美刀给了美国封杀伊朗的底气，但这样搞下去美元也顶不住呀_风闻

《南华早报》4月29日刊登汤姆·霍兰德文章《美元武器化将加快人民币时代的来临》

文：Tom Holland

译：李翠萍

美国政界的伊朗鹰派似乎已经战胜了油价鸽派。不久前，美国政府宣布结束伊朗石油进口制裁豁免。

美国国务卿迈克•蓬佩奥宣布打算停止伊朗石油运输，他表示：“我们要全面实现伊朗石油零出口。”

作为伊朗石油的最大买家，中国立即提出抗议，表示进口伊朗石油完全合理合法，并将继续下去。

但尽管中国表达了强烈的不满，短期内它恐怕只能屈从于美国的要求，停止从伊朗购买原油。

如果中国照美国的要求做，华盛顿的鹰派人士将弹冠相庆，他们成功实现了特朗普口中所谓“史上最严厉”的对伊制裁。

然而，这绝不是美国运用影响力的成功案例，从长远来看，华盛顿方面强迫中国遵从其意愿的能力只会削弱美国的实力，使美国在亚洲的经济、外交主导地位加速终结。

中国之所以别无选择只能屈从于美国的制裁，是因为近年来美国政府为达到政治目的，越来越将美元武器化。

中国每年进口价值约2500亿美元的石油，以及价值1500亿美元左右的铁矿石、铜、煤炭和大豆。由于这些重要的大宗商品在国际市场上是以美元定价和交易的，所以中国不得不用美元支付进口商品的货款。

这意味着，中国的交易最终要通过美国的金融体系来结算，因此美国当局在中国购买什么——以及更重要的——从谁那里购买的问题上拥有巨大的影响力。

近年来，美国当局表现得相当明确，随时准备利用这种来自美元国际地位的影响力。

例如，美国对渣打银行和法国巴黎银行等非美国银行开出巨额罚款，原因是它们与伊朗方面进行了美元交易，尽管这些银行没有违反交易所在国的任何法律。

假如现在中国无视美国的制裁，继续购买伊朗石油，中国的企业和银行可能会受到二级制裁（secondary sanctions），导致以美元结算的国际收支受影响。由于全球能源和金融市场以美元计价，此类制裁将对这些领域的企业造成严重损害。因此，中国和其他进口伊朗石油的亚洲国家——韩国、印度和日本——将不得不减少购买伊朗石油，转向其他国家的供应商。

但短暂的屈从并不意味着长久的顺服。恰恰相反，美国取消伊朗石油进口制裁豁免，将美元武器作为隐性威胁来确保其他国家就范的举动，只会激励中国和其他国家寻找其他货币来替代美元作为未来国际贸易和投资的计价货币。

建立可替代美元的货币体系谈何容易。美元作为世界的首选货币，拥有巨大的在位优势，这类似于计算机的主流操作系统。各家公司之所以使用微软的视窗操作系统，一是因为其他公司也用这套系统，二是因为它们多年使用该系统已经积累了大量知识和经验。所以，一个新系统要取代视窗操作系统，不能只比后者做的稍微好一点，必须要远远超过它。

不过，随着美国把美元当作武器来使用，反倒促使其他国家迫切地寻找替代选项。在过去几年里，中国政府已经为推广人民币做了大量工作，这是人民币挑战美元霸权的基础。

为了鼓励其他国家使用人民币进行交易，中国政府允许香港发展离岸流动性，改善了人民币融资渠道。

但对中国政府来说，更重要的一步是说服大宗商品出口国——尤其是石油出口国——接受人民币结算。要做到这一点，北京方面必须让出口国认识到，它们赚来的人民币不仅可以购买中国的制成品，还可以用来做更多的事情。

换而言之，中国政府必须提供一种稳定、安全、“无风险”的人民币计价资产，流动性充足且有可靠的退出路径，这样才能向世界提供一种安全的价值储存手段，来替代美国国债。

这正是中国政府当前努力的方向。不久前，习近平主席在“一带一路”高峰论坛上重申，中国不搞以邻为壑的汇率贬值，而将保持人民币汇率在合理均衡水平上的基本稳定。

与此同时，中国还推出以人民币计价的原油和黄金期货合约，这实际上为石油投资者提供了对冲工具，并可兑换成黄金。中国政府保持了人民币汇率稳定，特别是相对于其他亚洲货币而言。此外，它还确保了中国政府债券近年来的总回报率高于美国国债或德国国债等其它“无风险”资产。

以上所有措施的目的，都是为了说服中国的贸易伙伴使用和持有更多的人民币。截至目前，中国已经取得了些许成果，卡塔尔开始部分接受以人民币支付的天然气款项，俄罗斯去年将大约500亿美元的外汇储备从美元换成了人民币。

目前，美国威胁第三方石油进口国强制执行其对伊制裁的做法，只会加快人民币成为国际贸易和储备货币的步伐。亚洲国家尤其可能会认为，如果以美元进行交易意味着允许美国政府管制你的生意往来，那么换一种交易货币自然是合情合理的，而人民币正是显而易见的备选项。

简单来说，美国对伊朗的制裁正在推动亚洲形成一个以人民币为中心的非正式货币集团，而这是以美元地位受削弱为代价的。未来的人们回顾历史时可能会把2019年看作美国在亚洲经济影响力真正开始走下坡路的转折点，而这一切肇因都是美国错误地把美元当作武器。

The weaponisation of the US dollar is the end of its economic ascendancy in Asia – with China’s yuan ready to fill the void

It seems the Iran hawks have prevailed over the petrol-price doves; last week the United States government announced it would grant no more exemptions from its sanctions on Iranian oil exports.

“We’re going to zero across the board,” said US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, declaring his intention to halt Iranian oil shipments entirely.

China, the biggest buyer of Iranian oil, immediately protested, insisting its purchases of Iranian exports are perfectly legitimate and should continue.

Yet despite the vehemence of its complaints, in the near term China will have no option but to comply with US demands and stop buying crude from Iran.

That compliance will allow the hawks in Washington to congratulate themselves for successfully implementing what Donald Trump has described as the “toughest ever” sanctions regime against Iran.

Yet far from being a triumphant exercise of US influence, in the longer run the ability of Washington to compel China’s compliance with its wishes will only lead to a diminution of American power, and hasten the end of US economic and diplomatic primacy in Asia.

The reason China has no choice but to comply with US sanctions is that in recent years the US government has increasingly weaponised the US dollar to serve its political aims.

Each year China imports almost US$250 billion worth of oil and another US$150 billion or so of iron ore, copper, coal and soy beans. And because those vital commodities are priced and traded in US dollars internationally, China has to pay for its imports in the American currency.

That means China’s transactions are ultimately settled through the US financial system, which gives the US authorities a huge degree of leverage over what China buys and – more importantly – from whom.

In recent years, the US authorities have made it clear they are quite ready to use the leverage that the US dollar’s international status gives them.

For example, they have hit non-US banks such as Standard Chartered and BNP Paribas with huge fines for conducting US dollar transactions with Iranian counterparties, even though the banks broke no laws in the countries where the deals were done.

If China were now to continue to buy Iranian oil in defiance of Washington, it could find its companies and banks hit with secondary sanctions aimed at disrupting their ability to make or receive international payments in US dollars. For businesses operating in US dollar-denominated global energy and financial markets, such sanctions would be crippling. As a result, China and Asia’s other big buyers of Iranian oil – South Korea, India and Japan – will reluctantly decide to wind down their purchases in favour of crude from other suppliers.

But short-term compliance does not imply longer-term acquiescence. Quite the reverse; the US move to scrap Iranian sanction waivers, using its weaponisation of the US dollar as an implied threat to ensure compliance, will only encourage China and others to seek an alternative to the US dollar as the currency of denomination for their future international trade and investment flows.

Establishing an alternative will not be easy. Much like a dominant computer operating system, the US dollar has all the advantages of incumbency as the world’s currency of choice. The reason companies use Microsoft is that other companies use Microsoft, plus they have accumulated years of knowledge and experience of using Microsoft. So, for another operating system to replace Microsoft Windows, the new system can’t just be marginally better – it has to be miles better.

But by weaponising the US dollar, Washington has made the search for an alternative more urgent. And over the last few years, Beijing has done much of the groundwork needed to promote the yuan to the rest of the world as a potential challenger.

To encourage other countries to begin using the yuan as a trading currency, the Chinese government has improved access to yuan financing by allowing a pool of offshore liquidity to develop in Hong Kong.

But the big step will be for Beijing to persuade commodity exporters, and oil exporters in particular, to accept payment for their shipments in yuan. To do this, Beijing must convince producers that they can do more with the yuan they earn than simply use it to buy manufactured goods from China.

In other words, Beijing has to offer a stable, secure “risk-free” asset denominated in yuan, with plentiful liquidity and a guaranteed exit route, to provide the world with a viable alternative to US Treasury bonds as a safe store of value.

That is exactly what the Chinese government is trying to do. On Friday, president Xi Jinping repeated his assertion that China will not devalue the yuan, but instead will keep its value stable.

Meanwhile, China is offering oil and gold futures denominated in yuan, which effectively allow oil earnings to be hedged and potentially converted into gold. And Beijing has indeed kept the value of the yuan relatively stable, especially against other Asian currencies. What’s more, it has ensured that Chinese government bonds have offered better total returns over recent years than other “risk free” assets, including US Treasuries or German Bunds.

All these measures are aimed at persuading China’s trading partners to use and hold more yuan. So far, Beijing’s successes have been modest. Qatar is accepting some gas payments in yuan. And Russia last year moved around US$50 billion of its foreign reserves from US dollars to yuan.

Now, the threat that Washington will enforce its sanctions against Iran on third-party oil importers is only likely to accelerate the move towards the yuan as a trading and reserve currency. Countries in Asia especially are likely to reason that if trading in US dollars means allowing the US government to police who you deal with, then it makes good sense to transact your business in another currency, and the yuan is an obvious candidate.

In short, US sanctions on Iran are helping to promote the formation of a new informal Asian monetary bloc centred on the yuan, at the expense of the US currency. In retrospect, 2019 may come to be regarded as the year that US economic influence in Asia really began to wane – all because of Washington’s misguided weaponisation of the US dollar.

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