中共的生命力——后民主时代在中国开启-李世默

2012-12-28

【编者按：美国《外交事务》杂志（Foreign Affairs）最新一期(2013年1-2月刊）登载春秋发展战略研究院研究员李世默文章：《中共的生命力——后民主时代在中国开启》。观察者网独家首发该文章中文版，并附英文版以对照。】

以下为文章全文：

2012年11月，中国共产党召开了第十八次全国代表大会。在这次大会上，中共顺利完成了十年一次的最高权力交接，新一代领导集体登上政治舞台。一切正如预期，习近平接任中共中央总书记，并将在2013年3月出任中华人民共和国国家主席。

事实证明，这个自信的、崛起的大国的最高权力交接是平稳、周密且有序的。但国际媒体甚至一些中国国内的知识分子仍罔顾事实，继续把中国描绘成正处于“危急关头”。比如，在十八大开幕前夕出版的一期《经济学人》周刊，就匿名引用了某些学者在近期一次会议上的发言。这些学者声称，中国的政治现状是“底层失稳、中层失落、上层失控”。

确实，在进行政权交接之前数月，薄熙来事件对中共形象造成巨大冲击。继1989年春夏之交的广场政治风波后，中共最高层的紧密团结一直是中国国内政治稳定的中流砥柱。而薄事件使中共长期维护的团结一致的形象受到质疑。

雪上加霜的是，连续20多年保持GDP两位数增速的中国经济，在这关键时刻放缓了脚步，连续七个季度增长乏力。中国此前一直依靠发展劳动密集型产业、政府大规模投资基础设施以及扩大出口等举措，推动快速工业化的发展模式似乎已遭遇瓶颈。国内外某些人甚至断言，如果中国的领导人无法继续创造经济奇迹，中共的执政地位将会动摇，一党执政的中国将走向崩溃。

刊登本文的《外交事务》杂志封面

然而，这些悲观预言者将再一次被证明，他们的水平可能与坚信2012年12月21日是世界末日的人差不多。毋庸置疑，中国的新任领导人习近平未来的执政道路充满严峻挑战。但据此唱衰中共政权，认为中共无法应对未来的挑战，则是大大地误判了中国的政治形势，低估了中共执政体制的韧性。中共适应时势的能力、选贤任能的体制、深植于民心的政权合法性，将使其能灵活、高效地应对中国的各种问题。

可以预见，未来十年中国不仅不会崩溃，还会像神州大地上奔驰的高铁一样继续快速前进。中国的新一代领导人将不断巩固和完善一党执政的政治模式。这一历史进程，将挑战西方世界的传统政治理念，即认为政治进步的终极目标是实行多党选举式民主。在这文明古国的政治中心北京，世界也许将见证后民主时代的到来。

上下求索

有些人断言，一党制天生缺乏自我纠错能力。但历史实践却证明这一断言过于自信。从1949年新中国成立以来，中国共产党已连续执政63年，在其跌宕起伏的执政历程中，表现出了超凡的适应性和自我纠错能力。上世纪50年代初，中共发动了激进的土改；50年代末，又发起了“大跃进”运动；从60年代后期到70年代中期， “文化大革命”席卷全国。但令人难以置信的是，同样是这个党，早在60年代初就开始试行土地准私有化；70年代末，邓小平启动了市场化改革；到90年代，江泽民通过“三个代表”理论对党重新定位，主动吸纳新社会阶层人士入党，等等。实际上，中共从建党到1949年前的革命征途中和建国后的治国道路上，曾屡次因严重错误而使自身陷入困境，或把国家和民族带入歧途，但它每次都依靠其自身机制，而不是其他任何外部力量，一再改错纠偏、拨乱反正。其中最著名也是最成功的例子就是邓小平推行的以经济建设为中心和改革开放，这一巨大调整使中国在短短32年间一跃而为世界第二大经济体。

在政治体制上，中共近三十多年来推动了许多大刀阔斧的改革。在上世纪八九十年代，中共废除了领导干部终身制，改行任期制，并明确年龄限制，比如要求政治局常委当选时原则上不超过68岁。此前，由于政治领导人实际上是终身任职，很容易出现长期在位而引发的大权独揽、不受制约等问题。毛泽东可谓典型例子，他结束了中国肆虐的战乱，赶走了外国侵略者，是现代中国名副其实的缔造者，但也正是这个伟大的领导人，在长期执政的后期，直接发动了“文化大革命”等浩劫。任期制的确立，确保中共避免再犯最顶层的少数人长期垄断政治权力的错误，并为随后建立促进人才向上自由平等流动的机制奠定基础。

在外交政策上，为实现中华民族的复兴，中国同样做出了多次重大调整。上世纪50年代，中国一度实行向苏联“一边倒”的政策；70年代到80年代，中国却采取了事实上与美国结盟以遏制苏联的策略。新世纪以来，中国所坚持的独立自主的外交方针，频频引发了与美国的摩擦甚至冲突。现在，中国审时度势，清醒地吸取他国历史教训，又提出 “走和平发展道路”，以免重蹈德国和日本20世纪上半叶穷兵黩武的覆辙，努力实现一个和平的崛起。

在中国经历十年一次的政治交接时，国内外呼吁启动新一轮政治改革的呼声日渐高涨。其中最激进者催促中国开放多党选举，或至少使党内派系竞争合法化。这些呼吁者认为，只有通过竞争性选举，中共才能取得其继续执政所需的合法性。但这些呼声忽视了一个最基本的事实：中共一直在进行政治改革，堪称是世界近代史上最具自我革新勇气和能力的政治组织。当然，与2002年胡锦涛出任总书记时相比，中国今天的新一代领导集体面对的将是全新的世界格局，但中国共产党很可能在习近平总书记的领导下，再次通过自我革新，主动适应新的形势，有效应对高速变化的国内外环境所带来的新挑战。这一过程中，中共通过自身高效灵活的选贤任能体制，不断选拔任用优秀干练的干部充实到政府中去，是其制胜的一大法宝。

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能者居上

西方所谓的“中国通”们反复强调中国的干部腐败问题，用薄熙来事件等极端情况传播耸人听闻的故事，并以此为据宣称中共及其体制已病入膏肓。确实，中共的体制存在着种种弊端，但解铃还须系铃人，这些弊病必须通过中共自己从内部根治。西方人士或许无法相信，中共作为一个享有中国宪法确认并保护领导地位的执政党，其内部的选贤任能竞争之激烈程度，能够超过世界上所有的政治组织。

在十八大换届前，中共的最高领导机构--中央政治局共有25名委员，其中只有5人出身背景优越，也就是所谓的“太子党”。其余20人，包括国家主席胡锦涛和政府总理温家宝，都是平民出身。再看由300多人组成的十七届中央委员会，出身显赫者的比例更低。据此可以说，绝大多数中共高层领导人都是靠自身努力和激烈竞争获得晋升的。毋庸讳言，新领导人习近平的父亲是中共元老，但他也同样经历了长期的基层历练，十八大当选出的新一届高层领导人，绝大多数都是基层起家的。

中共如何从制度上保证选贤任能呢？关键之一是有一个强有力的组织机构，即中央组织部。对此西方鲜有人知。中央组织部主持制定了一整套完善的机制，通过复杂精细的程序进行干部遴选和评估，不断选拔出优秀的人才。这套机制的效力，恐怕最成功的商业公司都会自叹弗如。任人唯亲的现象确实存在，但总体上看，才干和政绩是决定晋升的主要标准。

政府以及相关机构一年一度地从大学毕业生中招录人员，被录取者的去向分三类：即政府职能部门、国有企业，以及政府管辖的事业单位，如大学、社区组织等。大部分新人会从最低一级的科员干起，经过几年的工作积累后，组织部门会根据其表现，决定是否将其提升到更高的管理职位上，比如副科、科、副处、处。这一区间的职位包罗万象，既包括负责贫困农村的卫生工作，也包括负责城区里的招商引资工作。各级干部每年都要接受组织部门的考察，其中包括绩效定量考核，征求上级、下级和同事的反馈意见，以及个人操守审查。此外，有关部门还频繁广泛地进行民意调查，内容既涉及对国家整体方向的满意度，也包括对各地具体政策的意见建议。在完成对候选人的全部考察后，有关部门还会公开征求公众意见，最后由组织部门汇总整理成详尽的考察材料，报送上级党委，由党委召开集体会议并慎重讨论后，确定提升人选。

完成最初的晋升后，公务人员的发展方向面临多种选择。中共的干部可以在政府职能部门、国有企业，以及社会事业单位等三大领域内轮转任职。具体来说，一位干部可能从经济管理工作调任政治或社会治理工作，也可能从传统意义上的政府机构调任国有企业或大学的管理职位。组织部门常常派送大批年轻有为的干部出国进修，了解世界各地的先进经验，比如他们会定期组织一些人到哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院和新加坡国立大学等机构培训。

公务员们经历长期的基层工作锻炼并不断积累实践经验后，佼佼者有望再次晋升，成为副局和正局级干部。这一级别的干部，有可能领导数百万人口的城区，也有可能管理年营业收入数亿美元的国有企业。因此，对局级干部的选拔更为严格。从统计数据来看，2012年，中国科级与副科级干部约为90万人，处级与副处级干部约为60万人，而局级与副局级干部仅为4万人。

在局级干部中，只有最为出众的极少数人才有机会继续晋升，最终进入中共中央委员会。在一位干部的职业生涯中，从积累基层经验开始，到进入高层领导序列，期间一般要经过二三十年的工作历练。因此几乎所有高层领导人，都有在中国社会各大领域主持工作的丰富管理经验。仅就十七届中央政治局而言，25人中就有19人兼有领导省、部工作的经验。值得一提的是，作为地方政府的省，在幅员上要超过世界上大多数国家；作为中央部门的部，在预算上要超过一般国家的整个政府。事实上，具有上千年历史的帝国官僚体系是中国的政治中坚和文化传统，今天中共的组织部门创造性地继承了这一独特的历史遗产，并制定了现代化的制度以培养当代中国的政治精英。如果要论政府管理经验，巴拉克•奥巴马第一次问鼎美国总统时，其资历可能还比不上中国一个县的负责人。

习近平的履历就是非常鲜明的例证。在过去的大约30年间，习近平从贫困地区相当于副科的村干部做起，跨过一个又一个台阶，一直做到政治局委员兼上海市委书记。在他成为中央领导人之前，他领导过的地区总人口累计已超过1.5亿，创造的GDP合计超过1.5万亿美元。习近平是这一代高层领导人的缩影，他的政治生涯充分证明了选贤任能体制是当代中国政治的巨大驱动力，所有位高权重者无不一步一个脚印，履历扎实丰富。

革故鼎新

中国集中化的选贤任能政治模式，还能激发政府的创新精神。中央政府的顶层设计经过地方的小规模试点验证后，再总结经验全国推广，这一模式的成功例证不胜枚举。其中最著名的，莫过于邓小平在80年代设立“经济特区”的创举。在中国最早的经济特区深圳，政府放开计划指令，按照市场原则搞活经济。深圳经济迅速腾飞，中央政府立即总结经验，并把经济特区的政策扩大推广到广东省珠海市、汕头市、福建省厦门市、上海浦东以及海南省的众多地区。

30多年来，全国各地成千上万的制度试验不断生根发芽，从下至上地推动着中国的改革。选贤任能的激烈竞争激发地方干部中的佼佼者勇于探索，期望通过政绩脱颖而出。在出席十八大的2326名代表中，中国西南偏远省份云南省委副书记仇和颇为引人注目。在刚结束的十八大上，仇和当选中央候补委员，这意味着这位55岁的“个性”干部正式步入中共高层。仇和的履历，是中国政治改革者成长的一个缩影。仇和出生于贫穷的农民家庭，八个兄弟姐妹中，曾有两个弟弟因为营养不良和疾病夭折。“文革”结束后，中国恢复高考，仇和经由这一改变命运的阶梯，考入大学。参加工作后，仇和先是在政府部门基层历练，于上世纪90年代起任职江苏省沭阳县县委书记。其时沭阳县是全国最贫穷的县之一，几乎没有像样的工业企业，全县人口多达170万，但人均年GDP仅有250美元，不及全国平均水平的五分之一。当时的沭阳县可谓一穷二白，且犯罪高发、腐败肆虐。

仇和新官上任就连烧几把火，果断实行大量实验性政策，在当地引起巨大争议。当时的情况下，如果实验失败，仇和的政治生命也必将夭折。他的第一把火，烧向了沭阳长期滞后的经济。1997年，仇和推出了市政建设债券强制购买计划，要求沭阳县民众购买建设债券，以支持急需的基础设施建设（据公开报道，仇和规定，每个财政供养人员扣除工资总额10％，每个农民出8个义务工，组成修路队，在高峰时，扣款达到20％，甚至离退休人员的工资，也被扣除10％用作交通建设。）这一举措后来证明是一箭双雕。首先，仇和作为县委书记根本无权开征新税，因此无法通过增税募集建设资金；其次，建设债券为沭阳县民众提供了投资机会，债券持有人后来都收回了本息，这就比纯粹增税更胜一筹。此外，仇和要求县政府所有干部都必须完成一定数额的招商引资指标。为了吸引投资，政府一方面大规模投资该地区的基础设施，另一方面为投资者提供税收和土地出让优惠。短短几年间，数千家私营企业蜂拥而来，沭阳县从该地区长期的贫穷落后分子，一举成为生机勃勃的市场经济领头羊。

仇和的第二把火烧向猖獗的腐败和持续恶化的干群关系。90年代晚期，仇和推出两项开创性举措，提高干部选拔的透明度和竞争性。其一是推行干部任前公示制，以广泛征求意见。其二是引入村干部选举“两票制”，即先由村民在本村党员中票选出若干名村干部候选人，再由党委在票数最多的两人中选出最终人选。

仇和的试验最初遭到当地干部和民众的强烈抵制，但他冒着风险坚决推进，终于成功地把沭阳这个当年全国著名的贫困县带领成为江苏省的工商业先进县，并率先开启城镇化进程，吸引全国不少贫困县前来学习取经。他倡导的干部任前公示制在全国广为推行，村级干部的差额选举方式也已被引入更高层的党组织选举中。仇和本人的政治生涯也更上层楼，先后出任江苏省副省长、昆明市委书记、云南省委副书记，并在十八大上当选中央候补委员。

某些批评者即使不得不承认中共具备自我改革能力，并且能做到选贤任能，他们依然坚持质疑这个政权的合法性。西方预设了一个假定的前提：政权合法性的唯一来源，就是多党竞争选举。依据这一假设，由于中国没有多党制选举，中共的政权自然就是无本之木。中共的批评者还进而沿着这一逻辑，多年来不断预言这个政权行将崩溃，几十年已经过去了，中国的发展和中共的壮大一再证明着这个预言的荒诞。近几年来，上述预言又改头换面，声称中共之所以还能维持统治，仅仅是因为最近三十多年中国经济一直保持着高速增长，即中共政权凭借“政绩”来维系着合法性。

坦率地说，骄人政绩的确是中共合法性的一大来源。据2011年美国皮尤研究中心在中国进行的民意调查显示，高达87%的中国民众对国家的未来方向表示满意； 66%的民众认为过去五年中生活水平显著提高；74%的民众相信未来五年生活会继续改善。不过，“政绩”只是中共获得民众支持的原因之一，中共执政合法性的真正根基和内核，还须追溯到中国的民族主义和更为根本性的道德合法性。

1949年中华人民共和国成立时，中国共产党在天安门广场树立了人民英雄纪念碑。纪念碑以一组浮雕展示了中国人民在近现代历史上顽强拼搏，最终建立中华人民共和国的历程。按照常理推测，既然中共是一个马克思列宁主义的政党，那么纪念碑的浮雕主题自然应该首先强调共产主义的意识形态，诸如马克思创作的《共产党宣言》，或者1921年中共建党。但事实并非如此，浮雕的开篇主题是1839年的“虎门销烟”，当时清朝的钦差大臣林则徐公开焚毁了没收来的英商走私鸦片，英国借机对华开战，史称“第一次鸦片战争”。中国战败，向英国割地赔款求和，中华民族从此陷入“百年国耻”。在之后的一百多年间，中国遭受了无数次入侵、战乱和饥荒，直到1949年新中国成立，才迎来众所周知的历史性转折。一直到今天，人民英雄纪念碑依旧是中国最神圣的公共地标，充分彰显着中共建国的道德权威。

中国共产党不仅是新中国的缔造者，同时也是中国现代化的领导者。自从1935年遵义会议上确立了毛泽东的领导地位之后，中共的宗旨就一直是复兴中华民族，而不是向世界输出共产主义革命。以此为起点，中共吸纳了马克思主义，逐渐形成了中国化的社会主义。这种社会主义不同于苏联式共产主义，而更多契合中国历史悠久的儒家平等主义诉求。中国化的社会主义、中国的文化传统，以及为现代化的诉求所付出的巨大牺牲，一起构成了中共深深植根民心的道德合法性，这绝非经济增长所带来的“政绩合法性”所能相提并论的。由此就不难理解，在中共执政以来的63年里，虽然经历了那么多次极为困难的历史阶段，包括灾难性的“大跃进”和“文化大革命”时期，社会主体包括中下层也从未对中共失去信任。这种信任使中共有时间和空间进行反思调整，开展自我革新。从高速的经济增长到成功的太空探索，当代中国所取得的成就无一不使国民——尤其是青年一代——的民族主义情绪更加高涨。未来几十年中，随着中国的进一步崛起，中共获得的政治支持只会水涨船高。

当然，为了保持政治稳定，中共也不得不采取某些压制措施。因此，西方的一些中国问题专家坚持认为，镇压就是中共得以实行统治的真正力量。他们指出中国实行的严格审查制度、对异议人士采取的打压举措，并对此进行批评。他们说的这些都是事实。其实中共清楚知道，压制不是巩固执政地位之道，并务实地采取了更巧妙的遏制策略。具体而言，就是允许并保障绝大多数民众最大程度的个人自由。今天的中国民众，要比近代史上任何一个时期都享有更多的自由，大部分人可以自由生活、自主择业、自行创业，在海内外自由旅行，在网上公开批评政府而不用担心受到打击报复。与此同时，政府坚决打击极少数旨在颠覆中共政权的政治反对人士。众所周知，近十年来网络、报刊上对政府的批评呈爆发式增长，对此政府并未严厉打压；全国各地因政策争议引发的群体性事件，每年多达数万起，但基本上都以和平方式平息。然而，政府对于旨在推翻现有政治制度的极少数人绝不会稍有容情，比如激进的刘晓波鼓吹终结中共执政地位，结果就被重判入狱。

当然，中共的执政地位并非高枕无忧。当下，腐败猖獗对中共的声誉构成巨大损坏。实际上，与其说腐败是中国政治制度自身固有的问题，不如说是国家快速发展的副产品。一个半世纪前，当美国经历经济快速增长和工业急剧扩张时，暴力犯罪、贫富分化和官员腐败程度比今日中国更甚。就当代的横向比较而言，据透明国际发布的全球清廉指数排名，中国位居第75位，且呈逐年上升之势，排名高于很多实行多党选举的所谓民主制国家，譬如希腊（第80位）、印度（第95位）、印度尼西亚与阿根廷（并列第100位）、菲律宾（第129位）。可见，中共的腐败问题远非无可救药，而且依托民众对中共的高度认同和支持，完全有时间和机会从容应对这一艰巨挑战。

龙的时代

十八大选举产生的新领导集体将在未来十年中领导中国。这十年中，中国将面临重重挑战，而中共自我改革的适应能力、选贤任能的组织制度、深植民心的执政合法性，将成为其战胜各种挑战的坚强依托。当前经济增速放缓的势头令人不安，但这一现象更多属于正常的经济周期，并不意味中国经济遭遇到结构性瓶颈。在未来二三十年中，由于城镇化和创业型经济的助力，中国经济良好的增长态势将至少再保持一代人。1990年，只有25%的中国人居住在城市里，今天这一人数已超过半数，增至51%，并有望在2040年前达到75%。这意味着中国将有近10亿城市人口，产生对新建道路、住房、供能、通讯基础设施等的极大需求。即使基础设施和房地产建设产生暂时性泡沫，也会被巨大的需求消化掉。事实上，在未来若干年，中国社会的城市化进程使决策层必须保持甚至加大对这些领域的投资力度。投资对经济的拉动效应，以及新增城市人口的生产和消费能力，足以推动经济高速增长。中共的政治权威，以及卓越的政策制定和施行能力，将为中国成功实现这一历史跨越保驾护航。

与此同时，创业型经济将帮助中国克服其出口驱动型增长模式的痼疾。在中国外部，全球经济衰退以及人民币升值，正逐渐挤压中国的出口。在中国国内，沿海工业地区劳动力成本上升，削弱了出口的价格优势。但是，这些问题会在市场中自然消化。毕竟中国经济的奇迹不是靠政府高层设计出来的，而是通过大力发展市场经济，培育了一大批活跃的私营企业扎实干出来的。在沿海地区，许多企业的业务正迅速向价值链的高端延伸，一些低端制造业开始从沿海向内地迁移，以有效控制劳动力成本，这正好契合了中西部地方政府加大基础设施投资、促进产业升级创新的思路。

中国的创业型新经济更是朝气蓬勃，将继续推动整体经济的高速度和高质量的发展。近年来，无数互联网创业者从零开始，打造全球网络经济的领头羊企业，仅阿里巴巴一家公司就在短短几年里创造了上百万的就业和从商机会。

确实，十八大后，政府需要推出一系列经济改革举措。例如，在某些领域，国有企业过于膨胀，挤压了民营企业的发展空间，导致经济活力下降。政府已经看到这些问题，并在酝酿出台硬性要求国有企业向股东分红和其它限制横向扩张的调整性政策。止步不前的金融自由化政策有望重启，或将涵盖利率市场化和发展中小型私营金融机构。这将打破国有银行的垄断地位，进一步激活信贷市场。上述种种举措，都将大大有利于资本向产业投资。

随着中国经济日趋开放，社会政策方面也需适时调整。在完善社会管理方面，决策者可能会双管齐下。首先，中共将致力于增强包容性，江泽民时期开启的吸纳新社会阶层人士入党的思路有望继续延续。其次，中共将尝试让合法的非政府组织参与社会福利管理。随着城镇化的快速推进，中国将出现一个庞大的中等收入阶层。令西方人士大跌眼镜的是，新出现的中产阶层并不追求抽象的政治诉求，而是十分关注切实的“民生”问题。要应对如此多的新问题，单靠政府包打天下恐怕不行。因此，向私人企业和非政府组织开放医疗、教育服务领域，就成为一举两得的政策选项。据说广东已经率先开展类似试点。

腐败无疑是最难攻克的关口。近年来，中共一些高级干部的亲属利用其政治影响建立关系网络，以谋取商业利益。从高层到地方，都有政经精英千丝万缕的裙带关系网，无时无刻不在损害民众对中共的合法性认同。在反腐方面，中共正逐渐摸索出新思路，并有望在换届完成后全力出击。在具体的反腐举措上，很可能是三管齐下。在当前所有的反腐机构中，最重要的莫过于中共中央纪律检查委员会。中央纪委地位崇高，其负责人一般都由政治局常委担任，纪委权力运作在起动司法程序之前，可直接要求有腐败嫌疑的党员在规定的时间和地点交待问题，这在一定程度上避免了繁琐的法律障碍。近年以来，在对腐败干部的追查中，纪委的角色和作用越来越大。在2011年，纪检监察机关共立案137859件，相关责任人受到党纪处分，甚至被移送司法。在1989年的政治风波中，腐败问题曾是一大导火索。自此之后中共对反腐常抓不懈，当前的查处数字接近1989年前的四倍，即为最鲜明的例证。核心领导层的违法违纪问题对中共的威信损害最大，新的领导集体是否会支持中纪委打破禁忌，从顶层果断反腐，将具有风向标的意义。

近年来，国有媒体和私营媒体都日趋独立，已成为政府反腐败的重要支持力量。干部的腐败行为一旦被曝光，就会在网上迅速传播，形成媒体事件。有关部门会迅速追查被曝光的腐败案件，并发布调查结果。这是全新的现象，其中不乏争议性问题，尤其是媒体行业自身也很腐败。贿赂记者和新闻造假早已司空见惯。如果这一情形无法迅速改观，中国的媒体将很快丧失仅有的一点公信力。

因此政府换届之后，或将从加强政治监管和法律约束，促进新兴媒体行业的发展和成熟。政府已在讨论制定有关行业法规，以保护真实、合法的新闻报道，并惩戒诽谤、不实的谣言。或许有人怀疑政府试图以此控制媒体，但更重要的是，媒体应借此机会提高自己的公信力。一个索贿和造谣事件频发的新闻媒体行业，是不可能真正遏制腐败的。

最后，中共会在党内促进开放性竞争，这在一定程度上是基层各种创新性实验的启发。党内竞争将有助于遏制党员的不当行为。胡锦涛总书记提出要推行“党内民主”，支持用差额选举产生党的各级委员会，这一提法在十八大上获得热烈拥护。

凤凰涅槃

如果十八大的战略规划能够一一落实，2012年将被后世视为世界政治史的分水岭。迄今为止，世界依旧受制于西方式选举民主的话语霸权，认为只有多党选举才能保证良治，并天生具有合法性。与中国的崛起形成鲜明对照的是，西方世界正陷入政治、经济的双重危机。冷战结束后仅仅一代人的时间，美国的中产阶级已然大批消亡；基础设施大量失修而无人问津；政治上无论是选举还是立法，都受制于资本和利益集团操纵；巨额赤字和负债吞噬了未来几代人的财富，民众生活水平持续下滑态势不可避免。在大西洋彼岸，欧盟各国在政治、经济、社会各领域迅速衰朽。至于雄心勃勃的欧洲计划，现在已无异于一条触礁搁浅的船。而在此期间，中国不仅使几亿人摆脱了贫困，还一举成为世界经济的引擎。

西方遭遇的这些困境都是自找的。由于过分自负自满地相信选举制度是绝对可靠的，西方民主政治已经缺失了自我修正的能力。选举被看作是最终目的，而不是形成良政的手段。在选举政治下，选出出类拔萃的领导人已经困难重重，有能力的领导人若想在现有体制内有所作为，更是难于登天。即使偶尔有少数出色的领导人上台，还是免不了要面对被政治、法律桎梏牢牢捆住手脚的局面，实际上是寸步难行。就在美国国务卿希拉里•克林顿穿行往来与世界各地，鼓吹选举民主的同时，美国政府各部门的合法性正濒临破产。今年11月，美国民众对国会的支持率只有可怜的18%；对总统的支持率稍高，约为50%；甚至一直标榜政治独立的最高法院，其支持率最近也跌破了50%。

许多发展中国家已意识到，民主不是包治百病的灵丹妙药。对这些彷徨者来说，中国的成功无疑更具有启发性。中国的崛起与西方民主国家的衰落，向全世界提供了鲜明的对照。当然，中国模式的政治制度不可能取代西式选举民主，因为中国从不将自己的政治模式包装成普世通用的典范，也不会对外输出。但中国的模式足以启发各国思考，如果一国政治制度不契合本国的文化、历史条件，结果一定是水土不服。中国模式的意义，不在于向世界各国提供足以替代民主制的灵丹妙药，而在于从实践上证明了良政的模式不是单一而是多元的，各国都能找到适合本国的政治制度。24年前，政治学家弗朗西斯•福山预言民主将一统天下，慨叹历史从此终结，世界陷入一片静寂。现在看来，福山是杞人忧天，一个更精彩的时代正缓缓拉开帷幕。

（本文原文刊发于最新一期美国《Foreign Affairs》杂志，作者中文首发于观察者网站）

李世默是上海的风险投资家和政治学者，阅读该作者专栏请点击

The Life of the Party

The Post-Democratic Future Begins in China

By Eric X. Li

January/February 2013

ERIC X. LI is a venture capitalist and political scientist in Shanghai.

In November 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 18th National Congress, setting in motion a once-in-a-decade transfer of power to a new generation of leaders. As expected, Xi Jinping took over as general secretary and will become the president of the People’s Republic this March. The turnover was a smooth and well-orchestrated demonstration by a confidently rising superpower. That didn’t stop international media and even some Chinese intellectuals, however, from portraying it as a moment of crisis. In an issue that was published before the beginning of the congress, for example, The Economist quoted unnamed scholars at a recent conference as saying that China is “unstable at the grass roots, dejected at the middle strata and out of control at the top.” To be sure, months before the handover, the scandal surrounding Bo Xilai, the former party boss of the Chongqing municipality, had shattered the CCP’s long-held facade of unity, which had underwritten domestic political stability since the Tiananmen Square upheavals in 1989. To make matters worse, the Chinese economy, which had sustained double-digit GDP growth for two decades, slowed, decelerating for seven straight quarters. China’s economic model of rapid industrialization, labor-intensive manufacturing, large-scale government investments in infrastructure, and export growth seemed to have nearly run its course. Some in China and the West have gone so far as to predict the demise of the one-party state, which they allege cannot survive if leading politicians stop delivering economic miracles.

Such pessimism, however, is misplaced. There is no doubt that daunting challenges await Xi. But those who suggest that the CCP will not be able to deal with them fundamentally misread China’s politics and the resilience of its governing institutions. Beijing will be able to meet the country’s ills with dynamism and resilience, thanks to the CCP’s adaptability, system of meritocracy, and legitimacy with the Chinese people. In the next decade, China will continue to rise, not fade. The country’s leaders will consolidate the one party model and, in the process, challenge the West’s conventional wisdom about political development and the inevitable march toward electoral democracy. In the capital of the Middle Kingdom, the world might witness the birth of a post-democratic future.

ON-THE-JOB LEARNING

The assertion that one-party rule is inherently incapable of self-correction does not reflect the historical record. During its 63 years in power, the CCP has shown extraordinary adaptability. Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic has pursued a broad range of economic policies. First, the CCP initiated radical land collectivization in the early 1950s. This was followed by the policies of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s to mid-1970s. After them came the quasi-privatization of farmland in the early 1960s, Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms in the late 1970s, and Jiang Zemin’s opening up of the CCP’s membership to private businesspeople in the 1990s. The underlying goal has always been economic health, and when a policy did not work-for example, the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution-China was able to find something that did: for example, Deng’s reforms, which catapulted the Chinese economy into the position of second largest in the world.

On the institutional front as well, the CCP has not shied away from reform. One example is the introduction in the 1980s and 1990s of term limits for most political positions (and even of age limits, of 68–70, for the party’s most senior leadership). Before this, political leaders had been able to use their positions to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao Zedong was a case in point. He had ended the civil wars that had plagued China and repelled foreign invasions to become the father of modern China. Yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes, such as the Cultural Revolution. Now, it is nearly impossible for the few at the top to consolidate long-term power. Upward mobility within the party has also increased.

In terms of foreign policy, China has also changed course many times to achieve national greatness. It moved from a close alliance with Moscow in the 1950s to a virtual alliance with the United States in the 1970s and 1980s as it sought to contain the Soviet Union. Today, its pursuit of a more independent foreign policy has once more put it at odds with the United States. But in its ongoing quest for greatness, China is seeking to defy recent historical precedents and rise peacefully, avoiding the militarism that plagued Germany and Japan in the first half of the last century.

As China undergoes its ten-year transition, calls at home and abroad for another round of political reform have increased. One radical camp in China and abroad is urging the party to allow multiparty elections or at least accept formal intraparty factions. In this view, only full-scale adversarial politics can ensure that China gets the leadership it needs. However sincere, these demands all miss a basic fact: the CCP has arguably been one of the most self-reforming political organizations in recent world history. There is no doubt that China’s new leaders face a different world than Hu Jintao did when he took over in 2002, but chances are good that Xi’s CCP will be able to adapt to and meet whatever new challenges the rapidly changing domestic and international environments pose. In part, that is because the CCP is heavily meritocratic and promotes those with proven experience and capabilities.

MAKING THE GRADE

China watchers in the West have used reports of corruption-compounded by sensational political scandals such as the Bo Xilai affair-to portray the ruling party as incurably diseased. The disease exists, to be sure, but the most important treatment is the party itself. As counterintuitive as it might seem to Westerners, the CCP, whose political preeminence is enshrined in the Chinese constitution, is one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world.

Of the 25 members that made up the pre-18th-Congress Politburo, the highest ruling body of the CCP, only five (the so-called princelings) came from privileged backgrounds. The other 20, including the president, Hu, and the premier, Wen Jiabao, came from middle- or lower-class backgrounds. In the CCP’s larger Central Committee, which was made up of more than 300 people, the percentage of people born into wealth and power was even smaller. The vast majority of those in government worked and competed their way through the ranks to the top. Admittedly, the new general secretary, Xi, is the son of a previous party leader. However, an overwhelming number of those who moved up the ranks this past fall had humbler beginnings.

So how does China ensure meritocracy? At the heart of the story is a powerful institution that is seldom studied in the West, the Organization Department of the CCP. This department carries out an elaborate process of bureaucratic selection, evaluation, and promotion that would be the envy of any corporation. Patronage continues to play a role, but by and large, merit determines who will rise through the ranks.

Every year, the government and its affiliated organizations recruit university graduates into entry-level positions in one of the three state-controlled systems: the civil service, state-owned enterprises, and government-affiliated social organizations such as universities or community programs. Most new recruits enter at the lowest level, or ke yuan. After a few years, the Organization Department reviews their performance and can promote them up through four increasingly elite managerial ranks: fu ke, ke, fu chu, and chu. The range of positions at these levels is wide, covering anything from running the health-care system in a poor village to attracting commercial investment in a city district. Once a year, the Organization Department reviews quantitative performance records for each official in each of these grades; carries out interviews with superiors, peers, and subordinates; and vets personal conduct. Extensive and frequent public opinion surveys are also conducted on questions ranging from satisfaction with the country’s general direction to opinions about more mundane and specific local policies. Once the department has gathered a complete dossier on all the candidates, and has confirmed the public’s general satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their performances, committees discuss the data and promote winners.

After this stage, public employees’ paths diverge, and individuals can be rotated through and out of all three tracks (the civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations). An official might start out working on economic policy and then move to a job dealing with political or social issues. He or she could go from a traditional government position to a managerial role in a state-owned enterprise or a university. In many cases, the Organization Department will also send a large number of promising officials abroad to learn best practices around the world. The likes of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and the National University of Singapore regularly host Chinese officials in their training programs.

Over time, the most successful workers are promoted again, to what are known as the fu ju and ju levels, at which point a typical assignment is to manage districts with populations in the millions or companies with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues. To get a sense of how rigorous the selection process is, in 2012, there were 900,000 officials at the fu ke and ke levels and 600,000 at the fu chu and chu levels. There were only 40,000 at the fu ju and ju levels.

After the ju level, a very talented few move up several more ranks and eventually make it to the party’s Central Committee. The entire process could take two to three decades, and most of those who make it to the top have had managerial experience in just about every sector of Chinese society. Indeed, of the 25 Politburo members before the 18th Party Congress, 19 had run provinces larger than most countries in the world and ministries with budgets higher than that of the average nation’s government. A person with Barack Obama’s pre-presidential professional experience would not even be the manager of a small county in China’s system.

Xi’s career path is illustrative. Over the course of 30 years, Xi rose from being a fu ke level deputy county chief in a poor village to party secretary of Shanghai and a member of the Politburo. By the time he made it to the top, Xi had already managed areas with total populations of over 150 million and combined GDPs of more than $1.5 trillion. His career demonstrates that meritocracy drives Chinese politics and that those who end up leading the country have proven records.

INNOVATE OR STAGNATE

China’s centralized meritocracy also fosters government entrepreneurship. The practice of conducting top-down policy experiments in select locales and expanding the successful ones nationwide is well documented. The best-known example is Deng’s creation of “special economic zones” in the 1980s. The first such zone was in Shenzhen. The district was encouraged to operate under market principles rather than the dictates of central planners. Shenzhen’s economy grew rapidly, which prompted the central government to replicate the program in the cities of Zhuhai and Shantou, in Guangdong Province; Xiamen, in Fujian Province; and throughout Hainan Province.

There are also thousands of policy experiments that rise up from the local level. The competitive government job market gives capable local officials incentives to take risks and differentiate themselves from the pack. Among the 2,326 party representatives who attended the 18th Party Congress, one such standout was Qiu He, who is vice party secretary of Yunnan Province. At the congress, Qiu was selected as an alternate member of the Central Committee, putting the 55-year-old maverick near the top of the nation’s political establishment. Qiu is the ultimate political entrepreneur. Born into poverty in rural China, Qiu watched two of his eight siblings die of childhood illness and malnutrition. After taking the national college entrance exam, China’s great equalizer, he was able to attend university. When he entered the work force, he held several low-level civil service jobs before being appointed party secretary of Shuyang County, in northern Jiangsu Province, in the 1990s. With a peasant population of 1.7 million and an annual per capita GDP of only $250 (less than one-fifth the national average), Shuyang was one of the poorest rural areas in the country. The county also suffered from the worst crime rate in the region and endemic government corruption.

Qiu carried out a broad range of risky and controversial policy experiments that, if they failed, would have sunk his political career. His first focus was Shuyang’s floundering economy. In 1997, Qiu initiated a mandatory municipal bond purchase program. The policy required every county resident to purchase bonds to fund much-needed infrastructure development. The genius of the plan was twofold. First, he could not have raised the funds through taxes because, at his level, he had no taxation authority. Second, the mandatory bond program offered the citizens of Shuyang something taxes would not have: yes, they were required to buy the bonds, but they eventually got their money back, with interest. Qiu also assigned quotas to almost every county government official for attracting commercial investments. To support their efforts, in addition to building up the area’s infrastructure, Qiu offered favorable tax rates and cheap land concessions to businesses. In just a few years, thousands of private enterprises sprang up and transformed a dormant, centrally planned rural community into a vibrant market economy.

Qiu’s second focus was combating corruption and mistrust between the population and the government. In the late 1990s, he instituted two unprecedented measures to make the selection of officials more open and competitive. One was to post upcoming official appointments in advance of the final decisions to allow for a public comment period. The other was the introduction of a two-tier voting system that enabled villagers to vote among party members for their preferred candidates for certain positions. The local party committee then picked between the top two vote getters.

Qiu initially met tremendous resistance from the local bureaucracy and population. But today, he is credited with turning one of the country’s most backward regions into a vibrant urban center of commerce and manufacturing. Other poor regions have adopted many of his economic policy experiments. Moreover, the public commenting period has been widely adopted across China. Competitive voting is finding its way into ever-higher levels of the party hierarchy. Qiu has been personally rewarded, too, moving rapidly up the ladder: to vice governor of Jiangsu Province, mayor of Kunmin, vice party secretary of Yunnan Province, and now an alternate member of the Central Committee.

Even if critics accept that the Chinese government is adaptable and meritocratic, they still question its legitimacy. Westerners assume that multiparty elections are the only source of political legitimacy. Because China does not hold such elections, they argue, the CCP’s rule rests on inherently shaky ground. Following this logic, critics have predicted the party’s collapse for decades, but no collapse has come. The most recent version of the argument is that the CCP has maintained its hold on power only because it has delivered economic growth -- so-called performance legitimacy.

No doubt, performance is a major source of the party’s popularity. In a poll of Chinese attitudes published by the Pew Research Center in 2011, 87 percent of respondents noted satisfaction with the general direction of the country, 66 percent reported significant progress in their lives in the past five years, and a whopping 74 percent said they expected the future to be even better. Performance legitimacy, however, is only one source of the party’s popular support. Much more significant is the role of Chinese nationalism and moral legitimacy.

When the CCP built the Monument to the People’s Heroes at the center of Tiananmen Square in 1949, it included a frieze depicting the struggles of the Chinese to establish the People’s Republic. One would expect the CCP, a Marxist-Leninist party, to have its most symbolic political narrative begin with communism -- the writing of The Communist Manifesto, for example, or perhaps the birth of the CCP in 1921. Instead, the first carving of the frieze depicts an event from 1839: the public burning of imported opium by the Qing dynasty’s imperial minister, Lin Zexu, which triggered the first Opium War. China’s subsequent loss to the British inaugurated the so-called century of humiliation. In the following hundred years, China suffered countless invasions, wars, and famines -- all, in the popular telling, to reach 1949. And today, the Monument to the People’s Heroes remains a sacred public site and the most significant symbol of the CCP’s national moral authority.

The CCP’s role in saving and modernizing China is a far more durable source of its legitimacy than the country’s economic performance. It explains why, even at the worst times of the party’s rule in the past 63 years, including the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, the CCP was able to keep the support of mainstream Chinese long enough for it to correct its mistakes. China’s recent achievements, from economic growth to space exploration, are only strengthening nationalist sentiments in the country, especially among the youth. The party can count on their support for decades to come.

A final type of staying power comes from repression, which China watchers in the West claim is the real force behind the CCP. They point to censorship and the regime’s harsh treatment of dissidents, which undoubtedly exist. Still, the party knows very well that general repression is not sustainable. Instead, it seeks to employ smart containment. The strategy is to give the vast majority of people the widest range possible of personal liberties. And today, Chinese people are freer than at any other period in recent memory; most of them can live where they want and work as they choose, go into business without hindrance, travel within and out of the country, and openly criticize the government online without retaliation. Meanwhile, state power focuses on containing a small number of individuals who have political agendas and want to topple the one-party system. As any casual observer would know, over the last ten years, the quantity of criticism against the government online and in print has increased exponentially -- without any reprisals. Every year, there are tens of thousands of local protests against specific policies. Most of the disputes are resolved peacefully. But the government deals forcefully with the very few who aim to subvert China’s political system, such as Liu Xiaobo, an activist who calls for the end of single-party rule and who is currently in jail.

That is not to say that there aren’t problems. Corruption, for one, could seriously harm the CCP’s reputation. But it will not derail party rule anytime soon. Far from being a problem inherent to the Chinese political system, corruption is largely a byproduct of the country’s rapid transformation. When the United States was going through its industrialization 150 years ago, violence, the wealth gap, and corruption in the country were just as bad as, if not worse than, in China today. According to Transparency International, China ranks 75th in global corruption and is gradually getting better. It is less corrupt than Greece (80th), India (95th), Indonesia and Argentina (tied at 100th), and the Philippines (129th) -- all of which are electoral democracies. Understood in such a context, the Chinese government’s corruption is by no means insurmountable. And the party’s deeply rooted popular support will allow it the breathing room to grapple with even the toughest problems.

ENTER THE DRAGON

China’s new leaders will govern the country for the next ten years, during which they will rely on the CCP’s adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy to tackle major challenges. The current economic slowdown is worrying, but it is largely cyclical, not structural. Two forces will reinvigorate the economy for at least another generation: urbanization and entrepreneurship. In 1990, only about 25 percent of Chinese lived in cities. Today, 51 percent do. Before 2040, a full 75 percent -- nearly one billion people -- are expected to be urban. The amount of new roads, housing, utilities, and communications infrastructure needed to accommodate this expansion is astounding. Therefore, any apparent infrastructure or housing bubbles will be momentary. In fact, China’s new leadership will need to continue or even increase investment in these sectors in the years to come. That investment and the vast new urban work force, with all its production and consumption, will drive high economic growth rates. The party’s extraordinary ability to develop and execute policy and its political authority will help it manage these processes.

Meanwhile, entrepreneurship will help China overcome threats to its export-fueled economic model. Externally, the global economic downturn and a rising currency value have dampened Chinese trade. Internally, labor costs have risen in the country’s coastal manufacturing regions. But the market will sort out these problems. After all, China’s economic miracle was not just a centrally planned phenomenon. Beijing facilitated the development of a powerful market economy, but private entrepreneurs are the lifeblood of the system. And these entrepreneurs are highly adaptive. Already, some low-end manufacturing has moved inland to contain labor costs. This is coinciding with local governments’ aggressive infrastructure investments and innovative efforts to attract new business. In the costal regions, many companies are producing increasingly-higher-value goods.

Of course, the government will need to make some economic adjustments. For one, many state-owned enterprises have grown too big, crowding out the private-sector growth that is critical to economic vitality. Plans to require companies to pay out dividends to shareholders and other limits on expansion are already in the works. These will likely be implemented early on in the new administration. And some stalled measures encouraging financial liberalization, such as allowing the market to determine interest rates and the development of private small and medium-sized lending institutions, which would break the large state-owned banks’ near monopoly in commercial lending, are likely to get picked up. These reforms would facilitate more efficient flows of capital to businesses.

Economic liberalization will likely be matched by a two-track reform of social policy. First, the process of making the party more inclusive, which began with Jiang’s inclusion of businesspeople in the CCP, will be accelerated. Second, the CCP will begin experimenting with outsourcing certain social welfare functions to approved nongovernmental organizations. Rapid urbanization is facilitating the growth of a large middle-income society. Instead of demanding abstract political rights, as many in the West expected, urban Chinese are focused on what are called min sheng (livelihood) issues. The party may not be able to manage these concerns alone. And so private businesses or nongovernmental organizations might be called in to provide health care and education in the cities, which has already started to happen in Guangdong Province.

Corruption remains the hardest nut to crack. In recent years, family members of some party leaders have used their political influence to build up large networks of commercial interests. Cronyism is spreading from the top down, which could eventually threaten the party’s rule. The CCP has articulated a three-pronged strategy to attack the problem, which the new leadership will carry out. The most important institution for containing corruption is the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Its leader usually sits on the Standing Committee of the Politburo and has more power than the state judiciary. This person can detain and interrogate party members suspected of corruption without legal limits. In recent years, the commission has been very aggressive. In 2011, it conducted formal investigations into 137,859 cases that resulted in disciplinary actions or legal convictions against party officials. This number represents a nearly fourfold increase since the years before 1989, when corruption was one of the main issues that drove the Tiananmen protests. One sign to watch in the next administration is whether the commission is authorized to investigate wrongdoing within the inner sanctum of the party leadership, where corruption can be the most detrimental to the party’s credibility.

Complementing the party’s own antigraft efforts is the increasing independence of media outlets, both state- and privately owned. News organizations have already exposed cases of official corruption and disseminated their findings on the Internet. The CCP has responded by pursuing some of the cases that the media have brought to light. Of course, this system is not perfect, and some media outlets are themselves corrupt. Illicit payments to journalists and fabricated stories are commonplace. If these problems are not corrected quickly, Chinese media will lose what little credibility they have gained.

Accordingly, the next administration might develop more sophisticated political regulations and legal constraints on journalists to provide space for the sector to mature. Officials have already discussed instituting a press law that would protect legitimate, factual reporting and penalize acts of libel and misrepresentation. Some might view the initiative as the government reining in journalists, but the larger impact would be to make the media more credible in the eyes of the Chinese public. Journalists who take bribes or invent rumors to attract readers can hardly check government corruption.

Also to tackle corruption, the party plans to increase open competition within its own ranks, inspired by the efforts of officials such as Qiu. The hope is that such competition will air dirty laundry and discourage unseemly behavior. The Hu administration initiated an “intraparty democracy” program to facilitate direct competition for seats on party committees, an idea that received high praise at the 18th Congress.

HISTORY’S RESTART

Should the 18th Party Congress’ initiatives succeed, 2012 might one day be seen as marking the end of the idea that electoral democracy is the only legitimate and effective system of political governance. While China’s might grows, the West’s ills multiply: since winning the Cold War, the United States has, in one generation, allowed its middle class to disintegrate. Its infrastructure languishes in disrepair, and its politics, both electoral and legislative, have fallen captive to money and special interests. Its future generations will be so heavily indebted that a sustained decline in average living standards is all but certain. In Europe, too, monumental political, economic, and social distress has caused the European project to run aground. Meanwhile, during the same period, China has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and is now a leading industrial powerhouse.

The West’s woes are self-inflicted. Claims that Western electoral systems are infallible have hampered self-correction. Elections are seen as ends in themselves, not merely means to good governance. Instead of producing capable leaders, electoral politics have made it very difficult for good leaders to gain power. And in the few cases when they do, they are paralyzed by their own political and legal systems. As U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travels around the world extolling electoral democracy, the legitimacy of nearly all U.S. political institutions is crumbling. The approval rating of the U.S. Congress among the American people stood at 18 percent in November. The president was performing somewhat better, with ratings in the 50s. And even support for the politically independent Supreme Court had fallen below 50 percent.

Many developing countries have already come to learn that democracy doesn’t solve all their problems. For them, China’s example is important. Its recent success and the failures of the West offer a stark contrast. To be sure, China’s political model will never supplant electoral democracy because, unlike the latter, it does not pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But its success does show that many systems of political governance can work when they are congruent with a country’s culture and history. The significance of China’s success, then, is not that China provides the world with an alternative but that it demonstrates that successful alternatives exist. Twenty-four years ago, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama predicted that all countries would eventually adopt liberal democracy and lamented that the world would become a boring place because of that. Relief is on the way. A more interesting age may be upon us.

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