游凯岚：为什么亚洲应该对安倍呼吁的国际法治下的亚洲说不

【被称为“香格里拉峰会”的亚洲安全会议5月30日正式召开。在当天的开幕会上，日本首相安倍晋三高调地发表主题演讲，以“法制”为名不点名地指责中国，并对日本自我表扬，向亚洲推销日本新型主导权，此举引发全球热议。本文由观察者网供稿，刊载于6月24日美国《赫芬顿邮报》旗下的《世界邮报》（World Post）。以下为中文译文。】

数周前，在新加坡香格里拉对话会上，安倍晋三大胆地向亚洲推销日本新型主导权。在安倍先生看来，奠定亚太地区高速增长的和平基础受到了威胁。虽未点名批评中国，但他却有的放矢地警告亚洲正面临新的危险。安倍提出，亚太地区需要日本的领导，需要对“国际法”在地区中的地位重新加以肯定。

在当前充满变数的形势下，安倍的言辞可谓非常猛烈。亚洲应该接受他的提议吗？在讲话中，安倍反复提及《联合国海洋法公约》与南中国海的航行自由，并代表日本政府表态，大力支持菲律宾与越南在南中国海的主权主张。

本文英文发表于《赫芬顿邮报》旗下的《世界邮报》

站在中国的角度，安倍对国际法的解读和表述是充满挑衅和非常危险的。中国从未采取任何行动或提出任何主张去限制南中国海的航行自由。早在1982年，中国便批准了《联合国海洋法公约》；2002年，中国又签署了《南中国海各方行为宣言》，再次肯定中国将“尊重并保证在南中国海及其上空的通航自由和飞行自由”。按照《联合国海洋法公约》规定的最后期限，中国于2009年5月7日向联合国提交了划定“九段线”的地图与公函。当菲律宾就南中国海的航行自由公开表达关切时，中国政府及时地做出了回应：“南中国海的航行自由与安全是有保障的”。

如果中国在南中国海的主权主张是一种威胁的话，为什么其他声索国的主张不是？同理，就外国军事监视而言，如果中国的立场存在问题，为什么菲律宾和马来西亚不持同样的立场？菲律宾提出可疑的“镜框”主张，不但将大片矩形海域作为“群岛海域”划归己有，还极具争议地提出该海域为其“内海”——即明确拒绝承认航行自由，甚至剥夺所有外国船舶的“无害通过权”，又该当何论？即使中国完全退出对该海域的主权声索，南中国海的大片海域仍将被诸国瓜分。

数周前，在新加坡香格里拉对话会上，安倍晋三大胆地向亚洲推销日本新型主导权

或许安倍先生认为，任何一个国家在单一毗连区内大片划定专属经济区，或专属经济区范围远超该国主要海岸线均属非法。但如果他真想发明一条这样的法律，是否会将其应用于范围远超日本主要岛屿的海上专属经济区呢？要知道，日本专属经济区的面积比南中国海存在争议的海域面积还要大，其边界超出日本主要岛屿海岸线一千多海里——其法理依据不过是日本对西太平洋上稀疏分布的诸小岛（证据不充分）的领土主张而已。

南中国海的海事纠纷从来都与航行自由无关，而是各声索国都在钻联合国海洋法公约的空子。从各个声索国对该公约的正式批准声明中能看出，他们对公约精神理解各不相同。菲律宾在批准声明中宣称联合国海洋法公约“没有损害如‘卡拉延群岛’（我南沙群岛）及附属海域等菲律宾共和国行使主权之领土。”同样，越南“重申越南对‘黄沙群岛’（我西沙群岛）及‘长沙群岛’（我南沙群岛）的主权。”中国也重新确认了对其“所有群岛和各岛屿拥有主权。”安倍先生在新加坡将中国拒与菲律宾接受国际仲裁的立场描黑为对地区和平的威胁。这又是对国际法错误的引述。在纠纷双方均同意的前提下，仲裁是解决纠纷的一种选项；联合国海洋法公约规定，在当事双方未就接受仲裁取得统一意见时，解决纠纷的主要途径是谈判（第279条），交换意见（第283条），以及调解程序（第284条）（另见联合国宪章第1条、第33条）。

联合国海洋法公约第298条保证了缔约国在任何时候退出由公约提供的海洋疆界仲裁的权利。包括澳大利亚、加拿大、智利、丹麦、法国、葡萄牙、意大利、西班牙、韩国和俄罗斯在内的许多国家已经行使了这一权利。在政治协议没有做出明文规定的情况下，极少数个人罔顾亿万人口利益（例如中国的14亿人口）提出的纠纷解决方案都是严重非法的。

安倍先生煽动南中国海的纠纷升级，其无益的野心与日本政府一贯拒不承认东中国海存在争议的做法形成了极大的反差。过去几年中，世界见证了中日两国在钓鱼岛（日称尖阁诸岛）问题上高度紧张甚至时有危险的对抗。中日间争议的来源在于1972年美国将钓鱼岛的“行政管辖权”交予日本，引起来自大陆与台湾的双重抗议。同年晚些时候，在中日两国决定实现邦交正常化时，两国领导人同意搁置争议，为未来最终解决领土问题创造条件。

纵观历史，日本与中国的罅隙虽由来已久，但任何人都想不到居然到了2014年安倍先生还不肯最起码的承认争议！安倍政府对国际法非同寻常的解读和鼓吹，与去年日本对中国宣布在东海设置防空识别区的回应一样，都非常危险，可能动摇地区安全与和平。

去年，在中国宣布防空识别区之后，安倍政府立刻宣称其“无效”。日本官员指责中国侵犯了日本的防空识别区，单方面改变了东海现状。安倍先生禁止所有日本飞机进入中国防空识别区后通报中方，并试图说服其他国家也照做，最后不了了之。

日本最不愿面对的事实是，日本有着全亚洲最大的防空识别区。历年来，日本防空识别区的面积曾多次扩大，且每次都是单方面行动，从不与邻国协商。如果日本的防空识别区是“合法的”，为什么中国的防空识别区是“非法的“？

全世界首个防空识别区是美国于1950年单方面划定的产物。其合法性阐释简单而直接：既然所有国家享有在美国领空通航的自由，那么美国不得不派遣飞机在近海上空拦截、干预、跟踪不明航班时，就存在潜在危险。为了降低产生严重误会和发生事故的风险，美国设立了一种可供飞机通报身份的新机制。本着合作原则，美国虽希望航班在国际空域中通报身份，但并未对此做硬性法律要求。

中国的做法与美国很像——援引了与美国相似的理论，在与领空毗邻的国际空域设置防空识别区。中日两国防空识别区存在重叠并非史无前例。共享国际空域的邻国，自然会根据自身的国防需要去设置重叠的防空识别区。中方的防空识别区覆盖钓鱼岛则更没什么特别的，毕竟日方的防空识别区也同样覆盖了这片存在争议的岛屿。中国对防空识别区的划定其实非常有节制，仅覆盖中国工业心腹重地（长江三角洲）和政治中心（北京）以外几百英里空域，这在国际上倒是非常少见。美国和日本的防空识别区一直延伸到离经济政治中心上千英里远的远洋公海上空，与中国形成了鲜明的对比。

在香格里拉对话会上，安倍先生大胆地提出了一套由日本主导和以“国际法”为基础的亚洲秩序。然而安倍政府一而再、再而三地显示出，日本构想中在“国际法”治下的亚洲，实际就是置于日本委任管理之下的亚洲。所有亚洲国家——包括那些日本正在拉拢讨好的国家——都应该反对这个“日本的亚洲”。

（观察者网杨晗轶 / 译  请翻页查看英文原文）

Why Asia Should Say No to Mr. Abe’s Vision of International Law for Asia

By: Allen K. Yu

A few weeks ago at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Shinzo Abe made a bold pitch to Asia to buy in on a new type of Japanese leadership. According to Mr. Abe, the peace that is at the foundation of the Asia Pacific’s unprecedented growth can no longer be guaranteed. Without naming China by name, Mr. Abe warns of a new danger that looms on the horizon. The Asia Pacific needs Japanese leadership and a new affirmation of “international law.”

These are heavy words for uncertain times. But should Asia buy in? In his speech, Mr. Abe talked extensively about The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, declaring his government’s strong support of the Philippines and Vietnam in their claims against China.

From China’s view, this was a provocative and dangerous articulation of law. China has never taken any actions or made any claims in the South China Sea that limits the freedom of passage. That is made abundantly clear with China’s ratification of the UNCLOS in 1982 and its signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002 reaffirming its “respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea.” Pursuant to a deadline set by the UNCLOS, on May 7, 2009, China submitted a map and a letter to the U.N. detailing the extent and bases of its “nine-dashed” claim. When Philippines officials publicly expressed concerns about freedom of passage in the South China Sea, the Chinese government promptly reaffirmed saying, “the freedom and safety of navigation in the South China Sea is assured.”

If China’s claims are a threat, one might ask, why are those of the other claimants not? For example, if China’s stance on foreign military surveillance is a problem, why is the the same stance not taken by the Philippines and Malaysia? What about the Philippines’ dubious “picture frame” claims over a vast rectangular swath in the South China Sea as its “archipelago waters” and its controversial insistence of treating this swath as its “internal waters” -- thus explicitly repudiating any freedom of passage, including freedom of “innocent passage, through this vast area? Even if all of China’s claims were removed, most of the South China Sea would still be claimed by one or more of the such other competing claimants.

Perhaps Mr. Abe believes that it is illegal for one nation to claim too much exclusive economic zone in a single contiguous zone -- or to claim an EEZ that extends too far out from a nation’s main coastlines. But if he is serious about conjuring up such a law, would he also apply the same law to Japan’s EEZ lying beyond its main islands -- covering an area larger than the disputed areas of the South China Sea, stretching at points over a thousand miles from Japan’s main islands --based on (tenuous) claims to minor islands spread thinly across the Western Pacific?

The current maritime disputes in the South China Sea have never been about the freedom to navigate the seas, but about various nations’ competing claims on which the UNCLOS says nothing about. All the claimants understand as much, as can be assessed from their ratification statements. Thus the Philippines pronounced in its ratification statement that UNCLOS did “not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines over any territory over which it exercises sovereign authority, such as the Kalayaan Islands, and the waters appurtenant thereto.” Similarly, Vietnam “reiterate[d] Viet Nam’s sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes.” China, too, “reaffirm[ed] its sovereignty over all its archipelagos and islands.”

In Singapore, Mr. Abe also intoned China to be a threat to regional peace in refusing to participate in Philippine’s arbitration case. That is another dangerous mischaracterization of law. Arbitration is an option when mutually agreed to. Absent mutual agreement, the primary means for resolving disputes under UNCLOS is through negotiations (Article 279), exchange of views (Article 283), and conciliation procedures (Article 284) (See also, Articles 1 and 33 of U.N. charter).

The right to opt out of UNCLOS-provided maritime boundary arbitration at any time is guaranteed by Article 298. Many nations that have explicitly exercised the right include Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Portugal, Italy, Spain, South Korea and Russia. The truth is, absent explicit political agreement, there is something very illegitimate about having a few individuals impose solutions on disputes that affect the interests of millions of people (or 1.4 plus billion as the case may be with China).

Mr. Abe’s unhelpful desire to declare and foment disputes in the South China Sea marks a great contrast to his government’s steadfast refusal to acknowledge any dispute in the East China Sea. Over the last few years, the world has come to witness the tense and sometimes dangerous confrontations between Japan and China over the Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands. The source of these disputes can be traced back to 1972 when the U.S. handed “administrative control” to Japan and both R.O.C. on Taiwan and P.R.C. on Mainland protested. When Japan and the P.R.C. decided to normalize their relations later that year, however, leaders from both nations agreed to shelve the disputes for the future.

Japan and China obviously hold wide and deeply-rooted differences over history, but one would think Mr. Abe would in 2014 at least acknowledge a dispute! The exceptional means by which Mr. Abe’s government approaches international law is dangerous and destabilizing, as was in full display last year with Japan’s response to China’s announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea.

Immediately, Mr. Abe’s government declared China’s ADIZ to be “invalid.” Japanese officials accused China of violating Japan’s ADIZ and of unilaterally changing the status quo in the East China Sea. Mr. Abe forbid all Japanese aircrafts from identifying themselves in China’s ADIZ and tried unsuccessfully to lobby other nations to do the same.

The inconvenient fact for Japan is that Japan claims the largest ADIZ in Asia, one that it has expanded multiple times throughout the years, each time unilaterally without ever consulting its neighbors. If Japan’s ADIZ “legal,” why is China’s “illegal”?

The first ADIZ in the world was created by the U.S., unilaterally, in 1950. The legal justification was straight forward. Since all nations enjoyed the freedom of navigation right up to the U.S.’s territorial airspace, a potentially dangerous situation above the near seas could arise when the U.S had to scramble aircrafts to intercept, meet and track unidentified aircrafts. To reduce the risk of serious incidents of misunderstanding and accidents, the U.S. provided a mechanism by which these aircrafts could identify themselves. The U.S. did not proclaim that aircrafts are legally required to identify themselves in these international airspaces, although it did generally expect them to do so since cooperation made sense.

China -- like the U.S. -- invoked a similar rationale to declare an ADIZ in its adjoining international airspace. The fact that China’s ADIZ overlap that of Japan was nothing exceptional. Nations sharing adjoining international airspaces would naturally look to the same airspaces to address their defense concerns. The fact that China’s ADIZ covers the disputed Diaoyutai / Senkaku is also unexceptional given that Japan’s ADIZ also covers the same disputed islands. China’s ADIZ is actually quite unexceptional in defining a modest area that is entirely within a few hundred miles from China’s industrial heartland (Shanghai delta area) and political center (Beijing area). By contrast, both the U.S. and Japan claim huge ADIZs that stretch deep into the open seas, at times over a thousand miles from any industrial or political center.

In the Shangri-La Dialogue, Mr. Abe boldly offers Asia an order based on Japanese leadership and “international law.” Yet in case after case, Mr. Abe’s government has shown that Japan’s conception of an Asia ruled by “international law” is really just an Asia ruled under Japanese mandate. All Asian nations -- including those currently being befriended by Japan -- should reject it.