李世默：不战而屈人之兵——乌克兰危机与中国机遇

大多数国际关系专家倾向于认为，乌克兰局势的发展正令中国陷入某种窘境。普遍认为，美国高调重返亚太，其用意是遏制中国崛起，因此俄罗斯对中国的战略意义愈发凸显。然而，俄罗斯最近在乌克兰积极出手，完成对克里米亚的合并，这一连串的动作似乎违反中国的一贯立场。众所周知，中国一直坚持在国际事务中互不干涉内政的原则。克里米亚的独立公投对中国来说更是敏感，因为中国也在与台湾和西藏的分裂势力进行斗争。这些专家强调，正是由于担心作茧自缚，中国对乌克兰局势的公开表态流于模棱两可。然而，这些高论误读了中国的决策。恰恰相反，中国的现行策略是高超的，既具有战略远见，也保持了战术灵活。中国的立场权衡了多种因素，体现了对国际关系大局和乌克兰特殊形势细微和深度的理解。

中国的官方立场是十分巧妙的。中国政府重申了互不干涉内政的原则，呼吁尊重乌克兰的领土完整。与此同时，中国政府强调必须关注乌克兰历史问题和当前局势的复杂性。从现实主义外交的层面分析，中国无疑是在保持中立的前提下，对俄罗斯予以默契支持，同时也避免与西方明显对立。因此，当美国要求联合国安理会谴责俄罗斯时，尽管已遭俄罗斯否决，中国仍然投了弃权票。这一策略符合中国长期的地缘政治利益。

本文英文版发表于《南华早报》、赫芬顿《世界邮报》等，图为《世界邮报》评论头版头条截图

中国一直致力于推动国际秩序朝多极化方向发展。在这一战略目标下，中国抵制美国的单边霸权，并努力在亚太地区重建其大国影响力。苏联解体后俄罗斯经历了20年的低谷，近年来国力逐渐复苏，并重新以大国姿态出现在世界舞台上，这一趋势有利于世界的多极化。美国对全球事务的支配能力，相对正每况愈下。“重返亚太”的高调宣示，结果证明是雷声大雨点小。毕竟明摆的事实是，一次出手只能有一个目标。在乌克兰危机之前，中东问题已使美国进退维谷，现在与俄罗斯摩擦更令美国被迫再一次转移目标。这个超级大国忙于四处灭火，对中国无疑是战略机遇期。

从中国的视角看，也很难轻易断言俄罗斯的举动就一定与中国互不干涉内政的原则相悖。其中牵涉的历史和现实问题，都相当复杂。苏联在一夜之间轰然倒地，世界格局因之失衡，在孕育国际新秩序的过程中，纷争四起，而西方阵营占据压倒性优势，攫取了巨额红利。不应忽视，俄罗斯以及其他前苏联加盟共和国的民众，在冷战的余波中受创尤甚。在这种历史环境中草草划定的边境，其合法性值得三思，克里米亚就是其中一例。中国人也注意到，西方的积极干预是乌克兰变局的关键推手。美国、欧洲的高级官员不惜亲自出马，到基辅独立广场为反对派公开站台。一段流出的电话录音揭示，早在亚努科维奇倒台前，美国助理国务卿纽兰就已着手筹划换马。在乌克兰危机中，各方其实都没有袖手旁观。

一旦西方开始制裁俄罗斯，两者之间的紧张关系反过来会促使俄向中靠拢。中俄关系的战略意义体现在三大领域：能源安全，中国在亚太的战略目的，以及中国在中亚的长期利益。如果遭遇西方的严厉制裁，俄罗斯必将进一步靠拢中国，这将有利于在各领域促进中国的战略利益。中国或能以更优惠的条件从俄罗斯购进天然气，并促使后者调整输气管道建设计划，以适应中国的需求。俄罗斯在亚太的动作，尤其是在对日关系上，可能更多考虑中国的立场。在贯穿中亚的新“丝绸之路”战略中，俄罗斯能为中国开放更多空间。

长期来看，中国的战略目标是和平崛起。为了实现和平崛起，中国必须探索出一种新的地缘政治范式。因此在加州峰会上，习近平主席向奥巴马总统提议在中美两国间建立新型大国关系。大国之大，不仅在于领土、经济规模，关键在于其文明拥有的全方位影响区域。在中国的视角看，只有大国间有效合作、有序竞争，才能保证全球新秩序的和平建立。当然，在中国的定位中，中国、美国和俄罗斯都是大国。在新型大国关系的框架下，大国之间应尊重各自的核心利益和影响区域。事实上，中国在亚太地区正开始奉行某种门罗主义。同样可以肯定，中国的决策者认为乌克兰无疑是在俄罗斯的影响区域之内。对西方来说，乌克兰其实是鞭长莫及的边缘利益，但西方在乌克兰的所作所为，极大伤害了俄罗斯的核心利益。在这个意义上，中国对俄罗斯的谨慎支持，恰好反映了中国长期的外交战略。

毋庸置疑，在乌克兰问题上，中国既要坚持上述战略，也要保持战术灵活和随机应变。尽管乌克兰问题牵涉很广，变数甚多，但目前来看，只要不出现重大失误，中国几乎不可能走错棋。克里米亚的独立公投如被中国默认，台湾或西藏的分裂势力难道真的会认为他们能效尤？答案无疑是否定的。中国能否恪守官方中立，有效避免与西方对立？根据历史判断，答案是肯定的。

（李世默是上海的风险投资家和政治学者，复旦大学中国发展模式研究中心的高级研究员。此文由观察者网guancha.cn 汇编供稿，发表于《南华早报》和《世界邮报》等。翻页查看英文全文。）

CHINA’S UKRAINIAN OPPORTUNITY -- KILLING A FEW BIRDS WITHOUT THROWING A SINGLE STONE

By:  Eric X. Li

SHANGHAI – Most international relations experts seem to believe that the development in Ukraine has put China into an uncomfortable dilemma.  With America’s pivot to the Asia Pacific - largely seen as a move to check rising Chinese power – Russia has grown in strategic importance to China.  However, Russia’s actions in Ukraine and its absorption of Crimea seem contravene China’s long held principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.  The secession referendum in Crimea carries sensitive implications for China as it deals with its own separatist issues in Taiwan and Tibet.  China’s equivocal public pronouncements on Ukraine are cited as proof that it is finding itself in a bind.  But this is a misreading of China’s behavior.  On the contrary, China is exploiting the situation with strategic foresight and tactical agility.  China’s reaction is also consistent with its nuanced understanding of international relations in general and the Ukrainian crisis in particular.

China’s official position has been subtle.  It asserts the principle of non-interference and respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.  On the other hand, it puts emphasis on recognizing the complexity of both the historic conditions and the current state of affairs in Ukraine.  It should be fairly clear to any foreign policy realists that China’s approach is maintaining formal neutrality while providing tacit support to Russia without causing an adversarial rift with the Western alliance.  Even with a Russian veto, China still chose to abstain from the recent United Nations Security Council vote on U.S. proposed resolution condemning Russia.   This strategy is consistent with China’s long-term geo-political interests.

One of China’s over-riding strategic objectives is to foster the development of a multi-polar world in which American hegemony is checked and China gradually gains the space to reclaim its leadership role in the Asia Pacific.  Russia’s reemergence as a great power 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union is conducive to this objective.  America’s dominance in global affairs is indeed receding on a relative basis.  Its much-touted “pivot to Asia” says as much.  After all, by definition, one can only pivot to one place at a time.  Even before Ukraine, America’s pivot already seemed to be redirecting back towards the Middle East.  Now no doubt it has to pivot to Russia.  A continuously swirling pivot by the super power serves China’s interests. 

From the Chinese perspective, whether Russia’s actions contradict China’s principle of non-interference may not be such an open and shut case.  This is where the recognition of complexity comes in.  The collapse of the Soviet Union happened suddenly.  The rearrangement of the world order that followed was chaotic and carried out under an imbalance of power overwhelmingly in favor of the Western alliance.  It is a historic fact that the peoples of Russia and many former Soviet republics suffered immeasurably in the aftermath of the Cold War.  The legitimacy of borders settled under such circumstances can be debatable.  And Crimea is a case in point.  The Chinese may also have seen that the overthrow of the Ukrainian government was caused in no small part by active Western interference.  Senior American and European officials were conspicuously present on the Maidan.  One leading American diplomat was recorded in a telephone discussion to be plotting out who should replace president Yanukovych before his overthrow.   So at the very least interference was carried out by both sides. 

The second aspect of the worsening conflict between Russia and the West has to do with the important relationship between Russia and China.  Russia’s strategic importance to China covers three dimensions: energy supply, China’s strategic objectives in the Asia Pacific, and China’s long-term interests in Central Asia.  A Russia under severe sanctions by a hostile Western alliance would be more reliant on China.  In return, Chinese interests would be better served in all three arenas.  Russia’s supply of natural gas to China would be on better terms and pipelines could be built in manners more favorable to Chinese interests.  Russia’s role in the Asia Pacific, especially vis-à-vis Japan, could be steered more towards China’s preferences.  More space may be afforded the Chinese in their strategic push to develop a new “silk road” through Central Asia. 

In the very long term, China wants its rise to be peaceful.  And a new geo-political paradigm is required to facilitate such a peaceful rise.  It is what Chinese president Xi Jinping proposed to U.S. president Barack Obama during their summit in California called a new formula of da-guo relations.   A da-guo is a major nation state with a civilizational sphere of influence.  In China’s view, only effective cooperation and prudential management of competition among the da-guo’s can ensure the peaceful emergence of a new global order.  Of course, China sees itself as a da-guo.  The U.S. and Russia are surely on that list as well.  According to this new da-guo relations doctrine, core interests and spheres of influence are to be respected.  China is indeed gradually asserting its own Monroe doctrine in the Asia Pacific.  It is a near certainty that Chinese policy makers would consider Ukraine to be within Russia’s sphere of influence.  Ukraine is at best of peripheral interests to the West, yet actions taken by the West have seriously harmed Russia’s core interests.  In that respect, China’s subtle support for Russia is consistent with its long-term foreign policy grand strategy. 

No doubt, tactical agility and some deft maneuvering by Chinese would be required to carry out this strategy with regards to Ukraine.  There are also many unpredictable forces that are shaping events.  But at present, short of a major blunder, the downside for China is minimal.  Would anyone in Taiwan or Tibet seriously think China’s acquiescence to a Crimean separation referendum would mean they could get away with one too?  Probably not.  Can the Chinese walk a tight rope on formal neutrality as not to trigger a confrontation with the West?  Their track record would indicate a yes. 

（Eric X. Li is a venture capitalist and political scientist in Shanghai.  He is a senior fellow at Fudan University’s Center for Chinese Development Model Research.  This article was published in the South China Morning Post.  The Chinese original is published by Guancha.cn and distributed by the Guancha Syndicate. ）

《南华早报》链接：http://www.scmp.com/comment/article/1452507/nothing-awkward-about-chinas-position-regard-ukraine 

赫芬顿《世界邮报》链接：http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-x-li/chinas-ukrainian-opportunity_b_4997075.html?utm_hp_ref=world