欧洲考虑怎么对待中国，美国想着怎么对付中国_风闻

《南华早报》4月1日刊登新加坡国立大学李光耀公共政策学院前院长马凯硕和亚洲与全球化研究中心高级研究员帕拉格·康纳文章《意大利加入“一带一路”反映美欧的亚洲政策存在差异》

文：Parag Khanna & Kishore Mahbubani

译：Kris

北京大学每年夏天都会迎来大约50名都灵大学的商科学生，他们利用这个暑期学术项目的机会到中国来学习中文、宏观经济学，并在中国企业里实习。

这些年轻人自称为“21世纪的马可·波罗”，算是以一种幽默的方式致敬这位13世纪著名的威尼斯探险家。当被问及未来的职业目标时，不少人都表示希望成为中国工商银行意大利分行的经理。

我们不妨以此作为背景，来分析不久前习近平主席对欧洲三国的国事访问。在习主席访问意大利期间，意大利正式成为七国集团里第一个加入中国“一带一路”倡议的国家。具有历史性意义的“一带一路”旨在为古丝绸之路沿线的亚洲、欧洲和非洲地区协调基础设施投资，总规模超过万亿美元。

意大利将自己视作中国向欧洲出口之路上的天然门户。三年前，希腊比雷埃夫斯港在中远海运集团的投资下获救，并成为了欧洲增长最快的港口之一。据德国《时代周报》报道，今年比雷埃夫斯将取代汉堡成为欧洲第三大港。

意大利计划从亚洲基础设施投资银行贷款开发的里雅斯特港，该港位于亚德里亚海战略要地，比汉堡与慕尼黑的距离还近300公里。难怪德国会对意大利诽谤中伤。

中国在塞尔维亚等巴尔干国家的某些基建项目受到非议，被认为性价比不高。尽管欧洲人的批评不无道理，但他们只能怪自己没有就中国投资形成统一意见。

南欧的希腊、葡萄牙等国和巴尔干国家一样，都受到2008年金融危机以及随后欧洲银行间拆借大幅萎缩的严重连锁影响。

后冷战时期，欧盟和西方国家分配给地中海国家的结构调整资金和私募资本越来越少，于是金融和物流的大门开始向中国敞开。

意大利是第14个与中国签署“一带一路”合作备忘录的欧盟成员国。与其责怪中国利用机会，欧盟不如反省一下自身对成员国的忽视。

欧洲经常让试图分裂欧洲的外部势力有机可乘，却从不自我检讨。本世纪初，美国为了争取外界支持其发动伊拉克战争，成功地将欧洲分化为“旧欧洲”和“新欧洲”。而如今，俄罗斯的北溪-2天然气项目又引起了极大争议。

该项目得到了德国的支持，但遭到美国反对，因为后者试图限制俄罗斯的天然气出口以便为本国天然气扩大市场。

中国的出现使欧洲局面更加混乱。德国和法国支持欧盟委员会的声明，将中国称作“系统性竞争对手”。但这两个国家的对华贸易反而最为平衡。

英国为了促进本国企业在“一带一路”沿线国家的业务，已经联手中国成立了“中英基础设施联盟”。意大利若再不推出类似的举措，便是不明智的。

老挝和斯里兰卡等小国偿还中国的普通贷款可能比较吃力，但意大利能以更优惠的条件获得亚投行贷款。与希腊的情况类似，意大利可以通过加入“一带一路”倡议创造更多就业机会，升级基础设施并促进与亚洲的贸易。

尽管欧洲内部积怨不浅，但中欧关系毫无疑问比中美关系更稳定、更富有成效。中欧贸易总量超过了中美贸易额，而中美贸易冲突只会进一步巩固欧洲相对于美国的领先优势。

中国已给予瑞银集团等欧洲银行在中国金融公司持有多数股份的特权；习主席访问法国期间，空客公司与中国各大航空公司签下出售300架客机的大单，大大改变美国波音公司面临的全球竞争环境。

值得注意的是，就在习主席出访欧洲的同时，中国发展高层论坛在北京召开。戴姆勒、宝马、西门子、博世、壳牌、安盛、联合利华等众多欧洲企业集团纷纷出席。

在西方提出市场准入对等性之后，中国逐渐开放市场。随着这一进程逐渐深化，最有可能获益的便是欧洲企业。

因此，虽然美欧对中国的战略雄心一致表示怀疑，但这只是表面现象，习主席出访欧洲让世人看清大西洋两岸在对待亚洲新兴大国的问题上存在根本性分歧。

一方面是美国不断加剧与中国的贸易冲突，并用各种关税逼得日本、韩国和印度等盟友与自己渐行渐远；另一方面欧盟与日本的自贸协定已经生效，与印度和东盟的贸易谈判也在进行当中。

另外，即便欧洲的某些表态有批评中国的意思，但这并不影响欧盟去年9月颁布的“欧亚连通战略”——它是对“一带一路”的回应。

不难看出，欧洲和美国对华政策的重大差异还不止于此。尽管欧洲也有保护主义倾向，但并没有下禁令驱逐华为，而是对其进行检视。比如德国要求华为与该国境内的信息安全实验室共享源代码。

美国拒绝了中国对其能源、技术等领域进行大规模投资，导致2018年期间中国对美直接投资下降了84％。而欧洲则忙着建立规章制度，对机器人等敏感领域投资进行审查。

与此同时，在欧洲许多中型企业和家族企业中，随着老一代领导者退休，新的管理层希望扩大亚洲业务，因此它们仍在大量吸收中国投资。中国对欧洲国家的直接投资总额已超过600亿美元。

同样重要的是，长期来看，中国在非洲投资飞速增长符合欧洲的根本利益。只有非洲取得经济发展，才能阻止更多的移民涌向欧洲。

欧盟与亚洲的货物贸易总额达到了1.6万亿美元，这个数字还在迅速攀升（而欧盟与美国的贸易额仅为7090亿美元）。未来，随着美国继续将中国、俄罗斯和伊朗视作安全威胁，欧亚之间的长期利益会越来越一致。

正如王毅外长不久前在布鲁塞尔的讲话中所提到的那样，“中欧关系当前总体向好，双方之间的共识远远多于分歧。”

如果下个月在华盛顿举办的北约成立70周年峰会变成美欧之间的口角之争，人们大概也会感到习以为常。特朗普政府企图将北约改造成一个反华联盟，而欧洲人则会继续提反对意见，并逃避承担更多的军费开支。

第二届“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛也将于本月在北京召开。尽管美国试图将“一带一路”倡议归作“面子工程”，但随着后者越来越大地冲击美欧关系，事实证明美国只是嘴硬罢了。

Italy joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative highlights different approaches of Europe and the US on Asia policy

At the annual summer academy for University of Turin students held on the campus of Peking University, about 50 Italian business students spend their days learning Mandarin, studying macroeconomics and interning with Chinese companies.

They call themselves the “Marco Polos of the 21st century”, a giggling nod to the famed 13th-century Venetian explorer. When asked what their career ambitions are, more than a few share the same goal: to be a country manager for China’s ICBC Bank back home in Italy.

This is worth remembering when analysing Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent state visits in Europe, during which Italy formally became the first G7 country to join China’s monumental Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious effort to coordinate trillions of dollars of infrastructure investment across the regions of Africa, Europe and Asia historically bound by the Silk Road.

Italy sees itself as a natural gateway for Chinese export ambitions into Europe. Investment from China’s Cosco Shipping rescued Greece’s Piraeus port three years ago, turning it into one of Europe’s fastest growing. According to Germany newspaper Die Zeit, Piraeus will displace Hamburg as Europe’s third-busiest port this year.

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No wonder Germany has cast aspersions on Italy’s plans to take loans from the mostly China-funded Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to develop strategically located Adriatic Sea ports such as Trieste, which is over 300km closer to Munich than Hamburg.

While Europeans have valid concerns about the cost and utility of certain Chinese-backed infrastructure projects in Balkan countries such as Serbia, they have only themselves to blame for these internal divisions over investment from China.

Southern European countries such as Greece and Portugal, as well as those in the Balkans, were hit hard by the knock-on effects of the 2008 financial crisis and the significant contraction of European intra-bank lending that followed.

With diminished structural adjustment funds and private capital coming from their post-cold war patrons in Brussels and other Western capitals, the door was left open for China to make financial and logistical inroads into the Mediterranean.

In the past three years, Italy has become the 14th European Union member to sign a memorandum with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. European neglect is to blame for Chinese opportunism.

Far too often, Europe allows itself to be divided by outside powers, blaming them rather than itself. The US managed to split “old Europe” and “new Europe” to garner support for its 2003 Iraq war. Currently, Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline has caused much controversy.

It is supported by Germany but opposed by the US, which seeks to curtail Russian gas exports while promoting its own liquefied natural gas.

China’s presence now compounds the disarray. Germany and France have backed a European Commission statement calling China a “systemic rival”. Yet, they enjoy the most balanced trade with it.

For its part, Britain has forged a “UK-China infrastructure alliance” aimed at boosting British business in countries where belt and road capital is flowing. Italy would be foolish not to pursue a similar path. Smaller countries like Laos and Sri Lanka may be struggling to pay off non-concessionary loans from Chinese bilateral agencies.

Italy will get loans at more favourable rates from the AIIB. As with Greece, Italy’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative is likely to create jobs, upgrade infrastructure and boost trade with Asia.

Despite the internal rancour, there is no question that Europe has a more stable and productive relationship with China than the US does. European trade with China exceeds China’s trade with the US, and the US-China trade war will only enhance Europe’s lead.

China has given European banks, such as UBS, privileged rights to own majority stakes in Chinese financial firms, and during Xi’s visit to France, Airbus signed a massive deal for 300 new aircraft to be sold to multiple Chinese airlines, significantly tilting the global aviation rivalry against Boeing.

Indeed, it is worth noting that, at the same time as Xi’s Europe tour, the China Development Forum was under way in Beijing, with major corporate participation and patronage from Daimler, BMW, Siemens, Bosch, Shell, AXA, Unilever, and many other European conglomerates.

As China slowly opens up its markets, in the name of the reciprocity the West demands, corporate Europe appears most likely to reap the benefits.

Thus, despite the new superficial alignment between the US and Europe in expressing suspicion over China’s strategic ambitions, Xi’s visit to Europe more fundamentally underscores the transatlantic divide over how to deal with rising Asian powers.

While the US has escalated its trade war with China and alienated allies Japan, South Korea and India with various tariffs, the EU’s free trade agreement with Japan has just gone into effect, with similar agreements under negotiation with India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Furthermore, Europe’s critical statements about China don’t nullify the “Asia connectivity strategy”, the EU’s answer to the Belt and Road Initiative, announced in Brussels last September.

It is not difficult to spot other major differences in China policy. While Europe has protectionist tendencies, it is not blocking Huawei but screening it, with Germany requiring the firm to share source codes in onshore information security labs.

While the US has rejected significant Chinese investment in energy, technology and other sectors – Chinese foreign direct investment into the US fell 84 per cent over the course of 2018 – Europe is instituting investment screening into sensitive areas such as robotics.

At the same time, European mid-size companies and family businesses are still drawing in large amounts of Chinese investment as an older generation retires and management committees seek greater Asian exposure. Total Chinese foreign direct investment into Europe has crossed US$60 billion.

Equally importantly, the surge in Chinese investment in Africa serves Europe’s fundamental long-term interests. Only the economic development of Africa will prevent more migrants going into Europe.

With annual EU-Asian trade totalling US$1.6 trillion in goods, and climbing rapidly (versus only US$709 billion in US-EU trade), Europe’s convergence of long-term interests with Asia is likely to advance while the US continues to view China, Russia and Iran through the prism of security alone.

As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi himself put it during a speech in Brussels recently, “Between China and Europe, sometimes we have differences, but we have far more common ground.”

It should not come as a surprise, then, if next month’s 70th anniversary Nato summit in Washington devolves into the transatlantic bickering we have become accustomed to, with the Trump administration seeking to steer Nato into an anti-China compact with Europeans as usual demurring and continuing to shirk promises of greater military spending.

April will also witness the second belt and road summit in Beijing. While Washington officials have dismissed the Belt and Road Initiative as “vanity project”, the growing impact it is having on transatlantic relations shows that it is anything but.

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