《金融时报》副主编：若帮着流氓超级大国打压中国，就太没良心了_风闻

《金融时报》5月21日刊登副主编、首席经济评论员马丁·沃尔夫文章《中美之争对世界构成了挑战》

文：Martin Wolf

译：Kris

随着中美之间的经济冲突愈演愈烈，世界其他地区——尤其是美国过去的盟友们——将如何自处？寻常情况下，美国是能够得到盟国支持的，毕竟欧盟本身也和美国一样，对中国的某些行为有所顾虑。但今天的情况非比寻常：在特朗普的领导下，美国已经成为流氓超级大国，对许多事物——包括建立在多边协议和约束性规则之上的贸易体系的根本规范——充满敌意。事实上，美国已经连续对各个盟国分别进行了“一对一”的霸凌。

那么在中美展开搏斗的时候，美国的盟友们应该怎么做呢？中美之间的问题不仅仅是特朗普这么简单。甚至可以说，他关注的双边贸易平衡问题是相对比较容易管控的。更糟糕的是，很大一部分美国人之所以对中国抱有敌意，不仅因为中国采取了某些具体行动，更来自于中国崛起这一事实。

当前，保守主义思想正在发生重大转变。2005年，美国前副国务卿罗伯特·佐利克提出，中国应该“成为国际体系中负责任的利益攸关者”。最近，美国现任国务卿迈克·蓬佩奥传递出一种非常不同的观点。外交事务专家沃尔特·拉塞尔·米德对蓬佩奥的思想进行如下描述：“自由派的国际主义者认为美国参与全球事务的目标应该是促生一种新的世界秩序，其中国际机构越来越多地取代民族国家作为全球政治的主要行为体；而保守派国际主义者则认为美国的参与全球事务应该以狭义的美国利益为指导。”简单来说，就是美国不认为自己应该继续扮演国际体系中“负责任的利益攸关者”的角色，它的观念回到了19世纪的强权政治，一切凭实力说话。

这种转变影响到国际贸易。许多人受到误导，以为贸易体系的根基在于以国际机构取代民族国家。其实国际贸易建立在两大基石之上，一是国家应该达成多边协议，二是通过具有约束力的争端解决机制加强各国对协议的信心。由此而产生的稳定的贸易环境，正是国际企业高度依赖的。

如今，这一切都面临危险。随着关税战蔓延到其他领域，美国开始限制世界领先的中国高科技制造商华为获取美国技术，其目的似乎是永远使中国低它一等——至少中国人是这样看的。

贸易战也使美国变成了一个保护主义倾向严重的国家。按加权平均计算，美国的关税水平可能很快就要超过印度。彼得森国际经济研究所的报告指出，“特朗普威胁对中国征收关税，几乎快要达到美国1930年颁布《斯姆特-霍利关税法》后的平均水平。”关税可能将保持在这样的高位上，因为美国在谈判中对中国提出的要求几乎是羞辱性的，后者绝对难以接受。美国征收关税的做法也将导致其他供应商打退堂鼓，因为他们也可能成为关税的牺牲品：这种双边主义做法具有传染病。与特朗普的说法相反，关税的成本也要落到美国人头上，特别是消费者和农产品出口商。具有讽刺意味的是，美国许多受关税战影响最严重的县都是由共和党控制的。

有些人可能会得出结论，高昂的代价意味着冲突无法一直持续下去，特别是如果股票市场也受到冲击。另一种更合理的结果是，中美两国的强势领导人都不能轻易屈服。随着两个超级大国之间的关系益将继续冻结，甚至进一步恶化。

那么美国的盟国面临怎样的处境呢？它们不应该支持美国阻挠中国的崛起，那样做太没有良心。它们应该表明在哪些地方认同美国的贸易和技术目标，并且尽量保持共同立场，特别是欧盟和日本。它们也应该在世贸组织的主持下维护多边贸易体系的基本原则。如果美国成功使争议解决机制失效，那么其他成员应该同意遵守另一套非正式机制。

最重要的是，即使在伤害中美利益的情况下，仍然有可能维持自由主义贸易。国际货币基金组织前副总裁安妮•克鲁格在一篇专栏文章中指出，由于美国愚蠢地决定退出跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（TPP），美国对“全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定”（CPTPP，即美国退出后的TPP）成员国的出口受世贸组织的法律歧视。欧盟也与加拿大和日本签订了自由贸易协定。

这是好事，但还可以做得更好。认识到牢固的贸易秩序有好处的国家应该将这种自由贸易协定变成“自愿加入的全球自由贸易协定”，任何愿意承诺履行自贸义务的国家都可以加入其中。我们甚至可以构想，未来这个全球自由贸易协定的成员国在遭受非成员国非法贸易攻击的时候，可以采取协调一致的反制措施来保护自身利益。

中美之间的敌对关系对全球和平与繁荣构成了威胁。局外人虽然无法阻止这场冲突，但也没有陷入无助的境地。如果大国要退出多边贸易体系，恰好是其他国家上场的机会。它们加在一起能形成巨大的体量，也应该拿出重量级玩家的勇气。

The US-China conflict challenges the world

Where does deepening economic conflict between the US and China leave the rest of the world, especially historic allies of the US? In normal circumstances, the latter would stand beside it. The EU, after all, shares many of its concerns about Chinese behaviour. Yet these are not normal circumstances. Under Donald Trump, the US has become a rogue superpower, hostile, among many other things, to the fundamental norms of a trading system based on multilateral agreement and binding rules. Indeed, US allies, too, area target of the wave of bilateral bullying.

So what are American allies to do as the US and China battle? This is not just about Mr Trump. His focus on bilateral trade balances may evenbe relatively manageable. Worse, a large proportion of Americans shares a deepening hostility not just to China’s behaviour, but to the fact of a rising China.

We are also seeing a big shift in conservative thinking. In 2005, Robert Zoellick, deputy secretary of state, argued that China should“become a responsible stakeholder” in the international system. Recently, Mike Pompeo, secretary of state, has indicated a different perspective. Foreign affairs specialist Walter Russell Mead describes Mr Pompeo’s animating idea as follows: “Where liberal internationalists believe the goal of American global engagement should be to promote the emergence of a world order in which international institutions increasingly supplant nation-states as the chief actors in global politics, conservative internationalists believe American engagement should be guided by a narrower focus on specific US interests.” Inbrief, the US no longer sees why it should be a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system. Its concept is, instead, that of 19th century power politics, in which the strong dictate to the weak.

This is relevant to trade, too. It is a canard that the trading system was based on the notion that international institutions should supplant nation states. The system was built on the twin ideas that states should make multilateral agreements with one another and that confidence in such agreements should be reinforced by a binding dispute settlement system. This would bring stability to the conditions of trade, on which international businesses rely.

All this is now at risk. The spread of the tariff war and the decision to limit the access to US technology of Huawei, China’s only world-leading advanced technology manufacturer, seem aimed at keeping China in permanent inferiority. That is certainly how the Chinese view it.

The trade war is also turning the US into a significantly protectionist country, with weighted-average tariffs possibly soon higher than India’s. A paper from the Peterson Institute for International Economics states, that “Trump is . . . threatening tariffs on China that are not far from the average level of duties the United States imposed with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.” Tariffs may even stay this high, because the US’s negotiating demands are too humiliating for China to accept. These levies will also lead to diversion to other suppliers. Tariffs may then spread to the latter, too: bilateralism is often a contagious disease. Contrary to Mr Trump’s protestations, the costs are also being borne by Americans, especially consumers and farm exporters. Ironically, many of the worst hit counties are in Republican control. 

Some might conclude that the high costs mean that the conflict cannot be sustained, particularly if stock markets are disrupted. An alternative and more plausible outcome is that Mr Trump and China’s Xi Jinping are “strongmen” leaders who cannot be seen to yield. The conflict will then either remain frozen or, more likely, worsen as relations between the two superpowers become increasingly poisoned.

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Where does this leave US allies? They should not support American attempts to thwart China’s rise: that would be unconscionable. They should indicate where they agree with US objectives on trade and technology and, if possible, sustain a common position on these issues, notably between the EU and Japan. They should uphold the principles of a multilateral trading system, under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. If the US succeeds in rendering the dispute system inquorate, the other members could agree to abide by an informal mechanism instead.

Most significantly, it should be possible to sustain liberal trade, at the expense of the US and China. Anne Krueger, former first deputy managing director of the IMF, notes in a column that, by its own foolish decision to reject the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the US suffers from WTO legal discrimination against its exports to members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which replaced TPP. The EU also has free trade agreements with Canada and Japan.

This is good. But they can go further. Countries that see the benefits of a strong trading order should turn such FTAs into a “global FTA ofthe willing”, in which any country willing to accept the commitments could participate. One might even envisage a future in which participants in such a global FTA would defend its members against illegal trade assaults from non-members, via co-ordinated retaliation.

Hostility between the US and China is a threat to global peace and prosperity. Outsiders cannot halt this conflict. But they are not helpless. If the big powers stand outside the multilateral trading system, others can step in. They are, in aggregate, huge players. They should dare to act as such.

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