中国崛起与“元叙事”的终结-李世默

【按】：2013年TED环球大会在爱丁堡举行。6月13日，上海的风险投资家和政治学学者，春秋研究院研究员、中欧国际工商学院校董李世默在大会上发表演讲，题目为China and the End of Meta-Narratives，以亲身经历讲述中国发展的两个三十年故事，突破了以往TED演讲题材，涉及中国崛起的历史、制度、经验等方方面面，引起现场热烈反响。观察者网编辑列席大会，下面是演讲全文，摘要已刊发于今日的《环球时报》：

我出生在“文化大革命”高潮时的上海。

外婆后来告诉我，她当时抱着襁褓之中啼哭不止的我，心惊胆战地听着“武斗”的枪声。

在我少年时，我被灌输了一个关于人类社会发展规律的大故事，这个“元叙事”是这样说的：

所有的人类社会都遵循一个线性的目标明确的发展规律，即从原始社会开始，经由奴隶社会、封建社会、资本主义社会、社会主义社会，最终过渡到（猜猜这个终点？）共产主义社会。共产主义社会是人类政治、社会发展的最高阶段，所有的人类社会，不管民族、文化、语言有何异同，或早或晚都将演进到这一阶段。人类社会自此大同，彼此相亲相爱，永远过着幸福的生活——人间天堂。但在实现这样目标之前，我们必须投身于正义与邪恶的斗争，即正义的社会主义与邪恶的资本主义之间的斗争，正义终将胜利！

当然，这就是从马克思主义发展而来的社会发展阶段论，这一“元叙事”在中国影响甚广。

我们从小就被反复灌输了这个宏大故事，几乎融化到了血液之中，笃信不疑。

这个“元叙事”不仅征服了中国，也影响了全世界。世界上曾经有整整三分之一人在它笼罩之下。

然而，忽然一夜之间，苏联崩溃，世界沧桑巨变。

我赴美留学，改宗成为伯克利的嬉皮士，哈哈！

就这样，开启了我另一段成年经历，我又被灌输了一个全新的宏大叙事，仿佛我这辈子只经历那一个还不够似的。这个宏大叙事的完美程度与早前的那一个不分伯仲。它同样宣称，人类社会遵循着一个线性的发展规律，指向一个终极目标。叙事故事是这样展开的：

所有的人类社会，不论其文化有何异同，其民众是基督徒、穆斯林还是儒家信徒，都将从传统社会过渡到现代社会。在传统社会中，最基本的社会单位是家庭、氏族、部落等群体；而在现代社会中，最基本的、神圣不可侵犯的社会单位是原子化的个人。所有的个人都被认定为是理性的，都有同一个诉求：选举权！

因为每一个个人都是理性的，一旦有了权选举，必然会选出好政府，随后就可以在好政府的领导下，过上幸福的生活，相当于实现大同社会——又是一个人间天堂。选举民主制将成为所有国家和民族唯一的政治制度，再加上一个自由放任的市场让他们发财。当然，在实现这个目标之前，我们必须投身于正义与邪恶的斗争，即正义的民主与邪恶的不民主之间的斗争。前者肩负着在全世界推动民主的使命，必要时甚至可以动用武力，来打击那些不投票不选举的邪恶势力。

上述宏大叙事同样传播甚广。根据“自由之家”的统计，全世界采用选举民主制的国家，从1970年的45个已增至2010年的115个。近20多年来，西方的精英人士孜孜不倦地在全世界奔走，推荐选举民主这一救世良方。他们声称，实行多党选举是拯救发展中国家于水火的唯一良药，只要吃下它，就一定会实现繁荣，否则，永无翻身之日。

但这一次，中国敬谢不敏。

历史是最好的裁判。仅仅30多年间，中国就从世界上最贫困的农业国，一跃而为世界第二大经济体，实现6.5亿人脱贫。实际上，这期间全世界80%的减贫任务是由中国完成的。也就是说，如果没有中国的成绩，全世界的减贫成就不值一提。所有老的、新的民主国家的脱贫人口加起来，都不及中国一个零头。而取得这些成绩的中国，没有实行他们所谓的选举，也没有实行多党制。

所以，我禁不住问自己，我眼前画面到底哪里不对劲儿？我的故乡上海，一切都已今非昔比，新生企业如雨后春笋般发展起来，中产阶级以史无前例的速度和规模在增长。但根据西方的那个宏大叙事，这一切繁荣景象本不应该出现。

面对这一切，我开始做我唯一可以做的事，即思考它！

中国的确是个一党制的国家，由中国共产党长期执政，不实行西方意义上的选举。按照当代主流的政治理论，人们据此可以生成三个判断，即这个体制一定是僵化的、封闭的、不具合法性的。

但这些论断被证明是完全错误的。事实恰恰相反，中国的一党制具有与时俱进的能力、选贤任能的体制、深植于民心的政权合法性，这些是确保其成功的核心要素。

李世默在2013年TED环球大会发表演讲

大多数政治学家断言，一党制天生缺乏自我纠错能力，因此很难持久。

但历史实践却证明这一断言过于自信。中共已经在中国这个世界上最大的国家之一连续执政64年，其政策调整的幅度超过近代任何国家。从激进的土改到“大跃进”运动，再到土地“准私有化”；从“文化大革命”到邓小平的市场化改革。邓小平的继任者江泽民更进一步，主动吸纳包括民营企业家在内的新社会阶层人士入党，而这在毛的时代是不可想象的。事实证明，中共具有超凡的与时俱进和自我纠错能力。

过去实行的一些不再有效的制度也不断得到纠正和更新。比如，政治领导人的任期制，毛时期，政治领导人实际上是终身任职的。这容易导致大权独揽、不受制约等问题。毛泽东作为现代中国的缔造者，在位晚年也未能避免犯下类似的严重错误。随后，中共逐步实施了领导人的任期制，并将任职的年龄上限确定为68到70岁。

最近很多人声称，相比于经济改革，中国的政治改革严重滞后，因此当前亟需在政改中取得突破。这一论断实际上是隐藏着政治偏见的话语陷阱，这个话语陷阱预设了哪些变革才算所谓的政治改革，只有实行这些特定的变革才行。事实上，中国的政治改革从未停滞。与三十年、二十年，甚至十年前相比，中国从基层到高层，从社会各领域到国家治理方式上，都发生了翻天覆地的变化。如果没有根本性的政治改革，这一切变化都是不可能的。

我甚至想大胆地判断说，中共是世界第一流的政治改革专家。

西方主流的观点认为，一党制意味着政治上封闭，一小撮人把持了权力，必然导致劣政和腐败。

的确，腐败是一个大问题。不过，让我们先打开视野看一下全景。说起来可能令人难以置信，中共内部选贤任能竞争之激烈程度，可能超过世界上所有的政治组织。

十八大前，中共的最高领导机构——中央政治局共有25名委员，其中只有5人出身背景优越，也就是所谓的“太子党”。其余20人，包括国家主席胡锦涛和政府总理温家宝，都是平民出身。再看300多人组成的十七届中央委员会，出身显赫者的比例更低。可以说，绝大多数中共高层领导人都是靠自身努力和激烈竞争获得晋升的。与其他发达国家和发展中国家统治精英的出身相比，我们必须承认中共内部平民出身的干部享有广阔的晋升空间。

中共如何在一党制的基础上保证选贤任能呢？关键之一是有一个强有力的组织机构，即组织部。对此西方鲜有人知。这套机制选贤任能的效力，恐怕最成功的商业公司都会自叹弗如。

它像一个旋转的金字塔，有三个部位组合而成。

中国的公务人员分为三类：即政府职能部门、国有企业，以及政府管辖的事业单位，如大学、社区组织等。公务人员既可以在某一类部门中长期工作，也可以在三类中交替任职。政府以及相关机构一年一度地从大学毕业生中招录人员，大部分新人会从最低一级的科员干起。组织部门会根据其表现，决定是否将其提升到更高的管理职位上，比如副科、科、副处、处。这可不是电影《龙威小子》中的动作名称，而是严肃的人事工作。

这一区间的职位包罗万象，既可以负责贫困农村的卫生工作，也可能负责城区里的招商引资，也可能是一家公司的基层经理。各级干部每年都要接受组织部门的考察，其中包括征求上级、下级和同事的反馈意见，以及个人操守审查，此外还有民意调查，最终择优提职。

在整个职业生涯中，中共的干部可以在政府职能部门、企业，以及社会事业单位等三大领域内轮转任职。在基层表现优秀的佼佼者可以晋升为副局和正局级干部，进入高级干部行列。这一级别的干部，有可能领导数百万人口的城区，也有可能管理年营业收入数亿美元的企业。从统计数据就可以看出选拔局级干部的竞争有多激烈，2012年，中国科级与副科级干部约为90万人，处级与副处级干部约为60万人，而局级与副局级干部仅为4万人。

在局级干部中，只有最为出众的极少数人才有机会继续晋升，最终进入中共中央委员会。就职业生涯来看，一位干部要晋升到高层，期间一般要经过二三十年的工作历练。这过程中有任人唯亲的问题吗，当然有。但从根本上，干部是否德才兼备才是提拔的决定性因素。事实上，中华帝国的官僚体系有着千年历史，今天中共的组织部门创造性地继承了这一独特的历史遗产，并发展成现代化的制度以培养当代中国的政治精英。

习近平的履历就是非常鲜明的例证。习的父亲确实是中共的一位前领导人，但他的仕途也历经了30年之久。习近平从村干部做起，一步一个脚印的走到今天这个岗位。在他进入中央政治局之前，他领导过的地区总人口累计已超过1.5亿，创造的GDP合计超过1.5万亿美元。

千万不要误解，这不是针对具体的人，仅仅是事实的陈述。如果要论政府管理经验，小布什在任德州州长前和奥巴马第一次问鼎美国总统时，他们资历还比不上中国一个小县长。

温斯顿·丘吉尔曾说：“民主是个坏制度，但其他制度更坏”。可惜，他没有见识过组织部。

西方人总认为多党竞选和普选是合法性的唯一来源。曾有人问我：“中共不经选举执政，其合法性从何而来？”我的回答是：“舍我其谁的执政能力。”

我们都知道历史，1949年中共执政时，由于战火肆虐，外敌横行，中国的国土四分五裂，满目疮痍；中国人的人均寿命仅为41岁。但在今天，中国已跻身世界第二大经济体，成为在全球有重要影响的大国，人民生活迅速改善，人均寿命排名奇迹般地列中等发达国家前茅。

根据皮尤研究中心在中国的民意调查报告，其中一些数据反映了中国的主流民意，其中大部分数据在近几十年来十分稳定。

高达85%的中国民众，对国家未来方向表示满意；70%的民众认为在过去的五年生活得到改善；82%的民众对未来五年颇感乐观。

英国《金融时报》刚刚公布的全球青年人民调结果显示：93%的中国90后年轻人对国家的未来感到乐观。

如果这不是合法性，那我就不知道到底什么才是合法性了。

相比之下，全世界大部分选举民主制国家都处于惨淡经营的境况。关于美国和欧洲的政治困境，在座的听众都了然于胸，无需我再详述。除了极少数例外，大部分采用选举的发展中国家，迄今为止还在遭受贫困和战火的折磨。政府通过选举上台后，其支持率在几个月内就会跌到50%以下，从此一蹶不振甚至持续走低，直到下一次选举。可以说，民主已经陷入“一次选举，长期后悔”的周期性怪圈。这样下去，失去合法性的恐怕不是中国的一党制，而是选举民主制。

当然，我不想造成一种误会，认为中国成为超级大国已经指日可待了。中国当前面临重大挑战，巨大变迁带来的经济、社会问题数不胜数，譬如环境污染， 食品安全、人口问题。在政治领域，最大的挑战是腐败。

目前，腐败猖獗，危及中国的政治制度及其道德合法性。但是，很多分析人士误判了腐败的原因，他们声称腐败是一党制导致的，只有终结一党制才能根绝腐败。更严谨一点儿的分析将证明这种观点毫无根据。

据透明国际发布的全球清廉指数排名，中国近年来的排名在第70到80名之间。印度是世界上人口最多的选举民主制国家，排名第95位，且逐年下滑；希腊排名第80位；印度尼西亚与阿根廷排名并列第100位；菲律宾排名第129位。排名在中国后的约100个国家中，超过一半是选举民主制国家。如果选举是根治腐败的万灵药，为何在这么多国家不灵呢？

我是做风险投资的，长于预测。因此，不做几个预测就结束今天的讨论似乎不妥。以下是我的三个预测：

未来十年：

1. 中国将超过美国成为世界第一大经济体，按人均收入计算也将在发展中国家里名列前茅。2. 腐败虽然无法根绝，但将得到有效控制。在透明国际的全球清廉指数排行榜上，中国有望继续提升10到20名，跨入全球最清廉的前60国之列。3. 经济改革会加速实施，政治改革也将继续推进，中共仍稳固执政。

我们正在见证一个时代的落幕。共产主义和选举民主制，都是基于普世价值的“元叙事”。在20世纪，我们见证了前者因极端教条而失败；到21世纪，后者正重蹈同样的覆辙。“元叙事”就像癌症一样，正在从内部吞噬民主。我想澄清一下，我并不是要谴责民主。相反，我认为民主政治对西方的崛起和现代世界的诞生居功至伟。然而，很多西方精英把某一种民主形式模式化、普世化，这是西方当前各种病症的病灶所在。如果西方的精英不是将大把的时间花在向外国推销民主上，而是更多关心一下自身的政治改革，恐怕民主还不至于像今天这样无望。

中国的政治模式不可能取代选举民主，因为中国从不将自己的政治制度包装成普世通用的模式，也不热衷于对外输出。进一步说，中国模式的重要意义，不在于为世界各国提供了一个可以替代选举民主的新模式，而在于从实践上证明了良政的模式不是单一而是多元的，各国都有可能找到适合本国的政治制度。

让我们为“元叙事”的时代画个句号吧。共产主义和民主可能都是人类最美好的追求，但它们普世化的教条时代已经过去。我们的下一代，不需要被灌输说，世界上只有一种政治模式，所有社会都只有一种归宿。这是错误的，不负责任的，也是乏味的。多元化正在取代普世化。一个更精彩的时代正缓缓拉开帷幕，我们有没有勇气拥抱它呢？

以下为演讲的英文全文：

CHINA AND THE END OF META-NARRATIVES

TED GLOBAL 2013

ERIC X. LI

I was born in Shanghai at the height of the Cultural Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard gunfire along with my first cries.

When I was growing up, I was taught a story that explained all I ever needed to know about humanity. It went like this:

All human societies develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, going through slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, (guess where we end up?) Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of nationality, culture, language, will reach that final stage of political and social development. The entire world’s peoples will be unified in this paradise on earth and live happily ever after. But, before we get there, we are engaged in a struggle between good and evil: the good of socialism and the evil of capitalism. And the good shall triumph!

That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it.

We were told that grand story day in and day out. It became part of us and we believed in it.

The story was a best seller. A full one-third of the world’s population was living under that meta-narrative.

Then, the world changed, overnight.

As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America – became a hippie in Berkeley.

As I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story wasn’t enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also claims that all societies must develop along linear progression towards a singular end. It goes as follows:

All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups were the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units. All these individuals are by definition rational, and they all want one thing – the vote!

Because they are all rational, once given the vote they produce good government and live happily ever after – paradise on earth. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich. Before we get there, however, we are engaged in a struggle of good against evil. Good belongs to those who are democracies charged with the mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections.

This story also became a best seller. According to the Freedom House, the number of countries practicing electoral democracy grew from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20 years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe, selling this prospectus – multiple political parties fight for power with everyone voting on them - as the only path to salvation for the long suffering developing world. Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success and those who do not are doomed to fail.

But this time, the Chinese didn’t buy it. Fool me once …

The rest is history. In just 30 years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries to the world’s second largest economy. 650 million people were lifted out of poverty. A full 80% of the world’s poverty alleviation during this period happened in China. In other words, without China’s numbers, the world’s poverty reduction would have been almost flat. Apparently, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a fraction of what a single one-party state did – without voting.

See, I grew up on these things – food stamps. In Shanghai, meat was rationed to 300 grams per person per month. Needless to say, I ate all my grandmother’s portions.

So, I ask myself, what’s wrong with this picture? Here I am, in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds, entrepreneurs are starting companies every day, middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history. Yet, according to the grand story none of this should be happening.

So I went and did the only thing I could, I studied it.

China is a one-party state – run by the Chinese Communist Party – the Party; and they don’t hold elections. Three assumptions are made by the dominant political theory of our time: Such a system must be operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate.

These assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China’s one-party system.

Adaptability

Most political scientists would tell you that a system monopolized by a single party is by definition incapable of self-correction. It can’t survive long because it can’t adapt.

Here are the facts: During its 64 years running the largest country in the world, the range of the Party’s policies was broader than any country in recent history. Radical land collectivization and the Great Leap Foreward, then the quasi-privatization of farmland. The Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms. Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, took the giant political step of opening up Party membership to private businesspeople – something unimaginable during Mao’s rule. The Party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions.

Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to retain positions for life. They accumulated power and perpetuated their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule also led to disastrous mistakes. So the Party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 – 70.

One thing we often hear is that political reform has lagged behind economic reform and China is in dire need of political reforms. But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. Some have decided a priori what changes they want to see and only such changes can be called political reform. But political reforms have never stopped. Compared with ten years ago, twenty years ago, and thirty years ago, just about every aspect of Chinese society and how the country is governed, from the most local to the highest center, are unrecognizable. Such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind.

I would venture to suggest that the Party is the world’s leading expert in political reform.

The second assumption: one-party rule leads to a closed political system in which power gets concentrated in the hands of the few. Bad governance and corruption are the results.

Yes, corruption is a big problem. But let’s first look at the larger context. It might be counter intuitive to you, but the Party is one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world.

China’s highest ruling body is the Politburo. It usually has 25 members. In the most recent Politburo only five came from privileged backgrounds (the so-called princelings). The other 20, including the president and the premier, came from completely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger Central Committee of over 300, the percentage born into wealth and power was even smaller. The vast majority of senior officials worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that to the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you would find the Party ranks near the top in upward mobility.

The question then is how could that be possible in a system run by one party? Now we come to a powerful institution little known to Westerners – the Party’s Organization Department. The Department functions like a human resource engine that would be the envy of even the most successful corporations.

It operates a rotating pyramid.

Made up of three components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations such a university or a community program. They form separate and yet integrated career tracks for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in one of these tracks. They start at the lowest level, called ke yuan. Periodically, the Organization Department reviews their performance and can promote them up through four increasingly elite ranks: fu ke, ke, fu chu, and chu. These are not moves from Karate Kids. It’s serious business.

The range of positions is wide, from running health-care in a village to foreign investment in a city to manager in a company. Once a year, the Organization Department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, peers, and subordinates, vet their personal conducts, conduct public opinion surveys. Then they promote winners.

Throughout their careers, these cadres could rotate through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the good ones move beyond the four base-level grades to the fu ju and ju levels. There they enter high officialdom. At that point a typical assignment is to manage districts with populations in the millions or companies with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues. To show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900,000 fu ke and ke levels, 600,000 fu chu and chu levels, and only 40,000 fu ju and ju levels.

After the Ju level, the best few move up several more ranks and eventually make it to the Central Committee. The entire process takes two to three decades. Does patronage play a role? Yes, of course. But by and large, merit is the underlying driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernized version of China’s centuries old Mandarin system.

China’s new president Xi Jinping in son of a former Chinese senior official – very unusual, the first of his kind to get the top job. Even for him the career path took 30 years. He started as a village manager and when he entered the Politburo he had managed areas with total populations of over 150 million and combined GDPS of more than US$1.5 trillion.

Please don’t get me wrong. This is not a put-down of anyone but merely a statement of fact. George W. Bush before becoming governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for president, would not make a small county chief in China’s system.

Winston Churchill once said, “Democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest”. Well, apparently he hadn’t heard of the Organization Department.

Legitimacy

Westerners assume that multiparty election with universal suffrage is the only source of legitimacy. I was asked once, “the Party was not voted in by election, where is its source of legitimacy?” I said, “how about competency?”

We know the facts: In 1949 when the Party took over, China was mired in civil wars and dismembered by foreign aggressions; average life expectancy was 41. Today, it is the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity.

Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes. These are the numbers in recent years, and they have been largely consistent in the last couple of decades:

Satisfaction with the general direction of the country – 85% Those who report significant progress in their lives in the past five years – 70% Those who expect the future to be better – a whopping 82%

Financial Times survey of global youth attitudes just released:

93% of China’s generation-Y are optimistic about their country’s future!

If this is not legitimacy, I’m not sure what is.

In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance. I don’t need to elaborate for this audience how dysfunctional it is from America to Europe. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries who adopted electoral regimes are still mired in poverty and civil strife. Governments get elected and then fall below 50% approval a few months later and stay there or get worse till the next election. Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of “elect and regret”. At this rate, I’m afraid democracy itself, not China’s one-party system, is in danger of losing legitimacy.

Now, I don’t want to create the misimpression that China is hunky dory on way to superpower-dom. China is not a superpower and probably will never be one. The country faces enormous challenges. Economic and social problems that come with such drastic changes are mind-boggling: pollution, food safety, population issues. On the political front, the biggest challenge is corruption.

Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its moral legitimacy. But most commentators misdiagnose the disease. They say corruption is a result of the one-party system and to cure it you have to do away with the entire system. A more careful look would tell us otherwise.

According to Transparency International, China ranks in recent years between 70 and 80 among some 170 countries and has been gradually moving up. India, the largest electoral democracy in the world, 95 and has been dropping. More than half of the 100 countries below China are electoral democracies. If election is the panacea for corruption how come these countries can’t fix it?

I’m a venture capitalist. I make bets. It wouldn’t be proper to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions.

In the next ten years:

1. China will surpass the US and become the largest economy in the world; Income per capita will be near the top of all developing countries.

2. Corruption will be curbed, not eliminated, and China will move up 10 – 20 notches to above 60 in TI ranking.

3. Economic reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold firm.

We live in the dusk of an era. Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st. Meta-narrative is the cancer that is killing democracy from inside. Let me clarify one thing: I am not here to make an indictment of democracy. On the contrary, I think democracy contributed to the rise of the West and the creation of the modern world. It is the universal claim many Western elites are making about their political system – the hubris – that is at the heart of the West’s current ills. Perhaps, if they spend a little less time forcing their ways onto others and a little more on political reform at home, they can give their own democracy a better chance.

China’s political model will never supplant electoral democracy because, unlike the latter, it does not pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But that is the point precisely. The significance of China’s example is not that it provides an alternative but the demonstration that alternatives exist.

Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives. Communism and democracy may both be laudable ideals. But the era of their dogmatic universalism is over. Let us stop telling people, and our children, there is only one way to govern ourselves and a singular future towards which all societies must evolve. It is wrong, it is irresponsible, and worst of all, it is boring. Let universality make way for plurality. Perhaps, a more interesting age is upon us. Are we brave enough to welcome it?

END