阎学通：中美为战略伙伴而竞争

【中国一贯奉行不结盟政策，赢得了世界各国的尊重，但随着世界格局的改变，特别是中俄走近之后，在国际关系学界也出现了主张结盟的声音。清华大学当代国际关系研究院阎学通院长近日在《中美聚焦网》上发表文章，认为中国需要新的联盟战略，而不仅仅满足于所谓的“战略合作伙伴关系”，尤其是与“与亚太地区的美国盟友结成新的联盟，将能塑造一个有利于民族复兴的环境”。观察者网翻译全文，以资读者参考。】

2012年年底习近平的任期刚开始时，没人能想到2015年9月，来自美国三大盟国的领导人会前往北京出席纪念抗战胜利70周年的盛大阅兵式。但他们——韩国的朴槿惠总统、捷克总统米罗什·泽曼以及泰国副总理——的确来了。在那场展示中国军事实力的盛会上，他们就站在习近平主席身旁。

美国虽然仍是世界上唯一的超级大国，但中国正在逐渐缩短距离。中国已是世界第二大经济体，其领导人在国际场合发言时底气越来越足。虽然中国历史上一直避免与其他国家建立正式联盟，但这个政策正在慢慢发生变化：北京方面正在接触新的合作伙伴，其中包括了韩国等美国的盟友。

但中国若想成为像美国那样的超级大国，北京方面需要新的联盟战略，而不仅仅满足于所谓的“战略合作伙伴关系”。真正的盟国关系往往由条约约束 ，当一国安全受到战争冲突威胁时，盟国将提供防卫支援；相反，“战略伙伴关系”只是个漂亮的外交术语，两国只要签订过经济协议，基本上都能往里面套，这种关系不如真正的联盟那样紧密。

北京方面一直很厌恶联盟这个概念，因为中国自1982年以来，为避免被卷入冷战，一直奉行不结盟政策。不结盟的立场降低了卷入其他国家尤其是美苏之间冲突的风险，同时给予了中国政策制定者更多的独立性。此后，中国得以在不承担外交同盟义务的情况下，将精力集中到发展经济上去。

就目前来看，中国的“朋友圈”在深度广度上都远远不及美国。中国已经与大约70个国家建立了“战略合作伙伴”或“合作伙伴关系”，其中包括英国、法国、德国和意大利等许多美国的盟国。中国与这些国家的伙伴关系大多属于经济性质，而非传统的、全面的军事联盟。美国则与大约60个国家签署了全面条约，其中规定了军事合作。以这个标准来看，中国只有一个正式的盟友，那就是巴基斯坦。今年早些时候，中国与巴基斯坦签署了联合声明，将中巴关系提升到“全天候战略合作伙伴关系”。

在巩固双边战略合作方面，普通的战略合作伙伴关系显然不如军事同盟可靠。国内社会与国际社会之间的根本区别在于，后者当中不存在垄断军事力量的中央政府。因此，所有不具备充分军事能力的国家为求生存，必须借助外国军事力量或组织来保护本国的安全。对次要国家或小国来说，军事保护比经济援助更加重要。中国周边的国家若能通过与中国结盟换来安全保障，它们将支持中国实现民族复兴，但如果得不到这样的安全承诺，它们将担心中国可能对它们动武。

在与美国进行战略竞争的方面，中国需要更多的军事盟友，才能维持东亚的政治平衡。由于世界中心从跨大西洋转向亚太地区，美国若想遏制中国的崛起，很可能将强化“亚太再平衡”战略。中国若能恢复其1982年以前的结盟传统，与亚太地区的美国盟友结成新的联盟，将能塑造一个有利于民族复兴的环境。在该地区内，越多美国盟友成为中国的盟友，华盛顿方面达成“再平衡战略”目标的机会就越渺茫。

虽然许多国家的领导人出席中国9·3阅兵，说明了中国的对外战略正在慢慢转型，开始与更多国家进行更多军事合作；但该战略面临另一重与不结盟原则相关的障碍，即经济决定论。在过去三十年里，中国人一心争取经济成就，因此“以经促政”——即用经济手段改善政治关系——成为了中国外交的主要形式。建立经贸伙伴关系自然比完全没有战略合作更好，但它不如军事同盟对双边战略关系的影响大。

中国应该首先与地区邻国结盟。从地缘政治上讲，中国为了民族复兴大计，必须获取周边国家的战略支持。如果大多数邻国不认同中国的地区领导者角色，很难想象中国能成为世界级大国。民族复兴大计不仅比发展经济困难得多，而且还需要另一套高度重视周边军事合作的对外战略。一个国家的后院要是不安全，那么它几乎不可能在世界上发挥领导作用。

认为中国能在短期内与多数邻国结成联盟，是不现实的。然而，中国不是没有可能把同柬埔寨、老挝以及上合组织六个成员国之间的关系提升为与巴基斯坦一样的全面军事同盟，名义上可以也叫做“全天候战略合作伙伴”。美国是中国的主要战略竞争对手，它与中国某些邻国之间的冲突可能导致这些国家转而寻求中国的保护。地区军事霸权不掌握在中美任何一国手上，是某些国家——尤其是大多数东盟国家——更乐于见到的局面。与中美两国结盟相当于不结盟策略，能帮助这些国家减少对中美的依赖性，降低来自任何一方的威胁。

事实上，中国扩大结盟范围有助于抗衡美国的影响力，也有利于世界和平。大多数西方人可能更中意于一个以美国为首的单极世界，但并非所有国家都这样看。如果全球大国平衡向某个国家倾斜，那么该国制造的问题将比它解决的问题多。所有东盟国家都知道，要维护东盟在地区安全事务中的主导作用，唯一途径是保持中美之间的平衡，并迫使它们争取东盟的支持。

美国的欧洲盟友与中国之间不存在边境争议，也没有安全冲突，虽然这些国家目前与中国建立军事同盟还不现实，但建立经济战略合作伙伴关系是正确的一步。在中国所有邻国里，日本、菲律宾、越南和朝鲜与中国缔结联盟的可能性最低。虽然《中朝友好合作互助条约》尚未废除，但已经有名无实。多年以来，中朝之间既未发展军事关系，也没有高层互访。中国必须耐心等待这四个国家内部发生变化，改变对华政策。随着现任总统阿基诺三世将于明年下台，菲律宾可能第一个转变对中国的态度。

中国应该汲取冷战时期美苏争霸的经验教训。苏联在其盟国面前缺乏战略可信度，它们不相信苏联提供的安全保护，这在一定程度上导致了苏联的失败。相反，大多数盟国对苏联的军事势力充满戒心，害怕它做出1956年在匈牙利和1968年在捷克斯洛伐克那样的军事干预行动。这就是为什么1990年东德率先退出华约后，这个军事组织比苏联更早瓦解。反观美国，它对盟友的信誉为其最终赢得冷战作出了巨大贡献。正因为有这段历史，奥巴马的“再平衡战略”才会对传统盟友关系给予高度重视。

中美两国有许多人认为，如果中国采取结盟战略，世界将陷入新的冷战。然而，联盟网络只是冷战的必要条件，而不是充分条件。事实上，意识形态不是中美之间的核心冲突，所以两国不大可能把世界再次拖入冷战。每年往来于中美两国之间的旅客数以百万计，更何况双方经济联系广泛而密切，这些因素都会减少可预见的未来再次爆发冷战的可能性。

随着中国在未来十年内全面成长为超级大国，中美之间防止爆发军事冲突，维持和平竞争，对全世界都十分重要。由于两大巨人的冲突与竞争正在增加，预防性安全合作的重要性大于经济合作的重要性。建立网络安全治理规范是一个典型的案例。如果中国与邻国——尤其是美国的盟友——结盟，将对安全风险起到预防作用。它将从三个方面维护地区和平。首先，中国与邻国既已结盟，它们之间的安全冲突将减少。其次，结盟将降低美国介入其盟友与中国间冲突的危险。第三，它将把亚太地区军事平衡从不对称状态调整至相对平衡的状态，使中美双方在采取军事行动时都更加谨慎。

（本文英文原文载于chinausfocus.com，观察者网杨晗轶/译。）

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No one would have imagined in late 2012, at the start of Xi Jinping’s tenure as president of China, that by September 2015 leaders from three U.S. allies would attend an extravagant military parade put on by Beijing to celebrate the end of the Sino-Japanese War 70 years ago. But there they were -- President Park Geun-hye of South Korea, President Miloš Zeman of the Czech Republic and Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan of Thailand -- standing near President Xi earlier this month surveying the impressive display of modern military might.

America is still the world’s only superpower, but China is gradually catching up. China’s economy has become the second largest in the world, and the leadership is speaking with a louder voice in international affairs. And while historically China has eschewed building formal alliances with other countries, even that policy is slowly shifting: Beijing is courting new partners, including allies of Washington like President Park and others.

But for China to become a superpower like the United States, Beijing needs a new strategy that fully embraces genuine alliances, and not just so-called “strategic partnerships.” True allies are most often bound by treaties that commit each country to defending the other in times of security, conflict or war, while “strategic partnership” is only a nice diplomatic jargon for a bilateral relationship involving any number of agreements -- often economic in nature -- that falls short of true alliances.

The concept of alliances has been anathema to Beijing since 1982, when China adopted a non-alignment policy to avoid getting entangled in the Cold War. This position reduced the risk of being dragged into conflicts among other states, especially between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, while allowing for more independence in policymaking. Later on, freedom from diplomatic obligations was a policy that allowed China to focus energies on building its economy.

China’s current list of friends is no match for America’s. At present China has established about 70 “strategy partnerships” or “cooperation partnerships,” including with many American allies, such as Britain, France, Germany and Italy. These friendships are mostly economic in nature, not traditional, full-fledged military alliances, whereas the U.S. has about 60 full-fledged treaty allies that involve military cooperation. By that standard, China has only one full-fledged ally, namely Pakistan, which signed a joint statement with China to upgrade their relationship to an “all-weather strategic partnership of cooperation” early this year.

The ordinary strategic partnership cannot consolidate the bilateral strategic cooperation as reliably as a military alliance. The fundamental difference between domestic society and international society is that there is no central government monopolizing military power in the latter. Thus all states without enough military capability to protect their own security have to rely on a foreign military power or organization for the sake of survival. In comparison with economic aid, military protection is more crucial for the secondary or small states. Surrounding countries will support China to achieve national rejuvenation if in return it provides security protection to those states by making alliances. In the absence of that kind of promise, these neighbors fear that China could use military might against them.

In terms of strategic competition with the U.S., China also needs more military allies in order to maintain a political balance in East Asia. Due to the world’s center shifting from cross-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific, it is very possible for the U.S. to strengthen its Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy if it wishes to constrain China’s rise. China will be able to shape a favorable environment for its national rejuvenation if it resumes its alliance tradition from before 1982, especially making new alliances with American allies in Asia Pacific. The more U.S. allies in this region become China’s allies, the slighter chance for Washington’s rebalancing strategy to achieve its goal.

Although the presence of many foreign heads of state at the military parade shows China’s foreign strategy is slowly shifting towards developing more military cooperation with as many countries as possible, the strategy is also faced with another obstacle related to the non-alliance principle, namely economic determinism. In the last three decades, economic achievement has dominated the minds of Chinese people, and thus “improving political ties with economic approaches,” called yi-jing-cu-zheng, has become the dominant form of China’s diplomacy. Economic partnership is better than no strategic cooperation, but it does not have the same impact as military alliance on bilateral strategic relations.

China should start by forming alliances from its own neighborhood. Geopolitically speaking, China must attain the strategic support of surrounding countries in order to achieve the goal of “national rejuvenation.” It is hard to imagine that China can become a leading world power without a majority of its neighbors accepting its role as the regional leader. The task of national rejuvenation is not only much more difficult than economic development but also requires a different foreign strategy, which gives the top priority to military cooperation with surrounding countries. It is almost impossible for a power to play a leading role in the world when it does not have a safe neighborhood.

It is unrealistic to argue that China is able to make an alliance with most of its neighbors in the short term. Nevertheless, there is potential for Cambodia, Laos and the six members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to upgrade their relations with China to full-fledged military allies, like Pakistan, with the title of all-weather strategic partnership of cooperation. The U.S. is certainly the major strategic competitor of China, but its conflict with some of China’s neighbors produces the possibility for those states to return to China for protection. Those states, particularly most of the ASEAN states, prefer no regional military dominance from either the U.S. or China. Making an alliance with both China and the U.S. is a strategic approach similar to non-alliance strategy helping them to reduce dependence on or threat from either China or America.

In fact, a deeper bench of allies for China would provide a counter-balance to America’s reach, and make the world a more peaceful place. Most people in the West may prefer a unipolar world led by the United States, but not all the world sees it that way. A global balance of power tipped in favor of any one country creates more problems than it solves. All ASEAN states know that the only way to maintain ASEAN’s leading role in regional security affairs is to maintain the balance between China and the U.S. and force them to compete for ASEAN’s support.

China made the right decision to establish an economic strategic partnership with those countries, including America’s European allies, who have neither border disputes nor security conflicts with it, while military alliance is not practical at present. Among all of its neighbors, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and North Korea have the least possibility of making an alliance with China. Although the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea has not been abrogated, it has become merely nominal. There have been neither military relations nor state summits between these two countries for years. China has to be patient to wait for the domestic change in these four countries, which will change their policy towards China. The Philippines could be the first one because its current president, Benigno Aquino III will step down next year in accordance with the Philippines constitution.

China should learn from the competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The failure of the Soviet Union is partially due to its lack of strategic credibility to its allies, namely those who did not trust Soviet security protection. On the contrary, most of its allies were fearful of Soviet military might after its military interventions into Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. That is why the Warsaw Pact was ended before the collapse of the Soviet Union, after East Germany took the lead to sign out this military organization in 1990. In contrast, America’s alliance credibility made a great contribution to its winning of the Cold War. This history can explain why Obama’s rebalancing strategy gives the top priority to relations with traditional allies.

Many people both in China and America have argued that the world would fall into a new Cold War if China adopted an alliance strategy. But an alliance network is only one of the necessary conditions for a Cold War, rather than a sufficient one. In fact, there is little chance of a new Cold War given that ideology is not a core conflict between China and the United States. Millions of Chinese and Americans visit each other’s country annually, not to mention the extensive economic ties between these two countries, factors which also reduce the chance for a new Cold War in the visible future.

It will be crucial to the whole world to prevent military clashes between China and the U.S. and maintain their competition peacefully when China becomes a full-fledged superpower in the next decade. Because conflicts and competition between these two giants are increasing, preventative security cooperation becomes more important than economic cooperation. Establishing norms to govern cybersecurity is a typical case. If China makes alliance with neighbors, especially American allies, it has some function of preventative cooperation. It can help to maintain regional peace in three aspects. First, it will reduce the security conflicts between China and its neighbors after they become allies. Second, it will decrease the danger of American involvement into conflicts between its allies and China. Third, it will transfer the asymmetric military balance to relative symmetric balance in Asia Pacific, making both sides more cautious about any military action.