印度不会成为下一个中国，但据说就这样也挺好_风闻

印度《经济时报》4月29日刊登摩根士丹利新兴市场和全球宏观投资管理主管鲁奇尔•夏尔马文章《为什么印度成为不了、也不应成为下一个中国》

文：Ruchir Sharma

译：Kris

纳伦德拉·莫迪2014年当选印度总理的时候，他希望在印度范围内干成他在古吉拉特邦担任首席部长时做到的事：让印度经济像中国那样快速增长，建立高效的官僚机构和先进工厂，吸引来自跨国公司的巨大投资。

五年后的今天，随着莫迪开始寻求在大选中取得连任，有一件事显而易见，那就是他不会使印度成为下一个中国，因为这是不可能做到的。

许多人喜欢拿中印两个大国来作比较，但两国除了人口都超过10亿以外，没有任何共同点。由一党执政的中国，可以动员说普通话的绝大多数国民，推进持续数十年的激进改革运动。而作为一个多元化的多党民主国家，印度一直很难将操着各种语言的几百个民族拧成一股绳，为了同一个目标而努力。

莫迪在古吉拉特邦的政绩证明，强势领导人可以靠发号施令改变印度，但一次只能改变一个邦。他于2002至2007年担任古吉拉特首席部长期间，该邦经济每年以接近12%的速度增长，创下各个印度大邦增长速度之最的记录。

但当上总理之后，莫迪却无法使印度整体经济交出同样亮眼的答卷。印度经济以6%至7%的速度缓缓前行，远低于中国处于同一发展水平时——即上世纪90年代——两位数的增长率。

上世纪70年代末，中国决心终结社会停滞和混乱的局面，开始放松对经济的控制。广大农村生产力得到了解放，农户可以选择耕种承包的土地，也可以去沿海省份谋求工作。中国在沿海城市设立经济特区，解脱官僚主义的束缚，使新的就业机会应运而生。政府还关停许多经营不善的国营工厂，无数下岗职工面临再就业问题。许多没有社保兜底的人被迫在蓬勃发展的私有部门自谋出路，这为此后十数年经济的两位数增长奠定了基础。

印度从来不敢冒这样大的风险，通过大规模下岗再就业和人口流动来促进经济增长，很大程度上是因为印度的民主领导人害怕短期的动荡和痛苦会使他们被选民无情抛弃。这样一来，印度从农村到城市、从农场到工厂，从国营到私营的转型便比中国按部就班得多。直到现在，大多数印度人的生活和工作仍然离不开农场，农村人口占总人口的70%。在印度，你基本看不到在中国比比皆是的新兴城市。效率低下的国营部门仍然主管着许多商业公司。

印度也尝试着进行了自由市场改革，但那只是经济危机压力下的被迫之举，而不是像中国那样稳定的长期战略。莫迪在第一个总理任期内，继续走渐进式改革道路，这个方式是印度支离破碎的选区里的各种社群所能共同接受的。例如，他没有大规模推进私有化，甚至没有向臃肿的国有银行动刀，而它们正是导致印度增长迟缓的主要障碍。

从莫迪的人民党和主要反对党近期公布的政党宣言来看，2019年印度大选结果有一点是完全可以肯定的。未来印度的土地购置和劳动力市场相关法律法规不会放松，国有企业规模也不会缩减，而当初正是这些改革释放了中国、韩国、日本和台湾地区的增长潜力，成就它们的经济奇迹。相反，印度各党统统承诺发钱。这会加重国家负担，使其无力投资道路、港口和电厂。

世界人口最多的两个国家在沿着截然不同的道路前行：中国走向自由市场式共产主义，印度则走向依赖国家型民主。两国的反差相当鲜明。

想想中国是如何通打造一个无现金社会的：先为技术公司解绑，然后靠它们来构建移动支付软件平台。这样一来，就在过去的几年里，现金几乎已经从上海、北京等大城市里消失了。2016年莫迪也尝试靠“废钞令”禁止发行大额纸币，促进印度走向无现金化，但结果不但没有使社会转而使用某种数字货币，反而导致现金短缺，对经济的影响直到今天仍然存在。

那么这是否意味着专制政府更有益于印度呢？完全不是。因为尽管有中国这样成功的一党制国家，仍然有古巴、委内瑞拉和朝鲜等许多失败的例子。中国有优秀的领导人，这是它的幸运。但中国是一个特例，不是适合印度和其他发展中经济体效仿的模式。

更重要的是，强有力的中央集权尤其不适合印度，印度的29个邦里有许多邦认为自己几乎是独立的国家。每当印度总理试图把权力集中到德里时，各邦的领导人便会站出来强烈反对，这正是上世纪70年代英迪拉·甘地遇到的状况。

与其说印度是一个国家，不如说它是一块大陆。印度各邦之间语言、文化和种族的差异比欧洲各个国家之间更显著。印度经济最好还是交给各邦内部熟悉当地情况的民选领导人分别管理，而不是由中央政权说了算。

仅仅五年前，外界还期待中国的经济自由化会通往政治自由化，但现在来看这种幻想已经破灭了。当印度刚成为民主国家的时候，外界对它的期望是政治自由化将使通往经济自由化，然而印度一连串信奉国家主义的总理却破坏了这个梦想。

如今，我们仍然有理由对印度的经济前景保持信心，但不能把希望寄托在德里的总理身上，而应期待各邦充满活力的首席部长有所作为。这些部长往往也是各政党的地方领导人。现在外界普遍认为，莫迪及人民党可能会继续掌权，但在国会中所占议席数量会减少，这将导致他更加依赖地方领导人。

这不是件坏事。对印度来说，最好是安然接受其高度多元化和民主化的本质，并赋予各邦领导人更多自治权，而不要试图成为下一个中国。

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Why India can’t be the next China, and shouldn’t try

When Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014 one hope was that he would do for India what he had done as chief minister in the state of Gujarat: build a fast-growing economy like China’s, with an efficient bureaucracy and advanced factories attracting billions in investment from multinational corporations. 

Five years later, with Modi seeking a second term in India’s general elections, it’s clear that he won’t make India the next China, because it’s not possible. 

Comparing these two giants is a popular thought experiment, but they have nothing in common other than populations of a billion plus. China is a one-party autocracy that mobilised its homogeneous Han and Mandarin-speaking majorities behind adecades-long campaign of radical reform. India is a diverse multi-party democracy that will always struggle to rally its hundreds of ethnic and linguistic minorities behind any single goal. 

What Modi proved in Gujarat was that a strong leader can command change inIndia, but only one state at a time. In Modi’s first-term as chief minister between 2002 and 2007, Gujarat’s economy grew at a nearly 12 per cent a year pace, the fastest rate ever recorded in any major Indian state, under any chief minister. 

As prime minister, Modi has been unable to generate the same kind of performance for the Indian economy as a whole; it has rumbled along at a rate of 6 to 7 percent — far below the double-digit pace recorded by China in the 1990s, when it was at the same level of development as India today. 

Fed up with the stagnation and chaos China suffered under Mao, its communist bosses began loosening their control over the economy in the late 1970s. They freed rural Chinese to till their own land or leave the interior provinces in search of work. They created economic zones free of heavy bureaucratic control in coastal cities, where new jobs flourished. The authorities also closed thousands of rusting state factories, which threw tens of millions out of work. With no social safety net, many were forced to find new livelihoods in the burgeoning private sector, which was responsible for the subsequent decades of double-digit growth. 

India has never risked anything like mass firings and large-scale migration to promote growth, in large part because its democratic leaders fear voters would punish them for the short-term upheaval and pain. As a result, India has seen a much more gradual shift from rural to urban, farm to factory, state to private sector, than China has. Most Indians still live and work on the farm. The population is 70 per cent rural. Booming new cities are as rare in India as they are common in China. Many business sectors remain largely owned and operated by the inefficient state. 

India has tinkered with free-market reforms, but only under pressure from economic crises, not as a steady long-term strategy like China. In his first term as prime minister, Modi continued on a path of gradual change, acceptable to the countless communities in India’s fractured electorate. He has for example pushed no broad privatisation, not even in the bloated state banks, which are a major obstacle to faster growth.

Already, one outcome of the 2019 election is entirely predictable, based on the party manifestos recently released by Modi and the main opposition parties. It will not lead to the easing of land acquisition laws or labour market rules, or the downsizing of state companies — the kinds of reforms that unleashed years of miracle growth in China, and in Korea, Japan and Taiwan before it. Instead, the manifestos offer dole-outs that will leave the overburdened state less money to invest in roads, ports and electricity plants.

The world’s most populous nations are evolving along very different paths – China toward freemarket communism, India toward state-dependent democracy. The contrast can be quite striking. 

Consider how China created a cashless society by freeing its tech giants to create the software platforms that made it possible; within the last few years cash has virtually disappeared as a medium of exchange in big cities like Shanghai or Beijing. Modi tried to promote the same goal by state fiat; suddenly withdrawing all big bills overnight in late 2016. The result was not a sudden shift to digital forms of currency; it was a shortage of the old kind that is still weighing on the economy today. 

Does this suggest that India would have been better off under an autocratic government? Not at all. For every authoritarian success story, like China, there are multiple failures like Cuba, Venezuela or North Korea. China got lucky with good leadership. It is an exceptional case, not a model for India and other developing economies to copy. 

More importantly, strong, centralised rule is particularly ill-suited to India, where many of the 29 states see themselves almost as separate countries. Whenever the prime ministers try to centralise more power in Delhi, as Indira Gandhi did in the 1970s, they have triggered a backlash, often led by state leaders. 

India is more a continent than a country, its states more varied in language, culture and ethnicity than the nations of Europe. Its economy is best-managed one state at a time, by a democratic leader close to local conditions, not by an authoritarian regime at the Centre. 

As recently as five years ago, the hope for China was that economic freedom would lead to political freedom, but that dream has been dashed by the tightening of the communist party rule. The hope for India, which became a democracy when it was still very poor, was that political freedom would lead to economic freedom, but that dream has been undermined by a long line of statist prime ministers. 

There is still reason to believe in India’s economic prospects, but hope won’t come from prime ministers in Delhi, it will come from dynamic chief ministers in state capitals. These figures often double as leaders of their own regional parties. Right now the conventional wisdom is that Modi and his party are likely to return to power but with fewer seats in the Parliament, which would leave him more dependent on regional leaders. 

That would not be a bad outcome. India is better off accepting its exuberantly diverse and democratic nature, and giving its state leaders more authority to govern themselves, than trying to be the next China. 

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