民主不是答案-李世默

编者按：春秋研究院研究员李世默先生接受以色列日报Calcalist的访问，就中国模式，中国的政治目标以及普世价值、言论自由等诸多问题展开讨论。作者授权观察者网独家发布。小标题为编者所加。

中国的政治目标与中国政治文化传统紧密关联

Beitarie：我且不拿中国的政治体系与其他国家去对比，我只是想了解中国模式本身。你与阿斯彭研究所（Aspen Institute）的阿南德·格里德哈拉达斯（Anand Giridharadas）曾有一次谈话，我记得你当时对中国模式有一些排除性描述。你说中国模式不是西方式的自由民主制，也不是资本主义。但除此之外，对中国模式至今还缺乏清晰的定义。你可否试着下一定义？比如阐释一下中国模式的目标指向，以及如何才能实现？

李：谈到政治的“目标”，在现代西方世界，要数托马斯·杰斐逊的表述最为精辟。他在《独立宣言》中指出：人的生命、自由及追求幸福的权利不可剥夺；如果遇有任何形式的政府有碍于此，人民就有权利改变或推翻它。不过，杰斐逊的政治思想有其哲学背景，即认为个人是宇宙的中心，是人类社会的主宰和基石。这种信念其实是西方世界文化传承、宗教发展的结果，而这一过程在全人类历史上是独一无二的。这一过程并不见于非西方社会，也无从产生相应的政治理念。所以，西方的政治理念并不是普世的。

在中国的历史上，早在2500多年前，孔子就阐述了政治的目标。孔子认为，相较于过于美好而只能诉诸理想的“大同”社会，政府在现实中应致力于促成“小康”。千百年来，孔子的政治思想历久弥新。在当下的语境中，孔子主张的“小康”，就是国家和平、和谐、繁荣，法制公正，社会道德向上。十分有趣的是，邓小平在1979年启动改革时，就把中国下一阶段的目标称为建设，或者更准确地说是重建“小康”社会。

邓小平的用语也许并非巧合。众所周知，在创建新中国的革命过程中，共产主义思想的影响不可磨灭。但随着形势的发展，这一思想在理论上逐渐僵化。因此在拟定中国发展目标时，邓小平摆脱了理论教条的桎梏，重新回到中国传统的深处，进而参详孔子的思想。现在看来，在政治目标上，孔子和邓小平的某些思想可以相互辉映。以此为标准来衡量，在共产党一党领导下，中国迄今为止的发展成就可圈可点，尽管并非十全十美。

在当下，中国模式具体而言，包括以下几点：

首先，中国共产党作为全体中国人民的代表，同时掌握政治权威与道德权威。而在西方政治体系中，即使在一国之内，不同群体的利益也是由不同的政党分别代表。

其次，选贤任能的规则保证了执政党的地位和效率。在官员的选拔、晋升问题上，中共建立了一套十分复杂、精致、有活力的制度，以便在有志进入政府的人中录用、提升德才兼备者，并做到人尽其才。

再次，高度的政治权威是中国模式的核心。这样就避免了特定的利益集团（比如资本集团或是专业技能群体）将一己之利凌驾于国家利益之上。市场，或所谓的公民社会，都要受政治权威约束。

最后，主张实事求是，拒绝意识形态化。在现阶段，中国最重要的任务是发展经济。在政治制度上，相关设计和调整必须有利于加快经济发展速度，并符合国家需要和国情变化。

就上述几方面而言，现实情况还远远达不到中国模式的理想状态。腐败泛滥和贫富分化，就是明证。

共产党的纠错能力更胜于一般选举

Beitarie：你最近在《纽约时报》评论中写道：当代西方把民主和人权作为人类发展的顶峰，而这是基于绝对信仰的信念。但是，中国的道路与此不同，如果有利于经济发展和国家利益，中国的领导人会提高政治决策的开放程度，过去10年以来就是如此。你认为民主制度陷入困境的观点，得到了很多人的认同，甚至在西方国家也是如此。但回到中国制度上来，如果开放政治决策的前提是对国家利益有利，那么中国领导人为何有权决定国家利益是什么？在没有司法监督、全民选举和新闻自由的情况下，中国的领导人是否会做出错误的决策？

李：弗朗西斯·福山曾指出，中国模式具有“响应性威权”（responsive authoritarianism）的特点。很多人都不会否认，中国政府似乎有一种能力，可以感受到“时代脉搏”，并相应地做出政治调整，同时又保证在大方向上与国家的长远目标契合。

很多人一直认为，自我纠错能力是民主制度的专利。但事实上历史已经证明，中国共产党具备了强大的自我纠错能力，这已经成为其最引人注目的特征。自从1949年建国以来，在中国共产党一党领导下，中国在政府政策和政治环境方面的变化，跨越了几乎不可能跨越的政治鸿沟。从最初的“新民主主义”联盟，到50年代初的激进土改；从“大跃进”，到60年代初的耕地准私有化；从“文化大革命”，到邓小平的市场经济改革，以及江泽民“三个代表”理论对共产党理念的创新。在国内政治上，中国从一个阶段到下一个阶段的变化令人震惊。

在外交政策上，中国同样在不断调整。在50年代，中国向苏联“一边倒”；70年代到80年代，中国事实上与美国结盟遏制苏联。今天，在越来越多极化的世界中，中国坚持独立而有特色的外交方针。没有人会否认，从毛泽东到邓小平，从江泽民到胡锦涛，以及今年将接班的习近平，几代中国的领导人在政治观念、政策路线存在巨大差异，甚至远远大于在西方政治制度中轮流执政的不同政党领导人。在过去60多年里，中国出现了很多错误，但也做出了相应的纠正。“文化大革命”被定性为一场浩劫，遭到彻底否定；中国从四分五裂的局面，发展到今天的成就，等等。这些事实足以证明中国的一党制，在自我调整和纠错方面具有卓越能力。

相对而言，很多建立了代议制政府的国家，却纷纷陷入困境。多党竞选、轮流执政，并不能保证必要的灵活性和自我纠错能力。在美国，选举可以产生新的总统和新的国会多数党，但是并不能解决当下美国面临的长远危机。欧洲各国通过选举定期更换政府，但是没有一场选举能稍稍缓解欧洲的巨大困境。在日本，首相几乎每年一换，但选举和政党轮换丝毫无助于摆脱20多年的滞胀。或许这能解释，为何在许多国家有定期选举，但政府的支持率长期不足50%；而中国一党领导的政府，几十年来支持率一直超过80%。

一个似乎垄断了权力的政党，怎么能保持如此强的灵活性和生命力？答案之一，是中国共产党在基因里保持了向上流动的活力。比如中共和中国的最高决策机构中央政治局有25位成员，其中只有5位成员在出身上有优越背景，也就是所谓的“太子党”。其余20位成员，包括国家主席和政府总理在内，他们的出身背景都十分普通，并没有特殊的政治或经济依靠，完全凭努力和竞争走到今天的地位。中央委员会包括的成员更多，出身优越者比例更小。相比于美国联邦参议院，一目了然，情况相反。任何人只要走进中国的名牌高校，都能看到中国共产党不断吸引着最优秀的年轻人加入。中国共产党也许是当今世界上最能选贤任能的主流政治组织之一，胜于多数西方国家和大多数发展中国家的执政集团。在中国，政治制度中向上流动的活力可以确保领导人不脱离社会，事实上他们和普通民众是同一代人。

选举“认同”徒具法律上的瞬间形式，而缺乏道德上的权威

Beitarie：你在阿斯彭研究所（Aspen Institute）的讨论中谈到民众的认同，你指出中国政府在国内有很高的支持率。当然，对此还有不同的数据，比如农村地区群体性事件不断增长，并且近来在城市中也发生了类似事件，执政党也对此表示担忧。我想问一个更基本的问题，你在那次讨论中说：“如果政府失去民众的认同，就会出问题。”历史告诉我们，任何统治者最后都毫无意外地失去了民众的认同。既然如此，中国模式就有一个缺陷，就是只有通过暴力才能实现政权更迭。即使民主本身不是目标，难道定期普选不是一种确保民众认同政府的合理机制吗？或者，中国能否发展出一种不同的机制，让中国民众来决定谁来领导？

李：这个问题是在比较苹果和橘子。这也就是弗朗西斯·福山说的“坏皇帝”的问题，当一个君主变坏时怎样使他下台？

这是一个错误的假设。中国古语说“水能载舟，亦能覆舟”。今天民族国家已经取代了帝国和王国，在这个比喻里，水还代表民众，但是舟已不再意味着皇帝和他的王朝，而是指构成当代民族国家的更为庞大、复杂的政治体系。一党制已经写入中国宪法，正如代议制民主写在美国宪法中一样。长期以来，独立的舆论调查显示，共产党领导的政府受到中国民众的持续支持。这一事实的背景是一党制的政治架构，所以足以说明民众对政府基本制度的支持。美国人在支持共和党还是民主党时，可能变化不定，但绝大多赞同代议制民主的基本制度。可以说，当前中美两国的民众各自都支持本国的政治制度。

一些人认为，除非中国共产党能做到，假如失去支持后就交权下台，才能证明这个党目前受到的支持具有合法性。按照这个逻辑推演，不难得出这样的结论，即如果美国当前的民主制度失去了民众的支持，美国就必须取消选举，废除权利法案，并建立独裁或者其他形式的政权。这显然荒谬无比。政治权力要实现和平交接和轮换，其前提是承认既定的政治制度，而后者恰恰是很难改动一分一毫的。除了极少数的例外情况，只有革命才能撼动政治制度。在美国短短两百多年的历史上，围绕政治制度的建立和巩固，已经发生过两次惨烈的战争。即使是在民主代议制下，要实现从总统制到议会制的变更，也几乎毫无可能，反之亦然。

在毛泽东、邓小平、江泽民、胡锦涛、习近平之间，一代又一代中国领导人在政治上促成了巨大变化。就变化的深度和广度而言，中国的领导人的作为要远远超过代议制民主产生的领导人。藉此，中国共产党获得并维系了民众的普遍支持。至于中国共产党的政治制度下，未来能否继续推出呼应民众要求并受到民众支持的领导集体？这有待历史去验证。

至于“认同”的概念，其实不过是政治炒作。在当代西方的政治意识形态中，所谓被统治者的“认同”被等同于政府的合法性，其实是形式盖过了内容，程序超越了本质。况且，这种简单的划等号有些不着边际。大量民意调查显示，世界上大多数经选举上台的政府，其支持率都低于50%。，包括美国近来的历任政府和欧洲的大多数政府，政府执政后支持率都迅速跌落，大幅低于50%，并在政府任期内一撅不振。难道这就是民主制度创造的“认同”？若如此，这种“认同”似乎只是流于瞬间程序，太虚了，一点也不真实。事实上，美国和欧洲的社会运动，表明这些国家的政府正决定性地在民众中失去合法性。即使是在诞生现代民主制的西方，由选举产生的所谓“认同”也不过徒具法律上的瞬间形式，而缺乏道德上的权威。法律程序上空虚的“认同”，配合道德上的破产，结果是合法性的崩溃。

中国模式并不排斥公民社会

Beitarie：从2002年起我就待在中国。在这些年里，我注意到公民社会（civil society）的逐渐发展。我说的公民社会，并不仅仅指政治异见人士，还包括动物权益保护者、环保人士、慈善人士等等。许多小型组织在相关层面上就自己关心的问题提出议题。然而在你的表述中，中国模式并不承认在政府之外存在公民社会。你能否具体阐述一下这一点？在你看来，这些发展趋势是消极的吗？为什么？

李：这个问题涉及到中国模式中的政府治理方式。中国公民社会的发展的确是有益的。事实上，公民社会为政府架起了感受“时代脉搏”的桥梁，政府以此接触民情、体察民意。公民社会当然可以在政府之外存在，但在中国模式中，公民社会不会也不能凌驾于国家的最高政治权威之上。

Beitarie：紧接着上一个问题。你曾经指出，中国模式有一个特点，就是能保障十分广泛的个人自由，但不允许干预政府行为。这两者之间，在何种程度上可以区别开来呢？比如说，就像北京等城市发生过的，当民众呼吁政府关注基本生存条件，如空气和饮用水质量时，这属于保障个人自由还是干预政府行为呢？在中国的许多案例中，包括最近发生且备受关注的乌坎事件，民众发现团结在一起，集体表达诉求，就往往能达到目的。在你看来，中国模式能包涵这些内容吗？若不能，中国模式如何保证其开放性？

李：中国政府并不压制民众对生存条件的诉求。恰恰相反，中国社会正经历巨大变迁，各方面的挑战尤其艰巨，但政府在回应公民诉求时表现极其敏锐，进而更加巩固了中央政府的道德权威。在乌坎事件中，最有趣的是抗议者高举的标语，其中最显眼的一条标语写着“中国共产党万岁！”。事件平息后，抗议活动的领导者被选为村长，而他恰恰是一名老党员。

普世的东西只能是最低标准的

Beitarie：你一针见血地指出，自由民主制度深深根植于犹太教-基督教宗教思想，这个事实无人能否认。然而，我对以下两个问题感到困惑。首先，根据我的理解，你认为中国模式是基于中国的历史传统尤其是儒家思想，然而当前中国的政治制度是从苏联输入的，而且宪法规定的国家意识形态是马克思列宁主义和毛泽东思想。这些因素为何能并行不悖？

我的第二个困惑是：虽然各种不同的文化都应该受到尊重，而不同的文化会塑造出不同形式的政府。但对照各种文化的文本典籍，就会发现其中很多观点总是极其相似的。孔子在其著作中坚持反对政府腐败，反对统治者滥用权力，这些观点也同样见于新约和旧约，其他文化中的先贤规训也近乎于此。在不同文化中，是非判断的基本价值观非常相似。巧合的是，权力无度、权力滥用、政府腐败总是最受关注的问题，这也是普通中国民众的切肤之痛。这是否意味着即使在不同的文化中，也有很多问题是相通的，意味着有很多价值观是普世的？进而意味着，不仅文化可以互相学习，甚至制度也可以移植？

李：所谓的普世价值，只是一个谬误。每次提到普世价值，它只能囊括最低端、最抽象的因素。饥饿时我们都想吃东西，我们都想找到异性来繁衍后代——好像很普世，但几乎所有动物也如此。人类区别于动物，是因为人类有文化，而文化塑造价值观。从根本上说，不同文化之间是不能简单比附的，因为它们成长于不同的环境，其中也包括地理、气候这样的客观条件。抽象地说，一个人可以宣称所有人都需要如尊严之类。谁能反驳呢？这听起来的确非常普世。但是在不同文化中，尊严的含义不仅会有不同，甚至还会是完全相反的。任何来自中东的人士都无需提醒，犹太人和穆斯林所理解的尊严是有差异的，许多人甚至不惜牺牲生命去维护这种差异。在儒家思想中，人的尊严来自于人际关系结构中其所处的位置，这当然和现代西方社会对尊严的理解完全相反。诚然，“权力无度”在儒家思想和其他文化中都是错误的。但是对“权力无度”如何定义，以及权力如何受“制约”，不同文化的看法就完全不同了。在儒家价值观中，对权力的制约来自社会内在的道德准则，而在西方传统观念中，则必须诉诸于法律措施。

但这并不是说不能引进、吸收外来文化。佛教本来也是外来文化，但它融入了中国文明，形成了非常重要的传统。外来文化是以原生态，还是以本土化的形式存在，以及输入的成功与否，在于它与当地文化土壤的契合程度。马克思主义传入中国后，引起儒家平等精神的共鸣，同时其现代因素呼应了中国全社会对现代化的迫切需求。最后，本土化的马克思主义在现代中国生根发芽。

张口就说的自由，有责任的人应该先想想其后果

Beitarie：在阿斯彭研究所（Aspen Institute），你曾经说过，如果触犯了中国刑法，艾未未就应被关进监狱。几个星期前我采访了艾未未先生。在准备采访时我很惊讶，因为他和你的生平有不少相似之处。你们出生的家庭，在革命年代都遭到过迫害；到你们年轻时，走出国门求学；尽管有其他选择，你们最后还是回到中国，并在各自的领域成为有影响力的成功人士。事实上，艾未未的诉求和你的主张很相似。他在接受采访时表示：“我不要求很多。我只要创作的自由，以及每个人想要什么张口就能说出来的自由。” 这有什么不对吗？如果中国模式是有效、成功和正确的，那为何要把批评人士关进监狱？而不是与他们辩论，就像你我之间这样探讨？你曾表示，在美国的经历让你学会了多元主义和公开辩论，但在现在的中国社会，多元化的辩论似乎越来越受到限制。你认为决策者这样做明智吗？

李：任何社会对多元主义和公开辩论的开放程度，都取决于当时的社会条件。只有历史才能坚定当今中国的开放程度是否有利于中国的长期发展。

“我不要求很多。我只要创作的自由，以及每个人想要什么张口能说出来的自由。”作为一项声明，这可真是够简单的。然而它要求的其实很多，而且是太多了。在西方政治意识形态中，有所谓的“言论自由”概念，但这是错误的。这一概念假设言论和行为不同，纯粹的言论是无害的，因此可以被授予绝对的自由，比如“每个人说出其需求的自由”。但是人类几千年的历史经验证明，言论即行动，而从史前时期开始，言论就足以危害到社会，中国古代先贤告诫说：赠人以言如沫春风，伤人以言胜过剑戟。在西方，无需追溯到近代以前，就可以轻易找到相关的事实。1933年，在特定的历史和社会条件下，一个政客的言论煽动导致了千百万人的死亡和毁灭。每个社会在不同的历史阶段都有其独一无二的文化环境，只有社会自身才能根据当时的条件决定言论（行动）的界限。比如鉴于德国的特殊历史，《我的奋斗》至今被禁止出版。

当代中国正在经历社会转型，其速度和规模是人类社会有史以来前所未有的。在转型过程中，社会稳定是非常脆弱的。某些言论被放大后，会冲击社会的稳定。有责任感的人士应该考虑到，支持“每个人想要什么张口就能说出来的自由”，可能会带来的后果。社会分析人士和历史研究者，应该更深思熟虑一些，而不是简单地问“这有什么不对吗？”

民主人士要避免狂热病

Beitarie：你也许已经了解，关于民主的界限，以色列也有一场生动的辩论。有些团体主张，以色列不应该成为民主国家，而应该找到某种基于犹太教传统的政治模式。在一些穆斯林国家，也有相同的思潮，希望能找到符合伊斯兰教法的现代模式。你认为不同的文化要找到各自的发展模式，这是不是符合你的观点？你认为其他国家无法照搬中国模式，原因是什么？

李：从根本上说，不同文化难以简单类比，中国模式和西方模式都是不可照搬的。在犹太教-基督教文化的西方世界之外，除了少数几个特例，大多数建立代议制民主的国家，都没有享受到繁荣与和平，这并不是偶然的。许多非洲和亚洲国家被西方殖民者和本国精英强加了代议制民主，至今依然在贫困和内乱的泥沼中挣扎，数亿人因此遭受无尽的苦难。中国模式唯一可以借鉴的一点，也许就是每一种文化都能够找到属于自己的发展道路。

Beitarie：对于1989年春天发生在北京的事件，可以说说你的看法吗？在《纽约时报》的评论中，你形容这是一次“大规模的动乱”。这真的是动乱，而不是公民的抗议吗？要是当时政府换一种方式来应对，结果是否会更好呢？

李：如果当时政府没有果断平息动乱，中国社会将会蒙受巨大暴力的破坏。任何导致无辜者，甚至本意善良的人伤亡的事件都是悲剧，这一事件也不例外。但除此之外的其他选择只会更糟糕，甚至引发一场旷日持久血流成河的内战。于是只能两害相权取其轻，而1989年以后的政治稳定，也使无数中国民众过上了比以往任何时候更富足、自由的生活。

Beitarie: 你强调中国模式的优势在于自我调整和纠错，很多评论家认为这在邓小平时代表现可谓出色，的确真正地为中国开辟了一条新路，但在此之后这些能力严重退化。比如，贫富分化是导致社会不满、不和谐的重要原因，然而分化依然在扩大。另外，过去几年中群体性事件的数量迅速增加，中国的领导人已经认识到其严重性。不过，政府在压制抗议方面展现的能力和投入，要比在治理官员腐败和滥用权力时更多。你对此怎么看？

李：没有人，包括共产党在内，会否认政府腐败和贫富分化的严重性，但是我们应该思考分析产生这些问题的原因。这是中国政治制度自身固有的问题，还是国家快速发展的副作用？一个多世纪前，当美国经历快速发展和工业扩张时，暴力犯罪、贫富分化和政府腐败比今天中国严重得多。相关的历史记录不胜枚举，如果要听故事，只要去看看好莱坞的电影，比如《纽约黑帮》 (Gangs of New York)和《血腥风暴》（Let There Be Blood）就够了。当时加利福尼亚州的整个经济，完全被几个家族所控制。

回到先前讨论的腐败问题上，据透明国际组织的报告，在全世界最透明，最少腐败的20个国家和地区中，仅有新加坡、香港、卡塔尔和日本不属于西方世界。而在这其中威权政府就有三个，且恰恰是上述国家、地区中仅有的廉政案例。据透明国际统计的透明指数，中国排名第75位，高于无数代议制民主国家，譬如印度的第95位、菲律宾的第129位、印度尼西亚的第100位、阿根廷的第100位，与希腊的第80位差相仿佛，稍稍低于意大利的第69位。可见，中国的一党执政，要比许多代议制民主国家更廉洁。

如果抛弃意识形态的偏见，仅看事实数据，不管纵向还是横向，或许我们可以看到，在有效解决快速发展的副作用时，中国在既有政治制度下胜出的机会，至少不会低于条件近似而制度不同的其他国家。

Beitarie：你曾经指出，在西方世界以外，民主制的实验大多以失败告终。但是在中国周边，却有一些最成功的例子，尤其是那些同样具有儒家精神的社会，比如日本、韩国和台湾。你认为这些国家的政治制度比较成功吗？如果是，原因是什么？

李：在过去半个世纪，有一些非西方国家逐渐发展到发达国家水平。其中，新加坡、台湾、韩国的发展是在威权政府的领导下实现的，而日本是一党执政下完成的。事实上，当时这些国家和地区的威权政府，要比当今中国的政府严厉很多。其中一些国家在富裕以后确实建立了代议制民主，但迄今为止还不到一代人的时间。对于严肃研究历史和政治的学者来说，现在就下最后定论是不是有点过早？

最后值得一提的是，当今世界上有许多人还在自由民主制度意识形态的优越感中沉迷不醒，相信其放之四海而皆准。从20世纪一开始，人类遭受苦难的祸根，莫过于历史决定论。卡尔·马克思拟定了人类社会向共产主义进军的必然道路，充满意识形态热情的领导人将其奉若圭臬，结果将人民引入深渊。中国的民众也品尝了这段苦果，但是历史的反讽最终在苏联实现，这个红色帝国土崩瓦解。中国早已在实践中摒弃了宏大叙事的历史目的论。相反，现在全世界的民主人士似乎继承了类似的衣钵，他们宣称自由民主制的胜利不可避免，民主的天国将降临人间。他们的道德狂热，完全可以和苏联的先驱们媲美。这一切，仿佛历史在重演。（完）

原文请见下页

This is a written Q&A with Rachel Beitarie of the Israeli daily newspaper the Calcalist, published on May 3, 2012.

Beitarie: I would like to start not with a comparison of the Chinese and other systems of government, but by a look at the Chinese model itself. You said at the talk with Anand Giridharadas at the Aspen Institute (I’m rephrasing a bit) that we know what the Chinese model isn’t -- it isn’t liberal democracy, and it isn’t capitalism, but that what it is was not yet well defined. Could you try and define it anyway? What is the end of the Chinese model and what are the means to get there?

Li: What is the “end” of political governance? Thomas Jefferson probably defined it best for the modern West: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and governments that prove to be destructive to such ends must be overthrown. This Jeffersonian articulation of the end of governance was the culmination of cultural and religious developments unique to the West. Such developments placed the individual at the center of the universe as the basic and sovereign unit of human society. However, they did not occur in non-Western societies and their resulting political philosophy is, therefore, not universal.

In the Chinese tradition, an enduring definition of the end of political governance was articulated by Confucius two and a half millenniums ago. He called it Xiao Kang (as differentiated from Da Tong -- an unattainable ideal). In contemporary terms it can be described as a society of general peace and prosperity with a just legal order and built upon a righteous moral foundation. Interestingly enough, when Deng Xiaoping launched his reforms in 1979 he declared that the goal of the Chinese nation in the next phase of its development was to build or, perhaps more accurately, rebuild a Xiao Kang society.

It was probably no accident that Mr. Deng, in declaring China’s national goal, did not rely on the modern Communist ideologies that were instrumental in the revolution that established the People’s Republic, but rather reached deep into China’s ancient tradition, to Confucius. Measured by the “end” as articulated by Confucius and by Deng, the current one-party state model has so far served China well, albeit with real shortcomings.

The current China model has the following components:

1. Political authority, combined with moral authority, is vested in a single political organization, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which represents the entirety of the Chinese nation. This is in contrast to systems under which multiple parties represent different sectors of a nation state.

2. Meritocracy underlies the effectiveness and survival of the ruling organization. A highly sophisticated, elaborate, and rigorous system of selection and promotion within the CCP is designed to recruit those with capabilities and integrity into the Party and move them up the ranks if they choose government service as their careers.

3. The preeminence of political authority is central to the China model. This ensures no special groups, be it capital or talents, can develop capabilities that enable them to place their interests above the national interests. The market and the so-called civil society are both subservient to political authority.

4. Pragmatism is central and ideologies are peripheral. As economic development is seen as of paramount importance to China at the current stage, the political system is designed and adjusted to maximize its success. As the nation’s needs and conditions change, political adjustments can follow.

The current practice of the Chinese model is far from obtaining the ideal state in each of these components. Widespread corruption and the wealth gap are but two examples.

Beitarie: In your recent New York Times op-ed you write: The modern West sees democracy and human rights as the pinnacle of human development. It is a belief premised on an absolute faith. China is on a different path. Its leaders are prepared to allow greater popular participation in political decisions if and when it is conducive to economic development and favorable to the country’s national interests, as they have done in the past 10 years. I think many, even in western countries, would agree with your view of the democratic system being dysfunctional in many ways. However, going back to the Chinese system, I’d say leaders definitely allow participation only if it serves what they see as the country’s national interests. But where do the rulers draw their authority from to decide what those national interests are? And in the absence of judicial oversight, popular vote or free press, what is the mechanism the Chinese model suggests to alert the rulers of being wrong about what they regard as national interests?

Li: One characteristic of the China model is what Francis Fukuyama once called “responsive authoritarianism”. Many would agree that the Chinese government seems to have developed the ability to “feel the pulse” of the nation and adjust its politics in response to it while keeping it largely in alignment with the country’s long-term interests.

Indeed, historical facts demonstrate that self-correction, a capability many ascribe to democratic systems, has been the most notable characteristic of the CCP. Since the Party established the People’s Republic in 1949, under the leadership of a single political party, changes in China’s government policies and political environment have covered the widest possible spectrum. From the so-called “New Democratic” coalition at the beginning to the dramatic land reforms of the early 1950’s, from the Great Leap Forward to the quasi privatization of farm land in the early 1960’s, from the Cultural Revolution to Deng Xiaoping’s market reform and Jiang Zemin’s re-definition of the Party through his “Theory of Three Represents”, China’s domestic politics is almost unrecognizable from one period to another.

In foreign policy, China moved from a close alliance with the Soviet Union in the 1950’s to a virtual alliance with the United States in the 1970’s and 80’s to contain the former. Today, its pursuit of an independent course in an increasingly multi-polar world is distinctive among the nations of the world. No one could deny that its leaders, from Mao to Deng, from Jiang to Hu and to Xi later this year, differ as widely in political outlooks and policy priorities as those that move in and out of power under any other political systems. Through the six decades, there have been many blunders and corresponding course corrections. The Cultural Revolution - a disaster - was outright condemned. And the country went from its shattered state to the China we know today. The facts demonstrate this extraordinary capability of a one-party system for change and self-correction.

On the other hand, the records of electoral regimes around the world indicate that party rotation through elections may not provide the needed flexibility or self-correction. In the United States, elections may have produced new presidents and Congressional majorities, but do not seem to have done much to tackle America’s long-term challenges. In Europe, governments regularly get voted in and out, but no elections have produced even the minimal corrections required to address their monumental distress. In the one-prime-minster-per-year Japan, elections and party rotations have failed to lift the country out of its 20-year stagnation. Perhaps this could explain why governments produced by elections routinely fall substantially below 50% approval rating in their countries and China’s one-party government retains above 80% approval for decades.

The question is how could a political organization that seems to have a monopoly on power be so agile and flexible? One answer is the upward mobility that seems to have been successfully engineered into the CCP’s DNA. The CCP’s Politburo, the highest ruling body of the Party and the state, consists of 25 members. At the current count, only five of them come from any background of wealth or power, the so-called princelings. The other twenty, including the President and the Prime Minister, come from totally ordinary backgrounds with no special political or economic advantages. They worked and competed their way to the top. In the larger Central Committee, those with privileged backgrounds are even scarcer. Compare that to the U.S. Senate? A visit to any top university campus in China would make it obvious to anyone that the CCP continues to attract the best and the brightest of the country’s youth into its ranks. In fact, one can suggest without much risk that the CCP may be one of the most meritocratic and upwardly mobile major political organizations in the world today - far more meritocratic than the ruling elites of most Western countries and the vast majority of developing countries. This upward mobility in its political system helps ensure the rulers are not disconnected from society; in fact, they are of the same generation as the ordinary populace.

Beitarie: At the Aspen Institute discussion you talked a bit about the consent of the ruled, and you rightly pointed out very high rates of support to the government in China. Of course, there is data of a different kind as well, like the growing number of mass incidents in rural areas, and lately also in urban ones, that the ruling party itself cites as a cause for worry. I would like to ask a more basic question though: in that talk you said: “If they lose the consent of the ruled, they are in trouble.” I think history shows us that every ruler without exception eventually loses the consent of the ruled. If so, I see a flaw in the Chinese model in that it won’t allow for a regime change in any other means but violent ones. Even if we don’t see democracy as an end to itself, wouldn’t periodical popular vote be a sensible mechanism for making sure the ruled are indeed consenting? Or can China develop a different mechanism that will allow the Chinese people a say in who would rule them?

Li: This question compares an apple to an orange. It is what Francis Fukuyam calls the “bad emperor” problem. How do you get rid of an emperor if and when he turns bad?

But this is a faux proposition. There is an old Chinese saying, “the people are like water; the ruler is a ship on that water. Water can carry the ship; water can overturn the ship.” Today, nation-states have replaced empires and kingdoms. In this analogy, water is still the people. The ship, however, is no longer just an emperor and his dynasty but the larger and far more sophisticated political system that constitutes the modern nation-state. China’s one-party rule is enshrined in its constitution, just as America’s electoral democracy is in its. The Chinese people’s overwhelming and sustained support for the Party’s leadership, as consistently reflected in independent public opinion surveys, is within the context of the nation’s one-party political constitution, and therefore can only be interpreted as support for this fundamental system of government. Americans’ support for either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party ebbs and flows but it is not necessarily linked to popular support for its fundamental system of electoral democracy. At the moment, both nations’ peoples support their respective political constitutions.

Some say that in the hypothetical situation in which the Party lost popular support it should step down from power, and only when this is ensured the support of the people the Party currently carries could be rendered legitimate. Such argument, if pushed to its logical conclusion, would mean that if, in a hypothetical situation, the current electoral regime in America lost the people’s support the U.S. must do away with elections, cancel the Bill of Rights, and install an authoritarian or some other system of governance. This, of course, is absurd. Rulers may be succeeded or rotated peacefully within established systems of governance. Political systems themselves cannot be changed on a dime. With few exceptions, political systems change quickly only through revolutions. In America’s short history, it took two violent wars on its soil to establish and consolidate its current governing system. Even within an electoral democracy, it is nearly impossible to change from a presidential system to a parliamentary one or vice versa.

The fact is China’s rulers have changed, from Mao to Deng to Jiang to Hu to Xi. The breath and depth of change in their politics have proven greater than those of most rulers produced by democratic elections, and the Party’s continued survival and success indicate the general support it enjoys. The question is can the CCP’s power mechanism continue to produce rulers that are responsive and accepted by the populace? It’s a big “if.”

The idea of consent is hyped. The political ideology of the modern West equates the so-called consent of the governed to legitimacy. This is form over substance and procedure over essence. And such equation is in need of some verification. Most public opinion polls indicate that a large majority of governments in the world that came to power through elections carry substantially lower than 50% approval rating. Most of them, including the recent governments of the United States and much of Europe, consistently fall below that mark soon after their elections and stay there throughout their terms. Is this the “consent” democracies produce? If so, such “consent” seems to be all procedure with little substance. In fact, social movements in America and Europe point to a decisive loss of legitimacy of their governments among their populations. It seems that even in the West, the birthplace of modern democracy, the so-called consent produced by elections is a legal form devoid of moral authority. Legally consensual but morally bankrupt do not legitimacy make.

Beitarie: I have been in China since 2002, and one development I’ve noticed over the years might be described as the gradual building up of a civil society. I don’t necessarily mean to include political dissidents in this phenomenon but rather groups like animal rights activists, environmentalists, charities, etc. Many small organizations, acting sometimes at a very local level to address issues they care about. You stated, however, that the Chinese model as you view it does not recognize a civil society that exists outside of the government, would you care to elaborate on that point? Are those developments in China negative in your view? Why?

Li: Refer to answer one regarding China’s model of governance. The development of civil society is indeed healthy. In fact it is one avenue through which the government has been able to “feel the pulse” of the nation and be more responsive. A civil society of course exists outside the government, but in the Chinese model, it is not, and cannot be, above the nation’s overall political authority.

Beitarie: Following my previous question, one feature you have described of the Chinese model was that of allowing fairly wide personal freedoms, but not participation in governing. To what extent can the two really be distinguished? When people have demands from their government regarding their basic living conditions, like the quality of the air they breathe or the water they drink (as happened lately in Beijing and elsewhere), does this fall under personal freedoms or political organization? In many cases in China (events in Wukan village of Guangdong being a recent and much cited example) people find that coming together and making their demands heard as a group is an effective way to get what they want. Does the Chinese model as you see it object to that? If it does, what is this model’s alternative to public participation?

Li: Far from objecting to people’s demands related to their living conditions the Chinese government has proved deftly competent in responding to and co-opting such demands, considering the scale of the challenge brought about by Chinese society’s rapid change. This actually further enhances the moral authority of the central government. One interesting thing to observe was the highest banner held by the Wukan protestors read: Long Live the Chinese Communist Party. Indeed the leader of the protest movement whom later was elected village chief is a long serving member of the Party.

Beitarie: You rightly point out that liberal democracies have deep roots in Judeo-Christian thinking, a fact probably no one can deny. However, there are two points that bother me here: if I understand you correctly, you suggest China bases its model on its own ancient traditions, specifically Confucianism, yet the organization of the current Chinese regime is borrowed from the soviet union, and its stated ideology (in the Chinese constitution) is Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong’s thought. How does that add up?

A second point that you might help me understand is this: Though of course we should respect different cultures and they may influence different forms of governments, if you look into the forming texts of different cultures, you can find that many of the issues are, and always have been, quite similar. Confucius wrote against corruption and abuse of power by the rulers, issues that are evident in both the old testaments and the new one, as well as in the words of thinkers from other cultures. Many of the basic evaluations of what’s right or wrong are also remarkably similar in different cultures. Coincidentally, the issue of unchecked power, abuse of power, and official corruption is repeatedly being mentioned as an issue most ordinary Chinese are extremely bothered by. Could it be that some issues are universal and that there are some universal values, and that therefore different cultures can learn from each other or adopt systems that have been working elsewhere?

Li: The fallacy of the so-called universal values is that whenever they are pronounced they cover only the most base or the most abstract. We all want to eat when we are hungry and we want to mate to produce offspring -- very universal. But all animals are like that. What makes man different from animals is the former has culture, which is the foundation of values. And cultures are fundamentally incommensurate to each other, as they have been developed under vastly different conditions, including hard conditions such as geography and climate. On the abstract end, one can claim we all want certain things, such as dignity - who can argue against that? Sounds universal? Yes. But what dignity means not only can be different but also totally opposite among cultures. Someone from the Middle East does not need to be educated on the difference between the meaning of dignity between Jews and Muslims - many are willing to die to defend that difference. For Confucius, dignity of man is derived from the respect he accords to his position in a hierarchy of human relations. This, of course, is fundamentally opposite to what dignity means in the modern West. And yes, unchecked power is indeed wrong in Confucian values as it is in most other cultures. But the very definition of “unchecked power” and how to “check” it are so abstract that the similarity ends there. For example, in Confucian values, power is checked by the inherent moral order of society not by legal means relied upon by the Western tradition.

This is not to say that aspects of alien cultures cannot be imported and absorbed. Buddhism came into China from the outside and became a major feature of the Chinese civilization. The success or failure of such importation depends on how consistent it is with the fundamentals of the host cultures, whether in its original or adapted forms. Marxism found deep resonance in China’s Confucian egalitarianism and its modern features were much needed in China’s desperate attempt to modernize. As such, Marxism’s adapted forms have taken roots in modern China.

Beitarie: At the Aspen Institute you’ve mentioned Ai Weiwei and said he should have been imprisoned. I’ve interviewed Mr. Ai a couple of weeks ago. And when I was preparing these questions it struck me that you and he have quite a few shared biographical details: both from families who were persecuted in the revolutionary era, both were given the opportunity to go abroad at a young age, and you both chose to come back to China despite no doubt having other options. You have both also became successful and influential in your respective fields. What Ai told me he aims for, is actually not very different from what you advocate yourself. I quote from my interview with him: “I don’t ask for much. Just the freedom to create, and the freedom for everyone to say what they want”. Why is that a problem? If the Chinese model is valid and successful and right for China, why is it necessary to imprison its critics rather than debate with them in the same way you are debating ideas? You asserted that what you’ve learned from your time in the U.S. was pluralism and the space for debate, yet China seems to be limiting more and more the space for pluralistic debate within its own society. Do you think that’s wise by the rulers?

Li: The degree of pluralism and the space for debate should be calibrated by the conditions of a society at particular times. History will tell if China’s current degree and space are conducive to its long-term success.

“I don’t ask for much. Just the freedom to create, and the freedom for everyone to say what they want”. That, indeed, is simple enough of a statement. However, it is asking for much - too much. One fallacy in the modern Western political ideology is the so-called freedom of speech. It makes a presumption that speech, unlike acts, is harmless and therefore can and must be allowed absolute freedom - “the freedom for everyone to say what they want.” But of course nothing can be further from the truth grounded in thousands of years of human experience. Speech is act; and speech has been harmful to human society since time immemorial. In the West, one does not need to go further than 1933 to find an example of the power of speech by just one man, due to the unique circumstances of that particular time and place, causing death and destruction to millions. The prevailing cultural conditions are unique to different societies at different times. It is up to that society to determine the boundaries of speech and alter them as conditions change. Germany, for instance, due to its unique recent history, seems to believe the publication of Mein Kampf must not be allowed.

Contemporary China is experiencing social transformations of which the speed and scale are unprecedented in human history. Under such conditions the fragility of social stability can be easily disrupted by amplified speech. A responsible person, one would think, would consider the consequences of advocating everyone being free to say whatever he wants. An intelligent observer of human society and student of history ought to be more thoughtful than simply asking, “why is that a problem?”

Beitarie: As you might know, in my country, Israel, there is also a lively debate regarding the limits of democracy, with some groups saying the country shouldn’t be a democracy at all but should find its own model based on Jewish tradition. You can find the same line of thought in some Muslim countries that try to adopt modern version of Sharia law. Is this what you have in mind when you advocate for different cultures to find their own models? You said the Chinese model was un-exportable. Why?

Li: Cultures are fundamentally incommensurate to each other and that is why the Chinese model is not exportable, neither is the modern Western model. It is no accident that, with a few exceptions due to notably unique circumstances, electoral democracies have not been successful in bringing peace and prosperity to countries outside of the Judeo-Christian West. With all the elections that have been imposed on them by Western conquerors or their own elites, the vast number of countries in Africa and Asia are still mired in poverty and civil strife, causing untold sufferings to hundreds of millions. Perhaps the only thing that is exportable from the Chinese experience is that each culture must find its own path.

Beitarie: Can you elaborate a bit regarding your views on the events of spring 1989 in Beijing. In your New York Times op-ed you described that event as a “vast rebellion”. Was it really a rebellion rather than a civil protest? What would have been the consequences had the government acted differently at the time?

Li: Chinese society at that time could not have sustained the enormous and violent disruptions that would have come about if the disturbances were not ended decisively. It was a tragic event, as any that causes death of innocent and even well intentioned people. However, the alternatives would have been far worse - the possibility of a civil war comes to mind. On the contrary, the stability post 1989 has led to hundreds of millions people living better and freer lives than ever.

Follow-ons:

Beitarie: You stress the ability of the system to adapt and self-correct as an advantage of the Chinese model. However, many commentators claim that this ability has been seriously reduced since the days of Deng Xiaoping, who really put the country on a new course. For example, we see that the wealth gap is a serious cause of discontent and disharmony; yet this gap continues to widen. What more, if you look at mass incidents; their number has grown significantly in recent years, a problem recognized by China’s top leaders. Wouldn’t you agree that the Party has shown itself to be much more competent and zealous in cracking down on protests than on official corruption and abuse of power?

Li: No one, not least the CCP itself, disputes that corruption and the wealth gap are significant problems in China. But one needs to be thoughtful in analyzing the cause of such problems. Are they inherent to China’s political system or by products of the rapid change the country is going through? When America was going through its rapid and expansive industrialization a century and a half ago, the violence, wealth gap and corruption were worse than China today. Historical data is abundant. For anecdotal evidence one needs to go no further than Hollywood movies such as Gangs of New York and Let There Be Blood. A few families once controlled the lion’s share of the economy of the entire state of California.

Fast forward to the present, according to Transparency International (TI), the top 20 cleanest (least corrupt) places worldwide include only four non-Western polities: Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, and Qatar -- three of the four are authoritarian regimes; the same three are the only ones that belong to the developing world. By TI’s account, China (75) ranks higher than Greece (80), India (95), Philippines (129), Indonesia (100), Argentina (100) and many more, and barely below Italy (69) -- all electoral democracies. Apparently, China’s one-party system is less corrupt than electoral democracy in many countries.

If one steps back from ideological bias and examines actual data, both vertically and horizontally, perhaps one can see that the probability for China’s political system to over time resolve these by products of its rapid development is at least as good as any other country, regardless of political system, that is undergoing similar change.

Beitarie: You wrote that experiments in democracy outside of Western countries have mostly failed. Some of the most successful examples, though, can be found in China’s proximity, and in societies that also carry the Confucian ethos: Japan, South Korea and of course Taiwan, whose population is Chinese. Do you agree that those countries have relatively successful governance systems, and if so, what do you make of that?

Li: Most of the non-Western polities that achieved first-world status in the last half century did so under authoritarian regimes (Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea) or some form of one-party rule (Japan). In fact, the authoritarian regimes of these places were much more severe than that of today’s China. True, some of them have implemented electoral democracies after they became wealthy. But barely a generation has passed since they did so - is it not much too soon for any serious student of history and politics to render judgment on their outcomes?

One more thing needs to be said about those who seem so confident in their political ideology of liberal democracy. Ever since the onset of the 20th century, few things have caused more human suffering than historic determinism. Karl Marx mapped out what he claimed to be an inevitable path for human society ending at Communism. Those who implemented it with ideological fervor brought catastrophe to their peoples, the Chinese being among them. But history had its revenge and the Soviet empire went up in flames. China had, in practice, long since abandoned such grand end-of-history schemes. Now the world’s democrats seem to have taken on that same mantle, claiming the inevitability of liberal democracy as man’s paradise on earth. Their moral certitude rivals that of their Soviet predecessors. History may be repeating itself.

【原文链接】

以色列最大的日报头版发表的希伯来文版 http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3569820,00.html

赫芬顿邮报的原文链接 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-x-li/democracy-is-not-the-answ_b_1520172.html