胡鞍钢：民主的中国集体领导体制

【美国《赫芬顿邮报》新闻评论网站《世界邮报》2014年5月12日刊登观察者网供稿，清华大学国情研究院院长胡鞍钢教授文章“Is China More Democratic Than The U.S.?”。】

《赫芬顿邮报》刊发胡鞍钢文章

二十多年前，随着冷战的铁幕落入历史，许多非西方国家选择以西方民主制度取代自身原有的政治体制。这些国家多数囫囵吞枣地移植了美国的总统制，而未将这种政治“舶来品”真正融入本国的政治文化。彼时，民主世界的新成员们皆视民主为包治百病的“万灵丹”，欲以此一扫苏联体制造成的种种痼疾；并与西方一起阔步走向历史的终结。然而，仅仅二十余年后，这些新兴民主国家几乎无一例外——甚至包括西方自身——都面临着深刻的结构性困境。

前几年的全球金融危机使本就饱受政治僵局、社会割裂、经济停滞等一系列难题困扰的西方民主国家雪上加霜，前景堪忧。中国则在这段时间里快速赶超西方，成为世界第二大经济体，其经济总量预计将在十年内超过美国。

1978年时，中国的人均收入还不足非洲国家平均水平的三分之一。她究竟是如何在不“改旗易帜”的前提下，在消除贫困、提升人民生活水平等方面取得举世瞩目成就的呢？

回答这个令西方费解的问题，关键在于中国社会的稳定。社会稳定，是中国以史为鉴得出的重要经验，也是中国当前阶段取得巨大成绩的关键。要创造有利于经济增长的宏观环境，就必须保证社会的秩序和稳定，这一切必须以成熟的政治制度作为基础。

要认真研究中国，就不能把中国的体制与东亚威权主义体制混为一谈；否则得出的结论就将流于概念化、简单化。诚然，中国的改革开放与其他东亚经济体更早期的改革不无相似之处；但它们的性质不尽相同。东亚国家和台湾地区的威权主义政府主导了产业升级，使国民经济的主要增长部门由农业向工业转移。

务实的中国模式

除了超大规模的人口和丰富的自然资源外，中国还得益于一套务实的政治体制。正是这套体制鼓励中国积极学习借鉴世界各国的先进生产实践经验，使中国得以超越东亚模式。

1980年，邓小平对中国的社会主义现代化建设提出了三个要求：中国要在经济上赶上发达的资本主义国家（实际上是指美国）；在政治上创造比资本主义国家（实际上还是主要指美国）的民主更高更切实的民主；并且造就比这些国家更多更优秀的人才。这三个要求也是判断一个发展中国家的政治制度，特别是中国的社会主义体制好不好、完善不完善的标准。

研究中国的政治体制，一定要避免陷入“专制-民主”这种陈旧的对比范式。一旦政治学者把所谓“威权体制”这张狗皮膏药贴到新一届中国领导人身上，就必将忽视中国政治体制的独到之处。西方许多人还错误地以为中国是个极权主义国家，但事实上，从权力和责任分配角度来说，中国的集体领导体制比被西方民主政治奉为圭臬的立法、行政、司法“三权分立”更加精密。早在民国时期，孙中山就结合国情，在西方各国实行的“三权分立”基础上提出了“五权分立”；其后，中国共产党进一步创新，组建起由多个机构构成的“超级国家机构”，这种情况只有欧盟有——欧盟理事会、欧盟委员会、欧洲议会、欧洲央行等大型组织共同分担各领域的权利和责任。

为什么中国的常委集体领导制要优于西方国家政治制度的“一党控制”、“两党分治”、“三权分立”、“总统（个人负责）制”？我在新书《中国集体领导体制》中，对这个问题进行了梳理和回答。中国走上集体领导制的道路，不是偶然的，也不是某个领导人凭空想出来的，而是新中国在吸取历史经验教训的基础上，经过长期的制度创新、制度学习、制度变迁的“试错”过程，摸索出来的。在书中，我将中国特色的集体领导制的运行机制概括为五大机制：集体分工协作机制、集体交接班机制、集体学习机制、集体调研机制和集体决策机制。

集体分工协作机制

中国有句古谚，叫做“三个臭皮匠，赛过诸葛亮”，这很准确地描述出中国这个文明古国对集体智慧的重视程度。实际上，遵义会议后不久，在党的第一代领导集体刚刚开始形成时，党中央常委的分工协作机制即以开始实际运作，也就是说，“大权集中、小权分散”已初具雏形。1945年，中共中央书记处“五大书记”便根据各自领导经验和才干，分别负责军事指挥、土地改革、情报联络、党组建设、群团统战等各项工作。

今天，国内外局势更加千头万绪，各方面综合治理更加需要中央领导集体坚持巩固分工协作的基本原则和运行机制。中国领导集体的沟通、协商、协作体现在不同层面上：首先，各常委个人之间存在协作关系，在自身主要负责领域之外，还需协助其他常委工作；其次，各常委所代表的决策机构之间互相协作、共享信息，各机构党组定期就重大战略问题向中央政治局常委会提交报告，研究重大决策；第三，各机构下属的内部智库相互竞争、相互合作，为形成全面、综合的战略决策信息、知识和建议的党中央“大脑”提供了基础。

西方政治学语境中的三权分立虽有效地限制了权力的滥用，但同时也造成了政治僵局，束缚领导人使其难以施展手脚进行迫切的根本性改革，用通俗的话来讲，就是干不了坏事，也干不了好事。反观中国，最高领导层及其管辖的各机构共同构成了一个团结统一的体系，各机构不但有互相监督的职能，更能够促成负责任的治理，鼓励领导人多干实事、好事。

集体交接班机制

西方长期以“缺乏透明度”为由，非议中国的领导集体交接班机制，然而正是这套被西方误读的机制，确保了党和国家领导权力的平稳交接。在中国领导人数次新老交替中，中共完成了从个人选择个人接班人到集体选择集体接班人的转变，形成了党中央集体选择、集体考察、集体交接班的机制。

中西领导人之间一项重要的区别是，中国提拔领导人看的是才干和政绩，西方民主国家领导人晋升靠的是选举。在奉行选举民主的国家里，不同政党代表着不同社会利益集团的部分利益，只要在周期性选战中击败政敌，该政党就直接获得了执政的正当性。中国共产党不是西方政治学意义上的普通政党，它代表着广大中国人民的根本利益。统治绩效是中共执政合法性的重要来源，要中国人民单凭选举接受一个缺乏能力和行政经验的领袖——诸如小布什或奥巴马——是很困难的。

大批共产党的中层干部需要跨越两个重要的政治台阶，才能成为中央领导集体成员。第一个台阶是担任党的省区市委书记，在治理国家前先接受省的锻炼和考验。从某种意义上说，担任省区市党委书记就进入了学习国家治理之道最好的学校。在经历了长期、激烈的竞争；积累了处理各地区、各部门难题的经验；熟练把握形势，掌握各种资源信息之后，有为的干部才能在严格的考验中脱颖而出。只有这样的领导人，才有能力管理好中国这个世界头号人口大国。说直接一点，这就是个政治学习过程，学好了的可以上去，没学好的基本就退休了。以中央政法委书记孟建柱为例，他曾经担任过上海川沙、嘉定县委书记、上海市副市长、市委副书记，后来调到江西省担任省委书记。江西省是个大省，有4500万人口，经济总量相当于一个中等国家。中央的高层干部几乎都要经过这样的历练，才能坐到现在这个位子上。

成为中央委员之后，高层干部们还需迈上第二个台阶才能真正成为中国最高权力的接班人。这个台阶的主要锻炼岗位是中央政治局委员和候补委员、中央书记处书记和候补书记，在“集体交接班”过渡期中，他们需要担任党的领导集体成员，即中央政治局常委的主要助手。在这个“实习期”和“预备期”中，他们全面接受治党治国理政之道之术的“强化训练”，为他们将来集体结伴作各种政治准备。

既然中国共产党代表着广大中国人民的根本利益，它就承担着确保国家昌盛、民族富强的至高责任。正因为此，中国最高领导权力的交接必须非常谨慎。这样，集体交接班机制不但有效地避免了个人独裁，而且更重要的是，它通过严格的政治考察，防止戈尔巴乔夫式的人物掌权，导致中国目前取得的伟大成就付诸东流。

集体学习机制

中国共产党是典型的学习型政党，中国历任领导人都带头学习、提倡学习，逐渐形成了学习的优良传统。2003年，中共十六届二中全会决定正式建立中央政治局集体学习制度。通过集体学习，党中央领导核心与决策咨询、政策评估部门展开积极互动，汇总多元背景信息，群策群智完成信息分享与综合判断，不断地提高自身的执政能力、积极学习创新、不断与时俱进。

在这一机制下，中央政治局定期邀请国家智库成员，向全体常委做专题授课，并召开各类讲座、研讨会。政治局常委则围绕国民经济与社会发展重要领域、重大问题，向顶尖专家学者征询意见和建议。正是通过这种建设性交流，中央领导集体得以在各决策咨询部门的帮助下，恰当地处理重大棘手问题。

我作为清华大学的教授，除了要给学生上课外，还要给在职干部上课，专讲中国国情与改革问题。过去只有中央党校、国家行政学院设立此类课程，后来拓展到清华大学、北京大学、北京师范大学、中国人民大学和国防大学等各类高校。今天，领导干部集体学习已经是一个制度化高、参与度广的机制了。

实际上，干部学习远不止于书本和教室：各级党委、政府、国企、事业单位，都是培养优秀干部的大课堂。中央政治局常委的平均工龄为43.6年，党龄为38.9年。习近平1953年生，1969年参加工作，1974年入党——也就是说，他在公共事务、组织管理方面已积累了四十余年的学习经验。

集体调研机制

“没有调查，就没有发言权。”毛泽东早在1930年便提出了这个著名论断。

任何公共政策要获得良好效果，其决策就应建立在大量相关信息的基础之上。中国幅员辽阔、人口众多，治理起来千头万绪，一个人再有智慧、能力，也不可能了解那么多信息。在个人领导体制下，这种信息不对称性严重影响了政府决策的有效性；在中国的集体领导体制下，政治局常委分管不同机构，下属多个研究室、委员会，这些内部智库负责为领导集体搜集各种信息。与此同时，中央领导人们也非常注重深入基层，着眼于不同侧重点广泛调查，充分采集第一手信息，便于接下去全面汇总、集体讨论、达成共识、做出决策。集体调研不但可以促进地方贯彻落实党中央的政策方针，也是应对突发性公共事件或重大自然灾害的积极手段。

中国曾是一个内部差异巨大的出口导向型经济体，易受国际经济环境震荡的影响。制定中国的宏观经济政策，关乎国计民生，尤须审慎。2008年金融危机爆发时，许多国家的政府要么措手不及，要么束手无策，而中共第十七届政治局常委第一时间展开了实地考察，通过调研很快形成共识，最终非常及时地推出了四万亿经济刺激计划。这种高度制度化的集体调研、集体决策机制，未雨绸缪，使中国能够从容应对外部挑战。

在今年3月新版的《民主决策：中国集体领导体制》一书中，我添加了一个附录：《踏遍青山，问计于民》。根据不完全统计，习近平总书记自上任起至2013年12月末的400余天时间里，共用了39天，进行了14次国内考察调研，遍及全国1/3多的省、自治区、直辖市及七大军区。在十八届三中全会召开之前，农村土地所有权、承包权、经营权等问题一直存在争议。为此，习近平特意拜访了湖北的农户，亲自询问农民的真实想法。他也会听汇报，听专家意见，但领导人不能仅有二手材料，通过调研获取第一手材料，是帮助领导人全面了解情况、综合判断的好方法。

集体决策机制

共和国六十余年来的历史实践，让党中央清楚地认识到：战略决策的成功是最大的成功，战略决策的失败是最大的失败。1958年以后，毛泽东在重大决策中的个人作用越来越凸显，逐渐凌驾于党中央之上，削弱了集体领导原则和民主集中制，党的民主生活和正规制度遭到严重破坏，导致中国经历了一场混乱的浩劫——如果中国当时能够保持革命时期和建国初期确立下来的政治原则，坚持集体领导不向个人领导退化，发生在毛泽东晚年的悲剧在较大程度上是可以避免的。

领导集体内部的权力不对称性，往往会妨碍其做出正确的决策。毛泽东时代晚期，中国政治权力结构逐渐失衡，这和他后来犯的错误密切相关；后来邓小平重建党中央集体决策机制，恢复结构平衡，为集体决策科学化、民主化和制度化打下了坚实的基础。

中共的集体决策，本着“集体领导、民主集中、个别酝酿、会议决定”的民主集中制原则。西方在看待民主集中制时，总难免戴着有色眼镜，但实际上，信息互换、追求共识等民主程序，正是中国集体决策机制的不可或缺的内容和形式。

有8500万党员的中国共产党，是世界最大的、最强有力的组织，它在吸取历史经验的基础上，开辟了核心性制度创新的道路。中国是一个区域差异明显、社会利益多元的文明型国家，只有接受集体领导的中国共产党才能全面代表中国人民的根本利益；只有这样才能确保各级政府部门良好的分工协作；也只有这样，各种社会力量才能凝聚到一起，不断推动中国向着实现民族复兴的伟大目标前进。

（观察者网杨晗轶/译。翻页请看英文原文）

Is China More Democratic Than The U.S.?

Hu Angang is director of the Center for China Studies, a joint research center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Tsinghua University. This article is distributed by the Guancha Syndicate and its Chinese original was published in Guancha.cn.

SHANGHAI -- After the iron curtain had come down more than two decades ago, many non-western countries got rid of their old political systems and replaced them with Western democracy. Instead of assimilating such foreign systems with their own political cultures, many simply transplanted the presidential system of the United States to their own soil. Back then, it was widely believed that democracy was the “panacea” that would cure all Soviet dysfunctions. And the new democracies would march with the West on a convergent path to the end of history. However, in merely 20 odd years, almost without exception, these new democracies -- and to some extent the West itself -- have all run into deep structural predicament.

Political stalemate, social malaise, economic stagnation, worsened by the latest global financial crisis, outline a depressing picture of the democratic West. Meanwhile, China has leapfrogged the West to become the world’s second largest economy, and it is projected to overtake the U.S within the next decade.

How could China, a country that, in as late as 1978, was three times poorer than an average African nation in terms of income per capita, succeed in the Herculean task of poverty reduction and general improvement of living standard for its people, without converting its political institutions to the western orthodox?

This remains a perplexing case to many in the West. The answer lies in China’s social stability. This is a lesson the Chinese learned it the hard way throughout their history. It is also the single most important factor behind the country’s enormous success. A growth-enabling macroeconomic environment is safeguarded by well-maintained social order and stability; which are in turn made possible by mature political institutions.

If one wants to study China seriously, then one can’t just group China among other East Asian authoritarian regimes without any differentiation. Otherwise, it would be a grossly vague and ineffective simplification. While it is true that, to a limited extent, China’s reform resembles earlier reforms in other East Asian economies, they are not the same. In Taiwan and other East Asian countries, authoritarian governments oversaw industrial upgrading; they incentivized and led the transition away from primary to secondary industry as the growth-generating sector.

PRAGMATIC INSTITUTIONS

However, in the case of China, in addition to the sheer size of its population and the abundance of its natural resources, the socialist government established pragmatic institutions that encourage learning best practices from around the world. This enabled China to go beyond the East Asian Model.

In 1980, Deng Xiaoping proposed three criteria for judging whether the government of any developing country, particularly China, is legitimate and qualified to govern or not: firstly, can its economic governance put the country on the right track to catch up with the most advanced capitalist economy, namely the U.S.; secondly, can its political governance produce more genuine democracy than the American institutions; and lastly, does the government play well its enabling and facilitative role in grooming ever more talents for the colossal task of modernization?

If one were to follow the antiquated paradigm of autocracy versus democracy and apply such labels to all five generations of Chinese leaders, one would invariably overlook some very crucial facts that are unique features of China’s political system. Many in the West still mistake China for a Stalinist totalitarian state. But the truth is, arguably, the distribution of power and accountability within China’s “Collective Presidency” is more sophisticated than the separation of power between legislative, executive and judiciary branches in the western political context. As early as in the Republican Period, Sun Yat-sen went beyond the West in terms of checks and balances within political institutions, by envisioning the separation of five powers. And the Communist Party of China (CPC) took an innovative step even further by first dividing and then reintegrating power into “super-institutions”, a practice vaguely resembled by the European Union, where the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank, and other organizations jointly share power on different fronts.

In a humble effort to illustrate the case of China, I have put together historical experience and lessons since the naissance of the People’s Republic in my recent book Democratic Decision-making: China’s Collective Presidency (China Renmin University Press, March 2014). I want to explain why the collective leadership of seven to nine Politburo Standing Committee members is superior to the system of singular presidency. China did not just stumble upon collective presidency by accident, nor did it happen by random invention. China has gone through laborious processes of innovation, trials and errors, rectification, and institutionalization to become what it is today. I have identified in the book the five major mechanisms of China’s collective presidency: collective collaboration, collective power transition, collective self-improvement, collective research, and collective decision-making.

COLLECTIVE COLLABORATION

“The collective wisdom of the masses humbles any individual prodigy”-- this time-tested Chinese proverb aptly reflects how this ancient civilization traditionally values collectivism. In fact, shortly after the Long March of 1938, the founding fathers of the People’s Republic had seen clearly the need for division of responsibilities. In other words, the decentralization of the centralized power. Important issues relating to military, land reform, intelligence, party organization, mobilization and publicity were divided among five members of the Central Secretariat according to individual expertise.

Today, as domestic and international affairs grow ever more complex, there is an increasing need for collaborative governance. For the Chinese top leadership, such collaboration manifests on multiple levels: firstly, most Politburo Standing Committee members have assistant roles to play apart from his major area of responsibility; secondly, Politburo members are each in charge of different policymaking organizations which exchange information on a regular basis, and brief the top leaders on matters of strategic importance; thirdly, a plethora of internal think tanks, in collaboration and competition with each other, form the brain of CPC central leadership, and serve as essential means to gather intelligence and advise on policies.

In the Western political context, while the separation of powers effectively prohibits ill usage of authority, it also produces political gridlocks and mutual detachments that prevent ambitious leaders from introducing much needed fundamental reforms. Whereas for China, top leaders and the respective organizations they represent not only facilitate but also supervise each other in a unified system, which gives rise to accountable governance and encourages leaders to do good.

COLLECTIVE POWER TRANSITION

Frequently dubbed as opaque by western media, leadership transition is one of the most misread modus operandi in Chinese politics. In nearly half a century’s time, China abolished personal appointment of heirs, and moved to a system of collectively selecting, evaluating, and grooming future leaders.

An important factor differentiating China from the West is that Chinese leaders compete on meritocratic basis alone, unlike their Western counterparts whose ascendance is dependent upon the merits of election campaigns rather than performance assessment. In electoral democracies, political parties literally represent various partial interests, and the right for any party to hold office is directly derived from winning periodical elections. In the case of the CPC’s, however, the Party is not meant to be “partial,” it represents the interest of the mass majority in society. Legitimacy for a CPC leader comes from performance and solid track record. It would be unthinkable to have an incompetent leader with scant experience in public affairs, such as the likes of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, running the government.

There are at least two major meritocratic thresholds that any mid-level CPC cadre must meet before they can move into the Party’s top echelon. First, they must have served at the level of provincial Party leader. In a way, these positions represent an elite training program for governance and public administration that few countries can offer. In a prolonged, competitive, and stringent process, capable candidates must tackle all kinds of regional / sectoral challenges. They need to keep themselves well informed and have various resources ready at their fingertips at all times. They need to be able to consistently demonstrate that they have what it takes to lead the world’s most populous country to an even better future. Put it bluntly, only the best and fittest survive, the rest would retire. For example, Meng Jianzhu, now a central government high-ranking Party official, began his career as a county Party Secretary and then Vice Mayor of Shanghai. Subsequently, he headed the provincial government and Party Committee of Jiangxi, a province in eastern China with over 45 million people and a GDP equivalent to that of Pakistan, before he was able to serve on the Central Committee of Political and Legislative Affairs.

Once a member of the Central Committee, a second threshold is for a potential future leader to demonstrate that he or she has the tenacity and commitment to make their way to the top. They need to serve as alternate members of Politburo Standing Committee for several years. In this preparatory phase, current leaders would put these candidates to tests, and screen the most competent and well disciplined for subsequent collective power transition.

Since the CPC is meant to be a guardian, if not the only guardian, of the overall interest of the Chinese people, the Party bears the ultimate responsibility for the betterment of the country, the nation, and the state. For obvious reasons, transition of such leadership must be handled with care. Such collective mechanism not only keeps potential dictators at bay, but also prevents the likes of Gorbachev from taking power in China and undoing China’s great achievements so far.

COLLECTIVE LEARNING

The CPC has a long tradition in collective learning, a multi-faceted practice that entails expert consulting, information-sharing, international exchange, and learning from best practices. Without exception, generations of Chinese leaders all called attention to continuous learning. In 2003, collective learning became a codified practice in the Second Plenum of 16th Central Committee.

The Politburo regularly and frequently organizes lectures, seminars, symposiums, where Standing Committee members would consult top Chinese minds on matters of economic and social importance. Through this mechanism, constructive interaction between various decision-making and policy-consulting bodies would help the central government take fitting actions on even the most delicate issues.

In my capacity as a professor at Tsinghua University, I teach high-level cadres customized courses on contemporary China studies and China’s reform. Such courses were first offered in Central Party School and Chinese Academy of Governance; top Chinese Universities soon followed. Today, collective learning has already become a highly institutionalized mechanism with broad participation.

To be sure, CPC officials learn far beyond from books and in classrooms, from their rotational career postings through different sectors, namely Party Committee, State-Owned Enterprises, and other social organizations. On average, the current members of Central Politburo Standing Committee each have 43.6 years of experience in civil service, and 38.9 years of Party membership. Born in 1953, President Xi Jinping, for instance, joined the civil service in 1969, and joined the CPC in 1974 - that adds up to more than four decades of learning and experience in public administration, organization and management.

COLLECTIVE RESEARCH

“He who carries out no research and investigation shouldn’t be entitled to his opinions”, said Mao Zedong in 1930.

Having adequate and relevant information is the foundation to any successful public policy making. This is particularly true for China, a country with vast territory and the world’s largest population. It is extremely unlikely that any individual would possess well-rounded and in-depth knowledge on all aspects of society. Therefore, no one, however capable, could act appropriately on such gross information deficit. In the case of Chinese collective presidency, each member of the Politburo Standing Committee stays well informed by a good number of subcommittees, internal research institutes and independent think-tanks in various fields. At the same time, they also conduct plenty primary research and investigations. Such effort not only strengthens local implementation of central government’s policies, but also provides preventive measures to deal with contingencies, such as natural disasters and social hazards.

Once an export-driven economy with complex domestic disparity, China was highly susceptible to external shocks from the international economic environment. It requires tremendous amount of knowledge and prudence to devise macro-level policies for the whole nation. When the latest financial crisis hit the world in 2008, while many governments were either gridlocked on the effective cause of action or taken by surprise due to internal unpreparedness. In China all nine members of the 17th Politburo Standing Committee promptly conducted field investigations and soon reached unanimous decision on the launch of a timely 4 trillion yuan stimulus package to boost the economy. This highly institutionalized collective decision-making process can effectively prepare China for any possible challenges that arise externally.

In the latest edition of China’s Collective Presidency, I attached a chronological record showing in detail that by the end of 2013, how President Xi spent nearly 10 percent of his time on 14 inspection trips that covered one third of China’s provinces and all seven military regions. Prior to the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee meeting of the CPC, topics such as rural land reform were most controversially debated. In order to have a better understanding on those key issues, in addition to official reports, Xi Jinping purposefully visited farmers in Hubei province and gathered firsthand information from the grassroots level.

COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING

After more than six decades of ups and downs, it is increasingly clear to Beijing that making the right strategic decision is the greatest success, and failing to do so would result in national calamity. In fact, China had learned its lessons from the chaotic late years of Mao -- If China had stood firmly against Mao’s personal leadership and held on to collective decision-making mechanism from 1958 to 1976, as it had during the civil war and in the first decade of communist rule, catastrophic movements such as the Cultural Revolution could have largely been prevented.

A common hindrance to efficient decision-making and good governance stems from the asymmetry of power. The loss and restoration of balance in China’s political power structure explain respectively Mao’s failure and Deng’s success. After seeing Mao’s grave mistakes, Deng Xiaoping openly stressed in 1980 that ‘important issues must be discussed collectively; each Party committee member should be entitled to one vote, and decision-making should strictly follow the rule of majority’.

Contrary to western stereotypical views on China’s democratic centralism, democratic procedures from information exchange to consensus seeking are in fact the backbones and lifeblood of the country’s collective decision-making.

With more than 85 million members, the Communist Party of China is the world’s largest ruling entity. It has seen the struggles and ambitions of earlier regimes, and explored on itself various institutional possibilities over the course of its history. China is a civilization with profound regional differences. Only collective presidency is able to capture such diverse interests of the Chinese people, and coordinate among different levels of the government to strike a balance between the Party and the state. It takes collective presidency to unify and mobilize social forces on all fronts, and continuously propel the nation forward.