tokyo and the Imperial Japanese Army’s own Kenpeitai military police and security service, tried to influence the Japanese to “exterminate” or enslave approximately 18,000–20,000 Jews who had escaped from Austria and Germany and who were living in Japanese-occupied Shanghai.[15] His proposals included the creation of a concentration camp on Chongming Island in the delta of the Yangtze[16] or starvation on freighters off the coast of China.[17] The Japanese admiral who ran Shanghai would not yield to pressure from Meisinger. However, the Japanese built a ghetto in the Shanghai neighborhood of Hongkew[18] (which had already been planned in Tokyo in 1939), a slum with about twice the population density of Manhattan, which remained strictly isolated by Japanese soldiers under the command of the sadistic official Kano Ghoya,[19] and which Jews could only leave with special permission. Some 2,000 Jews died[how?]} in the Shanghai ghetto[when?].[20] The Japanese government did not accept Meisinger’s requests, and never persecuted the Jews under its control.[21] Meisinger’s plans were reduced to the creation of what came to be known as the Shanghai ghetto.

Jews entering and residing in Japan, China, and Manchukuo were treated the same as other foreigners and, in one instance, Japanese officials in Harbin ignored a formal complaint by the German consulate which was deeply insulted by one of the Russian-Jewish newspapers’ attack on Hitler. In his book, “Japanese, Nazis and Jews”, Dr. David Kranzler states Japan’s position was ultimately pro-Jewish.

During the six months following the Five Minister’s Conference, lax restrictions for entering the International Settlement, such as the requirement for no visa or papers of any kind, allowed 15,000 Jewish refugees to be admitted to the Japanese sector in Shanghai. Japanese policy declared that Jews entering and residing in Japan, China, and Manchukuo would be treated the same as other foreigners.

From 1943, Jews in Shanghai shared a “Designated Area for Stateless Refugees” of 40 blocks along with 100,000 Chinese residents. Most Jews fared as well, often better than other Shanghai residents. The ghetto remained open and free of barbed wire and Jewish refugees could acquire passes to leave the zone. However it was bombed just months before the end of the war by Allied planes seeking to destroy a radio transmitter within the city, with the consequential loss of life to both Jews and Chinese in the ghetto.

Japan’s support of Zionism 

Japanese approval came as early as December 1918, when the Shanghai Zionist Association received a message endorsing the government’s “pleasure of having learned of the advent desire of the Zionists to establish in Palestine a National Jewish Homeland”. It indicated that, “Japan will accord its sympathy to the realization of your [Zionist] aspirations.”[22]

This was further explicit endorsement in January 1919 when Chinda Sutemi wrote to Chaim Weizmann in the name of the Japanese Emperor stating that, “the Japanese government gladly takes note of the Zionist aspiration to extend in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people and they look forward with a sympathetic interest to the realization of such desire upon the basis proposed.”[23] Japan recognized British policies in Palestine in return for British approval of Japanese control over the Shandong Peninsula in China.

Influential Japanese intellectuals including Uchimura Kanzō (1861–1930), Nitobe Inazō (1862–1933), Kenjirō Tokutomi (1868–1927) and professor in colonial policy at Tokyo University Tadao Yanaihara (1893–1961) were also in support. “The Zionist movement”, claimed Yanaihara, “is nothing more than an attempt to secure the right for Jews to migrate and colonize in order to establish a center for Jewish national culture”, defending the special protection given to the Jews in their quest for a national home based on his conviction that, “the Zionist case constituted a national problem deserving of a nation-state”.[24] The Zionist project, including the cooperative modes of agricultural settlements, he saw as a model Japan might emulate.[25][26]

A high-level Japanese government reports on plans for mass emigration to Manchuria in 1936 included references to ethnic conflict between Jews and Arabs as scenarios to avoid.[27] These influential Japanese policy makers and institutions referred to Zionist forms of cooperative agricultural settlement as a model that Japanese should emulate.[citation needed] A colonial enterprise having parallels with Japan’s own expansion into Asia.[citation needed] By 1940, Japanese occupied Manchuria was host to 17,000 Jewish refugees, most coming from Eastern Europe.

Yasue, Inuzuka and other sympathetic diplomats wished to utilize those Jewish refugees in Manchuria and Shanghai in return for the favorable treatments accorded to them. Japanese official quarters expected American Jewry influence American Far Eastern policy and make it neutral or pro-Japanese and attract badly needed Jewish capital for the industrial development of Manchuria.

Post-war, the 1952 recognition of full diplomatic relations with Israel by the Japanese government was a breakthrough amongst Asian nations.

Significance 

Approximately 24,000 Jews escaped the Holocaust either by immigrating through Japan or living under direct Japanese rule by the policies surrounding Japan’s more pro-Jewish attitude.[28] While this was not the 50,000 expected,[29] and those who arrived did not have the expected wealth to contribute to the Japanese economy, the achievement of the plan is looked back upon favorably. Chiune Sugihara was bestowed the honor of the Righteous Among the Nations by the Israeli government in 1985. In addition, the Mir Yeshiva, one of the largest centers of rabbinical study today, and the only European yeshiva to survive the Holocaust, survived as a result of these events.

Inuzuka’s help in rescuing Jewish refugees from Nazi-occupied Europe was acknowledged by the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States which saved him from being tried as a war criminal. He went on to establish the Japan-Israel Association and was president until his death in 1965.

Popular accounts 

There is little evidence to suggest that the Japanese had ever contemplated a Jewish state or a Jewish autonomous region,[30] something that the Soviet Union had already established in 1934. In 1979 Rabbi Marvin Tokayer and Mary Swartz authored a book called The Fugu Plan. In this partly fictionalized account, Tokayer & Swartz gave the name the ‘Fugu Plan’ to the 1930s memorandums. They claim that the plan, which was viewed by its proponents as risky but potentially rewarding for Japan, was named after the Japanese word for puffer-fish, a delicacy which can be fatally poisonous if incorrectly prepared.[2] (The memorandums were not actually called The Fugu Plan in Japanese.) Tokayer and Swartz base their claims on statements made by Captain Koreshige Inuzuka and allege that such a plan was first discussed in 1934 and then solidified in 1938, supported by notables such as Inuzuka, Ishiguro Shiro and Norihiro Yasue;[31] however, the signing of the Tripartite Pact in 1940 and other events prevented its full implementation.

Ben-Ami Shillony, a professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, confirmed the statements upon which Tokayer and Swartz based their claim were taken out of context, and that the translation with which they worked was flawed. Shillony’s view is further supported by Kiyoko Inuzuka (wife of Koreshige Inuzuka).[32] In ‘The Jews and the Japanese: The Successful Outsiders’, he questioned whether the Japanese ever contemplated establishing a Jewish state or a Jewish autonomous region.[33][34][35]