并非最后一战:中美贸易战的前途和世界经济体系的命运_风闻
Kris-观察者网编辑-洋媒吐气主讲2018-06-01 10:53

据陈平老师在美国的一线观察,美国正在进行以中国为战略敌手的全国动员,开始对全美人民统一思想,灌输信念。于此,我们对5月29日白宫突然宣布的仍然要与中国打贸易战的消息可能要料敌从宽,看看这场贸易战真打成战略决战会是什么样的。
虽然特朗普今天就可能把继续打贸易战的话收回去,这一波贸易摩擦美国也必然不能取胜。但应该说美国此役过后不会善罢甘休。这次美国不能取胜,是因为它的规模比美国想要达到的目的小的太多了。如果要战略进攻它可能会愿意付更大代价,打一场更大规模的贸易——金融战。
这次贸易摩擦,美方到北京提出的条件于它来说是合理的愿望,但不是合理的目标。它要将中国在全球劳动分工中的地位锁定在目前的位置上,不能再向高科技树攀爬。这么严肃的战略目标作为美国的愿望很合理,但小摩擦抛出大目标,这未免太儿戏了,结果小摩擦还没解决,这边厢习大大已经说“关键核心技术是要不来、买不来、讨不来的”,一下子帮中国做了一个长远决策。
“百里而趣利者蹶上将军”,特朗普口中说的是针对贸易逆差,却突然没有任何准备的提出大要价,如同大军未出却要灭人之国,美国根本没有把它的愿望设立为可执行的目标,被完全拒绝实属正常。
但万一它真的操作一场全面的战略进攻呢?
我们知道二战之后的全球化2.0版本和二战前列强争霸掠夺殖民地的全球化1.0不同,特征之一就是霸权决定全球劳动分工,而一国在全球劳动分工的地位决定了国穷国富。无论是苏东集团的经互会,还是美国带领的西方集团,其成员在全球劳动分工中的地位是老大决定的。举例来说,都说1980年代的美日贸易争端是贸易战,但细究的话,日本能做什么产业,本就是美国决定的,严格来讲那是老师给学生布置作业而不是贸易战。比如二战后美国一度基本将日本重工业一锅端掉了,现在它的很多产业,比如飞机产业,严格被压。至今,为了保护飞机产业那点余脉,自卫队不管日本货如何价格奇高,也要捏着鼻子买美国战斗机的日本组装版;大家也别忘了“广场协议”根本就是美日你情我愿的事。
但中国不同,中国自主决定产业结构的能力和美苏决定它国产业结构的权力一样,是在血与火的战场上打出来的。鸦片战争到建国前,中国基本已经被锁定为半殖民地的农业、原材料供应国。共产党带领全国人民打赢了解放战争和朝鲜战争,不但收回了美国资本借抗战获得的中国自然资源股权,还拒绝了苏联要求中国再次成为农业国的分工安排。亚当·斯密在《国富论》里头定义什么是“财富wealth”,用的是政治经济学的解释:财富即权力(power)。一国在全球劳动分工中的地位,首先是政治问题,其次才是经济和科技问题。
美国由苏联解体和中国改革开放后的经验,觉得它决定中国劳动分工的位置再正常不过了,而要防止衰落,必须处理中国这个对手,所以它提的条件是很合理的愿望。但中美建交以来,中国接受美日的资本和产业转移,为美国提供消费品生产,并非始自美国安排劳动分工的权力,而是中国和美国双方自主决定的战略耦合,这在史正富的著作《超常增长》一书中有详尽的分析。这就不是美国几千亿美元规模的贸易战可以左右的了。这次贸易争端如何解决不改变本质,最直接的影响是提醒了中国攀爬劳动分工的产业制高点不是单纯的商业行为,习近平的讲话和近期坊间对联想的非议,已经说明大家认识到看待高科技产业的视角根本上讲并不是“进口芯片每年要花几千亿美元”这种单纯商业上的考虑。
所以陈平老师提到前日,美国台高调纪念“被遗忘的”朝鲜战争,突显中国是美国的主要战争对手,公开篡改历史把发动朝鲜战争的责任说成是中国、进行战争动员。美国意识到它要想决定中国的位置,就需要举国之力认认真真打一战。
我们当然不希望和它打,因为没道理当年打赢了现在却打不赢,所以想想双方要付出的巨大代价,肯定认为这是没有必要的“瞎折腾”。但是现实已经说明,这次贸易摩擦可能不是最后一战,我们反复说金融是美国对中国有绝对优势的领域,一旦在此发动战争我们就很难受,代价会很大。
中美贸易战的前途如何,很重要的一点是防止它演变为贸易——金融战。但金融是美国的国本,在此开战需要全国共识,这美国已经开始凝聚。我们必须争取真正关心美国前途的美国人,防止这种对双方百害而无一利的共识形成,避免战火升级。美国就算衰落,那也不是中国的原因,美国对此须有正确认识。
未来几十年世界经济体系的命运也系于此。且不说城门失火殃及池鱼,美国在全球分工体系中的衰落和被赶超几乎难以阻止,引起的普遍焦虑促使特朗普一直在砍全球化的大旗。中国能自主决定自己的产业,但是没有也不会追求安排它国产业的权力,“人类命运共同体”是不是能带来全球化的3.0版本?那应该是一个所有国家都能自主选择前进方向,自主在适合自己的产业位置充分发展,在此基础上充分合作的全球化。希望美国不要破坏这个全球经济体系的美好愿景,中国有很多国际朋友可以争取。
*作者唐毅南系复旦大学中国研究院研究员
China-US Trade War And The War that Really Matters
A specter is haunting the world, the specter of US trade hawks. On May 29, by scrapping earlier trade truce and renewing tariff threats, the Trump Administration is not only moving against what it perceives to be one of its greatest strategic rivals but also mobilizing the masses and aligning their thinking with misplaced trade protectionism, which could spell disruption for the global economy. It is prudent for China to consider the worst-case scenario in which the bilateral trade war eventually evolves into a strategic showdown.
It is important to note that the United States will make relentless efforts to suppress China from challenging its global supremacy, even though there’s a chance that Trump may take back his bellicose rhetoric on trade any minute, and the odds of the US winning the ongoing trade skirmishes hands down are slim to none. The key factor limiting America’s success is the scale of conflict. Had the current tussle between Beijing and Washington been much grander in scale, a more strong-willed United States would not hesitate to drop financial weapons on trade battleground and make greater sacrifice in pursuit of ultimate strategic victory.
The terms brought up by American trade delegates in their negotiation with China reflect the US’s desire to confine China to its current role in the global division of labor and prevent the manufacturing giant from upgrading its technology. However, a reasoned desire for a strategic outcome may not prove to be tactically reasonable. When the US flaunted its strategic goal in a lesser affray, it helped China make a long-term decision to go all in on scientific and technological self-reliance. In a recent meeting with China’s top science and engineering academicians, President Xi Jinping stressed the importance for key and core technologies to be “self-developed and controllable”.
The current situation was created by the US when the Trump Administration touted deficit reduction as a simple- though incorrect- way to restore trade balance, before it quickly stepped up demands for China to destroy its own technological future. If The Art of the Deal author had known The Art of War better, he would probably heed Sun Tzu’s words of wisdom, “covering an unusual distance at a stretch, the leader of your army division will fall into the hands of the enemy.” Having failed to set executable goals for its long-term vision, the US revealed its strategic intention to China and was therefore flatly rejected.
But what if the US was well-prepared to wage an all-front war against China?
A key feature distinguishing post-WWII globalization from that of the previous era in which colonial powers fought against each other to carve up the world is that the new model centers around a hegemon who arbitrates global division of labor, which in turn determines the wealth of nations. In both the former Eastern Bloc and the Western world, a member state’s role in the international division of labor had always been assigned by the pack’s alpha. For example, when Japan and the US were embroiled in trade disputes in the 1980s, the US was in a position to discipline Japan: which sectors it could continue to develop and from which it must withdraw. That never was a trade war. After WWII, there was a time when Japan’s heavy industry base was largely obliterated by the US, and even now the Asian economic powerhouse still faces tremendous pressure from its ally in many high-end sectors such as aircraft manufacturing. Until very recently, Japan had insisted on assembling military aircrafts procured from the US despite staggering cost of doing so domestically, so as to keep the industry alive.
China is not Japan. Forged by fire, risen from blood, China’s autonomy in shaping its own industrial structure is the result of a series of hard-won victories, similar to those that empowered the US and the USSR to shape other countries’ industrial structures. From the Opium War to 1949, the semi-colonial China had been assigned the roles of an agricultural producer and a raw material provider. China was only able to defy such hegemonic arrangement after the Communist Party led the country to victory in both the Civil War and the Korean War. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith gives a political economic definition of wealth, “wealth… is power.” Therefore, a nation’s position in the international division of labor is primarily a political issue, and only secondarily an economic and technological issue.
Based on its hegemonic experience, the US naturally feels it is in the right position to determine China’s place in the global division of labor. Besides, the US sees clearly the necessity of taking China down if it wants to prevent its own decline. However, the transfer of capital and industries from the US to China, and of consumer products from China to the US, is not the result of an America-dictated division of labor, but a coincidental outcome shaped by independent decisions from both sides.
Therefore, the political economic setup between China and the US is heftier than what a hundred-billion-dollar trade war could shake up. No matter how the current trade dispute may end, the fundamentals will not change, but China has come to the realization that the quest to “reach commanding heights in scientific and technological competition” requires much more than just commercial activities.
During the past National Memorial Day weekend, America has put up a pageantry to commemorate the “forgotten” Korean War, underscoring its historical enmity towards China and openly fabricating allegations that China was responsible for waging the war. It is an indication that America has come to the realization that winning an all-out war against China is the only way for it to lay down the law.
China has no intention to play America’s game, though it stands a good chance of winning it, because the cost will be immeasurable. However, facts on the ground suggest that the final showdown between China and the US may come one day even if the bilateral relation successfully endures the current trade conflict.
China has every interest in avoiding escalating a trade war into a financial war, because the US superpower lies its foundation on finance, thus America’s financial sector enjoys absolute advantage over the Chinese. As anti-China national consensus is beginning to take shape in the US, it is vitally important for those who are concerned with America’s future to understand the country’s resentful blame on China for its own decline is misplaced.
The fate of global economic system in the coming decades hinges upon America’s attitude towards China. While Americans are understandably anxious about losing their preeminence in the global division of labor, Trump is barking up the wrong tree by trying to reverse course on globalization- a hardly reversible process. As for China, it is determined to uphold its industrial autonomy, but it will never seek the power to dictate how other countries operate. Will China’s vision of “a community of shared future for mankind” represent the next stage of globalization? It may well be. Such globalization should give every nation full autonomy in deciding its own future as basis for international cooperation. China’s best hope for the enticing future is the US will not sabotage it.