包道格：习马会不仅是两岸关系的一大步
**【2015年11月7日的习马会是自1949年以来两岸最高领导人第一次会面。此次会面将开启两岸领导人直接交流沟通的先河，有利于两岸增进互信，巩固共同的政治基础，推进两岸关系和平发展，维护台海和平稳定，其重要历史意义不言而喻。就在习马会前夕，观察者网收到了卡内基国际和平基金会副会长包道格（Douglas Paal）的来稿。曾任****美国在台协会台北办事处处长的包先生分别从大陆、台湾和美国三个角度分析了“习马会”将产生的深远政治影响。**观察者网独家翻译，以飨读者。】
本周六，也就是11月7日，台湾海峡两岸领导人习近平、马英九将在新加坡首次会面。自马英九2008年担任台湾“总统”以来，两岸关系取得了改善，此次具有突破性意义的峰会显然将进一步巩固和平发展的趋势。
即将离任的马英九在任期内一改前任民进党“总统”陈水扁的对抗性政策。如今距离台湾大选仅剩九个多星期，民进党候选人在民意调查中遥遥领先，中国领导人习近平似乎是想通过“习马会”提醒台湾选民，如果再次把民进党选上位，马英九任内取得的良好势头将有毁于一旦之虞。
长期以来，共产党和国民党一直是对头，双方都声称具备统治中国全境的合法性，所以安排这样的会面将涉及各种各样的敏感点。两党均未正式承认对方，两岸领导人彼此之间如何称呼是件令人头疼的事。如今官方发布消息称，经双方商定，此次在新加坡的会面将以两岸领导人的身份和名义举行，习近平与马英九见面时将互称“先生”。
习马会将对整个东亚局势产生深刻影响
此次“习马会”的筹备工作高度保密，因此当消息公布时许多反对派大受震惊，支持者们也表示出乎意料。且不论如果一开始筹划便大张旗鼓，双方还能否在敏感问题上协商一致；至少当该消息被泄露给反对党报纸后，台湾当局便在相当大程度上失去了对官方口径的掌控。（马英九幕僚中某个受到足够信任、能够接触机密信息的人向反对党走漏了风声，想必“总统府”上下为此大为懊恼。）
由于“习马会”消息过于出人意料，台湾岛内反对派们找到了充分理由指责马英九未征询民意便仓促行事，以“突袭”方式告知民众，是“出卖”台湾，是“黑箱作业”，是在为继任者“下指导棋”。民进党“总统”候选人蔡英文在发表的长文声明中，首先强调了积极一面：
“我首先要强调，在符合‘对等尊严’、‘公开透明’、‘不涉政治前提’的原则下，我们乐见两岸之间有正常的交流，只要是有助于台海和平、增进沟通对话、对双方互惠互利的做法，我们一直都正面看待。换句话说，如果今天‘马习会’的安排，能够有一个透明的磋商过程，能够把商谈的议题、彼此承诺的条件，让‘国人’了解，接受民意及‘国会’的监督，并且真正做到‘对等尊严’、‘公开透明’、‘不涉及政治前提’这三个原则，我相信，‘国人’的疑虑会降到最低。”
紧接着，蔡英文不忘严辞“敲打”马英九：“在此，我要严肃地提醒马‘总统’，两岸关系应该要跳脱政党政治利益的考量，台湾的未来不能拿来当作选举一时的操作。我们和‘国人’一样，都期待两岸关系走向和平稳定发展的方向，也因此，‘对等尊严’、‘公开透明’、‘不涉及政治前提’，是必须被遵守的原则，也是不能被牺牲的底线。我们会跟人民站在一起。”
马英九政府对此进行了回应，向民众确保本次会面旨在针对巩固两岸和平，维持台海现状交换意见，不会签署任何协议，也不会发表联合声明。
在得知“习马会”消息走漏后，台湾官方紧急通知了华盛顿方面。不搞突袭是令马英九颇为自得的原则，但这个消息还是让美国人始料不及。美国官方对此进行了积极回应，符合其长期所持的政治立场，即支持两岸缓和紧张关系，促进商业和民间交流。美国官方至少没有出格言论，官员也在私下明确表示，希望见到新加坡的“习马会”对两岸关系产生积极的影响。
不过，也有许多现任和前任官员在私下对此次“习马会”表达担忧，认为其结果将给两岸带来震荡，有损于台海稳定现状。在街头政治上，国民党一向不是民进党的对手，后者十分清楚如何利用一切机会诋毁国民党领导层。
岛内民意调查持续显示，人们对中国大陆经济越来越紧密地“拥抱”台湾持怀疑态度。近期以来，这种情绪还混杂着台湾方面对大陆增设新航线靠近“海峡中线”，以及换发卡式台胞证的反感。此外，台湾在外交上孤立无援、经济增速减缓，青年人口和劳动力市场存在错位，使他们感到发展机会受限。
所有这一切都表明，两岸领导人和各自团队必须在新加坡集中力量，才能避免海峡关系走下坡路，若要试图扭转台湾公众对大陆的负面心态，则更加不易。据报道，两岸领导人首先将开放媒体拍照，然后进行单独会谈，会后两人将各自举行记者会，并共进晚餐。
来自三个方面的观众将高度关注习近平主席会后的评论。内地观众希望看到他朝着两岸统一的最终目标迈进。心存疑虑的台湾观众将寻找大陆对台增压的迹象，以及关注大陆是否会对台湾做出让步，譬如允许其拓展在国际机构中的角色等，从而削弱民进党在明年大选中的优势。然而，具有讽刺意味的是，台北很可能将北京慷慨的提议视为隐蔽的陷阱。
第三个方面的观众则是美国。美国或许已经觉察到，习近平实际上已经把眼光投向马英九卸任以后，他最终需要与蔡英文打交道。如果蔡英文在2016年大选中胜出，考虑到中共十九大将于2017年召开，习近平将希望在台湾问题上得分，那么台海关系将成为中国大陆政治议程的重要部分。
既然蔡英文承诺维持海峡两岸现状，那么此次两岸领导人的会面等于给“现状”设置了非常高的标准。如果蔡英文当选且不再像马英九那样坚持“九二共识”，未来台海关系将迎来新基础，届时主动权将更多掌握在北京手里。通过此次与马英九会面，习近平展现出友善的一面，未来如果蔡英文没能妥善处理两岸关系，大陆方面将在与美国的交涉中占据有利地位。
尽管华盛顿和北京方面将密切关注马英九的表态，但他的观众主要还是集中在台湾岛内。讽刺的是，马英九的表态越不像是帮国民党在大选中得分，越符合和平稳定发展的战略原则，反而越有可能消减岛内的批评声，帮助国民党候选人赢得选民支持。他应该明白这一点，很可能将作出建设性的表态。
当然，除两岸领导人的评价以外，潜意识沟通也将发挥作用。大陆和台湾心照不宣，两岸领导人都不会在镜头前冒犯对方的尊严。但是任何人都不应低估台湾媒体混淆视听的能力，它们尤其擅长把一个人的威严举止曲解成对另一个人的贬低侮辱。任何政治行家都知道，习马会传递出的视觉信息，对外界如何解读政治讯号至关重要。
放眼更宽泛的背景：美国利用中国邻国对中国强硬举动的不适，通过“再平衡”战略侵入亚洲；作为回应，中国在过去两年中开始在亚太地区推行新政策，基本可以称之为对美国“再平衡战略”的“抗衡”。
近两年来，习近平提出了“一带一路”倡议，增进中国与东南亚和中亚邻国的商业与基础设施联系。中国创立了亚洲基础设施投资银行，为这些建设项目提供资金支持。随着美国拉拢缅甸政府，导致中缅关系明显疏远，中国开始主动走近昂山素季——虽然此前曾多年支持她所反对的军政府。
中日韩三国首脑峰会上周末在首尔举行，可以看出中日紧张关系得到了缓解。中俄关系也处于过去五十年最好的水平。习近平对地区安全架构提出了若干建议，并试图将中美紧张关系保持在可控的范围内。由于民族主义者对国家主权高度敏感，南海问题可能是一个特例。在这个问题上，时间会证明一切。
由此不难想象，如果主权问题能得到妥善处理，习近平希望稳定两岸关系，维持周边地区和谐。习近平把强势领导与外交成果相结合，如果台海局势朝积极方向发展，将成为他的重大得分点。这样一来，中国周边那些长期心存疑虑的邻国将吃下定心丸，不会一直抗拒中国而顺从美国。考虑到未来两年美国将投入大量精力到“总统选举”和组建下届政府当中去，中国外交可能会在此取得重大成就。
（观察者网杨晗轶译）
翻页可见英文原文
Taiwan and Mainland Leader Meet for the First Time
On Saturday, November 7, Singapore will host the first ever meeting between the leaders of Taiwan and mainland China. This breakthrough summit is evidently intended to reinforce the trends toward peace and development across the Taiwan Strait that prevailed under Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou since 2008.
Ma’s tenure, and now his legacy, marked a sharp departure from the confrontational policies of his predecessor, the Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Chen Shui-bian. With an election in Taiwan just over nine weeks away, and the opposition DPP candidate well ahead in the polls, Chinese leader Xi Jinping appears to want to remind Taiwan’s voters that the positive trends under President Ma could be at risk if they choose the DPP again.
Arrangements for a meeting of this sort involve every kind of sensitivity, since the leaders of the Nationalist and Communist parties have long been rival claimants for the mantle of governing all of China. They do not recognize each other formally, so terminology is tricky. Officials have revealed that they will refer to each other in the Singapore meeting as the “leader” of Taiwan and the mainland, rather than use the formal title of president. They will call each other as “Mr. Ma” and “Mr. Xi.”
The secrecy surrounding the preparations for the meeting contributed to the sense of shock and anger expressed by many opponents and of surprise by many supporters on Taiwan. Whether satisfactory terms for such a sensitive meeting could have been achieved without the cloak of secrecy is something for historians to wrestle with, but in any event Taiwan officials lost considerable control of their messages when the story was leaked to an opposition newspaper. (It must be a source of angst in the Presidential Office that someone trusted enough to be given access to the information was nonetheless motivated to hand it over to the opposition.)
The surprising nature of the news gave opponents of the ruling party on Taiwan ample opportunity to allege last minute efforts by Ma to “sell out” Taiwan, engage in “black box” decision making with insufficient public consultation, and to tie the hands of his successor with more extensive engagement with the mainland. Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP presidential frontrunner, issued a multi-part statement, first emphasizing the positive:
“I want to emphasize that we are happy to see communications between both sides of the Strait, in accordance with the principles of “equal respect”, “transparency” and “without political preconditions.” We would view these endeavors in a positive light if such communication is helpful to facilitate cross-strait peace, to improve communication and dialogue and is beneficial to mutual interests. In other words, if the arrangements between President Ma and President Xi were transparent--that is, allowing our citizens to understand what will be discussed; what will be promised, if anything; to have legislative and public opinion oversight, and genuinely implement these three principles of “equal respect”, “transparency” and “without political precondition.” I believe this will greatly reduce public anxieties.”
Then she delivered her warning punch: “I would like to issue a solemn reminder to President Ma that cross-strait relations should not be handled based on political parties’ self-interest. Taiwan’s future should not be traded away for short-term electoral success. We all wish for a stable, peaceful cross-strait relationship; therefore, the principles of “equal respect”, “transparency” and “without political precondition” should not be sacrificed in anyway. We will stand with the people
Ma’s officials responded by assuring the public that there will be no agreements reached at the summit. Nor will there be a joint statement. They emphasized the meeting is to reinforce cross-strait peace and prosperity and to nurture the status quo, not make new initiatives.
Once Taiwan officials knew the leak was out, they hastily notified relevant officials in Washington, on a principle that Ma Ying-jeou has frequently made a point of pride: no surprises. Still, it was pretty surprising to the Americans. The official U.S. response was positive, in line with long standing policy support for easing cross-strait tensions and developing commercial and popular exchanges. At least this should not have been a surprise. U.S. officials privately are equally clear that they hope the meeting in Singapore will bring a positive influence to Taiwan-mainland relations.
But many current and former officials also privately convey fears that the meeting and its results will reverberate on Taiwan and the mainland in ways that may in fact not contribute to stability and maintenance of the status quo. The DPP has long had better political street-fighting skills than the KMT, and it knows how to exploit opportunities to denigrate the KMT leadership.
Public opinion polls have continuously shown growing suspicion of China’s ever closer economic embrace of Taiwan. This combines in a volatile cocktail with resentment of recent unilateral Chinese actions regarding flight routes over the Taiwan Strait and travel documents to the mainland. And there is malaise about Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, slower economic growth than in previous eras, and the mismatch between Taiwan’s youth and labor markets that has limited their perceived opportunities.
All this suggests that avoiding a setback in cross-strait relations will take the concentrated efforts of both leaders and their teams in Singapore, let alone trying to turn around the current negative drift in public attitudes toward the mainland. Both leaders are reported to have a public meeting, then a private session, then dinner together. Each will have his own news conference to discuss their meetings.
What President Xi says will have at least three audiences. The mainland audience will expect him at least to show he is working toward eventual reunification of Taiwan with China. The skeptical (David facing Goliath) Taiwan audience will look for signs of increased pressure on the island, for efforts to undermine the DPP in the coming election, perhaps with last minute concessions to Taiwan, such as permitting an increased presence in international functional organizations. Here among the several ironies is that what Beijing might consider a generous offer could be seen in Taipei as a devious trap.
The third audience is the United States, which may sense Xi is in fact already looking past Ma to his need eventually to deal with Tsai. If Tsai wins, relations with Taiwan will be part of the background for Xi’s own political agenda at home, with an imminent 19th Party Congress in 2017 and all the changes attendant on that. Xi should want to position himself as securely as possible regarding Taiwan before then.
A “two leaders” meeting will be a very high bar for Tsai to jump to maintain the status quo, as she has pledged to do. This could give Beijing greater leverage to decide what basis for the relationship is good enough, if it is not to be based on the “1992 consensus” that prevails under Ma, as Tsai in the past has insisted it will not be. And by meeting with Ma, offering sweetness and light, Xi gains a talking point to use with the U.S. if ultimately she fails to compete in appearing reasonable about cross-strait relations.
President Ma’s audience will primarily be in Taiwan, though Washington and Beijing will watch him closely. Ironically, again, the less that Ma’s remarks appear to be aimed at tactically helping the KMT in the upcoming election and the more they address strategic principles of peace and prosperity, the more they are likely to defuse criticism at home and bolster support for KMT candidates. He is very likely to understand that and stick to a constructive script.
Of course, subliminal communications will also play a role in addition to the words of the leaders. Both the mainland and Taiwan share a culture of sophisticated protocol, and one should expect the leaders to treat each other before the cameras with appropriate dignity. But the capacity of Taiwan’s media to construe one man’s dignified behavior as a demeaning insult should not be underestimated. As any political pro would say, the optics of the visit could prove very important to the message that emerges.
Finally, a word about the broader context: In reaction to inroads made by the United States with its “rebalance” to Asia -- facilitated by China’s neighbors and their discomfort with Chinese assertive behavior -- China has for the past two years or so embarked on a policy one can term “counterbalance” in the Asia Pacific region to the American “rebalance.”
Xi Jinping has since announced the “one belt and one road” initiatives to strengthen commercial and infrastructure ties with Southeast and Central Asian neighbors. His government has produced the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to finance those connections. Xi has courted Aung San Suu Kyi after years of support for her Myanmar opponents in the military, after the Myanmar authorities visibly pulled away from China and toward the U.S.
Tensions have been lowered with Japan, as exemplified in last weekend’s trilateral summit in Seoul. Russia and China are getting along better than in the last fifty years. Xi has made several proposals for regional security architecture and has tried to keep tensions with the United States manageable. The South China Sea may be an outlier due to the nationalist sensitivity about sovereignty. Here only time will tell.
So it seems natural that Xi might want to add Taiwan to the picture of a calmer diplomacy on China’s periphery, if sovereignty issues can be managed adequately. This would be a major political point for Xi in selling his combination of strong leadership and mostly positive results for Chinese diplomacy. By the same token, he will have given China’s always skeptical neighbors material reasons not always to resist Chinese preferences in deference to American interests. This could become a quite substantial achievement over the next two years as the U.S. obsesses about elections and the next administration.
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