李世默：全球主义的终结与世界新秩序的诞生

俗话说，屋漏偏逢连夜雨。自从2008年金融海啸以来，经济大衰退、欧元区危机、贸易协定停滞，俄罗斯和西方冲突加剧，欧洲选民反叛政治精英等事接踵而至，再加上不久前的英国退欧公投，全球化已呈强弩之末，势衰力乏有目共睹。然而，全球化的信徒们却大都选择视而不见，而最激烈的反全球化者们也没料到，他们能这么快攻占最高的堡垒——白宫。

特朗普当选美国总统，揭开新时代序幕

头戴颠覆者光环的特朗普入主白宫，让世界各大国领导内心或抓狂或窃喜，反应奇特。早在美国大选尘埃落定之前，日本首相安倍晋三不但多次对特朗普竞选总统表示忧心，而且特地在大选前仅与希拉里·克林顿会面；但在选举结果揭晓后，安倍又摇身一变，连忙赶往纽约特朗普大厦，面见准总统。欧洲各国首脑对特朗普当选的态度也是逡巡不定，德国总理默克尔竟然给未来德美合作提出了先决条件。俄国上下则是一片欣喜，俄罗斯总统普京在贺信中写道，特朗普的胜利可以为莫斯科和华盛顿带来“基于平等、相互尊重和实事求是的建设性对话”。

然而，中国作为最重要的大国之一，仍未明确表露态度。在美国大选期间，中国是特朗普抨击美国贸易现状最主要的靶子。然而，特朗普如其所言大概会退出“跨太平洋伙伴关系协定”（TPP），这样中国将成为获益者。在对外政策方面，特朗普持反干涉主义观点，这显然符合中国人的世界观。目前的迹象表明，中国政府尚未完全消化特朗普当选美国总统这一重磅事件，仍在精确调校其对策。

北京得抓紧时间了。在特朗普的胜利一头撞开的新时代，中国潜在的得与失都有可能是最大的。作为世界第二大经济体以及最大贸易国，中国对特朗普政府的应对，或许决定着这个世界将通往繁荣还是停滞，甚至影响着世界走向战争还是和平。

全球主义的死亡

全球化诞生于20世纪70年代，它最初只是个单纯的概念：在贸易、投资、旅游和信息互通的作用下，世界各地联系越来越紧密。但冷战后，它被注入了一种意识形态：全球主义。如今，人们几乎已难以分辨全球化和全球主义。

全球主义植根于被新自由主义者奉为圭臬的华盛顿共识。华盛顿共识是由冷战后首任美国总统比尔·克林顿政府发起，并由小布什和奥巴马持续贯彻执行的。在其构想中，全世界经济、政治和国际关系等领域的规则与标准，都将必然地迈向一体化。国家边界将逐渐失去意义，甚至消失。文化差异将让位于普世价值。选举民主和市场资本主义将主导整个世界。最终，所有国家都将以几乎相同的模式治理。

政党轮替并没有阻碍美国推动全球主义

美国依仗它巨大的硬实力和软实力推动了这一进程。在相当程度上，也正是基于这种逻辑，脱胎于新自由主义的新保守主义者和自由干涉主义者，把美国拖入了阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争。这就是问题所在：全球主义是现代版的特洛伊木马，它吞噬了全球化，成为脱缰的野马一往无前，直到如今被自己的狂妄自大所压垮。

在西方，鼓吹全球主义最卖力的信徒成了全球化最大的受益者。财富和权力集中于社会顶层，掌握在高高在上的资本所有者和调度者手中；贸易自由、多元文化主义、多边机构，乃至在他国策划政权更迭和国家创建等等，都得到这群人的青睐与乐些不疲的支持。但他们的愿景伤害了包括中产阶级在内的绝大多数人。距离赢得冷战仅过了一代人的时间，美国的工业基础便已被掏空，基础设施年久失修，教育系统江河日下，社会契约分崩离析。

除了造成经济衰败，全球主义还传播了一套新的社会价值观，威胁到社会团结。政治学者罗伯特·普特南（Robert Putnam）在其重要书作《独自玩保龄》（Bowling Alone）中，通过描写美国基层社区走向崩溃的种种细节，精确地捕捉到全球主义对美国社会的冲击。换句话说，美国精英打着全球化的旗号，在以他们的国家为代价构建他们的帝国。

欧洲也发生着同样的事情。欧盟总部的技术官员以及他们在各成员国中的盟友们，致力于不断扩张欧盟，并推行一套不断扩充的统一准则，而将各成员国人民的根本利益置之脑后。在部分欧洲国家，青年失业率竟持续处于50%高位。

如果全球主义精英们当初没有那么好高骛远，他们有可能走得更远。但现在补救似乎为时已晚，精英们赖以维持统治的投票箱背叛了他们，他们正在被推翻。

中国与全球化

中国从全球化中获利超过其他任何发展中国家。它从一个贫穷的农业经济体，转变为全球工业强国，同时还实现了六亿多人的脱贫。然而，中国坚持以自己的方式基于本国的国情参与全球化，在拥抱互联互通的同时，断然拒绝了全球主义。相反，中国不但巩固了其一党执政的政治制度，还能够审时度势，根据本国发展的优先顺序决定市场开放的速度和程度。

或许是因为察觉到这一点，特朗普把美国的许多病灶都怪罪到中国头上。让中国背这黑锅是不公平的。中国领导人所推行的当然是以中国国家利益为最终考量的政策，这是他们的责任；如果不这样做，才是他们的过失。话说回来，如果特朗普上台后专为美国人民的利益着想——用他的竞选口号来说，就是“美国优先”——那么其正当性也应该是不言而喻的。

中国应从特朗普的胜利中有所启示。中国不应把众多——甚至可能是大多数——美国人的觉醒视为对中国崛起的全面对抗，或认为两国将不可避免地由此走向势不两立的冲突。相反，中国应该以此为契机，来研究如何在新时代与美国打交道。

特朗普的崛起来得正是时候。中国的意见领袖一直以来只从美国精英那里获取关于美国的信息，所以他们跟那些美国媒体和智库的专家们一样，与美国城乡的中产阶级严重脱节。因此，他们很容易也和希拉里一样，把特朗普的支持者看作一群“卑鄙之徒”，认为他们只是一群教育程度低下的种族主义者和性别歧视者。这将是非常严重的误判。

中国只需看看镜子，就会更好地理解欧美的改变。中国人一向批评全球主义者唯我独尊的“一刀切”的价值、治理模式，呼吁世界各国寻求适合自身的发展道路。中国国家主席习近平曾说：“鞋子合不合脚，自已穿了才知道。”而今特朗普似乎准备让美国试穿几双新鞋子。另外，特朗普持对外不干涉主义态度，他曾强调“要使既无民主经验、又对民主化缺乏兴趣的国家成为西方民主国家，是种危险的想法。”这种说法在中国无疑会产生共鸣。

毫无疑问，特朗普专注于追求美国国家利益必将给中美两国之间造成冲突。但中国应当重视和尊重美国社会支撑特朗普崛起的民怨与诉求。如果特朗普正如预期的那样，在贸易上为难中国，中国最好保持一定程度的克制。针锋相对的贸易报复行动，可能引发地缘政治冲突，而在这种情况下，中美两国都会是输家。

从零和博弈到正和博弈

多年执政表现证明，中国领导人是睿智的，他们应已意识到，与特朗普治下的美国谋求共同利益，意味着前所未有的机会。

在根本上，中国人的理念与特朗普的愿景是兼容的。强大的主权国家对于当今国际体系的有效治理至关重要。文化的首要地位必须得到承认，国际统一规则的执行不应凌驾于国家主权与国情差异之上。此外，当双边外交更有效时，多边机构不应被用来压制双边接触。以上这些话，不论从特朗普或习近平口中说出来，都毫不令人意外。

在现实层面上，有许多政策可以使中美两国共赢。特朗普最重要的倡议之一，是重建美国破旧的基础设施。他承诺在该领域将投入一万亿美元，也许还不够。这个目标是明智的，将会通过创造就业，新建和升级道路、机场、水坝等基础设施，为美国经济注入急需的活力，但执行时必将遭遇财政限制和工业产能不足等诸多挑战。

中国在基础设施建设方面，是有两把刷子的。对此特朗普十分清楚，他在竞选演说中曾多次提到中国的基建能力。在竞选过程中，特朗普还高声抱怨，美国的基础设施与中国相比，属于“第三世界”水平。中国完全可以去美国发挥自己的长项。一方面，中国可以邀请美国加入亚洲基础设施投资银行（亚投行），并且优惠而迅速地为美国基建提供工业产能支持。这将大大有利于中国，因为中国的过剩资本与产能需要消化，而美国作为中国最大的贸易伙伴，提供了绝佳而互利的用武之地。

2013年，美国土木工程协会曾给美国基础设施评出D+的低分

在地缘政治领域，中美也不乏重大共同利益。特朗普和中国似乎都认识到，非国家行为体对世界和平构成了最严重的威胁。全球主义给世界带来的最严重创伤之一，是削弱了国家主权。在跨国恐怖主义威胁提升的今天尤其如此，全球主义架空了国家边界，压缩了政府权力，却没有提供有效的替代品，造就了一个更危险的世界。多年来，全球主义者一直变着法子谴责中国不识时务地固守国家主权，但在维护人民安全和利益方面中国似乎做得更好。在这方面，中国和特朗普治下的美国可以找到许多全新的交集。

即使在贸易领域，中美之间也并非完全得失对立。挂在全球主义精英嘴边的教条，将贸易自由与保护主义说成是国际贸易非此即彼的二元对立关系。任何回避全球标准化的人，都可能被扣上贸易保护主义者的帽子。（基于这种叙事，中国常常被批评奉行保护主义。）然而，全球主义者的二元对立叙事其实根本站不住脚。促进国际贸易与保护各国合法利益完全可以并行不悖。例如，中国关于亚太地区贸易扩张的提议，即区域全面经济伙伴关系（RCEP），考虑到参与国经济和政治条件各异，特别对各国关税和行业标准进行区分对待。

与此相反，奥巴马的跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（TPP）奉行一套单一化的规则，不顾各国不同发展阶段相应地在贸易领域的特殊要求。具有讽刺意义的是，许多美国人现在到头来认为该协定不适应本国的国情。随着中国经济结构的调整，对出口的依赖减少，内需旺盛、高附加值服务业展露头角；与此同时，美国开始寻求重建生产能力，中美完全可以探索扩大贸易的新途径。

最后，特朗普似乎凭直觉认识到了历史学家保罗·肯尼迪所说的“帝国过度扩张”现象对美国造成的损害。美国精英有种强烈的愿望，要按照美国形象去塑造全世界，这使美国乃至世界付出了巨大代价。美国人口在全世界占比不足5%，GDP总量占比约为20%，但其军费开支占全球总额的40%（在某些年份，这个数字甚至达到了50%）。特朗普表示希望减少这种干涉主义，全球主义精英们因此给他戴上孤立主义者的帽子。但事实上，这是他们在全球主义话语中设立的两个极端：一个是坚持对其他国家的治理指手画脚，另一个是彻底脱离国际事务，但在现实中，两者之间美国明明有很大舞台发挥重大作用。例如，美国应继续关注和影响中东事务，但终结其对当地的政权更迭或国家创建的干涉。

促使特朗普跳出意识形态桎梏，非常符合中国的利益。作为世界第二大经济体，中国有责任协助维持全球稳定。要实现这一点，中国可以像对菲律宾所做的那样缓和紧张的双边关系，通过在亚太地区调整地缘政治姿态来促进地区和平。另外，中国正迅速成为中东地区最大的石油进口国，该地区的稳定符合中国长远利益，中国可以考虑帮助美国分担处理中东事务的负担。

营造世界新秩序

特朗普的胜利并非意外，而是美国精英长期忽视自己眼皮底下社会结构发生剧变的结果。在这些力量的推动下，美国和世界将脱离此前延续25年的惯性轨道，沿着新的路径前进。中国领导人认清这一现实，并做出相应的反应，将至关重要。如果中国踏错一步，贸易战争、地缘政治对抗甚至军事冲突都可能接踵而至。不幸如此，则一个经典的修昔底德陷阱重现：崛起大国刺激守成大国产生恐惧心理，紧张局势升级为战争。美国开始在世界事务中将自己的国家利益置于首位，有其正当的理由，对此，中国比其他任何国家都更应心知肚明。同时中国也比其他任何国家更有能耐助美国一臂之力，让特朗普成功调整国策，应对当务之急。

全球主义的死亡并不意味全球化的终结

全球主义的死亡并不意味着最初意义上的全球化走向终结。相反，由于科技和经济领域的长期趋势，国家之间的互联互通程度可能继续增加。也就是说，世界比以往任何时候都更需要有效的全球治理。但新时期的全球治理必将脱离全球主义叙事。

世界需要新的秩序，这套新秩序绝非是建立在二十世纪意识形态断层线上的，也必需抛弃自负的“历史终结论”。它将尊重国与国之间的多样性，尊重国家主权和文化主体性。各国可以按照适合本国国情的方式自由合作，而不是根据某种单一的全球标准来治理世界。只有强大的主权国家才能有效地相互合作，并在适当时，为维护世界秩序，自愿调整主权范围。

如果我们希望二十一世纪是个和平繁荣的世纪，那么中国应该与特朗普治下的美国共同开拓新的未来。虽然中美两个大国之间竞争不可避免，但今天，中美的世界观出现了几乎前所未有的重叠，两国之间求大同存小异越来越可能。中国领导人应该留意特朗普今年四月发表的重要外交政策讲话：“我们渴望与俄罗斯及中国和平共处。我们与这两个国家有严重分歧，必须保持警惕，但它们并不一定要成为美国的敌人。我们应该在共同利益的基础上寻求共同点。”

目前，太多人极度悲观，美国和世界的未来在他们眼里晦暗无光，前景无比险恶，因此保持乐观尤为可贵。中国无意取代美国的世界主导地位，只寻求在周边地区重新确立应有的领导地位；美国则需关注自我重建。如果双方拥有足够智慧和务实精神，互相宽容，共同实现这些目标，或许能够制定出全球治理的新共识，藉以通向更加稳定的新世界。

全球主义自杀了，又一个世界秩序诞生了。让我们迈向新的时代吧。

（观察者网杨晗轶译自《外交事务》，翻页阅读英文原文）

The End of Globalism: Where China and the United States Go From Here

By Eric X. Li

When it rains, it pours. As the Great Recession, eurozone crisis, stalled trade deals, increased conflict between Russia and the West, electoral revolts against European political elites, and finally Brexit followed the 2008 financial meltdown, the fact that globalization was running out of steam should have been obvious to all. Yet most of its converts were blind, and even the fiercest rebels against globalization never expected to claim the top prize—the White House—and so soon.

World powers are now scrambling to react to Donald Trump’s paradigm-shifting election as president of the United States. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, after repeatedly expressing concern about a potential Trump presidency and pointedly meeting with only Hillary Clinton before the election, rushed to New York for face time with the president-elect. European leaders have been more ambivalent, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel even putting conditions on working with Trump. And the Russians have seemed downright gleeful; in a congratulatory note, Russian President Vladimir Putin wrote that Trump’s victory could bring “a constructive dialogue between Moscow and Washington on the principles of equality, mutual respect and real consideration.”

Yet the feelings of perhaps the most consequential power—China—remain somewhat unclear. During the campaign, China was a primary target of Trump’s dissatisfaction with trade. Yet Trump’s likely jettisoning of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement would immediately benefit China. And for obvious reasons, his anti-interventionist foreign policy outlook suits the Chinese. For now, there are signs that Beijing is still processing the enormous development and is calibrating its response.

It better hurry. In the new era ushered in by Trump’s victory, the Chinese have the most to gain—or to lose. And as the world’s second-largest economy and its largest trading nation, China’s response could mean the difference between prosperity and stagnation, and even war and peace, around the world.

THE RISE AND FALL OF GLOBALISM

Globalization started as an innocent enough concept in the 1970s: the world was becoming increasingly connected through trade, investment, travel, and information. But after the Cold War, it was injected with an ideological component: globalism. And now one can hardly distinguish between the two.

Globalism is rooted in the neo-liberal doctrine of the Washington Consensus, which was initiated by the first post–Cold War U.S. president, Bill Clinton, and carried out by the successive administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. It envisioned a world moving inextricably toward the adoption of a unified set of rules and standards in economics, politics, and international relations. National borders would gradually lose relevance and even disappear. Cultural distinctions would give way to universal values. Electoral democracy and market capitalism would spread the world over. Eventually, all countries would be governed in more or less the same way.

The process would be backed by the United States’ hard and soft power. Indeed, it was partially according to this logic that neo-liberalism’s offspring, the neo-conservatives and liberal interventionists, took America to war in Afghanistan and Iraq. And therein lies the problem; globalism was a Trojan Horse. It devoured globalization, turning it into a force that seemed unstoppable until it collapsed under the weight of its own hubris.

In the West, the leading disciples of globalism became its greatest beneficiaries. Wealth and power concentrated at the top, among the owners and deployers of capital, who favored free trade, multiculturalism, multilateral institutions, and even regime change and nation building in foreign lands. But their vision harmed the vast majority that constituted the middle class. Just one generation after winning the Cold War, the United States saw its industrial base hollow out, its infrastructure fall into disrepair, its education system deteriorate, and its social contract rip apart.

Beyond the economic damage, changes in social values propagated by globalism threatened social cohesion. The political scientist Robert Putnam captured the process best in his important book, Bowling Alone, in which he described in painful detail the collapse of American communities. In the name of globalization, in other words, American elites had been building an empire at the expense of a nation.

THE VIEW FROM BEIJING

China, more than any other developing country, has benefited from globalization. It saw itself transform from a poor agrarian economy into a global industrial powerhouse, all while lifting more than 600 million people out of poverty. Yet China chose to engage globalization on its own terms, embracing connectivity while decisively rejecting globalism. In turn, China was able to strengthen its one-party political system and open its market according to its own national development priorities.

Perhaps sensing as much, Trump has taken to blaming China for many of the United States’ ills. This seems wholly unfair. Chinese leaders simply exercised their responsibility to do what was best for their people. They would have been in the wrong if they hadn’t. But it is also wholly understandable and justified for Trump to want to do what is best for the American people—to put, as his slogan goes, “America First.”

Rather than balking, China should see this as a teachable moment. The awakening of a large portion of the American people should not be viewed as a wholesale rejection of China or as a precursor to unavoidable and fundamental conflicts. Rather, it should be seen as a study in how to engage the United States in a new era.

The lesson comes at an important moment. China’s opinion leaders tend to get their information about the United States from American elites. So they are just as disconnected from Middle America as those in the country’s own newsrooms and think tanks. As such, they are susceptible to seeing Trump’s supporters as “deplorables,” as Trump’s rival, Hillary Clinton, put it, who are racist, uneducated, and misogynistic. And that would be a grave misjudgment.

China would do better to look in the mirror to understand the ways in which the United States and Europe are changing for good. The Chinese have been among the loudest voices criticizing the one-size-fits-all model of globalism and calling for the world’s nations to be allowed to pursue their own development paths. As Chinese President Xi Jinping famously said, “One could only know if a pair of shoes are good by wearing them.” Trump, it seems, is ready to try on some new ones for America. Meanwhile, Trump’s non-interventionist approach to the world—he has emphasized that it was “a dangerous idea that we could make Western democracies out of countries that had no experience or interest in becoming a Western democracy,”—must hearten the Chinese.

No doubt, there will be conflicts as Trump pursues American national interests. But the grievances behind his rise deserve China’s attention and due respect. If, for example, Trump were to be less friendly to China on trade, as is expected, China would do well to exercise a degree of restraint. If it responds with tit-for-tat escalation, the risk of a geopolitical conflict is real. In such a scenario, both China and the United States would lose.

ROOM TO MANEUVER

Chinese leaders, having proved wise over so many years, should see unprecedented opportunities to pursue common interests with Trump’s America.

China’s ideas are fundamentally compatible with Trump’s vision. Strong sovereign nations are paramount to a functioning international system. The primacy of culture must be recognized, and enforcing uniform rules should never take precedence over national considerations. Multilateral institutions, moreover, should not be used to suppress bilateral engagements when bilateral arrangements are more effective. All these statements could have been uttered by Trump or by Xi.

On a practical level, there is a wide range of policies that could benefit both the United States and China. One of Trump’s most important initiatives is to rebuild America’s decrepit infrastructure. He has promised one trillion dollars in spending, which might not even be enough. His is a laudable goal that would infuse the U.S. economy with much-needed vitality by creating jobs and by building new roads, airports, and dams and upgrading existing ones. But challenges, namely financial constraints and industrial capacity, abound.

China understands a thing or two about building infrastructure. And as his many campaign speeches indicated, Trump knows it. On the campaign trail, Trump complained loudly that, compared with China, America’s infrastructure was “third world.” China could bring its considerable capacities to bear in the United States. For one, it could bring the United States into the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and supply industrial capacity on favorable terms and relatively quickly. This would significantly benefit China, which needs to deploy its excess capital and capacity. And there is no better place to do so than in its largest trading partner.

In the area of geopolitics, there are likewise significant common interests. Both Trump and China seem to recognize that the gravest threat to world peace comes from nonstate actors. One of the worst injuries globalism has inflicted on the world has been to weaken the state just as the threat of transnational terrorism has grown. By erasing national borders and diminishing the powers of national governments without providing a good replacement, globalism has created a more dangerous world. Over the years, of course, globalists have condemned China for a supposedly regressive insistence on protecting its national sovereignty. But China certainly seems to have fared better in protecting its people’s safety and interests. China and Trump’s America can find much common ground in that.

Even on trade, there is potential for convergence. The globalist elite narrative presents a dichotomy between free trade and protectionism. Anyone who eschews global standardization risks being labeled a protectionist. (In fact, China has frequently been accused of protectionism on those grounds.) But the globalists’ dichotomy is false. It is possible to promote trade and to protect legitimate national interests at the same time. For example, China’s proposal for trade expansion in Asia Pacific, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), specifically allows for many differentiations on tariffs and industry standards based on participating countries’ varied economic and political conditions.

By contrast, Obama’s TPP was solely designed to enforce a set of uniform rules regardless of the particular requirements of nations at very different stages of development. Ironically, many Americans now see the agreement as unsuitable to their country’s own needs. As China restructures its economy to rely less on exports and more on domestic demand and service industries, which are higher value-add, and as the United States seeks to rebuild productive capacity, the two countries are in a good position to explore new approaches to expanding their trade.

Last but not least, Trump seems to intuitively grasp the damage done to the United States by what the historian Paul Kennedy called imperial overreach. The desire by American elites to remake the world in their country’s own image has cost them—and the world—dearly. The United States has less than five percent of the world’s population and about 20 percent of its total GDP, but it accounts for 40 percent of its total military expenditures (that figure reaches half in some years). Trump has said that he would like to curtail such interventionism, and global elites have derided him as isolationist. But there is plenty of room between a United States that insists on telling other countries how to govern themselves and total disengagement. For example, the United States should remain engaged on Middle East issues, but end efforts at regime change or nation building there.

It is very much in China’s interest to encourage Trump’s shift away from an ideologically driven worldview. And, as the second largest economy in the world, China has a responsibility to help maintain global stability. It could do so by moderating its own geopolitical postures in the Asia Pacific so as to foster a more peaceful region, as it has already done with the Philippines. China could also share the burden in the Middle East, where it is fast becoming the region’s largest oil importer and has a long-term interest in stability.

A NEW WORLD ORDER?

Trump’s victory was not an accident. It was the culmination of structural changes within American society that elites had ignored for too long. These forces will continue to push the United States and the world down a different path than the one they’ve been on for 25 years now. It is critical that Chinese leaders see this reality and respond accordingly. If China gets it wrong, trade wars, geopolitical confrontations, and even military conflicts could follow. It would be a classic case of the Thucydides Trap, in which a rising power strikes fear in an established power and tensions escalate into war. The United States has legitimate reasons to place itself first in its dealings with the world. China, more than any other nation, should be capable of understanding that. And China, also more than any other nation, could offer Trump’s America room to successfully adjust its national priorities.

The death of globalism does not mean the end of globalization as the idea was originally understood. On the contrary, interconnectedness will probably continue to increase, driven by secular trends in technology and economics. Effective global governance, in other words, is needed more than ever. But it can no longer be based on the narrative of globalism.

The world needs a new order grounded not in twentieth-century ideological fault lines and the idea that history would soon reach its end, but in respect for diversity among nations, state sovereignty, and cultural integrity. Instead of trying to run the world according to a singular set of global standards, nations can cooperate freely in ways that are suited to their particular circumstances. Only strong sovereign states can effectively cooperate with each other and, when appropriate, willingly moderate their sovereignties for the benefit of world order.

If we want a peaceful and prosperous twenty-first century, China should work with Trump’s America to develop that new future. Although competition between the two powers will be unavoidable, their now-shared outlooks on the world and common interests far outweigh their differences. Indeed, China’s leaders would be well advised to hear what Trump had to say in a major foreign policy speech last April: “We desire to live peacefully and in friendship with Russia and China. We have serious differences with these two nations, and must regard them with open eyes, but we are not bound to be adversaries. We should seek common ground based on shared interests.”

With so much doomsday thinking—so many dire predictions about what’s going to happen to America and the world—a dose of optimism is needed. China harbors no designs to somehow replace the United States as the dominant world power. It naturally seeks to reclaim a leadership position in its neighborhood. And America needs to focus on rebuilding itself. If the two nations have the wisdom and pragmatism to work together on those goals, to live and let live, they can perhaps formulate a new consensus on global governance that will lead to a more stable world.

Globalism has committed suicide. A new world order has been born. Let’s engage it now.

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