李世默谈中国与全球格局：要主导亚洲，先需改变世界

【**“要回归亚洲的主导地位，中国不得不寻求调整当前的世界格局。”李世默先生如此说道。本文是根据作者在挪威奥斯陆“2014全球战略评估”国际研讨会（9月19-21日）上的发言稿改编而成，原文为英语，发表在伦敦国际战略研究所（IISS）双月刊《生存：全球政治与战略》上2015年4、5月刊（57卷****，235-240页）。观察者网刘旭爽译。】**

一

世上本没有所谓的“亚洲”。“亚洲”一词不过指地图上那片被武断划定的地域。如果以文化与历史的一贯性来衡量，欧洲，甚至拉丁美洲，都是实至名归的。但亚洲却是不存在的。

这也部分解释了中国为什么只用全球视角来看待自己在亚洲的战略地位。但这种全球视角首先又是被美国框定了的——它在几乎任何方面都堪称中国最大的合作伙伴与竞争对手。当然，这两个合作伙伴在性质上有根本的差别。目前美国主导着世界，管理着一个将全球事务方方面面都囊括在内的世界格局——政治、经济、军事甚至文化，无一不包。二战与冷战之后，美国带头建构了这一全球格局，亚太地区也是其中一部分。相较之下，中国的崛起虽然强势，然而从崛起之初到今天成为世界大国，仅过了一代人时间。

中国并不把美国视为敌人，那种普遍的臆测可说是当代最大的误解之一。在我看来，美国也没有把中国当成敌人。尽管两国之间存在显而易见的张力，它们彼此仍是一种相互依赖的关系。在冷战后的世界格局渐趋分解的当下，这种紧张关系大约也无可避免。世界格局的分解有两个原因。第一，美国已泥足深陷。它既需承受国内矛盾的煎熬，又要担负起过度对外扩张所带来的严重后果。当下美国的内部矛盾也许是100年来最严重的，它们属于结构性矛盾：美国的政治体系被各种特殊利益裹挟着；意识形态造成的党派斗争使两党制的政治结构走向了两极化；经济与社会的弊病（比如走向衰落的中产阶级）被忽略；急需进行的改革则一拖再拖。而美国过度的对外扩张并未成功，还使它筋疲力尽。

第二个原因则是所谓的“群雄并起”局面所造成的，而中国是个中翘楚。美国对全球GDP的贡献值一直在下降，这个趋势也将继续。当你是某家公司的最大股东时（我用一下风险投资的术语），比如说你拥有80%的股份，你行动时大抵会着眼于公司的最大利益；如果你只拥有30%的股份，那么很可能，你行动时就会从自己的最大利益出发。按照这个逻辑，美国在全球秩序中的监护人身份将越来越不可靠。与此同时，“并起的群雄”自然都会要求分上一杯羹，这就常常会同当前的世界格局产生冲突。

在此很有必要追溯下历史。作为世界第二大经济体的中国（很快还会取代美国成为第一），当初并没有参与创设现今的世界格局。的确，中国利用这一体系壮大自身，从中受益颇丰，但当初设计与建造这一体系时，它的利益从未被纳入过考量范围。——以美国为首的联盟体系，或其在亚太地区的实际投射，才是主导力量。许多人认为现在中国已如此强大，它就必须成为这一世界体系里一个负责的股东。从原则上讲，这种想法当然没错，但它忽视了某种固有张力（就不说是矛盾吧），即，要求一个新兴大国成为某种体系里的利益相关者，但这一力量从未参与创建过此体系，并且这一体系构架之时，将其利益排除在了外面。

当前形势下的世界格局无法维持。然而，如同所有复杂的体制，这一格局的内部已经僵化，无法很好地适应变动。其后果就是，美国忙得焦头烂额，同时也筋疲力尽。华盛顿近期的“转向亚洲”战略就说明了一切。很明显，一次只能对准一个方向转向。几年前是亚洲，之后是俄罗斯与乌克兰，再以后就是中东。体系的“老大”想要在任何地域推行某种长期战略，都会遇到重重阻碍。 

二

中国有自己的长期战略目标：回归其在亚洲的主导地位。考虑到中国的历史地位及其在当今世界扮演的角色，这一抱负无可厚非，并且理所当然。但为达成这一目标，中国就不得不寻求调整亚洲范围内的世界格局，这自然会产生摩擦。许多人称中国近年来在东亚与东南亚的行动过于强势，已经损害了自己的地位——中国的邻国们纷纷倒向美国。对此我不能认同。你既然想在席上分得更大一杯羹，就不可能指望在座诸君都心甘情愿地成人之美。这在商界定然行不通。在我25年的投资者生涯里，从未出现过这样一种情形：某天我在董事会议里宣布：“我认为我在这间公司持有的股份应当再高些。”而在座股东纷纷鼓掌叫好：“好啊，您要不再多拿点儿。”这种好事从来不会发生，所以造成紧张局势也是在所难免。

分羹一事向来是把双刃剑，你也许能得到满满一杯，但锅破汤洒，当然不是没有可能。在中国这一案例中，军事冲突就会导致“锅破汤洒”的下场。战略的核心在于权衡利弊，最终使自身利益达到最优。从这一角度看，我认为中国近年来的表现极为出色。中国的目标，就是在不触发战争的前提下，对现状做出最有利于自身发展的调整。不管是同菲律宾人在南海上的较量，还是与日本人在东海的对峙，中国的的确确实现了这一目标。在中国东海的钓鱼岛问题上，过去的状况是日本否认争议的存在，行政控制权基本在日本手中。

现在中国的行动使争议成为现实，也显示了自己在钓鱼岛地区的存在，但并没有引发战争。在南海也一样，中国在黄岩岛附近的存在扭转了原有局势，同样没有触动战争的机括。

在这方面，中国有着显著的战略优势。比如说，较之日本，中国是个独立的行动者，日本却不是。日本是美国主导下的世界格局的一部分，牢牢受制于这种联盟体系。举个例子，日本一直致力于改善同俄罗斯的关系，这是东京多年来的战略重点，可一当乌克兰危机爆发，日本先时的努力就付诸东流。因为它不得不顺从其西方盟友的优先权。中国则不然，日本寸步难行之际，正是它游刃有余之时。

从战略层面来说，日本也许是把中国当作对手的，但中国的对手却始终是美国。中国人对日本那种植根于历史的愤怒当然是真切的，但这是道德层面上的分歧，并不能看作一种战略冲突。真正的战略竞争存在于中国和美国之间。自然，美国不论各方面都强过中国太多，但如考虑到各自目标的规模，情况却不同了。相较于中国的国力，中国在亚洲的“抱负”显得很有节制——它选择的是轻量级的目标；而同其国力以及它所面临的国际问题相比，美国对世界的野心太过泛滥——它的目标超过了自身量级。正是在这种背景下，中国会一步步推进其战略，而长期结果就是中国的邻国们将逐渐适应其力量，对局势进行定性重估。

这不是指一场冷战将降临亚洲。“冷战”一词指的是美国与苏联间的竞争，而今日之中国与苏联截然不同。中国同世界经济是融为一体的。事实上，当今中国是世界最大的贸易国，也是人类历史上最大的贸易国。中国和美国的关系在广度、深度与规模上都十分惊人，未来几代美国人都将依赖于中国的稳定与繁荣，反之亦然。而在亚洲，不管从哪个层面看，中国同邻国（包括日本）的利益都是休戚相关的。不过，这并不意味着在中国逐渐取得更多世界份额的过程中，将不会有冲突与不满出现。风险也是存在的，如意外事故。

IISS双月刊《生存：全球政治与战略》2015年4、5月封面，本文即刊在这一期

三

有人认为如果中国能乖乖遵守所谓的法治，那么伴随其崛起而产生的问题就能得到解决。比如2014年日本首相安倍晋三就在新加坡香格里拉对话（观察者网注：香格里拉对话由IISS，即国际战略研究所主办）上，把这点作为自己发言的中心议题，很多与会代表也反复提及了《联合国海洋法公约》（UNCLOS）。老实说，《联合国海洋法公约》一词被引用的次数实在太多，以至于我回到上海后就把它从头至尾读了一遍，一页都没落。对任何受虐狂来说，这绝对是一本值得强力推荐的书。不过我也收获了一个重要发现：《联合国海洋法公约》并没有提到主权争议。事实上，在制定《联合国海洋法公约》时，特别避开了历史遗留问题。——否则这部公约也无法被确立。主权问题本质上就是政治问题，所以《联合国海洋法公约》允许那些不想让法律沦为儿戏的国家“选择退出”。中国就做了这一选择。

所以中国脱离了束缚。比方说，没有一条法律能禁止它设立防空识别区。别忘了日本有着亚洲最大的防空识别区，相较之下，中国的防空识别区要小许多，而当你考虑到两国国土面积的相对大小时，这一差别就尤其显然。中国声明的防空识别区只是从北京和上海（其政治与经济中心）延伸至外的几百英里，而日本的防空识别区从其政治与工业中心延伸到最远一端，中间隔着1000多英里的距离。当然，也没有法律阻止日本设立它自己选择的防空识别区。事实上，在没有知会其它国家的情况下（也许美国除外），日本还曾单方面扩大过其防空识别区。

要记住的是，中国与美国的世界观截然不同，而当前的世界秩序是以后者为基础的。中国的视角立足于多元，而非普世。世界是一个大竞技场，各国与各组织在其中互相竞争、协作，互相制衡。全球化并不是某种项目，旨在把所有国家推向同一个预设的终点；它是一个层面丰富的动态过程。开拓一条西至中亚与欧洲，南抵东南亚的“新丝绸之路”的构想，以及新近成立的亚洲基础设施投资银行，都是对中国全球观的最佳诠释。这必然会同已有的结构发生摩擦，但也有许多的利益重叠。

如果我们想解决这些问题，就必须保持敏锐。我们还得耐心。当前的世界格局显然已僵化，难以接受调整，而变动的过程可能会很痛苦。中美之间这场历史性谈判漫长而复杂，我们正身处其中。但中国的战略规划与美国的利益目标，加上二者互相依赖的关系，终将创建出一个稳定的新格局。

翻页为原文：

I

There is no such thing as ‘Asia’. The term refers to an arbitrarily drawn space on a map. Asia does not exist as a coherent cultural and historical area in the way that Europe or even Latin America exists.

This is one reason why China views its position and strategies in Asia only in a global context. That global context is conditioned, first and foremost, by the United States of America: China’s largest partner and competitor in just about every dimension. These partners differ, of course, in one crucial respect. The US is currently the dominant world power, presiding over a global architecture that encompasses all aspects of world affairs – political, economic, military and even cultural. The United States led the design and building of this global architecture after the Second World War and the Cold War, and the Asia-Pacific is a part of that architecture. China, by contrast, is a rapidly rising power, but it only became the powerhouse that it is today in the past generation.

China does not view the United States as an enemy, and the widespread notion that it does is one of the greatest of contemporary misperceptions. Nor, in my view, does the United States view China as an enemy. These two countries are enormously intertwined, though their relations do have obvious elements of tension. Such tensions are arguably inevitable at a time when the post-Cold War architecture appears to be breaking down. It is breaking down for two reasons. Firstly, the United States is in trouble. It is suffering from internal contradictions and the grave consequences of external overreach. The internal difficulties are perhaps the most serious America has faced in 100 years, and they are structural. The American political system has found itself captured by special interests; ideological partisanship has polarised the two-party governance structure; economic and social ills, such as the declining middle class, are not being addressed; much-needed reforms are stalled. And external overreach has led to failures and exhaustion.

The second source of breakdown is the so-called ‘rise of the rest’, of which China is the most prominent example. America’s share of the world’s GDP has significantly declined, and this trend will continue. When you are the dominant shareholder in a company – I’m a venture capitalist, so I use those terms – a shareholder who owns, let us say, 80% of its shares, you are likely to act in the best interests of the company. But when you own 30%, you are more likely to act in your own best interests. The United States, by this logic, will be a decreasingly reliable custodian of global order. At the same time, of course, the ‘rest’ are making claims that are often in conflict with the way that the global architecture was set up.

Some historical perspective is important here. China, the world’s second-largest economy, and soon to surpass the US as the largest, did not participate in the design and establishment of the current global architecture. It has benefited tremendously from that architecture, taking advantage of the system for its own development. Nonetheless, China’s interests were never taken into account in the design and construction of the current system – the backbone of which is the US-led alliance system – or its manifestation in the Asia-Pacific. Many have argued that China, being so powerful, now must act as a responsible stakeholder in the world system. Of course, that is correct in principle. But there is inherent tension, if not a contradiction, in asking a new power to act as a stakeholder in a system that it did not participate in designing or constructing, and whose interests were not taken into consideration when it was built.

The global architecture cannot be sustained in its current form. Yet the current architecture, like any complex institution, is inherently rigid, and cannot easily adapt to change. As a result, the US is very, very busy and very, very tired at the same time. Washington’s recent ‘pivot’ to Asia says it all. By definition, one can only pivot in one direction at a time. A couple of years ago there was a pivot to Asia, but then came the problems in Russia and Ukraine, and then again in the Middle East. Troubles like these make it very difficult for the ‘boss’ of the system to sustain a long-term strategy in any particular region.

II

China has its own long-term strategic objective: to reclaim a pre-eminent position in Asia. Given its history and current position, this aspiration is understandable and wholly justified. In order to do so, however, it must seek adjustments to the current global architecture in Asia, and this, of course, gives rise to tensions. Many say that China’s assertive moves in recent years – in East Asia and Southeast Asia – have hurt its position, as many of its neighbours have now moved closer to the US. I disagree with that assessment. One cannot reach for a bigger share of the pie, and at the same time expect everyone else to happily oblige. I certainly have never experienced that in the business world. In 25 years as a capitalist, I’ve never walked into a boardroom and said, ‘I think I deserve a higher percentage share in this company’, and had everyone clap and say, ‘Wonderful; take some more.’ It doesn’t happen. So tension is natural.

Whenever one tries to get a bigger share of the pie, the potential upside is the bigger share, while the potential downside is, of course, a total breakdown which destroys the pie itself. In this case, the pie-destroying breakdown would be military conflict. The very essence of strategy is to balance upsides and downsides, and to optimise one’s interests. On that basis, it seems to me that China has performed rather brilliantly in recent years. The objective is to realise adjustments to the status quo, in China’s favour, without triggering a war. In both the South China Sea against the Philippines, and the East China Sea vis-à-vis Japan, China has indeed achieved that object. In the East China Sea, with regard to the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the status quo was Japan’s denial that any dispute existed, and its near-complete administrative control there.

Now, China’s moves have made the dispute, and its own presence in that area, a reality, but without war. Also in the South China Sea, China’s presence near Huangyan Island (sometimes called Scarborough Shoal) has altered the status quo in its favour, again without war.

In this respect, China holds a significant strategic advantage over, say, Japan. China is an independent player, while Japan is not. Japan is part of the US-led global architecture, and is locked into its alliance system. For instance, Japan has worked very hard to improve relations with Russia; for several years, this was a strategic priority for Tokyo. Yet, once the Ukraine crisis arrived, this strategy collapsed, because Japan had to go along with the priorities of the Western alliance. China, on the contrary, has wide room for manoeuvre, even as Japan is boxed in.

At the strategic level, while Japan’s counterparty may be China, China’s counterparty is always the United States. Chinese anger towards Japan on historic grounds is genuine, but this is a moral disagreement, not a strategic conflict. Between China and the United States there is genuine strategic competition. The US is, of course, much more powerful than China in all respects, except when it comes to the sizes of their objectives. China’s objectives in Asia are modest, relative to its national capabilities – it is punching below its weight. America’s objectives in the world are enormous compared to its national capabilities and the internal problems it faces – it is punching above its weight. It is in this context that China will execute its strategies, and the longer-term result will be qualitative recalculations by China’s neighbours in the region as they adjust to China’s power.  

None of this means an emerging Cold War in Asia. The term Cold War refers to the struggle between America and the Soviet Union. Yet China today is totally different from the Soviet Union. China is deeply integrated into the world economy; in fact, it is the largest trading nation in the world, and in history. China’s engagement with the United States is extraordinary in its breadth, depth and scale. Future generations of Americans will depend on China’s stability and prosperity, and vice versa. In Asia, moreover, China is deeply engaged with all its neighbours, including Japan, at all levels. This does not mean there will be no tension, or unhappiness, as China gradually gains a bigger share of the pie. Are there risks? Of course there are, because there could be accidents and unpredictable events.

III

Some argue that the difficulties presented by China’s rise could be resolved if China would simply adhere to the so-called rule of law. For instance, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made this argument the centrepiece of his 2014 address to the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, where various delegates also made repeated reference to UNCLOS (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea). Indeed, the word was invoked so often I finally went back to Shanghai and read the thing, every last page of it. To any masochist, I highly recommend the experience. But I made an important discovery: UNCLOS does not address the issue at hand, which is a sovereignty dispute. In fact, when UNCLOS was set up, it specifically skirted the issue of historical titles. Otherwise, the law would never have come into existence. Questions of sovereignty are fundamentally political issues. That is why UNCLOS provides a specific opt-out for countries that do not want the law to become a circus, and China has taken that option.

Thus, there is no law that can prevent China from, for instance, establishing an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). Indeed, it is worth remembering that Japan has the largest ADIZ in Asia. China’s, by comparison, is very modest, particularly when taking into consideration the relative sizes of the Chinese and Japanese land masses. China’s declared ADIZ only stretches a few hundred miles from Shanghai and Beijing (its industrial and political centres), while Japan’s ADIZ, at its furthest point, stretches well over 1,000 miles from Japan’s political and industrial centres. Of course, no law prevents Japan from setting such boundaries as it chooses, and indeed, Japan’s ADIZ has been enlarged before, unilaterally, without any calls being placed to foreign capitals, except perhaps to Washington.

It is worth noting that China has a fundamentally different world view than the American outlook, which underlies the current global order. China’s outlook is one of plurality, not universality. The world is an arena in which nations and groups compete, cooperate with and counterbalance each other. Globalisation is not a project to drive all nations towards a preconceived and unified end, but a process through which this multifaceted dynamic takes place. The drive to build ‘New Silk Roads’ west through Central Asia to Europe, and south to Southeast Asia, along with the recently launched Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank are excellent examples of this different Chinese view of globalisation. There will necessarily be divergences with the established structures, but also many overlapping interests.

If we want to resolve these issues we need to be clear-headed. And we need to be patient. The global architecture is by definition rigid. It is difficult to make adjustments to it, and adjustments may be painful. We are in the process of a long and complex historical negotiation between China and America. But China’s strategies and America’s own interests, and their interdependence, will lead to the gradual emergence of a new and stable configuration.