李世默：中国为何能赢在下一个三十年

2013年TED大会上，李世默发表了颇受瞩目的演讲，其中重复了他在此前多篇文章中论述的观点。李世默认为中国的经济和国力将持续增长，一党执政的中国模式将趋于完善，但中国绝不会尝试向外输出自己的价值观和政治模式。4月26日，美国百人会第23届年会在旧金山召开，今年的主题是“求同存异”。会上，李世默与《赫芬顿邮报》旗下的《世界邮报》（The World Post）专栏作家马特•希恩（Matt Sheehan）对话，以《中国为何能赢在太平洋》为题，刊发于今日的《世界邮报》上，主题包括中国在领土问题上的立场，国际秩序的演变，以及中国政治制度的前景。以下为马特·希恩与李世默对话。

马特·希恩对话李世默

马特•希恩：从奥巴马总统的日本之行，和他就乌克兰危机等的表态看，有迹象表明美国正试图对盟友表示更大的支持，在各种冲突中为他们助威。而美国在叙利亚和克里米亚危机中的表现众所周知, 您认为当下美国做的这些新的表态还有作用吗？

李世默：对您的问题，我没有直接的答案。不过在美国，口惠而实不至是政客的天性，他们总是轻易许诺，但很少兑现。在美国的选举中，人们对此已司空见惯，但这一现象正扩散到国际政治中。乔治•凯南是一位伟大的战略家，冷战初期，他为美国一手打造了遏制战略。冷战结束后，北约和欧盟不断东扩，也正是凯南警告这将铸成大错，他说美国尽管志得意满地到处派发安全保证，但事实上它既无力也无心真正兑现。今天的局势，证明凯南不幸言中。凯南已去，美国恐怕再没有这样清醒的战略家了。

乔治•凯南是一位伟大的战略家，冷战初期，他为美国一手打造了遏制战略。

马特•希恩：克里米亚危机是否会影响中国领导人对亚太问题的估计？比如，是否会鼓励他们采取更坚决的姿态？

李世默：我想影响是有限的。克里米亚危机只是次要的, 决定性的因素在美国自身。美国人口占世界的4.5%，经济产值不到20%，但军费开支高达全球一半，在世界各地频频征战。冷战结束后仅仅一代人多一点的时间，美国就债台高筑，产业空心化，中产阶级萎缩，基础设施失修，教育资金匮乏，社会契约失去合法性。显而易见，这种局面是难以为继的。美国的战略重心摇摆不定，先是亚洲，接着是中东，然后是乌克兰，最后又一无所获地回到起点。与此同时, 美国民众对重建本国社会基础的诉求与日俱增。这才是影响中国长远战略思考的重要趋势。

马特•希恩：关于中美关系的进一步发展，您强调有序竞争、战略合作和相互尊重各自的影响区域。就此，您如何看美国在亚太的角色？

李世默：在亚太地区，有些国家是美国的“保护国”，其中最大的是日本，菲律宾也名列其中。美国为这些“保护国”提供军事保障，而有些美国”保护国”和中国有各种利益, 文化和战略上的冲突。问题在于，中国作为一个崛起中的大国, 能否在其周边地区有序地建立合理的影响区域？这个历史悠久的大国，未来能否和平地重返其在亚太的领导地位？在这个过程中，美国又会扮演什么样的角色？

马特•希恩：您曾强调中共的合法性既来源于它带领中国实现的经济成就，也建立在中共领导的民族解放运动，最终结束了列强侵略的“百年国耻”的历史地位上。在与日本的领土争端上，中国领导人将遭遇两难挑战，要么不惜经济滑坡的风险动武开战，要么放弃民族核心利益并妥协让步。就您来看，中共的决策层会作何决断呢？

李世默：的确，中共的合法性有赖于保持经济增长与保卫民族利益。在您假设的挑战中，这两大目标很难兼顾，这将考验中共决策层的政治决断。要兼顾两者而不偏废，确实要求相当高的政治智慧，而迄今为止中共决策层的表现十分出色。如果一如既往，未来两者还会相得益彰。

中国最近在南海和东海问题上更趋坚决，很多分析家认为其结果对中国是负面的，我认为那是误判。事实很明显，中国的战略是积极改变对其不利的现有格局，同时避免军事冲突。 在与日本、菲律宾的领土争端上，中国的表现是出色的。在黄岩岛问题上，中国实现了对那个区域的实际控制权， 但避免了战争。在钓鱼岛争端上，中国改变了既往局势，日本否认领土争端的存在，但中国的策略已将争端成为现实， 中国的船只在钓鱼岛海域行驶， 挑战了日本的实际控制权，这些战略成果都是在一枪未发的条件下获取的。

马特•希恩：在您看来，美国开创了战后国际体系，但要继续担当世界警察，维持利维坦的门面已力不从心。而中国尽管正在崛起，却绝不会试图取代美国的角色。既然中国与非洲、南美乃至全世界的经济联系日渐密切，中国还能坚持孤立主义的外交政策吗？

李世默：毋庸置疑，中国与全球经济的联系越来越密切。从非洲、东南亚到世界各地，中国的政治、经济政策正不断向外拓展。但中国的观念与美国截然不同。中国从未企图建立一个普世体系并执其牛耳。中国的政策目标是与各国平等互惠地发展经贸关系，增进中国民众的福利。中国从未将自己的观念强加于人，或对其他国家的内政指手划脚，或兜售某种宏大叙事。中国一直致力于改善经贸关系，增进本国民众的福利。当然，随着其国力的上升, 中国的政策将趋于强势，但必须看到这与美国的世界观有本质区别。

马特•希恩：您深信中国政府有能力解决中国当下面临的诸多挑战。众所周知，这些挑战包括环境恶化、腐败引发的金融和经济问题，在您看来，哪些挑战是最严峻的？哪些是中共难以应对的？

李世默：经济和腐败问题是两大最紧迫的挑战。中国经济持续高增长，但既有的经济模式已走到尽头。中国经济亟需结构性改革，这意味着增速适当放缓，期间将出现一些新问题。兼顾结构调整与增长无疑是一大挑战，但我相信在这方面中国的领导人能力出众，足以应对。

第二大挑战是腐败问题。几千年来，腐败一直是中国政治中的顽症，历代王朝都深陷其中。因此，腐败的根源非常复杂、顽固，很难找到永久根治的灵丹妙药。当前，中共正发动一次运动式的反腐风暴：猛药去疴、重典治乱，在一定时期内足以遏制腐败；当然时过境迁，腐败还会死灰复燃，到时又必须启动另一次反腐风暴。目前，这次堪称建国以来最严厉的反腐风暴，正渐入高潮。我相信这足以在短期内遏制腐败，但肯定无法根治。远期来看，政府内部的制度化监督机制将逐渐强化，当然这是一个渐进的过程。

马特•希恩：习近平主席主政已有一年半的时间。对习近平主席的施政理念和举措，您有何感想？最大的看点是什么？

李世默：我认为习近平主席正在开创中华人民共和国的第三个三十年。毋庸置疑，我认为这具有划时代的意义。第一个三十年是毛泽东时代；第二个三十年是邓小平时代，在某种意义上江泽民和胡锦涛两位领导人继承发扬了邓小平的事业。我的理解是，习近平主席开创的新三十年，将是对前两个三十年的辩证综合。在刚过去的十八个月中，习近平主席让全国民众领会了他的施政理念和举措，在经济改革、反腐、政治改革等各方面，其大刀阔斧的决心和举措超越了所有人的预期。

马特•希恩：迄今为止，习近平主席的政绩相当完美，但接下来改革的主要挑战在哪里？

李世默：在我看来，最大的风险是难以预测的国际冲突。我相信中国政府能有效地调整和发展经济，许多人强调中国的经济风险，我承认许多问题确实存在，但相信政府能处理好。中国经济正踏上一个新台阶，有充分的创新能力。

许多人声称中国的一大困境是创新乏力，这简直是天方夜谭。今天的中国处于几百年来最具有创新活力的时代。大约十八或十九年前，我开始从事风险投资时，主流观点是中国永远产生不了市值十亿美元的高科技公司。今天，阿里巴巴和腾讯的市值都已超过千亿美元。至于十亿美元市值的公司，走进中关村的某家饭店，就随处可见。

马特•希恩：中国最大的高科技公司，都是在市场保护的环境中发展起来的。如果中国要培养更多有国际竞争力的公司，比如堪与WhatsApp竞争的微信，中共是否会助其一臂之力？

李世默：在我看来，中共不是直接帮助高科技公司，而是提供更基础性的支持，改善吸引人才和投资的环境。只要看看中国的大学，就会发现其科研设施和人才与十年前相比，早已不可同日而语。在这样的舞台上，年轻的创新人才将不断开发出新技术和方案。对此我相当乐观。

马特•希恩：您指出难以预料的国际冲突是对中国崛起的最大威胁，然而当前的国际环境因为中国的崛起而充满冲突, 就算中国成功地打破了对其不利的现有格局, 但是在大方向上中国的策略是否是失败的？

李世默：任何长远战略都有其短期目标之间的矛盾,受制于这种矛盾才会失败。利用和平的外部环境发展经济，是中国关键的战略目标。但是，中国的复兴有其多重使命，其中就包括恢复在亚太的领导地位，以保卫中国的核心利益。中国要实现复兴不可能不承担风险，我想中国的战略不是无谓的避免风险, 而是积极承担风险, 稳妥控制风险, 以实现利益最大化。

马特•希恩：您反驳了民众收入增加会刺激政治权利、言论自由之类诉求的观点。且不论政治表达的问题，您如何看如民族主义等中国民间政治意识觉醒的现象？

李世默：只要浏览一下中国的网络平台，比如微博、YY语音或微信，就会发现无数民众每天都在放开地表达自己。然而，认为中国民众正期待政治权利，这是自欺欺人的伪命题。

在描述中国民众时，我会避免用中产阶级这个词，因为这一概念的倾向十分明显。中产阶级的原义是资产阶级，这是欧洲历史特有的产物。资产阶级的核心特征不只是经济因素，而是基因中的政治宗教理念。资产阶级的政治宗教基因，可以追溯到欧洲历史上的新教改革和启蒙运动。新教改革和启蒙运动对资产阶级的诞生有决定性影响，而经济因素的影响相对次要。晚至工业革命后，资产阶级所取得的经济实力推动了他们夺取政权,从而实现原有的政治宗教诉求。中国没有什么真正意义上的资产阶级，却有一个不断扩大的中等收入群体。相形之下，欧洲的资产阶级天然就有政治、宗教的诉求，这在实质上并不取决于经济状况。

认为民众一旦获得冰箱、汽车，接着就自然会要求选票，这种想法十分荒唐，在历史和政治学中毫无根据。

（翻页请看英文原文）

Eric X. Li On Why China Is Winning In The Pacific

Matt Sheehan

（Eric X. Li is a venture capitalist, political scientist and frequent commentator on China’s growing economic and military influence. In a provocative TED Talk and several articles he has predicted that while China will continue to grow its wealth and power, it’s unlikely to depart from one-party governance or take an evangelical approach to extending its values beyond Chinese borders. While in San Francisco for a conference, Li sat down with The WorldPost’s Matt Sheehan for a conversation about China’s growing territorial assertiveness, the transforming international order, and the future of China’s political system.）

With Obama’s recent trip to Japan and the rhetoric on conflicts in places like Ukraine, it seems that the U.S. is attempting to reassure allies that it will be there for them in case of conflict. Do you think these assurances carry much weight after what’s happened in Syria and Crimea?

I really don’t know. I think that American politicians have a tendency to make promises for the sake of expediency that they can’t possibly keep. It’s the norm for domestic politics during elections, but it’s also increasingly the case in international relations. This reminds me of George Kennan, the great architect of America’s containment policy during the Cold War. When NATO was expanding eastward along with the EU after the end of the Cold War, he said it was a grave mistake. The U.S. was just lightheartedly issuing security guarantees to protect many nations that it had no real desire or intent or ability to truly meaningfully fulfill. I think his prediction is becoming reality. Where is George Kennan when you need him?

Has what’s happened in places like Crimea changed the calculus of what Chinese leaders think is possible in the Asia Pacific? Has it changed how far they think they can push these conflicts?

I think only on the margin. It’s a secondary trend, whether Crimea happens or not. The more decisive trend is occurring in America. I mean, the United States has 4.5 percent of the world’s population, less than 20 percent of its production, but accounts for half of the whole world’s defense spending. It is constantly at war in distant lands. In a little more than a generation’s time after winning the Cold War, it has become deeply in debt, its industry is hollowed out, its middle class is collapsing, its infrastructure is badly in disrepair, its education is under-funded, and its social contract is in shambles. It is not sustainable; it simply can’t go on forever. American foreign policy is “pivoting” to Asia, then to the Middle East, then to Ukraine, while the American people badly need a pivot to Ohio. And that is the context within which China seems to be considering its strategic options in the very long term.

When discussing the emerging relationship between the U.S. and China, you’ve talked about managed competition, strategic cooperation and respect for spheres of influence. In that context, what role does the U.S. have to play in the Asia Pacific?

The United States has protectorates in the Asia Pacific region that are in conflict with China, Japan being the biggest and the Philippines as well. The question is whether we’re going toward a future in which China will justifiably be able to establish a legitimate sphere of influence in this neighborhood in an orderly fashion. It’s a large country with a long history, and we’ll see if it can fulfill its destiny as a pre-eminent power in the Asia Pacific in a peaceful manner and what will the United States’ role be in this process. That is the question.

You’ve argued that the Chinese Communist Party derives its legitimacy from economic progress and the nationalist legitimacy of liberating China after the ‘century of humiliation’ at the hands of foreign powers. In a potential territorial showdown with Japan, Chinese leaders may have to choose between a military clash that is highly disruptive to the economy, or appearing to give ground on core nationalist interests. If so, how do you see the party choosing to move forward?

In that case, the two sources of legitimacy are in conflict and the Chinese leadership has just got to manage this. This is a delicate balance that they have to get, and I think they’ve done reasonably well so far. If managed well, in the long term, the two goals are mutually supportive of each other.

I don’t buy the argument that China has hurt itself in its more assertive policies in the South and East China Sea. I think they’ve performed brilliantly. The strategy was to change the status quo in China’s favor without leading to actual military conflict, and in territorial disputes with the Philippines and Japan they’ve done that. For the islands disputed with the Philippines, China now effectively controls the space and there has been no war. In the Diaoyu Islands, China has been able to create new realities on the ground. Japan’s long held position has been the denial of dispute. They continue to deny there is a dispute, but dispute is now a fact. China’s patrol boats are there frequently. China has changed the status quo qualitatively, and there’s been no war.

At the same time, you’ve described unanticipated military conflict as the greatest threat to China’s development. If that’s the case, can recent moves that have changed the status quo but also ratcheted up tensions and the likelihood of conflict really be called a success for China?

Success does not come out of being paralyzed by seemingly conflicting objectives. Economic development helped by a peaceful external environment is a critical strategic objective for China, but so is a multifaceted renaissance of the Chinese nation that includes reclaiming a leadership position in the Asia Pacific that would enable China to protect its core interests. These goals cannot be achieved without taking risks. I think the Chinese strategy is to take calculated risks but control risks in order to obtain optimal outcomes.

You argue that the U.S. is no longer able to fill the Leviathan role of policing an international order that it has created. You also say that despite China’s ascendancy, it will not try to fill this role of regulating an international architecture. Given China’s increasing economic entanglement everywhere from Africa to South America, can China maintain its aloofness on foreign policy issues?

I think certainly China is going to be more internationally involved. It has more outward-looking political and economic policies everywhere from Africa to Southeast Asia. But the fundamental outlook is different. They’re not trying to build an overarching system where they’re the hegemon. They’re trying to do what’s best for the Chinese people, and they treat the other participants as independent players. They’re not going to try to force their ideas on others or tell others how to run their countries or sign them up to some kind of grand scheme. The Chinese are there to trade and cut the best deals for their own people. Of course they will be more assertive but it’s fundamentally different from the American worldview.

You’ve expressed high confidence in the ability of China’s bureaucracy to deal with the many issues that China faces today. Looking at the vast array of challenges, from environmental degradation to corruption to financial and economic hurdles, which issues worry you the most? Are there problems that you think the Chinese Communist Party is not ready or able to handle?

The two front-burner items are economics and corruption. The current economic structure has served China well in the past but will no longer be sustainable in the future, so they’re going to need to make structural changes to the economy. But in order to make those structural changes they’re going to need to slow down the growth rate, which could cause other problems. So getting that balance right is really hard, I think. But they have a very, very competent team and I think they’ll be able to lick it.

The second problem is corruption … Corruption has been a problem for China for thousands of years; every dynasty has had enormous corruption problems. So the root causes are complex and deep, and it’s very difficult to address permanently. Right now the policy is a campaign-style anti-corruption drive: you hit ’em hard and it’ll get better for some time and then eventually it will come back and another hit will be required. Right now we’re in the early stages of a tough anti-corruption drive, probably the toughest in the history of the People’s Republic. I think it’ll succeed for some time and it’ll contain corruption but won’t eliminate it. Other longer-term reforms are also taking place that will see an increasing role of a rule-based institutional system in China’s governance, but that is a gradual process.

We’re now a year and a half into Xi Jinping’s leadership. How do you rate Xi on vision and execution, and what are the real sticking points and toughest nuts to crack?

I characterize the Xi leadership as the beginning of the third 30-year period for the People’s Republic, so needless to say I think it’s really important. The first 30 years were the Mao era, the second 30 years were the Deng era. In many respects both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were extensions of the Deng era. I think Xi opens a new era that dialectically synthesizes the previous two. In terms of the vision that he has articulated to the Chinese people, where he wants to take the country, and what he’s been able to execute in the last 18 months, it has been beyond anyone’s imagination or expectations. Economic reforms, anti-corruption, political reforms, everything.

Things have mostly gone well for the Xi leadership so far, but where do the toughest aspects of reform lie?

In my view the biggest risk is an unanticipated international conflict. I think they’re going to lick the economics. I know a lot of people are emphasizing the risks, and I agree there are risks but I think they’re going to get it right. The economy is moving toward a new phase and it’s highly innovative.

I don’t know what people are talking about when they say innovation is China’s problem. I think China is going through the most innovative period in hundreds of years. When I started as a venture capitalist 18 or 19 years ago, I was told that China could never produce a tech company with a $1 billion market cap. Today Ali Baba and Tencent each are over $100 billion. A $1 billion company? You go into a restaurant in Beijing’s university district and there are ten of them.

Many of China’s biggest international tech companies are essentially shielded from competition at home. If China wants to produce more companies that compete internationally, say WeChat with WhatsApp, what role (if any) will the Chinese Communist Party play in that?

I think the party’s role is not in directly helping these companies. The party’s role is more fundamental: attracting people, attracting investment. If you look at universities in China, they are unrecognizable from 10 years ago in terms of the laboratories they’ve built and the people they’ve been able to attract. I think they’re setting the stage for a sustained period of young talent coming up and being able to create new technologies, new ways of doing things. I’m optimistic on that front.

You’ve argued against the assumption that with rising incomes will come rising demand for political rights and freedom of expression in China. If this kind of political expression doesn’t occur, do you see another kind of political consciousness filling the void, increased nationalism for example?

Just go on any Chinese Internet portal, Weibo, YY, WeChat, for example, and the Chinese people are expressing themselves all day long. I think that this presumption in the West that they’ll seek political rights is a pre-supposed problem that didn’t exist.

In describing Chinese people, I hesitate to use the term middle class because it’s a loaded term. Middle class means bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie was a unique European phenomenon. The bourgeoisie was more than money, the bourgeoisie already had politics and religion in its DNA before their economic success. Money enabled them to act on those aspirations. It goes back to the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment. The bourgeoisie emerged with political and religious elements in its DNA and economics was part of it. China does not have a bourgeois class, it has a middle-income group that is rapidly expanding. In contrast, the European bourgeois class wanted political and religious rights to begin with, with or without money.

The idea that people start buying refrigerators and cars, and then the next thing is they want elections, that’s crazy. It has no basis in history or political science; it’s made up.

（This interview has been edited for length and clarity.）