叶刘淑仪：香港人，到底在愤怒什么？

如果你跟外国派驻香港的外交官员打过交道，就会发现越是来自动荡地区的官员，就越羡慕香港社会的安全。以热爱自由闻名于世香港人，就连游行示威也一向以和平著称。与暴行肆虐的地区相比，香港是一片和平的绿洲。但悲哀的是，如今这片绿洲随时可能消失。

虽然现阶段香港的实体安全尚未遭到威胁，但在暴力阴霾的笼罩下，整个城市的文明礼仪与社会稳定都岌岌可危。各种形式的暴力大行其道：自封“民主卫士”的反对派冀望通过“占领中环”向中央施压，让北京屈从于他们的要求；学生团体在特首选举上所持的极端立场不容妥协；民主派置香港未来于不顾，对立法会议事进行鲁莽地阻挠；年轻的激进分子携带危险武器，以前所未见的暴力方式冲击立法会大楼；大陆访港游客怎么也想不到，经历过大世面的香港竟会以如此充满仇恨的语言暴力来迎接自己。不久前，署理行政长官林郑月娥主礼香港演艺学院毕业典礼，却遭学生侮辱。其实，辱人者败坏礼仪，不过自取其辱罢了。

许多老一辈香港人都在问：我们的城市到底出了什么问题？

反对派不明白，一旦缺少中央支持，狮子山下的香港梦真可能碎成满地渣

香港确实出了很多问题。第一，虽然香港的总体财富增长了，但贫富差距却变大了。基尼系数是一项衡量发达经济体收入不平等程度的统计标准，而香港则是全球基尼系数最高的社会之一。新加坡和美国等其他自由市场经济体也存在同样的问题，或许自由、开放的市场本身就是一片弱肉强食的丛林。

官方统计数据显示，香港的基尼系数不但处于高位，且有逐年上升趋势——从1971年的0.43到1996年的0.518，到2011年的0.537。基尼系数的上升一方面缘于全球化，一方面与香港制造业向大陆转移、经济覆盖面收缩有关。今天，服务业在香港经济中占93%。香港制造业提供的多种就业机会和业务技能都在这场产业转移中消失了。

香港不再生产任何产品，除了作为金融中心提供金融和专业服务外，香港基本依赖向大陆客户提供贸易、物流、旅游服务来维持生计。在金融和专业服务之外，香港的服务业多分布于低端领域，并有江河日下趋势。

过去的十年是财富向房地产业高度集中的十年。由于大量财富从大陆流向香港，导致香港地价飙升，到了特区政府不得不进行干预的地步。年轻一代靠买房致富的希望越来越渺茫。高昂的房价挤走了其他更具风险与创新的经济活动，激化了无房产者与有房产者之间的矛盾。

在教育和技术培训方面，过去几十年中，香港的教育部门成功地普及了大众教育，却让精英学校付出了较大的代价，造成许多传统名校转型成为“直资学校”（接受政府直接资助），以在开课、募资上获取更大的自由。

一方面，家长们希望子女能具有全球竞争力，挤破头也要让孩子进直资学校、国际学校、独立学校；另一方面，越来越多的学校开设旅游、服务接待等“实用型”课程，培养学生满足低端服务业就业需求。知识技能的两极分化导致了就业机会的两极分化，社会流动性和上行空间有限，也是今天香港年轻人不满的缘由之一。

当下关于2017年特首普选的激烈争论，无异于给处于困境中香港社会火上浇油。许多香港人反对北京以任何形式将候选人范围控制在爱国爱港人士以内。表面来看，这是香港从北京争取“真正选择权”的对抗，但实际上，它是香港民意的试金石，香港人是愿意捍卫主权、安全和发展利益等国家目标，还是要与大陆背道而驰？

宗派和族群的分歧，从不曾深植于香港，在香港社会上造成隔阂的政治话题只有一个：中国。在反对派最狂妄的时候，他们鼓吹要彻底摆脱来自中央的约束，他们不明白，一旦缺少中央的支持，狮子山下的香港梦真可能碎成满地渣。

（英文原载香港《南华早报》2014年7月6日，原标题：The roots of Hong Kong’s rage；观察者网杨晗轶/译。翻页查看英文原文）

The roots of Hong Kong’s rage

Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee

Anyone who has met diplomats posted to Hong Kong from much more turbulent parts of the world will have noticed how appreciative they are of the safety and security of our city. Famed for their love of freedom, Hong Kong people have established a reputation for staging peaceful public demonstrations. Compared to the mayhem that has torn some parts of the world, Hong Kong has stood out as an oasis of peace. Sadly, that seems poised to change.

Although the threats to Hong Kong’s physical security seem insignificant at this stage, an atmosphere of violence has set in and is poisoning the civility and stability of our city. Violence in the form of calls to “occupy Central” from self-proclaimed democracy advocates who want to pressurise Beijing into yielding to their demands. Violence in the form of extremist positions on arrangements for electing the chief executive, taken by student groups who will brook no compromise. Violence in the form of reckless filibustering in the Legislative Council, whatever the cost to Hong Kong’s future. Violence in the form of unprecedented attempts by young radicals, some armed with offensive weapons, to storm the Legco building. Violence in the form of hate-filled verbal abuse hurled at mainland visitors unaccustomed to the ways of our sophisticated city.

Also, violence in the form of insults hurled at the chief secretary by graduates of the Academy for Performing Arts at a recent graduation ceremony. By insulting the guest of honour, they debased the ceremony and disgraced themselves.

Many older Hongkongers are asking: what has become of our city and what went wrong?

Many things have indeed gone wrong. First, despite the increase in overall wealth, our wealth gap has widened. Hong Kong has one of the highest Gini coefficients, a statistical measure of income inequality, among developed economies. And so, too, do other free-market economies such as Singapore and the US. This may be due to the fact that when you have free, open markets, the strong get stronger while the weak get weaker.

According to government statistics, Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient is not only high but has also been rising over the years - from 0.43 in 1971 to 0.518 in 1996 and 0.537 in 2011. The steady increase is partly the effect of globalisation and partly the progressive narrowing of our economy with the migration of our manufacturing activities across the border. Hong Kong’s economy is now 93 per cent service-oriented. This relocation has meant the loss of a wide range of jobs in the manufacturing sector and the skills that go with it.

Hong Kong no longer makes anything, but makes its living largely by providing trading, logistics and tourism services mainly for mainland Chinese clients, and financial and professional services in connection with the city’s financial hub. Other than the financial and professional services, many of the services provided by the city are low-end, and by some accounts trending down.

The past decade has also seen a staggering concentration of wealth in the property sector. The overspill of wealth from the mainland caused prices to go through the roof until they were artificially suppressed by the various stamp duties slapped on by the administration. Young people have become increasingly disillusioned as their hopes for acquiring wealth through owning a home diminish. High property prices have crowded out other riskier, more innovative economic activities and turned those without homes against the landed class.

Where education and skills are concerned, in the past few decades, our education authorities have largely succeeded in expanding mass education but at considerable cost to the standards of elite schools, so much so that many have converted themselves into “direct subsidy schools” to acquire greater freedom in setting their curriculum and raising resources.

Parents who want their children to be globally competitive scramble to put them in direct subsidy, international or independent schools, while more and more “practical” subjects, like tourism and hospitality studies, are introduced to cater for students at the low end. The polarisation of knowledge and skills translates into the polarisation of opportunity, another source of discontent to young people with limited scope for upward social mobility.

Adding to all these woes we now have the heated constitutional debate on how to elect the chief executive in 2017. Many Hongkongers oppose any attempt by Beijing to limit the field of candidates to trustworthy patriots. On the face of it, it is a matter of Beijing versus Hong Kong people in allowing the people a “real choice”. But, essentially, it is about whether Hong Kong people are willing to support the national goal of safeguarding sovereignty, security and developmental interest, or insist on going the other way.

Void of deep-rooted sectarian or ethnic divides, the political cleavage in Hong Kong has always been about China. In their rebellious moment, some demonstrators might wish to be rid of constraints imposed by the centre. But Hong Kong might well fall to pieces if the centre cannot hold.

（原文链接：http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1546647/roots-hong-kongs-rage）